34. Russia considers that Poland’s eastern frontier should run along the Curzon Line, leaving Vilna and Lvov in Russian hands. As compensation she is prepared to give Poland a large slice of Germany as far west as the Oder and East Prussia, with the exception of Königsberg and perhaps Tilsit. With East Prussia thus removed from German control, a frontier along the Curzon Line would, so long as Germany is kept weak and Poland is co-operative, adequately safeguard Russia’s strategic interests between the Baltic and the Carpathians. The extent to which Russia will be prepared to allow Poland relative independence within these frontiers will largely be governed by how far she feels that she can rely on Poland’s collaboration. For so long, however as Russia is not satisfied that Poland is willing to pursue a policy of collaboration Polish independence is likely to be more nominal than real.
35. In the period immediately after the war Russian forces will be in occupation of eastern Germany and the Russians will certainly insist on maintaining troops and air bases on their lines of communication through Poland. How soon, if ever, these troops will be withdrawn will depend on Russia’s appreciation of Polish readiness to collaborate, particularly in measures for common action to meet any threat to Russia’s western frontier.
Balkans.
36. South of the Carpathians the best defensive line would run along the Carpathians to the Galatz Gap and thence along the Danube estuary. The threat from this direction is not, however, as great as north of the Carpathians. Russia will have a strategic interest in ensuring that Roumania shall not be hostile and thus a potential base for attack. Moreover, although it would be an advantage to Russia’s economy to have the Roumanian oilfields, it would not be essential in time of war. On balance, we think that it will not be necessary for Russia, who will certainly exercise very great influence in all the Balkan countries except perhaps Greece, to hold a frontier further west than the 1940 frontier along the line of the Pruth.
37. Roumania .—Russia will probably be prepared to leave Roumania nominally independent, but will exercise close control over her. She will probably also maintain bases in Roumania and try to secure some form of control over the disposal of Roumanian oil. Having this control over Roumania, Russia will be satisfied with a frontier along the Pruth, leaving Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in Russian hands. Russia will also favour the return to Roumania of at least the greater part of the territories ceded to Hungary under the Vienna award.
38. Bulgaria .—Russia will similarly control Bulgaria but here the control is likely to be more indirect, both because there is much less to be got out of Bulgaria economically and because the Russians can rely on the generally pro-Russian attitude of the Bulgarian people. Russia has so far refuted any Bulgarian claims to Greek Thrace.
39. Yugoslavia .—Russia’s interest in Yugoslavia will be less than her interest in Roumania and Bulgaria, but she will nevertheless wish to have considerable influence in Yugoslavia, particularly in view of the possible future relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
40. Greece.—Russia has stated that she regards Greece as being within the British sphere of interest. She did not occupy Salonika when she was in a position to do so and we see no reason why in the post-war years she should depart from this policy so long as she is satisfied with British collaboration. This statement of Russian policy suggests that she regards the Mediterranean as falling rather within the British sphere of influence, since if she herself aspired to play a leading role in the Mediterranean she would probably wish as a first step to get Greece and the Ægean Islands under her control, direct or indirect.
The Western Powers.
41. It will strategically be most important to Russia that the Western Powers should continue to act as the other side of the ring round Germany and pursue a policy designed to prevent any revival of German military power. So long as they do this, Russia is not likely to have any other special interest in Western Europe, though she would no doubt welcome the replacement of the Franco régime in Spain, and perhaps also the Salazar régime in Portugal, by a less anti-Russian Government. Russia will seek to maintain close relations with a resurgent France both because France will be the Western Power most closely concerned with the prevention of German aggression and also because Russia may not wish any Western bloc to fall too exclusively under British influence.
42. Russia would regard any trend towards a reconciliation between the Western Powers and Germany as a potential menace to her security. If Russia thought that the policy of the Western Powers was developing along such lines, she might seek to bring pressure to bear on them and particularly on Great Britain by indulging in political intrigue designed to stir up trouble in Greece, in the Middle East as a whole, and particularly in Persia, Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, in Afghanistan and in India. Russia might also seek to exploit to the full her political influence over the Communist parties in the countries of Western Europe and generally by political intrigue to stimulate opposition on to anti-Russian policy. Russia might consider that her security required that she should at least have the right to maintain armed forces in Finland, Poland, Czecho-slovakia, Hungary and Roumania, in order to gain depth of defence and more times of military and economic mobilisation. If Russia believed that attack by the Western Powers was imminent, it is possible that she might seek to forestall it by a campaign in Persia and Iraq designed to deny to the Western Powers the oil resources of this area and to increase her security against air attack on her own oil resources in the Caucasus.
43. If Russia thought that Germany was likely to join the Western bloc forming against her, she might launch a preventive war against Germany. Alternatively, it is possible that she might seek to outbid the Western Powers and so win Germany over to her side, though fear of thus allowing Germany dangerously to increase her military power might decide Russia against this course.
BLACK SEA AND THE STRAITS .
44. Russia’s strategic interest in the Black Sea will be the defence of her coast line against amphibious assault and also to protect her shipping there.
45. Russia will not have a major strategic interest in controlling the sea routes in and through the Mediterranean which, in any case, could not be secured without assuming very large commitments. We therefore think that Russia’s strategic interest will only require that she should dominate the Black Sea, for which purpose she will require, as far as possible, to control the Straits. Full control of movement through the Straits could only be assured by occupations of a considerable stretch of territory on either side of them and of bases dominating the sea routes through the Ægean. We do not, however, think it would be essential to Russia’s security to extend her territory so far; it would be sufficient for Russia’s strategic interests if she had air and naval supremacy in the Black Sea and if Turkey was not closely associated with any potentially hostile Power or group of Powers.
46. As regards the Straits, Russia has already indicated that the Montreux Convention governing the passage of warships must be revised. She is likely to insist that she shall have the right of passage for her warships as she thinks fit and the last word in deciding whether or not warships of other Powers should pass through the Straits. Russia will maintain an impressive fleet in the Black Sea. Since a serious threat to Russian control of the Straits would, in practice, depend on the establishment, by some major Power, of bases in Turkish territory, Russia is likely to desire that Turkey should remain independent and not allied to any major Power. Russia is therefore likely to work for the termination of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance and may try to win Turkey over to her side. It is also possible that Russia may demand from Turkey the return of the province of Kars, which passed into Turkish hands at the end of the last war.
MIDDLE EAST .
47. Russia’s principal strategic need in the Middle East is to ensure adequate defence for the South Caucasus oilfields, which are essential for the maintenance of her war economy. These oil-bearing areas are protected against land attacks by very strong natural defences, a
nd by the great distance from any adequate base from which a land attack against them could be mounted. The communications in the areas bordering on South Caucasus would require much development before they would be capable of maintaining land armies sufficient to constitute any serious menace to the armies that Russia could deploy in defence of the oilfields. We therefore do not consider that there can be any serious land threat to the oilfields.
48. There remains the threat of air attack. Oilfields, as such, are not particularly vulnerable to any form of air attack at present in use; but the Russians will have seen, at Ploesti, the damage that can be done to oil refineries and transport facilities by intensive air attack from comparatively distant bases. One method of increasing the defence of Russia’s oil industry would be to locate the refineries at a considerable distance from the frontiers and build protected pipelines to them. Provided Russia takes this precaution, the protection of her oil supplies from the South Caucasus could be adequately secured within her present frontiers. It would not be essential for Russia’s war economy to possess oilfields in Northern Persia, but for reasons given it would be of considerable advantage to develop supplies there both for peace and war.
49. In the event of a threat of hostilities with Great Britain and the United States and possibly even if there was a threat of operations in the Middle East by the United States alone, Russia would have a strategic interest in being able to deny them the oil resources of the Middle East.
50. Since about 75 per cent of Russia’s oil supplies come from the Caucasus she will be sensitive to any potential threat to them however remote. She will therefore wish to increase her security in this area and present indications are that, although her strategic interests may not demand it, she is determined to obtain some degree of control over Northern Persia. The control of Azerbaijan would give Russia certain military advantages. She would have greater space for the quick deployment of her forces which would otherwise be hemmed in to the mountains on the Persian frontier; the maintenance of forces in Persia would be greatly eased by the possession of Persian ports on the Caspian Sea; and she would be in a better position rapidly to seize the key communication centre and airfields at Tehran if any hostile Power threatened to establish forces in Persia. She would, moreover, be well placed quickly to develop a threat against the airfields of the Middle East.
51. While, as stated above, this probably is not essential to Russia’s security, she may regard it as an added measure of insurance. Moreover, she may think that the British oil interests in Southern Persia will give Great Britain a considerable measure of control in that area; she may, therefore, wish, by controlling North Persia, to ensure that the whole country does not fall too much under the influence of Great Britain backed by the United States. Provided that Russia gets what she wants in Northern Persia, she will probably acquiesce in the status quo in Iraq, though she would probably prefer that Great Britain should cease to enjoy there the special position that she now has.
52. In general, Russia wishes to stand on an equal footing with other great Powers in the Middle East. She would prefer, as far as possible, to see in the Middle East a group of independent States with no special ties with any great Power. She is therefore likely to oppose Arab union if it appears to be under British inspiration, and also French claims to a predominant position in the Levant. Russia may prefer that Palestine should become independent of British control.
FAR EAST .
53. From Sinkiang to Manchuria Russia has an enormous land frontier with China; but China is militarily weak and will remain so for very many years to come. Even if China emerges from this war orderly and united, she could not be a menace to Russia until she had developed into a first-class military Power or unless she entered into a close association with the United States. In any case geographical considerations rule out a major attack on Russia across the frontier from Sinkiang to Manchuria.
54. The Power in the Far East with whose aggressive ambitions Russia has to reckon is Japan, who, like Germany, dreams of world domination and who, also like Germany, has in the past fought a successful war against Russia. Moreover, Japan has long desired to drive Russia from the dangerous proximity of the Maritime Provinces. Accordingly, Russia’s strategic interests in the Far East in relation to her security will be concerned primarily with the defence of the Trans-Siberian Railway east of Lake Baikal and the Maritime Provinces, particularly Vladivostok, from attack by Japan either direct or through Manchuria or Korea. Japan, however, can never be so serious a menace as Germany, because even a successful attack from this direction, though it would be a serious blow to Russia’s prestige, would scarcely menace her security as a whole, in view of the enormous distances the attack would have to cover before it reached areas strategically or economically vital to her.
55. Accordingly, the first requisite for Russia’s strategic security in the Far East is that Japan’s power of aggression should be eliminated for the longest possible period. So long as Japan is weak, the only other Power capable of threatening Russia’s security in the Far East would be the United States, either alone or in concert with the British Empire, and therefore, provided these Powers followed a policy of collaboration with Russia, it would not be essential for her to alter her present frontiers in the Far East.
56. As in other areas, however, Russia will wish to insure against aggression to a greater degree than the essential minimum. The security of the Maritime Provinces from attack from overseas would be increased if Russia held Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles; this would also reduce any threat to the airfields of Russian Sakhalin. Security from attack overland would be greatly increased by control over Manchuria and Korea, which would give much greater depth to the defence of the Maritime Provinces and cover the lines of communication with the rest of Russia. At present the main line is the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is very vulnerable to attack from Manchuria; but the Russians are believed to be building another line further north, branching off from the Trans-Siberian Railway west of Lake Baikal.
57. Economically also control over Manchuria and Korea would greatly increase Russia’s security in the Far East. At present the Russian population east of Lake Baikal is only some 5 to 6 million. This area is deficient in food and is incapable of supporting an armament industry sufficient to maintain large armed forces. Manchuria and Korea have a population of 65 million, and are rich sources of raw materials. Supplies of food are such as would make the whole area self-supporting. There are industrial areas capable over a long period of substantial development; but coking coal from North China might be necessary if full use is to be made of all the resources.
58. Russia’s security in the Far East would also be materially increased if she controlled the South Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur as naval bases, whose use could not easily be denied her by Japan. It would also be of some advantage to her to have the North-East Korean warm-water ports of Rashin and Seishin as potential bases within the Japan Sea.
59. Thus, with Manchuria and Korea, the whole of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, Russia’s Far Eastern possessions would form a powerful military and economic bloc, self-sufficient in food and capable of maintaining large armed forces without much support from the rest of Russia. Moreover, Russia would be in a position to ensure that Japan could not draw from Manchuria and Korea the resources that are essential to her economy and war industry.
60. We have scarcely any evidence to guide us as to Russian intentions in the Far East and it is therefore difficult to estimate to what extent Russia will try to secure these strategic advantages or to go beyond them. We think it almost certain that she will demand Japanese Sakhalin and the Kuriles. She will probably also wish in one way or another effectively to control Korea and Manchuria, including particularly the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. We cannot at present say how Russia will seek to achieve such a control and probably much will depend on the course of events in China after the war. It is true that Stalin’s statements at the Teheran Conference i
ndicated that Russia accepted the Cairo Declaration that Manchuria should be returned to China and Korea made independent; but if Russia comes into the war, it is probable that at the time of Japan’s final defeat Russian forces will be in occupation of at least a part and probably the whole of Manchuria. If China showed signs of relapsing into chaos and civil war Russia would not find it difficult, while nominally respecting China’s sovereignty over Manchuria, to secure a special position rather on the lines of the pre-1904 arrangement. Russia then had a lease of the Liaotung Peninsular with its two ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, the right to run the railway leading to it and also the right to maintain troops to guard the railway. The Czarist government were able to build up these railway guard troops to a force of 100,000 men and the present Russian Government could probably improve on this. Russia’s desiderata in Korea might be secured by a treaty on similar lines with a nominally independent Korean Government. We do not think that Russia would rely on the support of the Chinese Communists to give her such far-reaching concessions in Manchuria and Korea. Such arrangements could probably be stretched to cover the stationing of air forces in Manchuria and Korea and effective economic control. This would adequately safeguard Russia’s strategic interests.
61. The only disadvantage might be the opposition of the 65 million people of Manchuria and Korea. Initially this would probably not be a serious problem as these people have in the past shown little power of resistance to foreign domination; but the development of Chinese nationalism is likely to continue and the existence of a nationalist China just across the border might in time stimulate resistance in Manchuria and perhaps Korea as well, and so present the Russians with a considerable security problem. It is, however, unlikely that such considerations would deter Russia from seeking to control Manchuria and Korea.
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