On 4 September the JIC aired the ‘possibility’ that the Russians were installing surface-to-air missiles on behalf of the Cuban air defence system. 4 A fortnight later this assessment was strengthened as new intelligence was received. Taken together, the JIC concluded, the evidence ‘suggests that Soviet policy at present is to give military assistance to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the Castro regime without giving it an independent offensive capability’. 5 The crucial language here is ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’. Thus, over a month before the crisis, evidence of a new level of Soviet support was being put before ministers.
On 1 October, in its first detailed assessment since Soviet supplies to Cuba were identified, the JIC considered the likely developments of Soviet defence policy. Its paper concluded that Khrushchev would maintain his desire to avoid war, a position that the JIC had consistently argued. This desire, the paper continued, was underlined by the fact that the US had an overwhelming advantage in its ‘attack capability’. Furthermore, this had ‘probably caused the Russians some concern about the credibility of their deterrent’. 6 Yet in arguing this, the JIC failed to appreciate the lessons of Pearl Harbor and other instances of asymmetric warfare when one side perceives itself to be backed into a corner and resorts to seemingly suicidal tactics.
On 25 October, the JIC referred to developments as the ‘Cuba Crisis’ for the first time. 7 It is possible to make several observations about the period up to 25 October: the JIC was relatively well informed on developments and tried to assess Soviet intentions in light of what was known but also in respect to public statements and disclosed trade agreements; more important, perhaps, was the assumption that the Soviet military deployment was a defensive move, designed to bolster Cuban defences. Yet at no point did the JIC consider why this was happening.
Through the Grey and Red Books the JIC was able to produce short, weekly analytical observations on developments. In addition, though, the committee played a tactical role in the production of a daily assessment of what was happening. Related to the JIS were the ‘heads of sections’ meetings, involving the relevant people from across Whitehall responsible for different geographical locations. From 23 October onwards, the date by which access to US photographic reconnaissance evidence had been obtained and the crisis was underway, the heads of the Western and Latin American sections went onto two hours’ notice to prepare assessments, which they began to do on a daily basis. 8
The increase in tempo and concern was based largely, although not entirely, on the photographic reconnaissance images provided by the United States. In discussion both intelligence communities agreed on their meaning. 9 The JIC concluded there ‘was no question but that a strategic offensive missile threat existed in Cuba’. The key here is the word offensive , and it therefore signalled a reversal of the committee’s earlier conclusion. 10 The first JIC assessment of what the Soviets were up to was issued on 26 October. It did not question grander Soviet motives but examined, more closely, the reaction to the US quarantine of Cuba and concluded that the Soviet response would be threefold:
1.
to stall whilst the construction of the missile sites continued;
2. to use its position in Cuba as a bargaining chip with the Americans over Berlin;
3. and to mobilise world opinion by ‘representing themselves as moderate and peace-loving’. 11
In response to the grave danger presented by the situation, JIC members agreed to ‘hold themselves at two hours’ notice for an emergency meeting’. 12 To ensure that ministers and officials were given the best possible information, the JIC met on both Saturday, 27 and Sunday, 28 October. In addition the heads of sections continued to issue daily reports, providing an update on Soviet military developments worldwide and the progress of the missile construction on Cuba itself. From 29 October, once it had been reported that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle the offensive missile sites in Cuba, the frequency of the heads of sections’ report on other worldwide events declined.
By 8 November, the JIC concluded that unless there were any ‘unexpected developments’, the heads of sections could reduce their meetings to twice weekly, 13 and by 13 November, the date of the last heads of sections’ report, it was stated that Soviet missile sites were being dismantled and heavily laden ships were returning to the Soviet Union. 14 The Cuban Missile Crisis, in the JIC’s view, was over. Unsurprisingly, though, this was not the end of the JIC’s interest in Cuba. In fact the JIC’s most telling and valuable contribution was in the aftermath of the crisis, when it tried to explain Soviet motives.
Immediately following the cessation of the crisis the JIC approved an assessment, four months in preparation, entitled ‘Escalation’. It began with the hypothetical premise that a hostile act had been committed by either the Soviet Union or the West and had been opposed by the other. Building upon how the crisis had developed, it concluded that ‘it is now the fear of global war arising through a process of escalation which constitutes the deterrent to limited aggression, rather than the fear of immediate, massive retaliation’. 15 There was a real danger in misunderstanding the opponent’s motives or misreading his intentions. A subsequent JIC paper, disseminated in early December, concluded that the Soviet Union would wish to avoid deliberate war; therefore, ‘apart from an accident, and assuming the Soviet leaders act rationally, we only envisage global or limited war between the Soviet Union and the West coming about as a result of a process of miscalculation’. 16
However, the most important assessment was a further paper also disseminated in early December. It was the first, substantial attempt by the JIC to consider what the Soviet motives had been in placing missiles in Cuba. The report re-examined the JIC’s earlier judgements on Soviet defence policy in light of what had happened in Cuba, concluding that its previous assessments were still valid. The Soviet Union’s concern about its strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the United States was thought to be central to its actions, and this was reflected in the desire to strengthen Cuban defences against a future US invasion, but also to place offensive Soviet missiles as close to the US mainland as possible. As a by-product, the Soviets could have used their new-found position to strengthen their hand in dealings about Berlin.
Khrushchev was, of course, the pivotal character, as the second of the documents reproduced below suggests. The JIC assumed that he knew that the Americans would not resort to all-out war and so he would have planned to use the political defusing of the crisis to enhance his own position as the leader of world communism. The nature of the termination of the crisis meant that Khrushchev had not been entirely successful. Yet, the JIC warned, the Soviet retreat in Cuba should not be taken as a sign that similar retreats should be expected elsewhere. 17 In a sense, therefore very little had changed.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of .
TOP SECRET Copy No 113
J.I.C. (62) 99 UK EYES ONLY
27th October, 1962.
CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSE TO A U.S. DECISION TO BOMB OR INVADE CUBA
1. We have considered the above in the light of information given to H.M. Ambassador by the U.S. Government on the evening of 26th October that the U.S. must obtain within 48 hours three objectives:
(i) The cessation of the shipping of offensive weapons;
(ii) The cessation of construction work on the sites, and
(iii) The “de-fusing” of the weapons already in Cuba.
2. Once these objectives had been obtained, the U.S. would then be prepared to negotiate over two to three weeks the removal of the weapons from the island. All these arrangements would have to include satisfactory verification of compliance, and the U.S. could not suspend their quarantine arrangements until there was a satisfactory substitute including such verification. If there was a flat refusal t
o permit any inspection or control, the U.S. would have to pursue “other courses”. They would have to consider destroying the sites by bombing.
3. We assume that the U.S. would not launch an attack on Cuba before they had received a refusal to permit inspection or control. If, however, the U.S. did launch an attack before a Russian reply had been received, the Russians might conclude that it was no good talking to the U.S. and their reactions would be unpredictable because the element of irrationality might enter in.
4. The extent to which the Soviet Government are committed to defend Cuba is covered by the statement on 12th September, 1962.
5. We have said and we repeat, that if war is unleashed, if the aggressor makes an attack on one state or another and this state asks for assistance, the Soviet Union is capable of rendering assistance from its own territory to any peace-loving state and not only to Cuba. And let no one doubt that the Soviet Union will render such assistance, just as it was ready in 1956 to render military assistance to Egypt at the time of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in the Suez Canal region. But, at a time when the U.S.A. is taking steps to mobilise its armed forces and is preparing aggression against Cuba and other peace-loving states, the Soviet Government wishes to draw attention to the fact that it is now impossible to attack Cuba and consider that the aggressor will be free from punishment for this attack. If this attack is made it will be the beginning of the unleashing of war.
6. We have taken notice of the fact that the Soviet response so far to U.S. action over Cuba following the President’s statement of 22nd October has been relatively moderate. They have clearly attached importance to playing for time during which they hoped to complete the offensive sites, though President Kennedy gave clear warning of his determination to prevent this happening. The Soviet Government have given no observable sign so far of an intention to respond by force to a U.S. bombing attack or invasion. We do not think that they have any intention of carrying out a pre-emptive strike against the U.S.A. although they have taken precautions to put their forces at a high state of readiness.
7. It is conceivable that the initial Soviet response either to a U.S. ultimatum of a bombing attack on Cuba or to an actual attack would be to avoid immediate resort to arms. They might confine their riposte to appeals to world opinion and to the U.N., seeking to win world wide support for the Soviet Union as a model peace-loving power compared with a belligerent U.S... They are not bound to Cuba by a defence treaty such as they have with all other bloc countries. They must recognise that any military action they might take in response to a U.S. move would be bound to carry a grave risk of escalation into nuclear war. We believe too that they are conscious at the present time of an overall strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the US. This inferiority, which may have been a major factor in the build-up in Cuba, would militate against creating a showdown with the U.S. at the present stage. The response the Soviet Government have already made to the U.S. blockade amounts to a considerable climb-down on their part and to a loss of face. They are clearly at the moment playing for time and bidding for support as a peace-loving country and it is possible that they would continue to adopt this line as the lesser of two evils even in the event of a direct U.S. resort to force in Cuba.
8. Any minor response would undermine any attempt they might be making to represent themselves as a completely pacific party to the dispute, whereas it would do nothing to demonstrate their ability and determination to support Cuba nor would it avoid great impairment to their image as a great power comparable to the U.S.A.
9. We think it likely that, should the Russians decide that they must retaliate by some form of action, such action would be significant and would not be confined for instance to minor harassment to western access to Berlin.
9. We think that if therefore the Russians resort to arms it will be an effective military response, and we suggest that the most likely blow will be a tit-for-tat as nearly parallel as possible to the U.S. action. It seems unlikely therefore that they will attack directly either U.S. territory or the territory of any of the NATO powers. The closest parallel would appear to be a U.S. base in some third country or an attack on some major U.S. naval vessel. They might also attack Guantanamo though they must expect that this would invite a full-scale U.S. invasion of the islands.
10. We have considered the possibility of large-scale military action against Berlin but suggest that this is unlikely in view of the clear warning from the U.S. that this would bring about a full confrontation. Indeed central to Soviet thinking in deciding upon their reply will be their fear of doing anything that might escalate into general nuclear war. Their overriding concern therefore is likely to be to limit their reply to the least dangerous possible place. Should the Russians make an attack such as we have suggested they would probably follow it up with clear indications that this went as far as they intended to go at the present stage. Their aim indeed would be to carry out an exact tit-for-tat and no more.
11. It seems unlikely that the Russians will use nuclear weapons in reply to such a U.S. attack as may be envisaged.
(Signed) HUGH STEPHENSON
Chairman,
on behalf of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
27th October, 1962
* * *
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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
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TOP SECRET Copy No........
J.I.C. (62) 101 (Final)
6th December, 1962 .
CABINET
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SOVIET MOTIVES IN CUBA
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee
The object of this paper is to determine, in the light of events to date, the motives underlying recent Soviet actions in Cuba. In order to do this we first review briefly the evidence available as to the pattern and timing of the build-up of Soviet arms. We are not able to assess how far the Russians may have been planning to increase it later. We then relate these activities to what we believe to be the principles governing Soviet defence policy. Finally, we discuss Khrushchev’s reasons for agreeing to withdraw the offensive weapons.
THE BUILD-UP OF SOVIET ARMS
2. The build-up of Army, Naval and defensive Air equipment is set out at Appendix.
Bomber Aircraft
3. On 5th October, United States reconnaissance discovered ten large crates on the deck of a Russian freighter unloading in Cuba. These crates were identical to those used for shipment of IL28 (BEAGLE) bombers to Egypt. Between 5th and 14th October, air reconnaissance revealed crated BEAGLE bombers and subsequently more than forty BEAGLES were identified. These aircraft are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
4. On 5th September there was some indication that missile sites which were not SAM sites might be under construction. On 14th October aerial photography showed a possible MRBM site. Subsequent photography was carried out over the whole of Cuba. On 22nd October, sixteen MRBM pads appeared to be operational, and by 26th October a further eight, making twenty-four in all. Four IRBM sites each of four launches seen under construction were assessed as likely to be operational by early December. There was no indication of work starting on further sites. Buildings were seen of the type needed for storing nuclear warheads.
5. It is thought that the MRBMs were probably taken to Cuba in the Soviet Missile Carrier ship Poltava, which had made two sailings, arriving on 3rd August and 14th September respectively. The ship would have been due again on 29th October.
6. The United States assessment of what would have existed in Cuba if all offensive sites had become operational is as follows:–
(a) Six sites each of four launchers for 1100 n.m. missiles, i.e. a total first salvo of twenty-four missiles of this range (MRBM).
(b) Four sites each of four launche
rs for 2200 n.m. missiles, i.e. a total salvo of sixteen missiles of this range (IRBM).
7. The launching of these missiles could immediately be detected by United States radar on the Florida coast; the average time of flight of Soviet MRBMs, which varies little with range, is of the order of thirteen minutes. BMEWS at present should give about sixteen minutes warning of ICBMs launched from the Soviet Union. The warning time of attack by submarine launched missiles could not possibly be more than seven minutes, the flight time of the missile, and is likely to be much less. As regards warning time, therefore, missiles in Cuba would have given the Russians at the best only a marginal advantage.
Soviet Personnel
8. It is believed that at the height of the crisis there were some 16,000 military and 3,000 civilian Soviet personnel in Cuba. It is estimated that about 9,000 military personnel would have been needed to operate all missile systems of types set up in Cuba, including the dismantled surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, there are an unknown number of Soviet military personnel in various command, communications and other support installations in Cuba, serving as advisers and technicians with the Cuban forces.
Timing
9. It is apparent that after the beginning of August there was a significant change in the character and volume of the Soviet build up of arms. Offensive weapons and more modern types of defensive weapons began then to be introduced, SAM sites, radar and Mach 2 fighters were deployed, missile firing patrol boats arrived and the numbers of tanks and field guns greatly increased. We do not know when the decision to send the missiles was made. For technical and logistic reasons it could not possibly have been made later than the beginning of July; we believe it must have been made earlier.
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