71. The preparation of emergency airstrips and a marked increase in the number of satellite landing grounds.
72. The development of dispersal areas.
*73. A marked increase in the volume of high grade cypher traffic, including Naval W/T traffic.
*74. Call up of that portion of the male population of North Germany which has had seafaring experience. (These have all been registered already).
*75. Concentration of landing craft in south Baltic ports.
*76. Concentration of merchant shipping, especially in the south Baltic.
*77. Fitting of warheads to torpedoes; ammunitioning of ships; landing of practice ammunition.
*78. A simultaneous exodus of warships from a number of ports.
*79. Laying of mines in the south Baltic.
*80. Arming of merchant ships.
81. A general withdrawal of Russian controlled merchant shipping from foreign waters.
Political.
82. Intensification of strike action (see Item 53 above).
APPENDIX
Finland
Germany
Austria
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Yugoslavia
Greece
Hungary
Bulgaria
Roumania
Soviet Union
Turkey
Persia
France
Belgium
Holland
Luxembourg
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Italy
Afghanistan
Palestine
Syria
Lebanon
Transjordan
Iraq
Pakistan
India
Burma
China
Egypt.
* * *
J.I.C. (48) 78 (0)
LIMITED CIRCULATION.
16th July, 1948.
Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of staff CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
MEASURES TO PREVENT THE RUSSIANS OBTAINING
STRATEGIC SURPRISE.
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee.
We have been instructed * + to examine what further arrangements are necessary to prevent the Russians obtaining strategic surprise, including any further steps that might need to be taken to accelerate the passage of tactical information on Russian activities across the Zonal frontiers.
2. We believe that the Soviet Armed Forces in Germany are sufficiently strong and sufficiently prepared to be able to undertake, with little or no warning, a limited offensive against likely opposition. Their formations are so disposed that this could be done with little preliminary movement.
3. Nevertheless, the fighter defences of Russia itself, and the Russian strategic long range bomber force, have not yet reached the standard of efficiency which we would expect if they are to play a major part in any immediate war. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the necessary administrative or industrial preparations having been made, or of general mobilisation having taken place. We do not, therefore, consider that the Russians are at present contemplating a major war.
4. Subject to the difficulties stated in paragraph 2 above, we have already taken certain action which may provide warning of preparations for war, as follows:-
Action to prevent the Russians Obtaining Strategic Surprise.
5. We have prepared and circulated to British representatives in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria, and in the countries within or adjacent to the Soviet orbit, as well as to the joint intelligence authorities concerned, a report examining the indications which might appear if the Russians were preparing to launch an offensive. This report, of which a copy is annexed * ø , lists indications of hostile intentions and emphasises those which are considered to be bound to precede an offensive and which must therefore be reported by telegram at once.
Tactical intelligence concerning Soviet Military Activities
6. We have taken the necessary action to institute an organisation to obtain tactical intelligence concerning Soviet Military activities up to a depth of fifty miles in the Soviet Zone. The ultimate aim of the organisation is to obtain this intelligence by covering twelve targets within the fifty mile belt. This should ensure that no major Soviet Military move could take place within that belt without the responsible agency getting early knowledge of it and passing information back possibly within twenty four hours. Four of the most important targets are already covered and urgent consideration is being given to include a fifth, Rostock. Clandestine W/T communications are not at present provided for this network but the problem of providing this method of communication is under consideration with Germany.
Photographic reconnaissance.
7. We are having prepared lists of air photographic targets which are considered most desirable and worthwhile to complete in the near future, and also a comprehensive list of targets for clandestine air reconnaissance in Satellite countries. Consultations are in progress with the authorities in Germany on the feasibility of supplementing intelligence from ground sources by those means.
Future Reports.
8. We intend to prepare periodical reviews of the short term indications of Russian preparedness for war drawing attention to any evidence that might indicate an alteration in Soviet intentions. Should significant intelligence of immediate importance arise, this will, of course, at once be brought to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff.
Recommendations.
9. We therefore recommend that the Chiefs of Staff:– Take note of the arrangements made to prevent the Russians from obtaining strategic surprise and to obtain tactical intelligence concerning Soviet military activities across the Zonal frontiers.
(Signed) W.G. HAYTER
E.W.L. LONGLEY-COOK
C.D. PACKARD
L.F. FEMDRAD
K.W.D. STRONG.
Ministry of Defence, S.W.1
16th July 1948.
* AAP/15/Air and AAP/15/5/Air
† J.I.C. Germany 48 (24) (Revised)
* C.O.S. (48) 92nd Meeting Item 1. Confidential Annex.
* J.I.C. (48) 42 (0) Final
Notes
1 . JIC(48)121(Revised Final), ‘Possibility of War Before the End of 1956’, 27 January 1949, TNA: CAB 159/5.
2 . David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War (London: Yale University Press, 1997).
3 . The American and British papers are both in JIC(48)42(0)Final, ‘Indications of Russian Preparedness for War’, 18 June 1948, TNA: CAB 158/3.
4 . JIC(48) 67th Meeting (0), 2 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4. The first such report is JIC(48)70(0)Final, ‘Short Term Indications of Soviet Preparedness for War’, 1 October 1948, TNA: CAB 159/3.
5 . JIC(48) 73rd Meeting (0), 16 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4.
6 . JIC(48)78(0), ‘Measures to Prevent the Russians Obtaining Strategic Surprise’, 16 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/3.
7 . JIC(48)121(Revised Final), ‘Possibility of War before the End of 1956’, 27 January 1949, TNA: CAB 159/5.
8 . JIC(48) 80th Meeting (0), 30 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4.
8
CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE
KOREAN WAR
M UCH LIKE GERMANY , Korea was split amongst the victors in the aftermath of the Second World War. North Korea became a Soviet proxy and the South an American one. The leaders of both halves of Korea were united in wanting to unify Korea in their own image but, inevitably, there could be no hope of both emerging victorious. On paper, then, this was a potentially explosive issue but the JIC did not specifically focus on it prior to the outbreak of war in in 1950 for one simple reason: it was perceived as an American concern. Thus, British intelligence collection was accorded the lower priority in the region.
In June 1950, in what is widely cited as one of the classic examples of intelligence failure,
the North Koreans, without warning, invaded South Korea. Although the JIC did not focus specifically on Korea prior to this point, there had been a number of papers on the Far East, particularly following the success of the communists the previous year in the Chinese Civil War. The JIC had discussed the idea that the North Koreans could, potentially, launch a large military offensive, but it was discounted because it was thought small incursions would be favoured over the prospect of war. Consequently, with priorities for collection low, the assumption that the US were responsible and the belief that the North Koreans would avoid war, the invasion came as something of a surprise. The JIC conceded that it had been surprised and that no forewarning had been available. 1
The North Korean attack was instantly assumed to be the work of Moscow and it prompted a swift rebuke in the United Nations. Writing a few weeks later, the JIC concluded that Stalin would have been surprised by the strength of the Western reaction and that events in Korea were not the start of a larger communist-inspired world war. Britain committed troops as part of the UN effort to repel the North Korean forces but in London the Chief of Staffs Committee remained hugely concerned at the scale and pace of events. 2 It was not clear to them, for instance, quite what the objective of the UN commanders was: would they stop at the border between North and South Korea or push beyond it? Related to this was angst about not provoking the Russian or Chinese into intervening militarily. 3
To make matters worse, there was (rightly) great fear and trepidation about the intentions of General Douglas MacArthur, the American military commander in Korea. The JIC, which was instructed to watch out for any sign of Chinese intervention, asked the Joint Intelligence Staff to assess whether the Chinese would intervene if the UN forces crossed the border. 4 On 7 October the COS fears were confirmed when MacArthur’s army advanced into North Korea. The JIC’s initial reaction – included in the appended paper – was that the Chinese would not ‘embark upon operations’. 5 Despite what, in hindsight, was an overly optimistic assessment, the JIC’s report was subsequently accepted by the COS, who used it as a briefing document for discussions with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. 6
The JIC’s assessment was not based on intelligence. Instead it relied upon a reading of the character of the Chinese leadership. The committee concluded that China would not risk war with the UN because this would, inevitably, lead to a major war with the West. And, according to the JIC, this was something the Chinese would want to avoid. The great difficulty was that there was simply no high-level, reliable intelligence to count on. Indeed, the JIC conceded that it was ‘seriously concerned about the inadequacy of intelligence’. A JIC assessment in November 1950 stated that intelligence on the Chinese army was considered ‘negligible’, on the air force it was ‘almost totally lacking’, and ‘very little’ was known about the navy. 7 Perhaps naively, certainly in retrospect, the JIC’s Assistant Secretary confidently reported that ‘the war in Korea has developed even more rapidly than expected and it looks as if the real fighting will be over very shortly’. 8 Almost simultaneously, however, messages began to be received indicating a large concentration of Chinese troops, yet nothing was known about their intent.
On 1 November 1950 the People’s Liberation Army advanced in huge numbers, pushing the UN’s troops back to the border. The initial JIC reaction was one of uncertainty: it was not known whether this Chinese military involvement was officially sanctioned, whether it was merely an intensification of Chinese effort, or whether it was the start of something altogether new. 9 Furthermore, would China actually declare war in its support of the North Korean effort? Or would its assistance remain relatively covert? 10 Within a few weeks the situation had clarified. The JIC’s earlier predictions had been proved incorrect and, for the first time, the intentions of the Chinese leadership became apparent: ‘The scale of Chinese intervention in Korea leaves no doubt that the Chinese Communist Government is intent on defeating the main aim of the United Nations forces.’ More alarming was what this move signified:
This intention may be interpreted as a desire to drive back these forces beyond the 38th Parallel or even out of Korea altogether, but we must now face the possibility that China is prepared, with Soviet support and approval, to accept the increase of existing risks of open war in an attempt to drive the United Nations forces from Korea. 11
The JIC’s efforts on the Korean War, particularly concerning Chinese intervention, highlight several important aspects: they emphasise the immense difficulties in producing analyses based on areas where there is negligible intelligence coverage and where priorities for collection are low; they also highlight the difficulties of using assumptions in the absence of intelligence and, particularly, the dangers of mirror-imaging. These would be hard lessons and ones that were not always heeded in future years.
JIC(50)88
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 89
Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff
J.I.C. (50) 88 (Final – Revise)
11th October, 1950.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES –
1950/51. Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee.
As instructed *+ we have re-examined in the light of the latest political intelligence from China the Chinese Communists’ military intentions and capabilities against Korea, Indo-China, Burma, Siam, Formosa, Macao, and Tibet in the period 1950/51. Our report is at Annex.
2. Conclusions . We conclude that:–
(a) Chinese Communist policy in the Far East and South-East Asia is dominated by the desire to secure the withdrawal of the Western Powers and the elimination of the Chinese Nationalists.
(b) In pursuing this aim they are likely to concentrate in the initial stages on political infiltration and subversion, combined, where appropriate, with military advice and assistance.
(c) They might, however, resort to overt aggression if they judged that the conflict could be localised and that aggression would therefore be in their own interest.
(d) They are unlikely to be pushed into overt aggression by the Soviet Union unless they judge that condition (c) above is fulfilled.
(e) Sufficient forces are available to undertake overt aggression against any of the territories under review. The possibility of such action cannot therefore be excluded.
(f) The likelihood of such action in each case is estimated to be as follows:–
(i) Korea . We do not think the Chinese Communists will embark upon operations in Korea as this would involve a risk of war with the United Nations. But the possibility cannot be excluded that they may enter Korea and occupy a defence line covering the Manchurian frontier and as far forward as possible without engaging in hostilities with United Nations forces, unless attacked by them.
(ii) Indo-China . We consider that the Chinese Communists are likely to give all possible support to Viet Minh short of armed intervention. The threat of armed intervention would, however, be increased in the event of Chinese armed intervention in Korea.
(iii) Burma and Siam . We have no evidence that overt aggression is amongst the short term objectives of Communist China.
(iv) Formosa . While the Chinese aim to gain control of Formosa, they are unlikely in face of American intervention to undertake an invasion at present. Indeed current indications are that the invasion has been postponed although the ability to invade remains and at present constitutes a dangerous threat. In the event of Chinese armed intervention in Korea the Chinese Communists would have to abandon all hope for the present of a successful invasion of Formosa.
(v) Macao . We believe the Chinese Communists will prefer to render the Portuguese position untenable in the Colony by means other than the use of force.
(vi) Tibet . We have no reason to doubt that the Chinese Communists intend to enforce their claims to sovereignty over Tibet and that they will resort to force if negotiations break down.
3. The Chinese Communists’ intentions with regard to Hong Kong have already been covered elsewhere * ø and in this paper we have confined our examination to the repercussions on the Colony in the event of Chinese intervention in Korea. We conclude that in this event the risk of action against Hong Kong taking place would be much greater than at present.
Recommendation
4. We recommend the Chiefs of Staff endorse this report as an expression of their views.
(Signed) D.P. REILLY.
N.C. OGILVIE-FORBES.
P. SILLITOE.
B.K. BLOUNT.
A.J. BAKER-CRESSWELL (for D.N.I.)
R.F. JOHNSTONE (for D.M.I.).
M.Y. WATSON (for Director, J.I.B.).
Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
11th October, 1950.
ANNEX
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES – 1950/51 REVIEW OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS
The declared primary aim of Chinese Communist policy is to consolidate the revolution and to bring the whole of the national territory, including Formosa, under control of the Peking Government. It is also the avowed intention of the Chinese Communists to secure the withdrawal of the Western Powers from the Far East and South East Asia. These two aims can be pursued simultaneously but the Chinese Government must inevitably consider in every case whether a particular course of action, designed to further the second aim, will also contribute to the achievement of the first and they may be expected to refrain from any action which will in fact have the contrary effect.
2. Although the Chinese Government have a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Government and although they will take cognisance of Soviet policy, there is no evidence that they are amenable to Soviet dictation. Indeed any suggestion that they were acting as the tool of Moscow would weaken their claim to leadership over the whole Chinese people, and is consequently likely to be resisted. While therefore the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government are at one in desiring to see the withdrawal of the Western Powers from the Far East and South East Asia, and while the Soviet leaders would welcome a situation in which China was involved in conflict with the Western Powers, it may be assumed that the Chinese Government will not resort to overt aggression against any neighbouring foreign territory unless they are convinced and can demonstrate to the public at large that this action is dictated by China’s own interests.
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