Spying on the World

by Richard J Aldrich

  3 . JIC(45)265(0)(Final), ‘Post-War Organisation of Intelligence’, 7 September 1945, TNA: CAB 81/130.

  4 . Misc/P(47)31, ‘Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947’, 6 November 1947, TNA: CAB 163/7.

  5 . DO(48)21, ‘Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee’, 24 February 1948, TNA: CAB 131/6.

  5

  ORIGINS OF THE SOVIET THREAT

  O NE OF THE lessons the JIC had learnt from pre-war intelligence was the importance of careful planning. Halfway through the war, therefore, the committee engaged in nascent efforts to gauge the nature of the post-war world. In fact the JIC was not alone in Whitehall in doing this; both the Foreign Office and the military did likewise. There was consensus that the fate and role of the Soviet Union would be of paramount importance, yet there was little agreement about what this would entail. In many ways the questions were simple – whether the Soviet Union was likely to continue to be an ally of the West and whether coexistence would be possible – but the answers were anything but straightforward.

  Within Whitehall a wealth of different organisations were created from 1943 onwards, designed to look towards the post-war world. The difficulty underpinning them was the polar positions occupied by the FO and the military: in simple terms the former did not appreciate the idea of making plans against a current ally, whilst the latter thought that the wartime rapprochement was a temporary aberration, and once war was over the alliance would crumble. As the strategic assessment body of His Majesty’s Government, the JIC should have provided a voice into this maelstrom. Its involvement, however, was limited. Why this was so is, at a glance, odd; certainly the JIC’s wartime Chairman and Secretary were aware of the opposing positions. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the able wartime Chairman, did attempt to smooth over the cracks between his FO and military colleagues, but the positions were too entrenched.

  What did the JIC forecast? The paper reproduced below is from December 1944. It is an extraordinary paper, as is evident from its title: ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions from the Point of View of Her Security’. Here was a unique attempt to consider how the world looked from the vantage point of the Kremlin. At the outset the JIC conceded that ‘any study … must be speculative as we have little evidence’. Despite this it was given an unusually high classification with a specially restricted circulation. The paper concluded that whilst

  Russia will not, in our opinion, follow an aggressive policy of territorial expansion, her suspicion of British and American policy will nevertheless continue to cause difficulty as will also her tactlessness in the handling of international affairs. Accordingly Russia’s relations with the British Empire and the United States will depend very largely on the ability of each side to convince the other of the sincerity of its desire for collaboration. 1

  The report was also hugely detailed. It provided information on Russian economic production, fuel, power and industry; but also its intentions towards Scandinavian and Baltic states, Germany, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece, in addition to the Western powers, the Black Sea region, the Middle East and the Far East. Summarising the conclusions, the JIC stated that Russia’s primary policy would be directed towards ‘achieving the greatest possible measure of security’. To achieve this, ‘Russia will … draw the States lying along her borders, and particularly those in Europe, into her strategic system’. Overall the report was sensible and offered a balanced assessment, but it did little to help settle debate.

  Within Whitehall the arguments were vicious and acrimonious but events, fortuitously, intervened. Concern over Russian troop movements towards the Caucasus in late 1945 and in Persia in early 1946, together with Frank Roberts’s telegrams from the embassy in Moscow, convinced many that the FO view had been incorrect. An updated JIC paper at this time – March 1946 – repeated many of its wartime conclusions but emphasised the Russian fear of attack, the necessity to create a ‘belt of satellite States with governments subservient to their policy’ and, crucially, that Russian policy will be ‘aggressive by all means short of war’, and that consequently, ‘attention should be drawn to the dangers inherent in Russian policy as we see it’. 2 The assessment was approved by both the FO and the Chiefs of Staff Committee and it was forwarded to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. By the summer of 1946 there was widespread support, particularly in the FO, that the JIC was the place to prepare judgements on Russian actions. 3 Perspectives were certainly hardening and in the aftermath of the Persian crisis that spring, when Moscow refused to remove troops as had previously been agreed, the JIC wrote that ‘the Soviet Union will take every opportunity to foment anti-British feeling and to reduce British influence throughout the Arab world, and will ultimately hope to supplant it’. 4

  In London the anti-Soviet faction was clearly in the ascendant. Even the most sceptical of FO advisers had become convinced of the need to coordinate policy against the Russians. Such views were supported by concern over the fate of Turkey and Greece – countries, it was believed, that were firmly in Moscow’s sights. In the summer of 1947, following the announcement a few months earlier of the ‘Truman Doctrine’, the American pledge to support ‘subjugated’ people worldwide, the JIC set itself the task of producing a fresh assessment of Soviet actions. This time it would be based on two overarching questions: what was Russia trying to do and how far was she capable of doing it? The answer to the first question was clear: ‘The Soviet leaders are inspired by the conviction that it is their long-term task to hasten the elimination of capitalism in all parts of the world.’ This was not based on any hard intelligence, but rather on a reading of the ‘published maxims of Lenin and Stalin’.

  The issue then, as the JIC posed implicitly in its second question, was: how was this to be achieved? With a pressing need to reconstruct the Soviet economy, it was felt that Russian policy would strive towards dependence on its own natural resources, and that until this was achieved Stalin would attempt to avoid war whilst continuing to establish a ‘protective belt’ around his borders and through the ‘continued aggressive promotion of communism’. Thus, taking everything into account, it was unlikely that war would occur before 1955–60. 5 The consequences of this assessment were long lived. Discussions in the JIC in late 1947, for instance, centred on what might propel the Soviet Union into war before this period. 6 The COS and the FO were both, by now, avid readers of these JIC assessments. Ultimately, however, it would be events, rather than the JIC’s assessments, that brought about a change in governmental thinking.

  THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERMENT

  Printed for the War Cabinet. December 1944.

  The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of TOP SECRET Copy No. 32

  J.I.C.(44)467(O)(Final.) RESTRICTED CIRCULATION

  18th December , 1944

  Circulated for the consideration for the Chiefs of Staff

  WAR CABINET.

  Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee.

  RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND INTENTIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF HER SECURITY. REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE.

  IN this paper we consider Russia’s strategic interests in the period after the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, from the point of view of her security. We also consider the policy that Russia may be intending to pursue in the post-war period in supporting her interests. We examine in detail, in an Annex, Russia’s strategic interests and policy in various countries. We have assumed that the depth of defence needed for the adequate deployment of air defences will not be greatly different from what it is to-day. We do not take account of forms of warfare not at present in use.

  2. We must emphasise that any study of Russia’s strategic interests and policy must be speculative as we have little evidence to show what view Russia herself takes of her strategic interests or what policy she intends to pursue. Moreover, Russian policy at present depends very largely on the decisions of
Marshal Stalin; he is over 65 and it is impossible to predict what changes in the internal and foreign policies of Russia might follow his removal from the scene. We report as follows:-

  3. Russia after the war will present a phenomenon new in modern history, a land empire containing within its frontiers a large, youthful and rapidly expanding population, nearly all the raw materials essential for an adequate war economy, and an industry capable of supporting in the field armies substantially larger than those of any other Power in Europe. In addition to this Russia’s immense size and the distribution of her natural resources give her great advantages in depth of defence and dispersal of economically important targets; the only exceptions are the Caucasus oilfields, the coal, iron and industries of the Ukraine and, of lesser economic importance, the industrial areas of Moscow and Leningrad. Even these areas are far less vulnerable to attack than the corresponding areas in any other country in Europe.

  4. Russia has already shown that she can make good military use of these natural resources. Although her level of technical efficiency is still below that of the most advanced modern Powers, she has proved her capacity to deploy and maintain in the field very large forces and to defeat immensely powerful German armies. Russia’s technical and military efficiency are likely to increase; it is probable that there will be an improvement in the general standard of education and that technical training will be further developed, which will tend to raise the level of technical efficiency; similarly, the growth of a military tradition based on the experience gained in the present war is likely to bring about an improvement in Russia’s military efficiency.

  5. If, as we expect, no violent political upheaval takes place in Russia after the war, the military and economic development of the country will continue without serious disturbance, not perhaps at the exceptional intensity of the years before this war, but at least on an upward curve. Russia will contain within her own frontiers such military and economic resources as would enable her to face without serious defeat even a combination of the major European Powers. It is true that Russia will probably want to import considerable quantities of oil, but her object would be to conserve her own internal resources and to facilitate industrial expansion and the development of road transport. Since Russian oil production in 1950 may be as high as 50 million tons, these additional imports could, if necessary, be dispensed with in time of war.

  6. Russia could, therefore, with much less risk than any other Power in Europe, pursue a policy of isolation and rely exclusively on her own military strength to protect her against aggression. For reasons of geography and communications a serious threat to Russia’s security can only be mounted across Russia’s western frontier between the Baltic and the Carpathians; in all other directions considerations of terrain or communications make it impossible to deploy sufficient forces to challenge the Russian armies or involve advances of many hundreds of miles before strategically or economically important areas can be reached. Russia can therefore concentrate her immense strength very largely on the defence of her Western frontier.

  7. Russia’s desire for absolute security will, however, be very great. There is little doubt that the Russian Government is determined to raise the standard of living of the Russian people to something approaching that of the Western Powers; the fact that by the end of this war a large number of Russian soldiers will have had personal experience of the greater comfort available to the countries of the West will give a great impetus to this determination. Much of the industry of European Russia has been devastated; if the desired improvement of the standard of living is to be achieved, not only will the devastated areas have to be restored, but also there will have to be a great deal of fresh industrial and agricultural development. A programme of this size will require a long period of peace, and it would be considerably speeded up if Russia could import industrial equipment from abroad and exact large reparations deliveries from Germany.

  8. Russia, therefore, will not be prepared to take any chances, and however small may be the risk of aggression, particularly in the period immediately after the war, she will seek to build up a system of security outside her frontiers in order to make sure, so far as is humanly possible, that she is left in peace and that her development is never again imperilled by the appalling devastation and misery of wars such as she has twice experienced within a generation.

  9. With this end in view Russia will at least experiment with a policy of collaboration with the British Empire and the United States. She will consider it natural that world affairs should be largely regulated by these three Powers and she will tend to took on any world security organisation as a from of Grand Alliance through which this triumvirate will be able to settle the disputes of the lesser Powers. She will not regard a world security organisation as a suitable body to settle serious disputes between the three great Powers themselves, since she will argue that if they fall out the foundation of world security will have been destroyed.

  10. While Russia will be prepared to join a world security organisation, if its aims are in line with her conception of its proper functions, she will insure against the failure of such an organisation by building up along her frontiers a system of buffer States closely linked with her and by destroying for the longest possible period the power of aggression of Germany and Japan. Thus in Europe, Russia will regard Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia as forming her protective screen. She will, however, probably regard Norway and Greece as being outside her sphere so long as she is satisfied with British collaboration. She will wish to dominate the Black Sea and to be able effectively to control the passage of warships through the Straits. In the Middle East she will want to control North Persia. In the Far East, apart from the acquisition of Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles, she will try to get some form of control over Manchuria before 1904, which gave her control of Dairen and Port Arthur and of the lines of communication running to them.

  11. Russia will tend to regard these territories as falling naturally within her special sphere of interest and will not admit that there could be any conflict between such a national security system and a world security organisation. Russia will hope that the creation of such a protective screen will ensure that if at any time a combination of hostile Powers should seek to challenge her, the first shock of aggression would be taken so far as possible outside Russia’s borders. Such a system would also add depth to Russia’s defences, give greater time for mobilisation, increase the chance that the fighting would not take place on Russian soil and deny to the enemy the support of neighbouring States. She will wish to import oil from Roumania and possibly coal from Poland. She will also wish to prevent Germany from making use of the heavy industries of Silesia or importing oil from Roumania. Russia’s relations with the States concerned will be affected by the practical possibility of exercising control over them, by their strategic importance and by the extent to which Russia feels that she can rely on the sincere collaboration of the local government and on the sympathy of the people as a whole. Generally speaking, Russia will wish to occupy in the strategically important countries along her frontiers a position rather similar to that of Great Britain in Egypt; that is to say, Russia will allow these countries independence so long as she is in a position to ensure that they pursue a policy that tends to protect her strategic interests.

  12. Outside this bastion of associated Powers Russia will do her utmost to make certain that Germany and Japan are for longest possible time rendered incapable of aggression. As stated above, a serious threat to the security of Russia as a whole can in practice only be mounted across her western frontier between the Baltic and the Carpathians. This would involve the use of German territory and for this reason it will be the keystone of Russia’s post-war policy to ensure that Germany is kept weak. Russia will favour the military and economic disarmament of Germany and perhaps her political dismemberment; she will attach importance to blasting the economic bases of Germany�
��s military power. As part of the policy of dominating Germany, Russia will look to the Western Powers and particularly to Great Britain and France to act as the other side of the ring round Germany and she will regard as the acid tests of the sincerity of their collaboration their determination to make and keep Germany weak. Russia would regard as a potential menace to her security any trend towards a reconciliation between the Western Powers and Germany. If events took such a turn, Russia might seek to outbid the Western Powers and thereby win Germany over to her side; alternatively, if Russia feared that Germany was joining a potentially hostile combination against her, she might launch a preventive war on Germany.

  13. Though Japan could not be so serious a menace to Russia as Germany, Russia will nevertheless wish to make sure that if she was to fight a war in Europe, she will be able to do so without the threat of Japanese aggression in her rear. She will therefore favour the strict demilitarisation of Japan and control over her economy. Russia will hope that the control she will secure over the resources of Manchuria and Korea will not only enable her to develop her Far Eastern territories and so greatly increase her military strength there, but also make it difficult for Japan, cut off from these resources, to build up an adequate war economy.

  Conclusion.

  14. In the period after the war Russia’s policy will be directed primarily towards achieving the greatest possible measure of security. She will not regard as sufficient even the security inherent in her vast size and great resources in men and materials, but will wish to take every possible precaution against being again invaded, however small the risk may seem to be. Russia has a further reason for seeking security: she will wish to raise the standard of living of her people to something more nearly approaching that of the Western Powers. To achieve this she will need a prolonged period of peace in which to restore the devastated areas and, in addition, to develop her industry and agriculture. Particularly in the years immediately after the war this programme of internal development would be greatly faciliated if Russia could import industrial equipment.