Dynamic Full Ring Poker

by James Sweeney

  Well if a TAG used a wide range to isolate, say 22+/ATB, then he is using an 18% range. Some TAGs would isolate tighter, some looser, so 18% seemed like a nice even number to work with. Because a LRR was usually viewed as KK or AA trying to get tricky, an isolator would react in one of two ways:

  Fold everything but QQ+/AK. QQ+/AK makes up 2.6% of hands. So 2.6/18 = 14%, so we would expect a fold from him about 86% of the time. We probably wouldn’t be able to win postflop with a CB every time, but we gave ourselves a great range to get paid against if he called our LRR PF and we hit.

  Call all pairs to setmine. If he called with 22+/AK, that makes up 7.1% of hands. So 7.1/18 = 40%, so only 60% of his range is folding preflop to the LRR. We would probably be able to fold out a lot of his hands with good CBs, so we give ourselves added ways of winning the pot.

  So we have two logical happenings if we get isolated. We either win it often outright, or we give ourselves a chance to win it outright and get some extra profit from the CB. If we just looked at the play from a purely “if we get folds we win, if we get action we lose” point of view, we see that versus the range that folds a ton:

  This is a great ROI for our hand, even though it is greatly simplified and doesn’t take into consideration getting paid if we hit postflop versus a strong range, changing our LRR size, etc. All we see is that it makes a better ROI than the standard raise or fold line would.

  If I did open limp, would it seem odd?

  This was a big factor. When I create a new play I want to make sure that it blends in with my normal actions and doesn’t stand out or raise an eyebrow from players that are paying attention. I ultimately came to the conclusion that TAGs (in this game condition) weren’t paying enough attention to who the limper actually was, only that there was a limper and then a 3-bet back to them.

  After I ran through the math I started to consider the hand range I would use for this. I decided that I would select hands that would do best if they flatted my 3-bet and I had to play postflop. I also had to select a range of hands that would do well if I didn’t get isolated and had to play postflop in a limped pot (because remember, not every play will go according to plan). Because of this I decided to use a range of suited connectors, suited gappers, and some small pairs. I actually almost never used KK+ because I didn’t want to represent the hand I actually held, unless I thought a particular player would make big mistakes against it.

  There were quite a few things to consider with this play. It became more of a math problem due to the risk and the assumed C-Ranges. This was a great play until TAGs started to pay attention to who the limpers actually were and either limp behind or isolated larger with a less favorable range (forcing me to have to risk an even larger chunk of money to LRR). This play was able to work for awhile, but once the TAGs adjusted it wasn’t looking great. By the time the fish started isolating more (again, that “monkey see, monkey do” effect), the play was useless because fish don’t fold and it defeated the purpose of trying to inject value into a less valuable part of my range.

  The EP/MP 3-Bet

  There was once a time when players began to think and understand things. Almost overnight players began to understand how strong or weak perceived ranges were. However, players were unable to think a step further, which left an opportunity on the table.

  Many TAG players were using a standard opening range of 22+/AQ+/KQ from EP, and a slightly wider range from MP. They also understood that 3-bets versus a player who opened from EP or MP were usually with strong hands. Because of this, they were more apt to fold preflop versus a 3-bet, esp from OOP, given the perceived strength of the 3-bettor. This left some serious opportunity to those willing to do some simple math and risk a little money. Let’s explore some things I considered:

  What logical range are TAGs raising with?

  The average TAG range was looking like 22+/AQ+/KQ. That is 9.5% of hands. We’ll just use that as a baseline (of course sometimes it will be wider, especially from MP, but it makes the math simpler).

  What would they logically continue with versus a 3-bet?

  Players would usually combat the 3-bet in one of two ways. Only continue with strong hands (QQ+/AK), or setmine and continue with 22+/AK.

  QQ+/AK = 73% folds

  22+/AK = 25% folds

  We know that 25% folds is nowhere near enough, outright, to justify making 3-bets. But if they called with 22+/AK, understanding that my represented range is very strong, they were doing so to play “fit-or-fold” on the flop. So I had a chance of picking the pot up outright, or picking the pot up on the flop if they tried to setmine too often preflop versus my 3-bet. Of course, if I saw that a player had a Foldv3-bet of 85% from EP or MP, then I would 3-bet them every time until I thought they adjusted.

  Would they 4-bet or flat call?

  Of course we would prefer if they always flatted versus 4-betting. If they were only continuing with the QQ+/AK range, by 4-betting or folding, then we wouldn’t care as much because the 3-bet is outright profitable. But overall we would prefer if they flatted so we could hit a flop and play poker from there.

  My hand range?

  Because my range is perceived as super strong, I could use any two cards here. Again, I liked having either some equity (so suited connectors, suited gappers, suited trash, etc) or blocking hands were great. Having a hand like K7s or A4o was great as I blocked out the number of big hand combos he could continue with.

  Against players that were only continuing with the very top of their range, I would just 3-bet anything from LP (assuming there were no fish behind me). This allowed me to turn a lot of hands that should be losers in my database (76o, A4s, K9o, etc.) into winning hands. When the game became aware of how liberally aggressive TAGs and LAGs were 3-betting these situations, players started adjusting their EP/MP ranges (making them stronger and cutting out smaller pairs and such) and also 4-betting some of the bottom of their range. While this play still works in certain games and against certain players, it’s not nearly as profitable as it used to be.

  The Special CB

  There are times when a CB can do great or terrible things for us. This is actually a play I still use from time to time, when the parameters are correct for it. I’ll show an example. A TAG player raises from MP, I 3-bet KK on the button, and just the TAG calls. He checks on a flop of A94. Here, with certain information, I can breakaway from my default line of checking back to induce/minimize.

  If I know that the player wouldn’t make a mistake if I checked here, then my check isn’t all that great. Say he would never call a CB here with QQ or TT, and that he would never c/c later in the hand with unimproved pairs. Effectively, he would never pay me anything unless he sucks out, or he already has me beat. In this situation the $EV equation would like like this:

  Essentially, a check will put me on the bad side of the minimax game. I make nothing when I am ahead, and lose the most when I am behind (or get sucked out on). In this situation I would rather CB and pick up the pot than check. I close out his equity and take my pot, rather than just giving free cards when giving those free cards create no extra gain for me. Again, the CB breaks away from the default line of checking there to induce. While it isn’t a revolutionary play, it was created due to thinking about the situation, possible future situations, and weighing the $EV of each line.

  The Massive ISO

  There was a time when nits and TAGs were doing a lot of open limping with small pairs in an effort to setmine for cheap. When they would limp/call they tended to play fairly “set-or-jet” on the flop, which made for a very profitable opportunity. Here are some things I would consider:

  What are they open limping with?

  They were pretty much using two types of hands, small pairs and suited connectors. They wanted to get into the pot for cheap so they would limp and try to create a MW pot.

  Will they continue versus $X size?

  At this point in the game, many players were thinking that bigger sizes PF meant bigger hand
s. So if they saw a big isolation raise, they thought it was a hand that would offer them a lot in IO. The finesse of this situation was finding an isolation size that maximized overall $EV. If they would limp/call for 5bb, would they do it for 7bb? What about 9bb? Where did the calling stop and the folding begin?

  How will they handle postflop?

  Because they were limp/calling, especially from OOP, they were unlikely to get very aggressive postflop. They were tending to play very “set-or-jet” on the flop, so they would only continue with sets and fold whiffed setmines. On average they were just check/folding flops about 80% of the time.

  Will they continue versus $X CB?

  The sizing here is the crux of the whole play. Sure we could isolate for 4bb PF and CB for 7bb, but why not other sizes? If they are playing so fit-or-fold on the flop, why do I need to make a ⅔ PSB? Why couldn’t I use a ½ PSB? Why not a 2/5 PSB? How big could I go preflop, and small could I go on the flop, so that I could risk the least for the most profitable line? Of course there becomes a point when a CB could be too small (same as the isolation size could get to a point where it is too big), but so long as we keep it reasonable, we should see great results.

  At this point it became a total balancing act. Because I knew how he would react preflop (to an extent) and how he would react on the flop (to an extent), I knew I had the makings of a big play. So I simply ran through some math with the assumptions that my ISO always got called, he folded 80% of the time to a CB, and I never hit a hand nor made money if he called the CB. I tried running the play if I used a 6bb isolation and then a 6bb CB. This was netting me about 3.6bb/isolation, which is a great ROI. But then I tried an 8bb isolation and 7bb CB. This was netting me about 4.6bb/isolation. This is massive!

  I kept playing with the numbers until I had numbers that I liked. I ended up choosing a 7bb isolation and 6bb CB (for a 4.2bb/isolation ROI) because I felt those numbers would work the best without putting me in too much trouble. As for my hand selection, I didn’t need any. The play is outright profitable considering the parameters of that player type and the table. I could technically turn a 4.2bb return on any hand that I had in that situation. Of course, this play didn’t last more than a few months. Eventually nits and TAGs realized what was going on and started open raising rather than open limping with pairs. But, it was an amazingly profitable play while it was available.

  The Back-Raise

  There once was a man who wrote a very solid article on squeezing. This article was read by many, internalized by many, and just as importantly, used by many. It created a window of time when squeezing become the most popular play ever. Because of this, the TAGs and LAGs that had read this article began squeezing at super high frequencies. Of course, if a lot of players are doing one particular thing, it has to leave room for opportunity. So I decided to consider putting some extra back-raises into my play book. A back-raise is simply a spot where you call a raise, and then 4-bet over a 3-bet.

  What frequency are they squeezing at?

  Some players were starting to squeeze as high as 40% of the time. They were looking for every squeeze opportunity that didn’t have a fish involved, and they would run it aggressively.

  With what are they squeezing?

  If they are squeezing at such high frequencies it is unlikely that their range could possibly be very strong. This means that a large percentage of their squeeze range was going to be air.

  What would they put me on?

  Because I would be back-raising into thinking players, I would need to consider what I represent. If I just called the open-raise it looks like I probably have a setmining hand, so a paired range 22-QQ. Because of this, I am effectively “turning my hand face-up.” This gives them room to shove as a bluff in an effort to get me to fold my 44, or shove their “value” hands like AQ or TT because the pot was so massive and they thought there might be FE.

  This left opportunities to bluff, but also massive opportunities for value. What about instead of 3-betting AA or KK myself, I just called and let one of the TAGs behind me squeeze? I give him the chance to put in a ton of money badly, make a lot of mistakes, and let others possibly misinterpret the information allowing for a possibly huge pot. Say he is squeezing at 30%, and squeezes up to 14bb. That means I give myself a chance to make an outright extra 4.2bb per aggressive squeezer behind me (before I even consider things like him bluff shipping his stack over my back-raise, him using a bigger size, him squeezing me more liberally, him overvaluing TT, etc.). This also doesn’t even include the times that a player squeezes and then the original raiser calls.

  Of course, by flatting the open-raise here I did run the risk of the pot going very MW, or going HU with the original raiser and playing a much deeper SPR pot. However, every play comes with risk, so I just adjusted and played whatever situation would arise. This play was super profitable as long as it lasted (which wasn’t long sadly). It took advantage of a group-think idea that was executed without a plan on facing a back-raise. These kinds of plays are actually readily available if you pay attention to the latest strategic articles and videos released amongst the poker communities.

  The Draw And CR

  In exploring the resteal and CB part of my game, I noticed a few things that lead me to this play. For one, I was getting my resteals called a bit more liberally, lowering my success rate from something like 80% to 70%. I also noticed that players were starting to peel flops a little more liberally (not folding TT religiously on a Q high board, calling AK high sometimes, etc.). Because of this I started to stop CBing every time with my whiffed hands and noticed that my opponents almost always bet when I checked to them.

  I was trying to figure out how to use all of this information, as it is a lot to process. In doing that, I noticed that most of my resteal range at the time was suited stuff, especially suited junk like 8d4d and Ac5c. I also noticed that when I caught a FD with these hands it was incredibly difficult to play well. If I CB and they peeled, I was in a very tough spot on the turn when I bricked my draw. If I checked the flop rather than CB they would bet a ton of the time at me. Then a light bulb went off, what if I started to check/raise FDs rather than CB them?

  Take a normal spot where where the BUT opened for $3, I 3-bet to $10 with 7h5h, and he called. The flop is Th6d2h. I looked at my options:

  Bet. If I bet I was expecting to get called often. I would only improve on the turn about 18% of the time, making for a very difficult spot 82% of the time when I bricked. I could bet the flop and bet the turn, but I had no idea if that play would be profitable without information on how he would respond to turn bets (does he get sticky with a hand like JJ or 99? Does he ever bluff turns? Etc.)

  Check. If I checked I could expect a bet almost always. Check/folding all of this equity seemed silly, and check/calling would make the turn really difficult to play without initiative and still bricking about 82% of the time. So if I were to check I would have to either check/call a small bet (which probably wasn’t happening often), check/fold to a massive bet which didn’t offer direct pot odds, or check/raise.

  I ran the math on a check/shove I saw that with 35% estimated equity I would need a fold from my opponent 29% of the time to breakeven. When I looked at how often a logical flatting range of 99+/AQ+ hits this board, it’s about 41%. So he misses about 60% of the time (I think his O-Range is the whole 99+/AQ+ range because I think he would CB his whole range if I check to him), meaning I make snap profit on my ship. But what if I made a smaller CR which would blend in with the times I had a real hand? Maybe I could do a CR up to like $33? This would do a lot of things.

  First, it would give me a CR range. Usually in these spots I would just check/fold or bet/feel. So having a CR range gives me a chance to veer away from my standard lines. Two, however he reacts is great for me. If he folds, I made snap profit and I know I have a possible bluffing opportunity I can use in the future. If he calls, I know he isn’t folding to this CR and thus I should CR these spots in the future with big pair
s and other nuttish hands. If he shoves, I get to see what his stack off range is which will let me play this spot more perfectly in the future. No matter what the outcome is, I get information that will help me later against this opponent. Plus, there is no better feeling than getting it AI versus QQ here and spiking the flush!

  The Database Adjustment

  Our database (DB) is a goldmine of data. Not only do we have information on our opponents, but just as importantly we have information on ourselves. We should be continuously going through our DB to see how certain actions and lines are profiting for us. Here are some things I like to check in the DB:

  How are parts of my range performing from different positions?

  Because preflop is so important, I check a ton of PF things when looking through my DB. I run filters to see how certain parts of my range are performing. How is AJ/AQ doing from MP? Is it positive? If not, why? Was it variance or am I misplaying hands? Am I getting 3-bet too liberally to justify opening it in the first place? I do the same thing with things like 22-66, 77-99, 54s-JTs, etc. to see if I should delete things from my opening range. I have no problem tightening up when I can see that X or Y isn’t making me money.