105. Distances from assembly points to likely objectives are:-
Time taken at 5 knots
(a) Foochow (mouth of Min river) to Tamsai – 110 nautical miles..
22 hours
(b) Amoy to Tainan – 135 nautical miles..
27 hours
(c) Amoy to Takao – 155 nautical miles..
31 hours
(d) Swatow to Takao – 195 nautical miles..
39 hours
(e) Tsinkiang to Tai Chung area – 95 nautical miles..
19 hours
(f) Amoy to Tai Chung area – 130 nautical miles..
26 hours
106. Communications . There are adequate North to South road and rail communications in the Western coastal plain of Formosa although they have deteriorated from their excellent pre-war standard.
107. Weather Conditions . As far as weather conditions in the Strait of Formosa are concerned, the best time for a crossing and for landings on the west, north-west and south-west coasts would be during the period April to September, inclusive, and more particularly from April to June in order to minimise the typhoon risk. This risk is greatest in July, August and September, but the risk of a typhoon occurring at any particular time cannot be considered great. (Only six typhoons affected the west coast from 1932 to 1938). The disturbed conditions caused by a typhoon might last for 3 to 4 days. From October to March (inclusive) the north-east monsoon blows strongly. It is estimated that in an average year wind strength is force 6 OR over for more than half the time. The winds raise considerable sea and swell, and surf on the beaches, although the south-west coast is to some extent sheltered. Winds are usually appreciably less strong in March than during the rest of the period. We consider that unless an attack were to take place by the middle of October 1950 at the latest, weather conditions would compel its postponement until the following Spring.
Communist Armed Forces Available for this Campaign
108. Ground Forces. In view of the problem of providing adequate sea and air lift across the Formosan straits, it is probable that the Communists would aim at a superiority of only two-to-one in manpower. Such a force might consist of up to 300,000 men, or 10 Armies, together with up to 660 guns and 100 armoured cars and light tanks. Of this force it is likely that A minimum of 50,000 men would be required for the initial assault.
109. For some time past there have been reports of paratroops training in Manchuria under Russian auspices, and the arrival in Fukien of a large number of Chinese Communist paratroops is now reliably reported; a figure as high as 10,000 has been mentioned. The state of training of these troops is, however, unknown. The transport aircraft at present in the possession of the Chinese Communist Air Force could, however, only lift some 1,000 lightly armed troops in a single operation but the possibility that the Soviet Union may provide additional transport aircraft, with aircrews, cannot be discounted. The possibility of airborne operations against Formosa cannot be neglected.
110. Naval Forces. The Chinese Communists are likely to employ all the operational vessels of their fleet in an operation against Formosa. Although the numbers given in paragraph 18 may seem considerable, the efficiency of the Communist navy is at a low ebb and maintenance is known to be poor.
111. Sea Lift . The Chinese Communists are building up an ocean-going merchant fleet. Although exact figures are not known it is probable that they have acquired by defection or purchase about 40 merchant ships. A number of large landing ships and craft which were left in China by the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company when the Nationalists withdrew will also be available to the Chinese Communists. In addition to acquiring ocean going ships the Chinese Communists have been reported to be building motor and sailing junks and to be purchasing or requisitioning engines for fitting in the latter. The Communists are also reported to be building 250 tugs and to have placed an order for 300 small landing craft in Manilla.
112. We consider that the Chinese Communists at present have sufficient sea transport, including junks, for all the troops that would be required for an invasion of Formosa, and for the military equipment and stores. The number of specialised craft capable of landing tanks and equipment direct on to the beaches is, however, very small. Although troop landing craft may be acquired from Manilla, the Chinese Communists are unlikely to be able greatly to increase the number of tank landing craft and amphibians within the period of this report, and therefore they will be able to land only a limited number of guns, tanks etc., in the assault.
113. Air Forces . The C.C.A.F. would probably employ all its available resources in the air battle.
Nationalist Forces available for Defending Formosa
114. Ground Forces . Because of the arrival of defeated Nationalist troops in the island from the mainland the strength of the Nationalist garrison in Formosa is not known with any accuracy, but it is believed to number nearly 300,000 men, of which at least a half are combatant troops. This garrison is made up of men trained on the island who have never seen battle and remnants of the Nationalist armies evacuated from the mainland. Under the leadership of General Sun-Li-Jen the efficiency and the equipping of the garrison have been improved and the garrison has reached a rather better standard than the Nationalists achieved earlier in the civil war. The size of this force is likely to be enlarged as a result of local conscription and the ultimate evacuation of some Nationalist troops from the Quemoy and Pescadores Islands.
115. There are five Nationalist field armies in the island, together with a light armoured force and garrison troops. Two of the field armies are in the Taipei area in the north, one in the west central plain and two in the south. Substantial reinforcements have recently been sent to the Nationalist forces on the mainland from this garrison, but the organisation and locations of the above field armies are not believed to have been altered materially.
116. There are large stockpiles of arms and ammunition in Formosa, since the bulk of U.S. military supplies to China have been diverted to the island since February 1949. Some of the Nationalist armament factories are reported to have been transferred there. The agricultural resources of the island are believed to be adequate to support the requirements of the garrison indefinitely but it is not known how long financial support will last.
117. Naval Forces . The strength of the Nationalist Naval forces which could be concentrated to counter a seaborne invasion is assessed as follows:-
(a) First Line (Sea going).
1 Destroyer.
12 Escort Vessels.
12 Minesweepers
(b) Second Line (Coastal Operations).
4 Gunboats.
24 Patrol Craft or Motor Gunboats
About 40 Landing Craft.
About 20 auxiliary Vessels.
118. The Nationalist Navy is led by an able and determined Commander-in-Chief (Admiral Kwei). Morale is an uncertain factor, though it has hitherto been high. Maintenance is not of a high standard.
119. It must therefore be assumed that the Nationalist navy could send a force of at least 25 sea going ships, and some 80 or more armed small craft, against an invasion fleet, but there is a serious shortage of ammunition. The Nationalist navy already possesses a base in the Pescadores islands, and its position out in the Formosa Strait is likely to be an important advantage to the navy in its anti-invasion operations. It also holds advanced bases at Quemoy, Matsu and other small islands off the coast of the mainland.
120. The Air Force . Practically the whole of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (C.N.A.F.) is based on Formosa and its operational strength is estimated to be 36 heavy bombers, 60 light bombers, 192 fighters, 102 transports and l4 reconnaissance aircraft. Although the efficiency and offensive value of the C.N.A.F. is considered to fall well short of Western standards, the morale of the aircrews is thought to be quite good. Their standard of training is believed to be fair though limited in scope. The maintenance and repair organisation lacks proper facilities on Formosa and is probably inefficient.
; 121. The C.N.A.F. is thought to possess substantial reserves of aircraft and considerable stocks of spares and fuel, it is estimated that existing stocks will allow it to be maintained at, or near its present level for at least a year, provided that there is no sharp increase in its rate of activities.
Nationalism and Communism
122. A body called the Formosa Autonomy Movement Committee, which is alleged to have the covert backing of Americans and is apparently non-communist, is said to be working in Hong Kong (it appears also to have branches in Japan and the Philippines) with the object of setting up a Formosa Autonomy Government. Two other similar bodies, both Communist sponsored, are also reported to be operating from Hong Kong with a view to setting up a Red regime in Formosa, using self-government and opposition to the National Government administration as a means to arouse public sympathy.
123. The C.C.P. is reported to be trying to build up an active organisation in the island but there is no evidence to show that its efforts, so far, have met with any appreciable success. A Formosan People’s Democratic Self-Government League has been formed in North China under the auspices of the C.C.P., but it is devoting itself to propaganda rather than to building up an organisation inside the island. Communist influence among the people of Formosa is unlikely to grow rapidly and thus to constitute a threat to the existing regime, so long as the Nationalist armed forces remain loyal.
The Assault
124. Although a proportion of the craft could probably effect the passage of the Straits of Formosa within 24 hours, the majority would take longer and the destination of the assault force would soon become apparent. This would facilitate the concentration of Nationalist land forces in the threatened areas.
125. Provided their loyalty remains unweakened, the Nationalist Navy and Air Force, even with their past record and present standard of performance, could achieVE the destruction of a proportion of the invasion force during its passage. In this event it is unlikely that the small proportion of the invading force which effected a landing would be able to maintain a foothold, owing to the numerical superiority of the Nationalist force which it would encounter.
126. From the military point of view, we consider that the Nationalists should be able to repel an assault against the island, and that its capture can result only from the collapse of the Nationalist will to fight. The fact that Formosa is their last refuge from which there can be no retreat, and the immediate presence of Chiang Kai Shek and the more forceful leaders, increase the chances of resistance. But past experience of the unexpected collapse of Nationalist forces, when, on military grounds, resistance could have been successful, make us think that a collapse may nevertheless occur.
MACAO
127. Recent evidence indicates that Macao is thoroughly penetrated by Communists and that the small garrison is unlikely to be able to deal with the internal situation let alone an external attack. It is most improbable that any support would be available from outside.
128. The garrison is poorly equipped by modern standards and comprises a squadron of armoured cars, 3 batteries of artillery and 9 companies of infantry having a total strength of about 4,000 (half of whom are colonial troops from Angola). There are two naval sloops at present based on the colony and no air force garrison.
TIBET
Present Situation and Likelihood of Invasion .
129. It now looks as if the Chinese Communists intend to resolve the Tibetan question by negotiation rather than by force, and a Tibetan Delegation has arrived in New Delhi for this purpose. Chou En Lai has however insisted that final talks must be in Peking. We have no reason to doubt that the Chinese Communists intend to enforce their claims to sovereignty over Tibet and that they will resort to force if negotiations break down.
Opposing Forces.
130. Chinese Communist forces for an assault total some 90,000 men. This force is considered more than adequate to carry a successful invasion of which we do not expect to receive any warning. The Tibetan army comprises some 10,000 men who are badly equipped and are incapable of offering much resistance.
* * *
J.I.C./2l62/50
COPY NO. 12
KOREA – SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 90 .
Attached is the Daily Situation Report on Korea.
(Signed) I.S. STOGKWELL.
1st November, 1950.
DISTRIBUTION:
H.M. The King
The Prime Minister
The Minister of Defence
The Chiefs of Staff
Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence.
Joint Intelligence Committee
Commonwealth Relations Office
Combined Operations Headquarters.
TOP SECRET
SITUATION REPORT NO.90: KOREA.
SITUATION AS KNOWN AT 0900, 1ST NOVEMBER, 1950.
Military Report Source
BOUCHIER REPORT and TOKYO SITREP.
1. Enemy resistance to the Commonwealth and American advance along the West Coast has been moderate to stiff, and tanks, self-propelled guns and mortars are being used in considerable numbers. The Allied advance, however, has been methodical and steady.
2. Further inland more ground has been given as the result of the confusion into which the South Korean Divisions have been thrown by unexpectedly strong North Korean counter attacks. The regimental group, elements of which had reached the Manchurian border, is now cut off, and has orders to withdraw. Meanwhile the American 1st Cavalry Division is moving up to restore the situation.
3. On the East Coast, the enemy drive towards Hamhung has been checked. while in the far North East a further advance has been made against moderate opposition. 10,000 men of the 7th U.S. Division have been landed at Iwon.
4. There is insufficient information to assess either the nature or the extent of the Chinese intervention. It appears to be merely an intensification of the policy of unofficial support to North Korea, which the Chinese Government has been giving throughout the war. During the last few days a considerable number of tanks, self-propelled guns and mortars have been supplied; and information given by a few Chinese prisoners indicates that elements of three Chinese divisions have crossed the Manchurian border into Korea and are fighting with and giving fresh life to North Korean formations. The support is ‘unofficial’ and the Chinese who have been captured have been without shoulder straps or Chinese markings on their uniforms.
* J.I.C.(50) 15 (Final), J.I.C.(50) 1 Series, J.I.C.(50) 54 (Final), J.P. (50) 82 (Final).
Notes
1 . For more see Michael S Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume I – From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming).
2 . See Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The Official History of the British Part in the Korean War, Vol. I: A Distant Obligation (London; HMSO, 1990).
3 . COS(50) 152nd Meeting, 20 September 1950, Confidential Annex, TNA: DEFE 4/33.
4 . JIC(50) 105th Meeting, 4 October 1950, TNA: CAB 159/8.
5 . JIC(50)88(Final – Revise), ‘Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities – 1950/51’, 11 October 1950, TNA: CAB 158/11.
6 . COS(50) 169th Meeting, 16 October 1950, TNA: DEFE 4/36.
7 . Cited in Goodman, The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee .
8 . JIC/2095/50, ‘SITREPS’, 25 October 1950, TNA: DEFE 11/202.
9 . JIC/2162/50, ‘Korea – Situation Report Number 90’, 1 November 1950, TNA: DEFE 11/202.
10 . JIC(50) 117th Meeting, 1 November 1950, TNA: CAB 159/8.
11 . JIC(50)1/17(Final), ‘The Chinese Communist Threat in the Far East and South-East Asia on 29th November 1950’, 30 November 1950, TNA: CAB 158/9.
9
ESTIMATING SOVIET CAPABILITIES
O NE OF THE few wartime secrets to which the JIC had not been privy was the existence of the atomic bomb. The decision to withhold this information had been made by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Yet by the end of the w
ar, the JIC was at the centre of intelligence assessments of Soviet capabilities. This included everything from the disposition, size, quality of training and morale of conventional forces, through to highly scientific analyses of Soviet nuclear progress. These papers were often long and extremely detailed and were intended for a variety of audiences, from the technical consumers in the services to the policy planners in the Ministry of Defence.
At the centre was an estimation of the ‘threat’: a combination of assessing Soviet ‘intent’ and ‘capabilities’. The JIC consistently asserted its view that the Soviet Union would not dare risk starting a nuclear war until it had stockpiled a sufficient number of nuclear weapons. Bombs, of course, were not the sole requirement: they had to be delivered somehow and in the pre-missile era there was a discrepancy between the relative proximity of the Soviet Union’s targets in the UK and the much greater distances to those in the US. As the years progressed and the Soviets manufactured increasingly advanced weaponry and delivery systems, alongside a greater number of bombs, the JIC’s assertion became something of a mantra. Given this assumption, JIC forecasts of Russian capabilities became crucial to post-war military planning.
Initial forecasts of atomic progress, beginning in 1945, foresaw that the Soviet Union would not be in a position to launch a nuclear offensive until 1957. This date was maintained throughout estimates produced in the 1940s. Even the premature detonation of the first Soviet bomb – Joe-1 – in August 1949, coming two or three years before expected, did not alter strategic estimates. 1 This discrepancy was easily explained away because the JIC believed it to be a test, and not the first bomb off the production line. 2
The JIC maintained the belief that any conflict would involve the United States. As the 1950s wore on, and with Anglo-American relations growing closer, this assumption had more credibility. By 1957 it was assessed, for the first time, that the Soviet Union had now reached ‘nuclear sufficiency’ – defined by the JIC as being ‘when the USSR has sufficient nuclear warheads and delivery systems to allocate to the targets which she would wish to destroy in nuclear war’. 3 The implications were disastrous, especially as only a matter of months later the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, thereby increasing the implied threat to the American heartland.
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