3. They may judge that this condition is fulfilled if the weakness of the Western Powers is so apparent as to make the prospects of success irresistibly attractive. This would most probably be the case if the Western Powers were already involved in a global war. They will correspondingly be deterred from action if it is clear to them that action will lead to general war with the Western Powers on several fronts. Except in the case of Formosa where at present only military action can bring the island under the rule of Peking, the Chinese Government will in our opinion concentrate in the initial stages on weakening the neighbouring territories by political infiltration and subversion combined, where appropriate, with military advice and assistance. They will prefer this policy to overt aggression as a means of eliminating Western influence since they will judge the risk of its provoking counter action by the Western Powers to be negligible.
4. The overall military intentions of the Chinese Communists throughout the period under review must be subject to constant variation depending on such factors as the outcome of the war in Korea, the future relation of China with the United Nations, a Japanese peace treaty and internal economic problems. These intentions are covered in our monthly reports *+ on the Chinese Communist threat. In general we consider that the Chinese Communists will not attempt any independent external aggression unless they think the effects can be localised. We estimate below their current intentions towards Korea, Indo-China, Burma, Siam, Formosa, Macao and Tibet, and in each case examine the Forces likely to be used should circumstances prompt them to embark on a policy of aggression.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
5. China’s economy, always backward, has been severely impaired by years of war and even though the Communists are pursuing a vigorous rehabilitation policy, Mao Tse-tung has said they can expect it to be at least three years before the economic situation improves.
6. The country as a whole produces about 90% of its requirements in foodstuffs; this 90% cannot be evenly distributed because of transport difficulties. Famines are therefore endemic. China’s natural resources are rich, but only a fraction has been tapped, and industrially the country is poorly developed.
7. There is an almost complete lack of liquid fuel production in China. Electric power is inadequate and the engineering and armament industries produce only a small volume of inferior quality items. Communications are generally poor and in this, combined with China’s heavy dependence on foreign oil, lies her great strategic weakness.
8. It is considered that rehabilitation and development of industry will not have progressed very far during the period under review. Development of communications will be comparatively slow. China, including Manchuria and its other territories, would not be able to supply and maintain a force in the field which would be capable of a large scale offensive against well-balanced Western forces of a comparable size. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of their success against smaller Western forces through sheer weight of numbers.
9. The acquiring of the rice supplies of Burma and Siam must constitute a standing temptation to the Chinese Communists since it would enable them to secure themselves against the dangers of a famine, always provided it could be effectively distributed. Any Chinese Communist action in these areas would have very grave effects on the rice supplies of South East Asia as a whole and be most damaging to allied interests there, particularly in Malaya. Overt action in this direction would, however, inevitably provoke strong reaction on the part of India and Ceylon. At present there is no evidence that the Chinese Communists will consider that the balance of advantage lies with overt action against Burma and Siam in the period under review.
MILITARY FACTORS
Army
10. The Chinese Communist Army (C.C.A) at present consists of 2,500,000 men, organised in 80 armies, with a militia of 1 million. It is estimated that in addition some 3 million men with war experience will be available for mobilisation but the total number mobilised will be limited only by the equipment available.
11. If adequate Soviet assistance is forthcoming, the standard of tactical and technical training will improve continually and present shortages of heavy equipment in the Chinese Communist Army are likely to be made good. The best of the Chinese fighting men will possibly be equal to their Soviet counterpart, but the army as a whole will be considerably inferior to any army of the Western Powers. Its discipline and morale will be of a high order and its training thorough. There will, however, be serious deficiencies in specialists and technicians. Its commanders and staffs will have little or no experience in handling armour and artillery on a large scale and will have little knowledge of air support or co-operation with other Services. They will also lack experience in modern war. From the point of view of operations in South East Asia and the Far East, the army will lack experience of jungle warfare.
12. In spite of these limitations, the Chinese Army should not be under-estimated, as it will be incomparably stronger than any of the other indigenous armies of the Far East and South East Asia or the forces of the Western Allies that are likely to be available for defence in these areas.
Air Force
13. We believe that the Chinese Communist Air Force (C.C.A.F) now consists of four air regiments organised primarily as a tactical support force, and an independent communications unit.
14. The present strength is estimated to be as follows:–
(a) Fighters
53 Japanese types
110 Soviet LA-5, LA-7, and LA-9
22 Mustangs
(b) Bombers
80 Soviet TU-2 and IL-10
1 U.S. B-24
1 Mosquito
(c) Reconnaissance 10 Japanese types
(d) Transports 10 U.S. C-46 and C-47.
In addition there are believed to be about 50 Transport aircraft, probably C-47, in the Chinese Communist Civil Aviation. It is unlikely that any degree of emphasis will be placed on strategic bombing and there is no present information that a strategic bomber force is planned.
15. The personnel strength of the C.C.A.F. has recently been estimated to be about 35,000, of which some 1,000 are aircrew, including approximately 400 pilots. It is also estimated that 3,500–4,500 students are in training at the eleven flying and technical schools. We believe that a large number of students undergo advanced flying training in the Soviet Union, but no assessment of the number can be made.
16. The Soviet Union under the reported secret terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty (the veracity of which has never been confirmed) undertook to provide the Chinese with an operational air force in the shortest possible time. It was, we believe, decided to place Soviet personnel in key positions throughout the organisation. As the Chinese become more efficient, Soviet personnel will probably be withdrawn from all lower formations, but will probably be retained in key positions in order to ensure that the C.C.A.F. is in a position to further Soviet policy in the Far East.
17. The C.C.A.F. is expanding rapidly and under the reported terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty the Soviet Union is to provide 300 fighters, 140 ground attack aircraft, 100 light bombers and 260 transport and reconnaissance aircraft. It is possible that these aircraft may be handed over by the end of 1951. We believe that the C.C.A.F. is being developed along Soviet lines to function as a fighter defence and army support force. We consider that, even with Soviet help, the C.C.A.F. ground organisation is likely to be inefficient by Western standards and this, coupled with lack of combat experience, will be reflected in a low standard of operating proficiency.
Navy
18. The Communists have acquired some 50 warships, including 5 destroyer escorts and six gunboats, together with a number of Nationalist personnel who are reported to be largely undergoing instruction in Communist indoctrination schools. The Communists could probably only muster in a weak operational state the number of ships shown BELOW . By the end of the year they may have crews that can man and operate them sufficiently well to attempt to tackle a Nationalist Force of similar size
.
(a) First Line
3 Escort Vessels
1 Minesweeper
(b) Second Line
25 Gunboats, improvised Gunboats, armed launches and control boats.
(c) Landing Craft
About 60 landing craft of U.S. origin including some commandeered from commercial firms.
19. The Soviet Union is, however, providing considerable assistance in training and has probably given some material help. This is likely to continue, and as a result the Communist Navy will probably by the end of 1951 have considerably increased in efficiency although it will be a long way below Western standards.
20. Should the whole of the Nationalist Navy or any part of it become available to the Communists, either by defection or capture, it will increase the potential naval strength of the latter, but the Nationalists lack ammunition spares and equipment and their efficiency is low judged by Western standards. Therefore, although the addition of 120 Warships of all types, including 7 destroyers, 21 destroyer escorts, 22 gun-boats and 21 patrol craft, including minesweepers would be a great incrEASE in potential for the Communists, their efficiency would remain low. Even, therefore, if the Chinese Communists acquire the entire Nationalist Navy before they embark on a major war, we do not consider that their force would constitute more than a minor threat provided the Western Allies maintain adequate forces in the area.
21. The Communists will have very considerable numbers of coastal craft, junks, sampans etc., available for use in landing operations. They have also acquired a large number of miscellaneous merchant vessels, some of the Liberty type, but mainly of small tonnage.
ASSUMPTIONS.
22. We have assumed that:–
(a) Although the Chinese Communists have over-whelming forces in comparison with neighbouring non-communist countries they are unlikely to use a ground force of greater superiority than five to one in any one campaign.
(b) That the governments of the anti-communist countries in South East Asia will remain anti-communist or neutral during the period under review.
(c) That the Soviet Union will limit its aid to China to military and technical advice and to the supply of material including arms, equipment and oil.
POSSIBLE CAMPAIGNS
23. We estimate below current Chinese Communist intentions and capabilities in relation to Korea, Indo-China, Burma, Siam, Formosa, Macao and Tibet.
24. While we are unable to assess with confidence the exact logistical requirements of the Chinese Communist forces we consider that the land communications available in South East Asia would be sufficient to maintain the forces whose employment there is envisaged in the following paragraphs.
KOREA
Present Situation
25. It is clear that the rapid success of the United Nations forces in South Korea and the increasing prospect that the North Korean Forces and Government will soon be eliminated are causing serious anxiety to the Chinese Communists, who may regard the elimination of the North Korean buffer state as a direct threat to the security of China. During the past few weeks Chinese propaganda against the United States has become increasingly violent and has harped on the theme that the Americans intend to extend their aggressive designs not only against North Korea but against China. This propaganda has also attempted to discredit the United Nations (particularly over their action in Korea) as being no more than a cloak for United States aggression and to make it clear that in the absence of Chinese (Peking) representation in the United Nations all the decisions of that body must be considered illegal. At a large meeting of government officials on September 30th Chou En Lai stated that in no circumstances could the Chinese people tolerate or ignore reckless aggression against their neighbours by the imperialists. Two days later he summoned the Indian Ambassador and gave him to understand that if the United States Army crossed the 38th Parallel China would be forced to take “immediate steps”. He added that such a crossing of the boundary would make it clear that the United States authorities had elected for war and that China would be forced to act “accordingly”; and a few days later he again confirmed this intention. These statements are in themselves somewhat unspecific, although clearly threatening, and the Chinese Government have not irrevocably committed themselves in writing to send troops into North Korea in the event of a crossing of the 38th Parallel, but they have deliberately made the Indian Ambassador believe that such is their intention.
Topography
26. Most of the country on both sides of the North Korean frontier is rugged and mountainous. Movement away from established routes is difficult (especially in an east-west direction) because of the steep slopes and dense forests. The areas around the western and eastern ends of the frontier are lower and less difficult than the centre; the west coastal areas and lover Amnok (Yalu) valley resemble the west coast lowlands further south; the east coast and Tomen valley have narrow areas of a lowland. Along most of its length the frontier is formed by the Amnok (Yalu) and Tomen rivers, which are the two 1argest rivers in Korea. The Amnok is normally not fordable over long stretches, but the Tomen is shallow except when in spate. River levels are low from November to March; they are high after snowmelt in April and after summer rains in July and August. The rivers are normally frozen from mid-December to mid-March, when the ice is used for cart traffic.
Climate
27. The wet season is from April to September. In Winter appreciable depths of snow accumulate in the mountains which are normally snow-covered from December to March.
Communications (See Map)
28. There are two main routes of entry into Korea from the north: via Antung at the west end of the frontier; and along the narrow corridor down the east coast. The Antung route is served by a single track railway from Mukden (the focal point of the south Manchurian railways); after entering Korea the railway follows the west coast more or less closely via Pyongyang to Seoul. The east coast route is served by a railway (also single track) from central Manchuria; this railway, after meeting two lines from the Soviet territory to the east, enters Korea at Tomen and then follows the east coast, ending at Samchok. The only lateral railways connecting the two routes are those from Kowen to Pyongyang and from Wonsan to Seoul. The basic pattern of the roads system follows that of the railways, with the addition that there is a direct road from Dairen to Antung. In Korea a fair secondary road close to the frontier connects the two main entry routes, and there are lateral roads from Wonsan (east coast) to Pyongyang, Pyonsan and Seoul. A few minor roads cross the frontier, but before reaching a line from Wonsan to Pyongyang they all lead to either the west or the east coasts.
29. We lack the information notably that concerning the effect of United Nations air attacks, necessary for a calculation of the size of the forces which the two main entry routes could support. As a very tentative estimate, we believe that each route could probably support Chinese Communist forces of the order of 250,000 men.
Chinese Armed Forces likely to be employed and their capabilities .
30. Land Forces . Our intelligence cover in Manchuria is almost non-existent. It is therefore impossible to check information concerning the strength, organisation or equipment of the ChiNESE Army believed to be concentrated in Manchuria.
31. We believe the strength of the Chinese Army in Manchuria to be about 13 armies, comprising some 400,000 men; however, their strength could quite well be below or in excess of this figure. We also believe that formations of this force are not only being re-equipped with Soviet weapons including tanks, but have probably reached the combat efficiency described in para 11. It is difficult however to assess what proportion of the quantities of equipment arriving in Manchuria from the Soviet Union has gone to the Chinese Army, or how much has gone to Korea to replace losses in battle. Furthermore, although re-organisation of the Chinese army in Manchuria has taken place, we do not know whether the formations have merely received new equipment or whether they are emerging as Russian type divisions. We estimate that the Soviet Union h
ad available sufficient equipment to equip the Chinese armies in Manchuria at least to the scale of the North Korean Divisions at the beginning of hostilities.
32. We consider therefore that the Chinese Army available for intervention in Korea must be assessed in terms of the best case and the worst case. We give these below:–
(a) The best case
A force of 400,000 men with artillery support of some 690 guns, but lacking in armour.
(b) The worst case
A balanced force of 400,000 men organised on the Russian pattern with adequate artillery support and including at least two armoured divisions.
33. In addition to the forces already believed to be in Manchuria, a Field Army of about 300,000 men is concentrated in the Hankow area of Central China. It is believed this formation is also being re-organised and re-equipped with Soviet weapons. This Field Army is therefore conveniently located as a strategic reserve and could quickly reinforce Manchuria if required.
34. Air Forces . The details given in paras 14 and 15 show that the first line strength of the C.C.A.F. amounts to some 300 aircraft. There have been several reports of aircraft (amounting to 300) on airfields in Manchuria. These are in all probability Soviet aircraft which were intended as reinforcements for either the North Koreans or the C.C.A.F. It is reasonable to assume that if the Chinese intervened in the Korean War these aircraft would be made available to them. This would double the strength of the C.C.A.F. in aircraft, but the problem of air crews and maintenance personnel would still remain. Moreover, it is unlikely that the C.C.A.F. could afford to move all its aircraft away from their present duties. A figure of around 275 first 1ine aircraft would, it is considered, be the maximum number which could be made available for operations in Korea.
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