Spying on the World

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Spying on the World Page 27

by Richard J Aldrich


  Templer’s influential report on colonial security was broader than the JIC’s assessment. It spanned police training, issues of financing and potential trouble spots (although the latter drew heavily on another JIC paper). The JIC’s assessment on colonial intelligence and security annexed here, however, strongly influenced Templer’s discussion of intelligence organisation. Importantly, Templer’s clout ensured that many of the JIC’s initial recommendations would be met.

  Broadly speaking, Templer used the JIC’s conclusions as a foundation. Combining them with his experience in Malaya, he added his own irascible and straight-talking style to the report. For example, he built on the committee’s musings about the difference between political and security intelligence. Arguing for interaction between the two, the JIC defined security intelligence as information required to protect a colony from subversion, sabotage and espionage. Political intelligence, by contrast, was all other information required for the effective governance of a colony. Building on this idea, Templer made a similar point – albeit more critically and in a far blunter style. Security intelligence, according to Templer, was neglected in the colonial context. It was ‘regarded as a kind of spicy condiment added to the Secretariat hot-pot by a supernumerary and possibly superfluous cook, instead of being a carefully planned and expertly served dish of its own’. 8

  At the local level, Templer echoed JIC calls to strengthen local intelligence committees (LICs). Although all colonies had an LIC by 1955, their terms of reference differed greatly from territory to territory. The JIC hoped to issue greater guidance from London about the constitution and function of local committees. Templer agreed. Drawing on his own experiences in Malaya and on the JIC recommendations, he rated LICs as ‘a very useful step in the right direction’. 9 He sought to raise the LICs’ status, ensure access to the governor and improve coordination and output. Templer’s (and the JIC’s) recommendations were met. The Colonial Secretary sent fresh instructions to governors on the functioning of LICs in May 1956. 10

  At the Whitehall level, Templer developed JIC ideas about Colonial Office integration. Contrasting with the committee’s polite calls for greater Colonial Office input into the intelligence machinery, Templer lamented the Colonial Office’s lack of ‘intelligence mindedness’. Moreover, he criticised it for being ‘an information rather than an action addressee’. It is likely that JIC members were thinking the same thing but, unlike Templer, were unable to commit such strong terms to paper. Templer recommended reform. He pushed for (and achieved) the creation of an Intelligence and Security Department within the Colonial Office. This promoted a hitherto absent ‘intelligence culture’ and transformed the relationship between the Colonial Office and central intelligence, allowing the JIC to better consider insurgency. 11

  Directly building on the JIC’s recommendations, Templer also strengthened links between the committee and the Colonial Office. He backed the JIC’s request to reissue its charter under the authority of the Colonial Secretary (alongside the Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence). Once more, this was successfully achieved. Templer also recommended greater Colonial Office involvement in the JIC’s report-drafting process, exactly as the committee had requested. This, however, pushed the Colonial Office too far. Colonial officials vehemently opposed what they saw as JIC encroachment onto their jurisdiction. They argued that the committee misunderstood the complexities of colonial territories and overplayed the communist threat. Senior colonial officials even threatened a ‘Whitehall showdown’ in a long-running battle which lingered until after the JIC moved to the Cabinet Office in 1957. 12

  In other cases, Templer made criticisms where the JIC had not. The committee, for example, praised the role of MI5 (and the document below gives a useful overview of MI5’s colonial role). Templer, however, sought to strengthen the system. He successfully pushed for deputies to aid the security intelligence adviser seconded to the Colonial Office from MI5, whilst unsuccessfully seeking to strengthen the role of MI5’s security liaison officers posted in the colonies. 13

  Overall, Templer drew heavily on JIC conclusions in an influential review of colonial security. This led to important reforms which significantly aided the JIC’s ability to consider insurgency. In turn, the committee’s future assessments were then used by policy practitioners considering strategic planning. Insurgency had reached the intelligence agenda, and Whitehall was now better equipped to respond. Importantly, however, the JIC conclusions and Templer’s report started an important debate between the committee and the Colonial Office. They caused a reappraisal of the nature of the Cold War threat and the type of intelligence required to counter it. The JIC could no longer rely purely on defence intelligence and on conceptualising security in narrow militaristic terms. The world was changing. This JIC report not only aided the committee’s ability to assess insurgencies, but also formed part of the debate which ultimately preceded the JIC’s transition to the Cabinet Office, where it could take a more holistic account of security. With the Colonial Office better integrated into the intelligence machinery, policymakers were offered more accurate appreciations of future insurgencies.

  (THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT)

  J.I.C. (55) 28 COPY NO. 5

  23rd March, 1955.

  CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

  JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

  COLONIAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

  Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

  At the request of General Templer we have examined certain points relating to Colonial Security and Intelligence. Our report is at Annex. Our conclusions are as follows.

  CONCLUSIONS

  2. Intelligence Reports from the Colonies

  The value of the periodic reports now rendered would be greatly increased if all Colonial Governors added regularly their own appraisal or evaluation of facts contained in the report, including an indication of likely future developments (Part I, para. 2).

  3. Local Intelligence Committees

  The guidance given to Colonial Governors over a period of years regarding the composition and working of Local Intelligence committees should be reviewed and consideration should be given to consolidating and re-issuing it in a single document (Part I, Paragraph 5).

  4. The Functions of the Security Service in Colonial Territories

  The present arrangements seem to enable the Security Service to make their contribution without weakening the responsibility of local Administrations for their own Security (Part I, para. 12).

  5. Methods of handling and destination of Intelligence reports from the Colonies

  In addition to existing arrangements for the dissemination of intelligence reports received from the colonies we consider that the JIC’s “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” should cover the Colonies. Arrangements should be made to enable the Colonial Office to take a full part in the drafting of the review by the Heads of Sections on Tuesday afternoons (Part I, paras. 15 and 17).

  SECRET

  U.K. EYES ONLY

  6. Colonial Office representation on the Joint Intelligence Staff

  Similar arrangements should be made to enable the Colonial Office to take a full part in the work of the Joint Intelligence Staff (Part I, para. 17).

  7. The J.I.C. Charter and Colonial Intelligence

  The J.I.C. Charter issued in 1948 by the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence, needs no substantive amendment, but should, in order to regularise and facilitate close co-operation between the Colonial Office and J.I.C., be withdrawn and reissued jointly by the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Colonial Secretary (Part I, para. 26).

  (Signed) P.H. DEAN

  V. BOUCHER

  W.H.L. McDONALD

  J.A. SINCLAIR

  D.G. WHITE

  K.W.D. STRONG

  C.Y. CARSTAIRS

  C.E. KEYS (for D.N.I.)

  Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.

  23rd March, 1955.


  ANNEX

  COLONIAL SECURITY

  PART I

  THE FORM WHICH INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM THE COLONIES SHOULD TAKE AND THE MATERIAL THEY SHOULD CONTAIN

  1. Security Intelligence Reports are for the most part prepared by the special branches of the various Colonial police forces. They are submitted to Colonial Governors but are not normally forwarded to London. Governors, however, include relevant matter contained in local security intelligence reports in their monthly Intelligence Reports which are sent to the Colonial Office. For this reason it will be more useful to consider the requirement for intelligence reports generally, rather than the more restrictive requirements for security intelligence reports.

  2. At the present time Colonial intelligence reports received in London are generally speaking factual documents; they do not usually attempt an evaluation of trends nor do they include any forecast of possible future developments. Their value would be greatly increased if all Colonial Governors added regularly a final section giving their own appraisal or evaluation of facts contained in the report, including an indication of likely future developments.

  CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES

  3. Governors from time to time receive advice. Guidance from the Secretaries of State for the Colonies on the working of Local Intelligence Committees. These are also referred to in a Chiefs of Staff paper * “Procedure for Calling for Assistance from the Armed Forces to Support Foreign and Colonial Policy” The relevant section is as follows:–

  “Local Intelligence Committees.

  Local Intelligence Committees exist in certain Colonial territories and are organised partly for the purpose of co-ordinating all intelligence within a particular territory for the guidance of the Governor and the local Service Commanders, and partly to provide a properly constituted body with which the Joint Intelligence Committee can exchange views. These Committees when constituted are normally under the chairmanship of a senior officer of the Colonial Goverment and contain representatives of the Services and of any Departments of the Colonial Government (e.g. Police or Native Affairs) who by their knowledge and experience are in a special possition to assist the Committee. Local Intelligence Committees are not necessarily subordinate to Local Defence Committees but may be responsible directly to the Colonial Governor himself, whilst co-operating freely with the appropriate Joint Initelligence Committee.”

  4. The foregoing extract, which was circulated in 1950, did not take fully into account the constitutional responsibilities of either the Secretary of State for the Colonies or of Governors; consequently it has not been followed to the letter. Local Intelligence Committees now exist in all Colonies and are advisory, and responsible to the Governors whose Intelligence report to the Secretary of State they draft. There is, of course, every reason for them to be in close touch with the appropriate regional Joint Intelligence Committees (i.e. J.I.C. (F.E.) and J.I.C. (M.E.)) and this is the practice. There has been very little contact between the J.I.C. (London) and the Local Intelligence Committees nor indeed, in practice, has there been a requirement for this. Occasions may arise when, because an external threat to a Colony has developed or if a Colony is outside the area of responsibility of a regional J.I.C., direct contact will become desirable. It can then be arranged on an ad hoc basis.

  5. Although Local Intelligence Committees exist in all Colonies and the appointments of the members of each committee are known, there is no standard constitution for these committees. The level at which the different committees are constituted varies from Colony to Colony. Experience indicates that if representation on such a committee is at too high a level its value as a working body tends to diminish. A standard constitution would clearly be impracticable, and it would probably be better in any case to avoid too rigid a set-up; but it is suggested that the guidance given over a period of years should be reviewed and if necessary collated and reissued to all Governors, laying down a broad pattern of the way in which Local Intelligence Committees should be constituted and given guidance on the functions they should perform. These should perhaps be defined broadly as the study and proper presentation of all relevant security and political intelligence at monthly (or more frequent) intervals; the preparation where appropriate of studies relevant to their work; the continuous consideration of the state of intelligence in the Colony, and the submission of proposals for measures to improve it where appropriate; forecasts of likely future developments and perhaps also the preparation of periodic reviews of the general situation in the Colony from the intelligence point of view.

  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES. DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

  6. As indicated above political intelligence and security intelligence in Colonial Territories must both overlap and interact. It is, therefore, difficult clearly to define them. As a rough and ready guide, however, it might be said that security intelligence is any information which may be needed to protect a Colony from subversion, sabotage and espionage; political intelligence is any other information required for the effective government of a Colony. Security intelligence includes all aspects of Communist activity and extremist “nationalist” activities. The Special Branch should collect and collate all information affecting the security of a colony and present it in collated form to the Local Intelligence committee where it can be related to political intelligence and the significance of both assessed before submission to the Governor.

  THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SECURITY SERVICE IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES

  7. The Director General of the Security Service is charged in his charter “in consultation with the Colonial Office (to) assist and advise Colonial administrations......”

  8. Assistance and advice is given both in London and in the Colonial territories. In London advice is given to the Colonial Office at all levels on security policy for the Colonies and methods of implementing it. In addition, British and international communist policy towards the Colonies is studied centrally, and case work within the U.K. is conducted on behalf of the Colonies.

  9. The Security Service has seconded to the Colonial Office a Security Intelligence Adviser (S.I.A.) who advises the Secretary of State and Colonial Governors on the organisation of the Special Branch and related intelligence matters. His work has been supported in a number of ways and particularly by training officers, who have already visited many Colonial areas to give training courses to members of Special Branches within their own Colonies. In addition, training courses to Colonial Special Branch Officers of the higher ranks are given periodically by the Security Service in London.

  10. Security Service representation within Colonial areas is not always in the same form. In Gibraltar and Malta there are Defence Security Officers (D.S.Os). In most other Colonies the Security Service representative is called the Security Liaison Officer (S.L.O). In some instances the Security Service representative has been placed within the Special Branch either as an adviser to the Head of the Special Branch, or as a research officer within the Special Branch.

  11. The Security Service representative in a Colony has the duty to inform the Governor, Service Commanders, the Commissioner of Police, and other appropriate local officials on matters affecting security. He is the normal channel for security business between the Special Branch and the Security Service Headquarters in London and other security organisations within the Commonwealth; and, through London, with the rest of the free world. He is so placed that he can give advice to the Special Branch, based on his own experience and backed by the authority and experience of the Security Service, and can bring matters to the attention of the Colonial Administration when he thinks it necessary. He can on occasion support this by getting the Security Service to intervene with the Colonial Office in London.

  12. It is believed that the present arrangements enable the Security Service to make their contribution without weakening the responsibility of local Administrat
ions for their own security.

  METHODS OF HANDLING AND DESTINATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM THE COLONIES

  13. As mentioned in paragraph 1 above, Special Branch reports as such are not generally received in London. Bearing in mind the difficulties of separating security from political intelligence, the present form in which security intelligence is collected, collated and disseminated in the Colonies, serves, in general, the purpose for which it is designed. The problem lies rather in ensuring that matters of security intelligence interest of moment are included in Governors’ regular monthly intelligence Reports. These normally reach London from all Colonies on or about the 20th of the following month and total collectively some 6-800 pages.

  14. The Joint Intelligence Committee is kept informed of intelligence affecting colonial security in the following ways:–

  (a) The Colonial Office compiles from reports received from Governors a monthly “Colonial Office Political Intelligence Summary”. These summaries are circulated to interested Departments on or about the twelfth of each month, and comprise some twenty pages of factual information, mainly on events that have occurred in each Colony during the last month but one, but also include more up to date information based on telegraphic reports.

  (b) In addition, the Colonial Office compiles specially for the J.I.C. a much shorter selection from the above summary, called the “Colonial Office Review of Current Intelligence”. This, also, is brought up to date by the inclusion of additional items that have been reported since the Political Summary was compiled. It is circulated to the J.I.C. on or about the 24th of each month.

  (c) Copies of Colonial Office Prints are circulated when issued.

  (d) When disturbances are feared or take place in a Colony the Colonial Office circulate to Defence and other Departments copies of telegrams from Governors.

 

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