(e) In present circumstances regular reports on the situation from the Governors of Hong Kong and Kenya and the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya are circulated automatically to Directors of Intelligence.
(f) The War Office circulates a number of Military situation reports received from Cs.-in-C. in Colonies where active operations are in progress, e.g. Kenya.
(g) From time to time the Colonial Office representative on the Joint Intelligence Committee produces at a J.I.C. Meeting under “Unforeseen Items” an item of “hot” current intelligence from a Colonial territory.
15. The Joint Intelligence Committee approves each Thursday morning a “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” which (or a summary of which) is submitted for the information of Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. At present this does not cover the Colonies except incidentally (e.g. British Somaliland in references to the Haud). The “hot” reports from the Colonial Office representative (paragraph 14 (g) above) are not normally incorporated in the “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” or its summary. Colonial Intelligence Reports through Joint Intelligence Committee channels are limited to the “Colonial Office Review of Current Intelligence” (paragraph 14 (b) above). It would seem desirable that the “Weekly Review of Current Intelligence” should cover important events and trends in the Colonies also and that arrangements should be made to enable the Colonial Office to take part in the drafting of the review by the Heads of Sections on Tuesday afternoons. It is understood that this would require regular telegraphic reports from named Colonies (such as those mentioned in paragraph 14 (g) above), and, in addition, telegraphic reports from any Colony where the situation demanded.
THE FUNCTIONS AND RELATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF IN THE COLONIAL OFFICE IN SO FAR AS THIS AFFECTS THE J.I.C. INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF COLONIAL OFFICE REPRESENTATIONS ON THE J.I.S.
16. The Colonial Office is represented on the Joint Intelligence Committee by the Under Secretary supervising its Defence Department. The same Department furnishes representation on the Joint Intelligence Staff when and as necessary calling in if required specialist advisors from the Geographical Department concerned.
17. The arrangements for representation on the Joint Intelligence Staff are satisfactory, subject to the condition in the last sentence of this paragraph. If the suggestions in paragraph 15 above are accepted and in order to make possible the rapid collation and presentation of intelligence from the Colonies in the Weekly Review and Summary, it will be neccessary for a Colonial Office representative to attend the weekly Heads of Sections meetings at the J.I.C. Both he and the Colonial Office representatives attending meetings of the Joint Intelligence Staff should be able to discuss, and modify where appropriate, their contributions.
THE J.I.C. CHARTER AND COLONIAL INTELLIGENCE
History of Charter
18. The present Charter of the J.I.C. was issued early in 1948 (D.O. (48) 21). It reads as follows:–
“The Joint Intelligence Committee is given the following responsibilities:–
(i) Under the Chiefs of Staff to plan, and to give higher direction to, operations of defence intelligence and security, to keep them under review in all fields and to report progress.
(ii) To assemble and appreciate available intelligence for presentation as required to the Chiefs of staff and to initiate other reports as the Committee may deem necessary.
(iii) To keep under review the organisation of intelligence as a whole and in particular the relations of its component parts so as to ensure efficiency, economy and a rapid adaptation to changing requirements, and to advise the Chiefs of Staff on what changes are deemed necessary.
(iv) To co-ordinate the general policy of Joint Intelligence Committees under United Kingdom Commands over-seas and to maintain an exchange of intelligence with them, and to maintain liaison with appropriate Commonweallth intelligence agencies.”
19. In none of the discussions connected with the charter was there any mention of Colonial Territories or the Colonial Office, which was not at that time represented on the J.I.C. The Charter was issued under the authority of the then Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence who circulated it for the information of the Defence Committee.
Colonial Office Representation
20. In the autumn of 1948, largely at the instance of the then Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister agreed to ask the Colonial Office to appoint a permanent representative on the J.I.C. Mr. Bevin’s minute to the Prime Minister read as follows:
“As you know it is my belief that our Colonial territories are likely to be one of the principal objectives of Communist attack in the near future. With this in mind it seems to me very important that we should do everything possible to ensure that we have the best possible intelligence about Comnunist activity in the Colonies, so that we may not be taken unawares.
As a first step towards this I suggest that the Colonial Office might consider appointing a permanent member of the J.I.C., so that the Colonial Office would remain in constant touch with the intelligence picture as a whole and with the development of communism throughout the world, in so far as it is known to our intelligence organisation. I am sure that such an appointment would be of great value not only to the Colonial Office but to the other departments represented on the J.I.C.”
21. On September 23, 1948, General Hollis, Principal Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence, supported the Foreign Secretary’s proposal in a minute to the Prime Minister as follows:
“My views on the Foreign Secretary’s proposal that the Colonial Office should have a permanent member on the J.I.C. are as follows.
The object of this proposal is to ensure that we have the best possible intelligence about Communist activity in the Colonies so that we may not be taken unawares. The best way to achieve this is to strengthen and tune up our Colonial Police Forces. We must have good Intelligence services on the spot so that communist activities can be apprehended right from the start, and not after they have secured a firm foothold. Recent events on the Gold Coast and in Malaya demonstrate this need.”
22. The Colonial Office accepted this invitation and after the Chiefs of Staff had given their approval a representative of the Colonial Office took his seat at the J.I.C. on October 8, 1948.
23. Since that date the Colonial Office have been represented at meetings of Directors and Deputy Directors but have had no regular representations of the J.I.C. or at Heads of Sections meetings.
Scope of charter
24. From the outset it has been assumed that the charter of the J.I.C. is wide enough to authorise them to deal with operation of defence intelligence and security in colonial territories. This view seems correct and the reference in paragraph (iv) of the Charter to “appropriate Commonwealth intelligence agencies” is clearly to the intelligence agencies in the self-governing territories of the Commonwealth. No change therefore in the present terms of reference of the J.I.C. appears necessary from this point of view.
25. At the time that the Colonial Office joined the JIC no changes were made in the Charter or in the issuing authorities, who remained the Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence only.
Conclusions
26. In these circumstances it is suggested that it would materially assist the Colonial Office to play a full part in the work of the J.I.C. and to give effect to the objects for which a representative of the Colonial Office was invited to join the J.I.C., if the present Charter of the J.I.C. were withdrawn and reissued under the authority of the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Colonial Secretary.
27. The advantages of this would be as follows:–
(a) to place the Colonial Secretary in the same position as the other two Ministers as regards calling on the J.I.C. to prepare intelligence estimates etc. within its terms of reference;
(b) to record formally that the J.I.C. has a responsibility under its charter for intelligence and security in the colonial territories;
(c) to enable the J.I.C. more easily to ask for
information, advice and assistance from the Colonial Office in the same way as it at present does from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Service Departments;
(d) to encourage and facilitate closer association and exchanges in the fields covered by the terms of references between the Colonial Office and the colonial territories on the one hand and the other departments represented on the J.I.C. on the other;
(e) to enable the J.I.C. to present to the Chiefs of Staff and to Ministers proper intelligence appreciations on the colonial territories, both individually and within the general framework of the threats posed to them by Russian and Chinese imperialism, Communism, nationalism, racialism etc., and to perform as regards those territories the functions with which it is charged at present in respect of intelligence and security in other territories.
* C.O.S. (50) 289
Notes
1 . John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–49 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), pp. 9–33.
2 . Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
3 . David French, The British Way in Counter-insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 13–24.
4 . Rory Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 195–221.
5 . Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 113–15.
6 . Gerald Templer, ‘Report on Colonial Security’, 23 April 1955. CAB 21/2925.
7 . Note from de Zulueta to Eden, 13 May 1955, PREM 11/2247; note from Eden to Lord Chancellor, 5 June 1955, PREM 11/2247; Rory Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security’, Intelligence and National Security 25/6 (2010), p. 803.
8 . Templer, ‘Report on Colonial Security’, p. 14.
9 . Ibid., p. 16.
10 . Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence’, p. 808.
11 . Templer, ‘Report on Colonial Security’, pp. 15, 18–19.
12 . Cormac, Confronting the Colonies , p. 72.
13 . Cormac, ‘Organizing Intelligence’, pp. 805–6.
11
THE SUEZ CRISIS
W HILST EUROPE MIGHT have been the primary Cold War battleground in the decade following the end of the Second World War, it was by no means the only one. Indeed, the success of the communists in the Chinese Civil War and the subsequent Korean War had embedded the Cold War in Asia. In the Middle East, with Britain’s responsibilities reducing, there arose an increasing amount of hostility to the remnants of her colonial past. In every other theatre the hand of Moscow was perceived to be present, even if its scale and level of involvement varied. In the Middle East, by contrast, the JIC immediately equated nationalist uprisings with communist-inspired insurrections: it was simply unthinkable to have one without the other.
Trouble in Egypt, and in particular the Suez Canal Zone, began several years before it reached boiling point in 1956. The canal itself was an important trading route which reduced shipping times, cut costs and shortened voyages. A 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty had solidified matters, with the British promising, amongst other things, to supply the Egyptians with arms and training. The reasoning was not just economic: Egypt was perceived to be central to British defence planning in the Middle East. The status quo was thrown into chaos by several changes starting with the 1951 Egyptian renouncement of the treaty, introducing fears that communism was on the rise.
Despite concern in some parts of Whitehall, the JIC’s initial assessments discounted the spread of communism. From 1951 the JIC regularly monitored events in Egypt. Indeed, there were a number of significant developments to understand, including the successful coup by military officers and the various governments that ensued. One of those closely involved was Colonel Gamal Nasser, who, initially at least, was welcomed in London as someone the British could deal with. Accordingly, preparations began for a new mutual defence agreement. Relations certainly seemed to be improving but, from 1955, they faltered and then completely disintegrated as both nations slipped towards war.
The abrogation of the 1936 treaty meant that the UK no longer provided arms to Egypt. As a result, the JIC was charged with monitoring Egyptian efforts to obtain arms. 1 At its meeting on 29 September 1955 the JIC discussed a startling new piece of intelligence: the report that an arms deal had been struck between Egypt and Czechoslovakia. 2 The instant reaction was that this was not simply a deal between two nations but a sign that Nasser, by now President, had welcomed the Russians into the region. Such sentiments were heightened by evidence in late 1955 to suggest that the Russians were offering to bankroll the construction of the Aswan Dam project. A key task for the JIC was to consider how far Nasser had been captured by these deals. Its assessments were remarkably measured, although it noted that eventually the Egyptians would reach the point of ‘no return’. 3
From the first weeks of 1956 plans began to be formalised in various parts of the government, designed to remove Nasser from power. The rationale was twofold: not only was he increasingly seen in some political quarters as irrevocably lost to the Soviet cause, but he was also affecting Britain’s commercial interests through his control of the Suez Canal. The JIC took a sober and level-headed view. The appended assessment from August 1956 provides evidence of the role that the JIC often played in unfolding events. Whilst the title of the report might seem narrow, its contents were anything but. The relatively brief assessment (for that period) offered a broad survey of the situation. 4
The assessment was produced in the aftermath of Nasser’s decision to nationalise the Suez Canal. According to the JIC, Nasser had two primary motives: to divert domestic attention (a move seen as a ‘triumph’) and to provide a means of striking back against the West. The assessment then considered Nasser’s character (an emotional demagogue) and attempted to gauge the effect of the nationalisation on regional states. Next it moved into the prophetical by discussing ‘possible future developments’. The JIC emphasised that the actions of the West would have a direct bearing on Soviet decision making but argued that there was still some independence in Egypt’s position. Perhaps more importantly, certainly for what would transpire next, the report looked at different regions and examined the potential effect of either a protracted conflict or war with Egypt. It concluded:
Although most, if not all, the Arab States would sympathise with Egypt [in the event of military conflict] we do not think that in the event they would come to her aid … We also doubt whether the Soviet Union would take any action … we do not believe she [the Soviet Union] would embark on global war on behalf of Egypt.
Apart from COS approval of the paper, there is no other evidence to suggest how it was greeted. Increasingly from August 1956 the JIC’s products were received and used in different ways. Its tactical assessments were important and appreciated by the military, but its strategic assessments were marginalised and ignored by policymakers. 5 Between late September and mid-October papers were issued on: Nasser’s possible future courses of action if the Suez dispute was settled on terms favourable to Egypt; the Israeli attitude towards Arab states; and a larger study on the threats to UK interests worldwide. 6
Whilst its Chairman, Patrick Dean, was involved in the signing of the Sèvres Protocol and other intimate details of the military plans concerning the Suez Canal, the JIC itself continued to meet, oblivious to the collusion being formed with Israel and France. In fact the JIC had more pressing matters to deal with: in mid-October events in Hungary took precedence over Suez. That changed on Monday, 29 October, when Israel attacked Egypt. The JIC was immediately called into action: it began the production of five daily outputs, it maintained an around-the-clock presence, and its military members met daily. Within a week military operations were halted, amidst widespread international condemnation. The JIC, marginalised and u
nheard, had nonetheless produced useful assessments. Its tactical reports were of huge value to the military and had its strategic assessments been read and digested, the folly of Suez might have been averted. Meanwhile, for the JIC, its unhappy marginalisation during Suez contributed to the decision to remove it from the machinery of the Chiefs of Staff and locate it more centrally within the Cabinet Office. 7
CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF
J.I.C. (56) 80 (Final) (Revise)
3rd August, 1956
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
EGYPTIAN NATIONALISATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL COMPANY
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
INTRODUCTION
Egyptian motives . The Egyptian nationalisation of the Canal Company followed promptly upon the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, United States and World Bank offers to help finance the Aswan High Dam. Nasser’s declared motive was to obtain from the operation of the Canal the funds he needed to build the Dam. We doubt however whether this is the real reason for his action. There have been a number of indications that he himself has recently had doubts whether the High Dam is the best way of solving his power and irrigation problems, and he must have realised that the net annual profit likely to be derived from the Canal is only a fraction of the Dam’s cost. The building of the Dam had, however, come to be seen in the popular mind as the cure for all Egypt’s ills and Nasser’s own position and prestige were staked upon its accomplishment. When the Western offer of financial aid was withdrawn, therefore, he urgently needed to distract public attention and at the same time find a new method to arouse their enthusiasm and to repair any damage which his stock might have suffered in other Arab countries. As a means to this end his nationalisation of the Canal has been a triumph; it has also served the subsidiary purpose of retaliation against the West for the withdrawal of the High Dam offer.
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