KHRUSHCHEV’S MOTIVES
Soviet Defence Policy
10. We have described elsewhere the objectives of Soviet defence policy as follows:–
“Khrushchev’s conviction about the ‘non-inevitabi1ity of war’, a doctrine not held by previous Soviet leaders, implies not only that the Soviet Government do not regard war as an expedient means of pursuing their ends but that the non–Communist world can be prevented from making war in pursuit of theirs. The only exceptions to this belief are:–
(a) the Soviet fear that the non-Communist countries may indulge in ‘local’ wars, confident that the balance of nuclear terror rules out the risk of escalation; and
(b) the Soviet conviction that it is the duty of Communists to support ‘wars of liberation’ everywhere, though cautiously, so as to avoid the risk of escalation into general war.
Nevertheless, their history and convictions about capitalist intentions must prevent the Soviet leaders from feeling complacent. The Soviet Union must be made as invulnerable as possible against the possibility of capitalist attack in any form. Apart from direct military needs, a ceaseless effort is required to alter the correlation of forces in the world in favour of Communism. The greater the strength of Soviet armed forces vis-avis the capitalist world, the greater the impulse behind political expansion and subversion”.
11. We continued:
“Within this general framework the Soviet Union see their armed forces as necessary for the following specific requirements:–
(a) to secure the Soviet Union and Communist bloc from external attacks by the possession of a credible deterrent;
(b) to defend the Soviet Union and bloc and secure the most favourable outcome to hostilities if the deterrent fails;
(c) to provide support for national liberation wars and the necessary counter to imperialist local wars;
(d) to provide a backing of impressive military strength for Soviet foreign policy;
(e) to assist in maintaining internal security and to frustrate any attempt to overthrow Communist regimes anywhere in the bloc.”
12. We further stated:
“Soviet policy is likely to be guided by the following principles, at least until such time as the Russian leaders are entirely confident about the relative balance of military power:
(a) great caution in foreign policy so as to avoid the risk of war or of having to back down because of this risk; nevertheless,
(b) a reluctance to negotiate from weakness on major issues.”
13. We now discuss how far Khrushchev’s actions over Cuba were consistent with the above.
Defence of the Soviet Union
14. The increased confidence of the Americans in their strategic capability, coupled with their evident determination to increase their strength yet further, appear to have caused the Russians some concern about the credibility of their deterrent. They therefore embarked in the second half of 1961 on a major expansion of their defence programme. The main Soviet effort in this respect must clearly be directed to those weapon systems, such as hardened ICBM sites and submarines, which could survive an initial surprise attack. The missiles in Cuba would have been very vulnerable to surprise or preemptive attack. Nevertheless, the additional nuclear potential which they would have provided would have significantly increased the overall Soviet nuclear capability. Moreover, as the word itself implies, the “credibility” of a deterrent is determined not only by numbers, quality and invulnerability of weapons but also by such considerations (which might perhaps be called psychological) as their nearness to the target country and the degree of control over their use likely to be exercised by the other side. Seen in this light, the Soviet nuclear strength in Cuba, despite its vulnerability, would have contributed in some measure to the requirement at paragraph 11(a) above.
Defence of Cuba
15. Since the Bay of Pigs attack in 1961 the Russians may well have had a genuine fear that sooner or later the United States might consider it necessary to attack Cuba. By supplying the Cubans with large quantities of conventional arms over the last two years they showed the Americans that an invasion of Cuba could only be conducted as a major and costly operation. The establishment in Cuba of surface-to-surface missiles and BEAGLE aircraft with a nuclear capability, even though under Soviet control, would have added to this deterrent. If they had wished to invade Cuba under these conditions the Americans would have had either to accept the risk of grave damage to their homeland or to guard against it by neutralising the weapons at the outset. Complete success in the latter could probably not be guaranteed by conventional attacks. The establishment of Soviet offensive nuclear power in Cuba would therefore have contributed considerably to requirements at paragraph 11(c) above.
Backing of Strength for Soviet Foreign Policy
16. The establishment of an offensive nuclear capability so close to the United States clearly posed an additional and substantial threat of Soviet attack on America. The Russians could have expected that this would have reduced the confidence with which the United States approached future critical confrontations with the Soviet Union and significantly increase the pressure which the latter could safely bring to bear in seeking to force Western acceptance of Soviet demands, for example in Berlin. The Russians had given the strong impression that they were planning such pressures towards the end of the year when the missile sites would have been completed.
17. Such a spectacular achievement would also have:-
(a) encouraged Communists throughout the world and particularly in Latin America;
(b) impressed the Chinese, whose accusations that Khrushchev has not been pursuing the communist cause with all the revolutionary vigour, would have been debunked;
(c) boosted Castro’s regime;
(d) appeased such elements, if any, in the Soviet hierarchy as may have been dissatisfied with Khrushchev’s policy of moderation.
18. All this would have been a significant contribution towards the requirements at paragraph 11(d) above.
Khrushchev’s Assessment
19. It is clear from the foregoing arguments that Khrushchev saw several important gains in the establishment of a nuclear capability in Cuba. He probably believed that in the last resort the Americans would not risk global war over this issue. He must have realised that to withdraw once he had begun the operation would result in a weakening of his authority within the Communist Bloc and perhaps also his personal position; it would give added substance to the Chinese claims that he was ineffective as the leader of world Communism against imperialism; and it would detract substantially from the credibility of Soviet threats to back up encroachment on Western interests by the use of military power.
20. Khrushchev’s calculation was therefore probably that the Americans would not go beyond political action, particularly if the Russians moved quickly enough to face them with a fait accompli . He may well have believed that there was a reasonable chance of success if he acted fast enough. He may well have been persuaded that the infrequency of the routine United States surveillance of Cuba, the public knowledge that SAM sites were being built there, the lull in political activity presented by his undertaking not to raise the Berlin issue until after the Congressional elections, and the Russians’ misleading statements, would enable the Soviet nuclear strength to become at any rate partly established in Cuba before discovery. He may well also have appreciated that the Americans on discovering it, would lose time by going first to the United Nations, where Khrushchev could count on the support of the neutral and uncommitted nations, so that he would then have further time in which to consolidate the build-up. Furthermore, he may have thought that once the force was fully operational, he would have been in a stronger position to deal with United States reactions. The Americans would not then have had the option of imposing a blockade on incoming weapons.
21. Against this Khrushchev must have considered the risk of U.S. discovery of his project before its completion. Furthermore he must have appreciated tha
t discovery would inflame American opinion and that in these circumstances the Administration would be under considerable pressure to neutralise the Soviet move. Admittedly he had done his best through public and private warnings to browbeat President Kennedy into believing that any forceful action, including blockade, would mean war and to deter him from the use of force. He had also strongly hinted that if the Americans acted against Cuba he would act where he had local tactical superiority, e.g. Berlin. He could not, however, completely have ignored the possibility that the Americans would use force and in this event he would be obliged to withdraw.
22. We believe that to have taken the risks involved Khrushchev was not simply actuated by the desire to seize the opportunity of turning a local situation to great advantage, but must have had specific and compelling motives for the action that he took. These may well have arisen from a concern that little Soviet progress had recently been made in the Cold War and that there had been no weakening in the West’s determination to maintain the status quo in Berlin. We believe that Khrushchev probably considered it very important, both for the Communist cause and his personal position, to try to obtain some lever against the West at this particular moment in the world’s history. He may have concluded that by placing missiles with nuclear warheads “in their own backyard”, he could jolt the Americans out of what he considered an exaggerated confidence in their superior nuclear strike capability, and wake them up to the realities of the present nuclear confrontation.
23. We believe that Khrushchev must have been influenced more by the politico-military advantages discussed in paragraphs 16, 17 and 22 above than by fine calculations of numbers of missiles and warning periods.
Khrushchev’s Withdrawal
24. The speed and decisiveness of the United States reaction coupled with the substantial support of the O.A.S. and the NATO governments, appears to have completely surprised the Russians. Khrushchev’s actions then were entirely consistent with his character and with our appraisal of Soviet defence policy at paragraphs 10 and 12 above. Finding his major assumption about United States reactions invalid, his paramount concern was to avoid the risk of global war through a head-on collision with the United States, even to the extent of accepting a major political setback to achieve this. He must also have attached considerable importance to safeguarding the communist position in Cuba.
25. Khrushchev has in the past shown a talent for making the best of such situations. He is making the best of this situation by representing himself as the man of peace who has saved the world from thermo-nuclear war; and he can claim that he has achieved his aim of obtaining a clear United States commitment not to attack Cuba. It is certainly his intention that Cuba should remain a Communist outpost of the western hemisphere. He is likely to feel that he cannot now accept any further set-back, and in this he may be influenced by the strong Chinese criticism of the Soviet climb down in Cuba. The Soviet retreat in an exposed area such as Cuba should not therefore be taken to imply an equal willingness to retreat on other issues where the Russians are in a stronger tactical position and where a retreat would more seriously affect their national interests.
(Signed) HUGH STEPHENSON
Chairman, on behalf of The Joint Intelligence Committee. Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
6th December, 1962
Appendix to J I.C. (62) 101 (Final)
BUILD-UP OF ARMY, NAVAL AND DEFENSIVE AIR EQUIPMENTS IN CUBA
Army
1. For the last two years at least the Russians have provided a continuous flow of military equipment to the Cuban Army, and have been helping to train it by a military mission in Cuba and by courses for individuals in the U.S.S.R. Equipment received up to November this year included the following major items:-
920 Pieces of artillery
300 Anti-tank guns
810 Conventional A.A. weapons
75 SU 100 self-propelled 100 mm guns (currently in the Soviet Army).
185-210 T.34/85 medium tanks (no longer in the Soviet Army but used to equip Satellites).
100-140 T.54/100 medium tanks (current Soviet medium tank)
40 JS-2 heavy tanks (no longer in the Soviet Army but used to equip Satellites).
600 82 mm mortars
180 120 mm mortars.
Five FROG free flight rockets (launched from a tank chassis) have been sighted, and about 20 SNAPPER anti-tank missiles have been identified.
2. More than half of the tanks and field artillery pieces listed above were delivered after the beginning of August, 1962.
Navy
3. Between January and June 1962 six anti-submarine coastal escorts of the Kronstadt class and twelve P-6 class torpedo boats were supplied to Cuba. During August and September these were augmented by twelve Komar class patrol boats and another four P-6 torpedo boats. The Komar class are P-6 torpedo boats converted to carry two 10-15 mile surface-to-surface missiles instead of torpedos.
4. There is evidence that there are Soviet technical personnel in the Komars; otherwise these ships are believed to be manned by the Cubans. There are also indications that the Russians may have intended to base submarines in Cuba.
Radar
5. Since early August over 100 modern radars were sited.
SAM Systems
6. Between 29th August and 5th September, air reconnaissance revealed the strengthening of Cuban defences by the introduction of SAM. By 5th October, twenty-four sites each with a range of approximately 25 n.m., were being installed and were operational before the end of the month, giving almost complete coverage of Cuba.
Fighter Aircraft
7. Sixty-one MIG15(FAGOT), MIG17(FRESCO) and MIG19(FARMER) fighters have been identified on Cuban airfields. In addition, by 5th September, thirty-nine MIG21(FISHBED) supersonic fighters have been detected by aerial reconnaissance.
Notes
1 . Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 37–41.
2 . For more see Michael S. Goodman, ‘The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, in David Gioe, Len Scott and Christopher Andrew (eds), An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-Year Retrospective (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming).
3 . WRCI (4 September 1962), TNA: CAB 179/9.
4 . Ibid.
5 . Cited in Goodman, ‘The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Cuban Missile Crisis’.
6 . JIC(62)81(Final), ‘Likely Development of Soviet Defence Policy in the Next Five Years and Its Bearing on Soviet Foreign Policy’, 1 October 1962, TNA: CAB 158/47.
7 . WCRI (25 October 1962), TNA: CAB 179/9.
8 . JIC(62) 50th Meeting, 23 October 1962, TNA: CAB 159/38.
9 . JIC(62)93(Final), ‘The Threat Posed by Soviet Missiles in Cuba’, 26 October 1962, TNA: CAB 158/47.
10 . JIC(62) 51st Meeting, 25 October 1962, TNA: CAB 159/38.
11 . JIC(62)97, ‘First Soviet Reactions to US Action and Intentions Concerning Cuba’, 26 October 1962, TNA: CAB 158/47.
12 . JIC(62) 52nd Meeting, 26 October 1962, TNA: CAB 159/38.
13 . JIC(62) 57th Meeting, 8 November 1962, TNA: CAB 159/38.
14 . Cited in Goodman, ‘The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Cuban Missile Crisis’.
15 . JIC(62)70(Final), ‘Escalation’, 2 November 1962, TNA: CAB 158/47.
16 . JIC(62)77(Final), ‘Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union up to 1967’, 6 December 1962, TNA: CAB 158/47.
17 . JIC(62)101(Final), ‘Soviet Motives in Cuba’, 6 December 1962, TNA: CAB 158/47.
13
VIETNAM
A MERICA ’S PROLONGED CONFLICT in Vietnam asked difficult questions of the British government. It strained the transatlantic relationship and challenged the UK’s understandings of its role east of Suez. Asia was an area of notable Anglo-American friction during the Cold War, dating back to the disagreements over Clement Attlee’s decision to recognise Communist China in 1950. Indeed, the JIC had long held a more realistic assessment of communism in the
region than Washington, which was more determined to resist its spread at all costs. Whitehall had more limited aims. 1
Because they were preoccupied with the Malaysian confrontation, British Conservative governments generally supported American policy over Vietnam. Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-Home sought to demonstrate solidarity with the Americans during the Cold War. Indeed, the Conservatives publicly supported American action as defensive. They had even sent a five-man advisory mission to Saigon in 1961, in an attempt to demonstrate to Washington that Britain was willing to take its share of the Cold War burden in the region. 2 The British genuinely thought their advice would be helpful, whilst they also sought to use the opportunity to gather useful information about the situation in Vietnam. By contrast, however, certain historians, such as Nigel Ashton, have dismissed the mission as merely ‘a sop to try to make up for [Britain’s] reluctance to become engaged in Laos’, 3 where Britain had long refused to offer military support to prevent a French defeat in Indo-China in the 1950s.
Whitehall’s attitude was somewhat torn. On the one hand, Britain had cochaired the 1954 Geneva Conference alongside the Soviet Union, which led to French withdrawal from Indochina and the creation of a ceasefire line between North and South Vietnam. Accordingly, Britain had developed by the early 1960s what it considered to be a monitoring role. The government was therefore apparently keen to uphold this settlement where possible. On the other hand, Douglas-Home when Foreign Secretary privately stated that Britain was ‘prepared to turn a blind eye’ to American intervention (that violated the Geneva Accords). 4
Under pressure from Washington but also dealing with its own problems, Whitehall needed to be aware of American activity in Vietnam. Moreover, policymakers had to understand the consequences of deeper intervention. The JIC was instructed to assess American actions. By the early 1960s, the committee had become far more adept at monitoring and understanding insurgencies. Drawing on experiences from Malaya and other colonial conflicts, the JIC learnt that military and political security had become increasingly blurred in the Cold War world. It was well aware that military solutions alone would not end insurgencies. In 1962, the committee conducted an important assessment on Vietnam. It was not to be shared with the Americans. Although the JIC underestimated the number of troops needed to secure South Vietnam, it made some prescient observations. For example, it correctly predicted that the war would be long and inconclusive. It also warned, accurately, that the Vietcong could not be defeated through military means alone. Interestingly, the committee predicted that increased US involvement would create discomfort within Whitehall. Awkward questions would be asked by Washington. 5
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