From the late 1940s onwards, there appeared a series of discrepancies between JIC and COS statements. The JIC paper below, from 1948, is a clear example of this. Here was a classic instance of a disagreement between intelligence producers and policy consumers. From the COS perspective, these were exhibited as doubts about JIC estimates. Such a critique was eloquently summed up in a note by Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, Chief of the Air Staff: ‘I have long thought that there are serious dangers and disadvantages in accepting for planning purposes the JIC estimates of Russian capabilities.’ 4 But despite such reservations, from the mid-1950s JIC and COS ideas began to converge again. The reason for this seems clear – the growing relationship with the Americans – which revealed COS anxieties about dealing with a Soviet attack alone. 5
Relations with the US intelligence community were close but not without their problems. A fascinating insight into the bomber gap myth was offered by the JIC in 1952, when it was recorded that
for some years the United States Air Force have been keenly concerned with obtaining the funds and authority to expand … DDI [Deputy Director for Intelligence, RAF] who three years ago was in the USA recollects numerous occasions on which the USAF were at pains to establish the existence of the air threat to justify this expansion in the face of opposition from the Navy in particular. The USAF have worked hard on this, and the idea of this threat [of an ‘aerial Pearl Harbor’] has gained wide acceptance. It is likely that this idea has now become so deeply embedded in American and in particular USAF thinking that collated intelligence upon the subject is often subjective to it; it is noteworthy that the intelligence organisation of the USAF lends itself to this sort of distortion … there probably [are] powerful ‘vested interests’ at work to ensure that the ‘intelligence threat’ against the USA is not reduced. 6
Comparing the estimates for different types of Soviet capability in the first decade of the post-war period is revealing. There were certainly some successes: intelligence on the Soviet air force was particularly good, with accurate assessments produced on the increasingly long-range bombers throughout the 1950s. British estimates of Soviet missile capabilities were more conservative than American ones. This was a deliberate move, for as the JIC had warned in 1954, the UK should be ‘wary’ of US forecasts, particularly given their tendency to overemphasise the Soviet threat. 7 In fact, estimates of Soviet progress in both missile and atomic programmes were based on similar, underlying factors: good intelligence on developments was lacking and so a number of assumptions were employed (including the incorrect belief that the Russians were technologically inferior and would not discover any new ways to develop weapons); by contrast, when either weapon was actually tested, remarkably accurate intelligence could be obtained.
By 1957 the JIC correctly concluded that the atomic and missile programmes had been merged, to the extent that it was inconceivable that any future missile would not be nuclear armed. 8 More scarce was intelligence on Soviet development of chemical and biological weapons. It was assumed that both were being worked on, but little evidence was forthcoming. Conventional forces, by contrast, offered a far more mainstream target for the JIC: regular assessments were produced on the Soviet capability and capacity to wage war, including estimates of the scale, nature and effectiveness of the Soviet military. Underlying all these sorts of forecasts was yet another assumption: as one 1947 JIC paper stated, whilst ‘the Soviet land forces … are sufficiently strong … to achieve rapid and far-reaching successes against any likely combination of opposing land forces’, it was unlikely that the Soviet leadership would choose to initiate hostilities in this way. 9
Taken together, although it was by no means straightforward, the elements of military capability were easier to identify. The JIC faced a tremendously difficult task: to achieve a balance in its understanding of the scale, location and capabilities of the Soviet war machine, including producing forecasts of the circumstances in which it might be used and how. In the absence of access to what the Soviet leadership was planning to do, intelligence gaps could only be filled by analytical judgements and assumptions. Despite the ups and downs of intelligence forecasts, throughout the immediate post-war period the view of the JIC was that, although the Soviet Union undoubtedly had the capability to attack the UK, at no point did it intend to do so.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of .
TOP SECRET Copy No. 75
J.I.C. (48) 104. (Final)
8th November, 1948.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES 1949 AND 1956/57.
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee .
The U.K. Joint Intelligence Committee and the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee have jointly prepared an agreed U.K./U.S. Intelligence estimate * on Soviet Intentions and Capabilities. Agreement between the two Intelligence Committees has been obtained on all but five points in the estimate, and only two of these, the Soviet campaign in Turkey and the Soviet submarine potential, are important. Where the differences occur, the views of both Joint Intelligence Committees have been included in the estimate. A list of the paragraphs in which these appear is at Appendix to this report.
2. The appreciation is in two parts. Part I † covers the period between now and the end of 1949. Part II deals with the period 1956/57. In discussing Part II, it became evident that the U.S. Intelligence Team were principally concerned with the period between now and the end of 1949 and not fully briefed to discuss the period 1956/57. Part II has, therefore, been produced in a more abbreviated form than Part I.
3. The main conclusions in this paper on the strategic intentions of the Soviet Union are in line with those in our paper ‡ “Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union”, which were not acceptable to the Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of Staff held that it would not be within the capacity of the Soviet Government to conduct so many simultaneous campaigns. Although in drafting this section of the paper the views of the Chiefs of Staff on this point were borne in mind throughout, we found ourselves unable to modify our previous views, and we also found that the American Intelligence Team was in agreement with them.
4. It may be that some of our differences are due to faulty presentation of our original paper. We then listed some eight campaigns which we considered likely to be carried out simultaneously. In point of fact there are only two major campaigns, Western Europe and the Middle East.
It is possible that the Soviet leaders might wish to carry out these two campaigns in succession. They would appreciate, however, that to attack one area first would enable the Anglo-American powers to attack the heart of the Soviet Union from the other. The inescapable conclusion is that in the event of war the Soviet Union would decide to attack both areas simultaneously.
This would also make the best use of the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union in land and tactical air forces in the early stages of the war, and would enable her to retain the initiative.
5. If this argument is accepted, the differences between the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff would be resolved. The other six simultaneous campaigns are subsidiary or supporting operations employing resources which our intelligence shows are available without interfering with the two main operations.
6. In dealing with our previous papers * “Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union” and “Forecast of World Situation in 1957”, the Chiefs of Staff based their disagreement on the four following arguments:-
(a) Sufficient heed had not been paid to Russian psychology;
(b) All experience went to show that the Soviet Union, unless she was invaded, would limit her strategic objectives;
(c) Russian possibilities were greatly over-estimated and it was doubtful whether 155 Divisions and 1,500 heavy bombers with 20,000 other aircraft in pea
ce time were within the economic capabilities of the Soviet Union, having regard to the immense number of skilled uniformed technicians who would be required to support modern forces of this order;
(d) The Russian command would not be capable of handling several large campaigns at once.
7. Of these arguments, (b) has been considered in paragraphs 3 to 5 above. As regards (a), (c) and (d) our comments are as follows:-
(a) Psychology. We understand that the Chiefs of Staff mean by this criticism that the Russian mind is likely to be reluctant to fight an offensive war on many fronts outside the territory of the Soviet Union because Russian history shows few examples of such a policy. Present Soviet-foreign policy shows that, at least as regards the “Cold War” the attitude of the Soviet Leaders is different. Furthermore, we believe that, if they become convinced that their aims can only be achieved more rapidly by war, they would provoke it and would hope, by forcing the Anglo-American powers to initiate operations, to persuade the Russian people that they were fighting a defensive war against Capitalist aggression.
(b) Size of the Soviet Air Forces and the Shortage of Skilled Technicians. The figure 20,000 other aircraft quoted in para 6(c) not only includes the 1,500 heavy bombers already mentioned, but also some 3,000 aircraft of the Civil Air Transport Fleet which, it was thought, might be made available for military duties. We have now agreed with the American Joint Intelligence Committee that the Soviet Air Force contains some 15,000 – 17,000 aircraft, of all types, in operational units and that the establishment of the Civil Air Transport Fleet is of the order of 1,000 – 1,500 medium and 2,000 light transport aircraft. Thus the Soviet Air Force has to provide maintenance backing for some 15,000 – 17,000 front-line aircraft of all types, and not 21,500 as suggested in para 6(c). Further, we believe that the Soviet Union has in its armed forces a relatively smaller number of skilled technicians than the Anglo-American powers. Although the Russians have fewer enlisted technicians than the Anglo-American powers and do not therefore carry out such major repairs within units, their standard of maintenance is adequate. A senior German tank officer has for example reported that in World War II Soviet tank maintenance was good, although bigger repairs were not carried out so fast as in the German Army. The Red Army had plenty of well-trained mechanics and the German Army increasingly employed Russian prisoners of war in their own tank maintenance companies. It is therefore dangerous to assume that lack of mechanical skill would be a source of weakness in their armed forces.
(c) Capabilities of the Russian Command. During World War II the Russian Command showed considerable ability in handling a number of different operations simultaneously along a front which stretched at one time from the Baltic to the Caucasus. They accomplished this by a system of decentralisation, by grouping armies and supporting air units in “fronts”, and allotting special command teams for specific operations to co-ordinate the action of groups of “fronts”. On the battlefield itself they developed considerable skill in manoeuvring large numbers of armoured formations. They were moreover skilful in moving formations from one area to another and in maintaining the impetus of the advance by ruthless energy in railway construction and operation right into the forward areas. After V.E. day they switched considerable resources to open up a new front in the Far East in accordance with a previously arranged time table. It would be dangerous to assume that the inefficiency resulting from party interference that has been observed in other branches of Soviet life, will also be present in the Army.
8. In reaching our agreed conclusions we have carefully examined the economic * and logistic † implications. We have concluded that, if the Soviet Union wished to go to war in 1949, economic considerations would not in themselves be enough to prevent her from doing so, if she felt confident of attaining her primary objectives rapidly. Since the biggest campaign, as planned, is not expected to last more than two months, and none more than six months, we consider that the needs of the Soviet forces for military equipment could be met largely from mobilisation reserves. The demands they would make on new production from Soviet industry would therefore not be great.
9. The forces allocated to the main campaigns in 1956/57 do not materially exceed those estimated for the same operations in 1949 except in the case of the attack on Western Europe. For this campaign it is considered that an additional 50 line divisions with supporting air regiments might be required ‡ . Since the total numbers engaged in all the campaigns would still be less than the present strength of the Soviet forces, it is considered that reserves of equipment for these additional 50 line divisions and supporting air regiments would continue to be available. Since the campaigns at the later date are not expected to last any longer than in 1949, the demands on new production would probably be even less than before owing to the additional reserves accumulated during the intervening period of low wastage. During the same period, moreover, a very great increase of production capacity should have taken place in accordance with the planned expansion of Soviet Industry.
10. The agreed view of the British and the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committees as to the intentions of the Soviet Union in a war starting between now and the end of 1949 may be summarised as follows:–
A campaign in Western Europe would be undertaken simultaneously with one designed to seize control of the Middle East (including Greece and Turkey and the Suez Canal area.)
11. It was agreed that these two major campaigns would be accompanied by:–
(a) An aerial bombardment against the British Isles.
(b) A sea and air offensive against Anglo-American sea communications.
(c) A campaign against China, and South Korea, and air and sea operations against Japan and U.S. bases in Alaska and the Pacific, in so far as the Soviet Union can support such operations without prejudice to those in other areas.
(d) Small scale one-way air attacks against the United States and Canada, and possibly small scale two-way air attacks against the Puget Sound area.
(e) Subversive activities and sabotage against Anglo-American interests in all parts of the world, and possibly also by a campaign against Scandinavia and air attacks on Pakistan.
12. It was also agreed that:–
(a) On the successful conclusion of the campaign in Western Europe (and possibly Scandinavia), a full scale sea and air offensive would be directed against the British Isles.
(b) The Soviet Union will have sufficient armed forces to undertake campaigns simultaneously in the theatres mentioned in paragraphs 10 and 11 above, and still have sufficient armed forces to form an adequate reserve.
13. It was also agreed that the Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union would be substantially the same in the event of war during the period 1956/57.
Recommendations
14. We recommend that the Chiefs of Staff approve this report as a background for further planning and intelligence studies.
15. We further recommend that the J.S.M. Washington should be instructed to seek the comments of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and to obtain their agreement to the following distribution of this report:–
(c) The Chiefs of Staff in Canada;
(ci) The Commanders-in-Chief, abroad.
(Signed) W.G. HAYTER
E.W.L. LONGLEY-COOK
C.D. PACKARD
L.F. PENDRED
K.W.D. STRONG
P. SILLITOE
D. BRUNT.
Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.
8th November, 1948
TOP SECRET APPENDIX TO
J.I.C. (48) 104
LIST OF PARAGRAPHS IN J.I.C. (48) 100
CONTAINING DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE U.K. AND U.S. JOINT
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
New Soviet Naval Units Expected to be Brought into Commission During 1949.
Part I, Appendix “A”, paragraph 29 (e).
Size, Strength, Disposition and Development of Soviet Submarine Force.
Part I, Appendix “A”, paragraphs 49, 118, 160 and 176.
Part II, paragraph 53.
Mobilisation Potential of Soviet Air Force.
Part I, Appendix “A”, paragraph 54.
Soviet Radar Defences.
Part I, Appendix “A”, paragraph 63.
Soviet Campaign in Turkey – Forces Required, Phasing and Timing.
Part I, Appendix “A”, paragraphs 153 and 154.
* * *
To be circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff
J.I.C. (51) 6 (Final)
19th January, 1951.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
THE SOVIET THREAT
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
1. We state below the present military strength of the Soviet Union, the trend of current developments and conclude with our views on the need for rearmament.
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET UNION Soviet Army
2. The general distribution of Soviet Army formations is as follows:–
Line Divs .
Tank Divs .
Arty. And A.A. Divs .
Total
E. Europe and W. Russia
34
13
16
63
Balkans and Black Sea
29
3
3
35
Central Russia
19
1
1
21
Caspian
29
-
6
35
North Russia
15
-
1
16
Siberia
6
-
-
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