(ii) the Vinh area. The normal supply routes to South Vietnam across the 17th parallel and through Laos could be cut. Opposition would initially be confined to one North Vietnamese Division though reinforcements from the Delta area could more easily be brought up. Direct Chinese military support for the North Vietnamese would be probable;
(iii) the Red River delta area. This would strike directly at the heart of the country. The landing would quickly be opposed by about five divisions. An initial advantage might be obtained but direct Chinese military involvement would be certain which would lead to a long drawn out “Korean” type war.
(b) Bombing of Viet Cong supply routes in North Vietnam . Identification of targets on the Viet Cong supply routes would be so difficult as to make tactical interdiction ineffective and uneconomical.
(c) Other air attacks . Conventional bombing of population centres in North Vietnam or targets in South China although conceivably effective as punitive measures would not be decisive in bringing the Viet Cong under control. The use of nuclear weapons raises issues which go beyond the scope of this report.
CONSEQUENCES
North Vietnam
27. In the face of a threat of United States action against North Vietnam, or even in the initial stages of such action, the North Vietnamese would have to consider whether they were prepared to allow matters to go to the point where the devastation of North Vietnam might become inevitable. We cannot confidently predict the psychological attitude of the North Vietnamese leaders, but it may be an indication of the dependence of their attitude on the Chinese reaction that they have officially announced that if the United States intervene they will have to reckon with “China or eventually the Socialist camp as a whole.”
China
28. (a) If the United States took military action against North Vietnam by means of air strikes; the Chinese would:-
(i) say that the situation in South Vietnam was not the result of North Vietnamese or Chinese action; give North Vietnam maximum diplomatic and propaganda support and mount a worldwide campaign for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference in the interests of maintaining peace;
(ii) provide what air cover they could for North Vietnam using their own planes and pilots, and airfields in China if those in North Vietnam were untenable, and supplying A.A. artillery where necessary. The terms of the Geneva Agreement would make it difficult for them to maintain the fiction that the pilots were volunteers in the North Vietnamese air force or that the planes were North Vietnamese. Nevertheless they might be expected to adopt what devices were possible in order to maintain the fiction that China was not directly involved. They would do this partly for propaganda purposes, and partly to minimise the chances of United States retaliation against targets in China;
(iii) threaten to bomb similar targets in South Vietnam. An air defence system would need to be created to meet this threat.
(b) If the United States took military action against North Vietnam using ground forces; the Chinese would:-
(i) act as in sub-paragraph (a) (i) above;
(ii) take ground and air action as in the case of North Korea and occupy North Vietnam with regular Chinese units, which they would probably describe as volunteers for the reasons in (a) (ii). If once involved in such an operation their objective would probably be confined to the ejection of American forces from North Vietnam and the elimination of the threat they would represent to the Chinese frontier, although we would expect a very significant increase in Viet Cong activities as South Vietnamese and American forces were deployed to cover the Northern frontier. In the event of action by land against North Vietnam, in addition to sending units into North Vietnam, the Chinese might well give overt support to the Pathet Lao in Laos and step up their subversive efforts elsewhere in the area.
(c) If United States naval forces were used in air or other attacks against North Vietnam, the possibility of light coastal forces being used in North Vietnamese waters or their immediate vicinity cannot be excluded. As the Chinese would wish to localise the conflict to Indo-China they would not be used except in the Gulf of Tonking. If United States naval forces were used to blockade North Vietnam, it is unlikely that Chinese naval forces would intervene.
29. The Chinese actions would be dictated primarily by the threat to South China that United States military action in Northern Indo-China would represent. In these circumstances, the Chinese would be unlikely to be influenced by Russian advice, or action unless the Russians were to take the two extreme steps, both equally unlikely, of –
(a) engaging themselves to give the Chinese full military support, and cover against the United States retaliation against the Chinese mainland;
or
(b) serving notice on the Chinese that if they did not avoid a clash and force the North Vietnamese to do so, they would cut off P.O.L. and other vital deliveries.
30. The possibility of war in the Far East inevitably represents some threat to Hong Kong but in all the circumstances described above the Chinese would wish to confine action to Indo-China and unless they became convinced that intervention in Vietnam would be quickly followed by general war, they would not take military or other decisive action against Hong Kong. They would, however, be likely to put some pressure on the Colony both in order to discourage the United Kingdom from supporting the Americans and to interest the United Kingdom in ending United States intervention.
The Soviet Union
31. Both as the major communist power and as a co-chairman of the Geneva Agreement the Soviet Union would be immediately involved. The Russians have already reacted to the press reports from the United States in a TASS statement issued on 25th February which says that “the Soviet people cannot remain indifferent to such developments (i.e. the extension by the United States of the war in South Vietnam) and will render the necessary assistance and support to this struggle” (i.e. the liberation struggle of the South Vietnamese). The attitude implied in this statement would not necessarily preclude the possibility that at the same time as warning off the United States the Soviet Union might urge caution on the North Vietnamese to avoid any action which might place the Soviet Union in an excessively awkward dilemma.
32. A United States threat of direct military action against North Vietnam would face the Russians with a decision which they have never been called upon to face before. If the Americans added a warning concerning action against Chinese territory the Russian dilemma would be intensified. They would obviously wish to do their utmost to avoid getting involved militarily in a clash with the United States. At the very least such a clash would negate their present policy of trying to maintain reasonable relations with the United States. They would recognise that at the worst such a clash even in North Vietnam would risk escalation to nuclear war.
33. At the same time to counsel negotiation or “surrender” by North Vietnam would be to accept that the Americans could similarly threaten other states allied to the Soviet Union if they continue to support “national liberation movements”. The possibility of some future action against Cuba would be obvious. Faced with this issue and with the possibility that the Chinese might support the North Vietnamese in defiance of the United States, it would be very difficult indeed for the Russians not to back the North Vietnamese at least in public. The first Soviet objective would therefore be to avoid the issue if at all possible by seeking to deter the United States from proceeding against North Vietnam by threat of incalculable consequences, and if this failed by mobilising international pressure against the United States. If the United States nevertheless persisted the Russians would probably supply the North Vietnamese with some arms and ammunition and might well reconsider the possibility of arms supply to China to the same end. In the last resort it seems likely that the Soviet Union would choose not to risk escalation of the conflict by direct military intervention and would probably maintain their attitude even in the face of United States air action against South China. Beyond this point it becomes increasingly hazardous to
predict Soviet reactions.
International Reactions
34. Outside the communist world, the international reaction to overt United States action against North Vietnam would probably be to regard it as aggression. Although many Asian and African countries are increasingly suspicious of Chinese support for revolutionary and subversive movements, old habits die hard and their attitude for example, in the United Nations, towards United States action would certainly be hostile. France would certainly disapprove strongly, and we see little prospect of spontaneous positive support from any other major country in the present state of opinion about South East Asian affairs; although the United States might persuade some of her allies to abstain. Therefore if the Soviet Union appealed to the United Nations, the United States might well have to resort to use of the veto in the Security Council on a motion of condemnation. The communist countries might be reluctant to appeal to the General Assembly because of their liability to loss of voting rights through being in arrears with their contributions. Nevertheless the United States would probably be unable to prevent an emergency session from passing a motion of condemnation. At the same time the North Vietnamese Government would probably appeal to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairman [sic] to call an international conference to discuss the problem, and to call on the United States to desist from further action in the meantime.
OTHER IMPLICATIONS
35. A limited non-nuclear war, whether confined to Vietnam or extended to other countries in South East Asia, would probably be protracted and indecisive. If it spread, there would be severe strains within SEATO, arising in particular from France’s favouring a neutralist solution for South Vietnam, and possibly Pakistan’s new attitude to China. With the United States preoccupied in Vietnam and United Kingdom and Commonwealth forces earmarked for possible action under existing commitments in mainland South East Asia, anti-Western elements elsewhere might exploit the opportunities so offered.
PART II
A UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
36. If the United States decided to withdraw from South Vietnam, and therefore a negotiated settlement had to be sought, the communists would be unlikely to agree to any arrangement potentially less damaging to the other side than that arrived at in Laos. There would thus be a very real prospect of South Vietnam eventually falling wholly or partially under communist control.
37. The loss to the West of South Vietnam would be a major blow to the West in the world-wide struggle against communism. It would cause an immediate crisis of confidence in the relations of the United States with her Asian allies, some at least of whom might seek accommodation with China. The United States and SEATO would be discredited and the latter would probably disintegrate. Neutralist pressure would develop in Thailand, which the present right-wing regime would be unable to resist even if it managed to obtain a specific guarantee of United States protection. Non-communist neutrals would lose confidence in the West; Cambodia’s traditional policy of neutrality might be maintained on paper, but in practice she would lean heavily towards China and Burma might well increase her efforts to stay on good terms with China. Indonesia and India might become even more suspicious of China’s intentions than they are at present, but would be unlikely to make any radical changes in their foreign policy. Communist influence amongst the overseas Chinese communities in South East Asia would increase, and communist and pro-communist parties throughout the region would gain in confidence. The economic consequences for the West would probably be confined initially to losses of trade and investment in South Vietnam itself. The French have a particularly big stake which they might however be able to retain. The long term economic effects are difficult to predict but in our view would not necessarily be significant.
38. The general western position in South East Asia would be seriously damaged; the strategic position would be impaired directly by the increased subversive and military threat and indirectly through loss of political prestige. It is impossible, for example, to say whether Malaysia would lose confidence in the West as guarantors of her defence against the threat from China or decide that the increased threat to her safety required still closer ties.
CONCLUSIONS
39. We conclude that:-
PART I
(a) whatever the form of United States action and whatever the degree of South Vietnamese Government/United States military success against the Viet Cong thereby achieved, decisive and final defeat of the Viet Cong cannot be achieved by military means alone. The fundamental task remains that of inducing the South Vietnamese authorities to undertake and persist in a programme of the necessary administrative, social and economic measures, and to winning popular confidence in, and support for such a programme;
(b) a heavier United States military commitment in South Vietnam in the form of the garrisoning of key towns and/or the introduction and use of combat units, might halt the present deterioration in the military situation and give the South Vietnamese Government a breathing space to get new measures under way, but it would raise difficult problems and might in the longer run be counter-productive;
(c) even full scale intervention would not lead to a lasting solution for a very long time, if at all;
(d) the cutting off of North Vietnamese assistance to the Viet Cong would not ensure a speedy end to the insurrection in South Vietnam;
(e) if the United States took military action confined to South Vietnam the North Vietnamese would probably increase their covert support to the Viet Cong and appeal to the Soviet Union and China for increased material support, the Chinese would give them full diplomatic and propaganda support and probably step up military supplies. The communist countries generally would probably mount a world-wide campaign, in particular demanding the reconvening of Geneva Conference in the interests of maintaining peace;
(f) there is some scope for covert support for guerilla [sic] activity among the tribes of north-west North Vietnam and this if successful could lead to localised disturbances and perhaps to revolts elsewhere in the countryside, the news of which could have some effect on Viet Cong morale, and encourage Government forces in South Vietnam;
(g) if the United States took military action against North Vietnam the Chinese would give direct military support, including “volunteers” and air cover to the North Vietnamese. They might give overt support to the Pathet Lao in Laos, and would step up their subversive effort elsewhere in the area. Unless they expected general war, they would not take military or other decisive action against Hong Kong;
(h) the first Soviet objective would be to avoid the issue if at all possible by seeking to deter the United States from action against North Vietnam. The Soviet Union might also put pressure on North Vietnam to make some temporary concessions, if they thought this would work. If the United States went ahead with action against North Vietnam the Soviet Union would probably supply the North Vietnamese with some arms and ammunition and might well reconsider the possibility of arms supply to China to the same end. Nevertheless the Russians would wish to keep their involvement to a minimum, and in any case would stop short of any action which might lead to their involvement in nuclear war;
(i) it would be difficult for the United States to obtain much support internationally for direct military action against North Vietnam, or to avoid condemnation in the United Nations;
(j) a limited non-nuclear war in Vietnam would probably be protracted and indecisive; it would not spread outside mainland South East Asia and it could lead to severe strains within SEATO;
PART II
(k) if, as the eventual result of United States withdrawal, South Vietnam were to fall under complete or partial communist control, the West would suffer a severe blow in the context of the world-wide struggle against communism; the United States and SEATO would be discredited and the latter would probably disintegrate; communist influence in South East Asia would increase; and the whole Western position in the area would be seriously damaged.
&nb
sp; Notes
1 . Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 192–3.
2 . J. W. Young, ‘Britain and “LBJ’s War”, 1964–68’, Cold War History 2/3 (2002), p. 65; Rhiannon Vickers, ‘Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam’, Journal of Cold War Studies 10/2 (2008), p. 44; Peter Busch, ‘Supporting the War: Britain’s Decision to Send the Thompson Mission to Vietnam, 1960–61’, Cold War History 2/1 (2001), pp. 69–94.
3 . Nigel Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days” of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957–63’, Diplomatic History 29/4 (2005), p. 709, fn. 54.
4 . Mark Curtis, Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human Rights Abuses (London: Vintage, 2004), p. 205.
5 . Cradock, Know Your Enemy , p. 197.
6 . Ibid., p. 198; ‘Vietnam Background’, FO draft 13 June 1962, FO 371/166705, quoted in Curtis, Unpeople , p. 202.
7 . Vickers, ‘Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam’, p. 45.
8 . Peter Busch, All the Way with JFK? Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 188–92.
9 . See Cradock, Know Your Enemy , p. 199.
10 . Curtis, Unpeople , p. 205.
11 . Rab Butler, May 1964, quoted in Stephen Dorril, MI6: 50 Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 716.
12 . Vickers, ‘Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam’, p. 44; Cradock, Know Your Enemy , p. 196; Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days” of Anglo-American Relations Revisited’, pp. 691, 694.
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