Spying on the World

by Richard J Aldrich

55. At first sight, it appeared to us anomalous that permanent Interception stations should be maintained separately by the three Services, the Radio Security service and the Post Office. We understand, however, that the requirements of the three Services differ so greatly, and the technique involved varies so much, that any proposal to provide a single interception service for all users would fail to secure support. None the less, the fact that the Radio Security Service does attempt to cover for its purposes the whole field of interception, leads us to believe that there is an area of common interest in which the specialised techniques of the Services should not be concerned. We are not qualified, nor have we had the time to make sufficient study, to express a firm opinion on this matter, but we believe that there is a sufficient prima facie case for a separate enquiry to be justified into the possibilities of economy in this direction.

  The Special Operations Executive .

  56. The Special Operations Executive, during the period before it was placed under the operational control of the several Theatre Commanders, had to build up a considerable intelligence organisation of its own. This was the inevitable result of its separate existence. Moreover, since it is an organisation which employs agents, it is natural that a considerable flow of intelligence from foreign countries has found its way into S.O.E. headquarters. Arrangements are made for this information to be available for other organisations, but only on condition that it is distributed to those organisations by S.I.S. This is a sound arrangement under existing conditions, since only thus can a check be put upon the information by the wider intelligence resources of the latter organisation. Despite the real contribution that S.O.E. has made during this war, we cannot believe that the experiment of running special operations as a separate military function outside the direct control of the Chiefs of Staff and under the direction of a non-service Minister, will be repeated. We understand that it is likely to be proposed that the nucleus of a Special Operations Organisation should be maintained within S.I.S. With this proposal we cordially agree. The intelligence requirements of those responsible for special operations in any future war should, we feel sure, be met in the same way as the intelligence requirements of any other body engaged in military operations.

  Communications .

  57. The present Secret Communications Organisation dates back only to 1938, and first took the form of linking up the London headquarters of S.I.S. with its chief representatives abroad by a special wireless network. At the same time the foundations were laid of an organisation for designing and producing wireless transmitting and receiving sets for the special purposes of S.I.S. The history of the subsequent development of the Special Communications Organisation is fascinating, but it would be out of place in this report to do more than indicate its present responsibilities. These may be summarised as follows:-

  (a) Direct Communications — Machinery exists to-day not only for communication with the fixed branch establishments of S.I.S. in different parts of the world, but also for communication with many S.I.S. agents equipped with light portable sets capable of the requisite range. At the terminal points of the main line system to the branch offices of S.I.S. further networks radiate to sub-stations operated by agents.

  (b) Interception — This is the function of the Radio Security Service, which is dealt with separately below.

  (c) Distribution to Theatre Commanders, &c . — It will be evident that much of the value of the product of the Government Code and Cypher School would have been lost were it not possible to transmit it by most rapid means and under conditions of the highest secrecy to Theatre Commanders. Moreover, when military operations are unsuccessful, the normal signal communications of armies in the field may collapse, as occurred at the time of the fall of France. Therefore, it was found necessary to set up a channel for conveying urgent operational intelligence to the fighting commanders by special channels of communication. The system has reached a high degree of efficiency, and has the added advantage of providing a specially secret signals link for certain communications by the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff, &c.

  (d) Production — Nearly all the equipment used by the Special Communications Organisation is designed, developed and produced within the organisation itself, and the results achieved have been impressive. At the same time it is to be noted that the S.O.E. have carried out a similar policy of designing and manufacturing their own communications equipment. While we recognise that in communications with agents S.I.S. are concerned more in the provision of efficient receivers and S.O.E. in the provision of efficient transmitters, we doubt whether the country is so rich in technicians and qualified artisans as to be able to afford this division of effort. In the Services, the Signals Directorates are, for good reasons, not controlled by the Directors of Intelligence. Therefore, it might be difficult under existing arrangements to bring about a complete centralisation of research, development and production of radio equipment. We do feel, however, that consideration should be given in future to means of devising economies in this direction.

  (e) “Black” Broadcasting — The Special Communications Organisation provides, maintains and operates the equipment with which the Political Warfare Executive carries out a large part of its distribution of propaganda. The technique of conveying the illusion that broadcasts in fact made from this country are made from stations established in enemy, or enemy-occupied country, has reached a high degree of efficiency. We have not yet seen the full capability of this technique. The very high-powered transmitter that is used for certain “black” broadcasts may before the end of the war play an important part by carrying out the “intruder” operation known as “Aspidistra.” It is hard to see how use can be made of this technique in peace-time, but its value in this war has in our opinion been sufficiently proved for it to be right that the Secret Communications Organisation should continue research in this field and should make preparations in peace to enable it to carry out similar responsibilities in any future war or international emergency.

  The Radio Security Service .

  58. The organisation from which the Radio Security Service has grown was originally established to act as policemen of the air to detect illicit wireless communication. In developing our own secret communications channels, experience was gained which showed the need for a protective security organisation to ensure that the messages passed over these channels did not become compromised. Now the Radio Security Service is responsible for a general inter-service scrutiny of wireless traffic to cover all communications not covered by the other “Y” Services. In particular, the Service intercepts and passes to the Government Code and Cypher School, which interprets and distributes a mass of valuable information originating from the enemy secret services. The knowledge that has been acquired by R.S.S. of methods of identification of signals traffic by characteristics of procedure and technique is now considerable, and has made a valuable contribution to intelligence and to the work of interpretation of intercepted communications generally. The experience that has been gained must not be lost, and the technique must in peace, as in war, continue to develop.

  V.—The Post-War Intelligence Organisation .

  59. In paragraph 13 above, we gave an outline of the characteristics which our post-war intelligence organisation should, in our opinion, display. The proposal which we now put forward is designed to create an organisation possessed of those characteristics. At the head of the organisation and directing its general policy we propose should be the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. The J.I.C. should remain directly responsible to the Chiefs of Staff, though we think that the practice that has grown up, of the Committee giving advice on request to other Departments and authorities, should be preserved. Under the J.I.C. we propose that there should be a system of standing sub-committees dealing with all the various aspects of intelligence. We think it essential that all the intelligence authorities should be brought under the J.I.C. umbrella. In addition to these sub-committees, we propose the establishment of a Joint Intellig
ence Bureau. Into this bureau should be fed information from all existing intelligence sources. Within the bureau, this information should be brought together and reproduced in the form required by the different customers of the intelligence machine. We have in mind that each intelligence-producing organisation should continue to collect intelligence from its own sources, but should not normally receive intelligence from other Departments or organisations save through the medium of the Central Bureau.

  60. In peace-time, a certain limited amount of officially acquired intelligence is made available to the general public either in the form of official publications, such as the commercial reports issued by the Department of Overseas Trade, or in answer to direct enquiries generally addressed to that Department by particular commercial firms. We believe that there is scope for a considerable extension of this practice. It is evident that the revival of our export trade after the war will be as difficult as it is important. It is no part of our responsibility to make recommendations to this end, but we believe that we can serve both the interests of defence and the wider economic interests of this country in peace-time by providing a comprehensive intelligence agency. Even in war, much of the information which is of value to the Foreign Office and the Defence Services is in no way secret. We propose, therefore, that the Central Intelligence Bureau should be available, not only to Government Departments and agencies, but also to the general public. While its services, like those of any other Government agency, would be provided free of cost to official customers, there is no reason why members of the public making use of it should not pay for its services. His Majesty’s Stationery Office make a charge for their publications, as does the Ordnance Survey for those of its maps that are made publicly available. This proposal would have a twofold advantage. In the first place, as has been said, it should provide trade and industry with much information which should assist them in their normal business. Secondly, it should provide a revenue which should assist the Defence organisation in meeting its expenditure on intelligence.

  61. We fully recognise that no Department or Service can absolve itself from direct responsibility for the technical assessment of the intelligence relating directly to its own constitutional responsibilities. We are satisfied, however, that there is a wide field of common interest where it should be possible to avoid duplication of effort. This field covers some highly secret matters as well as a large area of matters which are hardly, if at all, secret.

  62. If the J.I.C. is to take over the responsibility for the direction of the kind of organisation that we have outlined above, it may be that its constitution should be to some extent modified. In particular, the Board of Trade should, we think, at any rate in peace be represented. In any case, the Foreign Office, “C” and the Directors of Intelligence must clearly continue to be members. Separate representation on the J.I.C. of the Economic Intelligence Organisation within the Foreign Office should not, in our opinion, be necessary. Representation of the Security Service must evidently be a matter to be decided in the light of the decisions taken on the future of that body.

  63. A committee as large as the J.I.C., while competent to lay down policy, is evidently unsuited to the day-to-day administration of a large organisation. This task requires the whole time services of a single individual aided by a competent departmental staff. Here a special difficulty confronts us. We have little doubt but that the best arrangement would be for “C,” who is the head of S.I.S. and G.C. and C.S., the Chairman of the S.I.G.I.N.T. Board and the ultimate head of the Special Communications Organisation, to accept responsibility for the direction of the new Central Intelligence machine. Since the Central Bureau will, if our recommendations are accepted, be the principal clearing house for the product of “C’s” organisations, it would, in our opinion, be both administratively convenient and correct from the point of view of security for “C” to be in charge. At the same time, “C” for obvious reasons may not be a public figure, known to the world at large. Perhaps it would be possible to arrange for a deputy to be appointed to “C,” who would be responsible to him for the public side of his activities, but would bear a title which would not disclose to the outside world that he was a subordinate. In the following paragraphs we refer to the head of the organisation as the “Director-General.” We propose that the Director-General and, in his absence, his deputy, should be ex-officio members not only of the J.I.C., but of all its various sub-committees, though it should not be necessary for them to attend all subcommittee meetings. The Director-General would have the services of a permanent secretariat common to the J.I.C. and its sub-committees. The secretariat should be responsible, under the Director-General, for ensuring the co-ordination of the activities of the different branches of the national intelligence machine. The subcommittees we have in mind are the following, but the list is not intended to be exclusive. Moreover, there should be power to establish ad hoc sub-committees when need arises.

  The S.I.G.I.N.T. Board .

  64. This Board should be composed as at present, but its responsibility should cover not only G.C. and C.S., but also Special Communications and R.S.S., and ensure coordination between them. Should it, in future, be found possible to bring about some further integration of the “Y” Services, it would be proper that it should be under the Board.

  Joint Intelligence Staff .

  65. We have in mind that a Joint Intelligence Staff should exist as at present to draft strategic intelligence appreciations for the J.I.C. and to advise the Planning Staffs. Its members would take their instructions, as at present, from their own Ministries.

  Joint Technical Intelligence Committee .

  66. We propose that there should, in future, be established a permanent committee representative of the technical sections of the three Service Departments, which should be responsible for giving joint advice on foreign technical developments in the defence field to the Planning Staffs and the research and development organisations working under the Chiefs of Staff. In the light of experience it could be decided whether this committee should itself be served by a whole-time inter-service staff on the lines of the Joint Intelligence Staff.

  Security Committee .

  67. This Committee as its name implies, would advise the J.I.C. on all questions of military security in peace, and form the nucleus for the war-time Inter-Service Security Board. We propose that it should have sufficient contacts with the remainder of the Government machine for it to be unnecessary at any future date to re-establish anything on the lines of the Security Executive.

  Photographic Reconnaissance Committee .

  68. This Committee should, under the J.I.C., be responsible for the policy direction of aerial photographic reconnaissance and for the production, interpretation and distribution of aerial photographs. If it is agreed that a special air communications service can properly be run by the Intelligence Organisation, its policy direction should be in the hands of this sub-committee.

  War Planning Committee .

  69. We contemplate that a sub-committee with a small staff should be charged with planning and making all preparations for the expansion and modification of the intelligence machine that would be required for war. Such war-time needs as censorship and political warfare intelligence should be catered for by this sub-committee.

  General Intelligence Requirements Committee .

  70. This sub-committee’s task would be to lay down the priorities to be accorded to the nation’s “intelligence effort,” to co-ordinate the work of the different collecting agencies, to allot responsibilities between those agencies and to exercise general supervision over the Central Intelligence Bureau described below.

  The Central Intelligence Bureau

  71. We propose that the inter-service, inter-departmental intelligence organisations, such as the Postal and Telegraph Censorship, I.S.T.D. and the intelligence side of P.W.E., should find their home in peace-time in the Central Bureau, which should be so constituted as to permit of their expansion in time of
war to fulfil their full functions. It would be wrong to attempt to produce a detailed blue-print at this stage, of the bureau, but there may be advantage in providing a rough outline. We have in mind that the bureau should be organised on the lines of the Information and Records Branch of the Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department. That is to say that it should provide machinery, through liaison sections staffed by the consumer Departments, for conveying the needs of the consumers to the bureau, who would be responsible for ensuring that the information was collected by the agency best fitted to collect it. The bureau would also be responsible for ensuring that the material it produced was distributed to all those with a legitimate interest in it. The bureau should be divided into two parts, one of which would deal with secret information, and the other with information that is not secret. It is suggested that in both its secret and its non-secret parts the bureau should be organised both by geographical areas and by subjects. We have in mind that information required as a basis of high policy by, for example, the Foreign Office or the Chiefs of Staff should be collected and collated in the first instance in the non-secret branch of the bureau. It should then be tested in the light of any secret information that is available. The next stage, if appropriate for inter-service or inter-departmental assessment, would be for the material to be dealt with by the Joint Intelligence Staff, and the final assessment would be made by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee itself. The bureau would be responsible for providing in the shape of memoranda or reference books such factual information as was required. It will be for Departments to determine how far they will wish to maintain their own collating and appreciating machinery once the Central Bureau has been established. We believe that if our recommendation is accepted, the central machine will sufficiently justify itself to encourage Departments to refrain from duplicating its work.

  72. Our proposals are illustrated in the Chart attached to this report (Annex B).