13 . State Department to Saigon, 9 September 1964, File POL 27-14, Box 2922, CFPF, RG 59, NARA. John Colvin, Twice Around the World (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), pp. 96–117.
14
THE SOVIET INVASION OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968
N INETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT WAS a significant year in the history of the JIC. The committee was split into two: JIC(A) and JIC(B). A continuation of the traditional body, the former remained concerned with political, military and defence intelligence. The latter assessed economic, commercial and nonmilitary scientific intelligence. It proved to be a short-lived experiment, however, and the JIC was reunited in 1974. The year 1968 also saw a strengthening of the report-drafting process. A new Assessments Staff was created inside the Cabinet Office to replace the long-serving Joint Intelligence Staff. More independent than its predecessor, the Assessments Staff brought together around twenty members from different departments across Whitehall. Its chief became an influential position in its own right, whilst other members chaired the JIC’s Current Intelligence Groups. Finally, a new Intelligence Co-ordinator was appointed in 1968 to oversee the central intelligence process and machinery. The post was initially filled by Dick White, formerly head of both MI5 and MI6. 1
Events during the summer of 1968 seriously tested the new system. On 20 August, Warsaw Pact forces, led by the Russians, invaded Czechoslovakia in an attempt to counter reformist trends developing in Prague. Since its incorporation into the Soviet bloc via a communist coup in 1948, Czechoslovakia had caused few concerns for the leadership in Moscow. That changed, however, when Alexander Dubček became head of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in January 1968. Despite claiming to work within the ideological boundaries of Marxism-Leninism, Dubček began to introduce liberal reforms. For example, he made widespread personnel changes inside the party, eased censorship to allow more open debate about government policy, and even talked about opening the economy to the world market. Recalling the ill-fated Hungarian uprising of 1956, anxious about losing influence in Prague, and fearing the spread of liberalisation across eastern Europe, Moscow grew increasingly concerned. Although the leadership was divided and Leonid Brezhnev wavered, the Soviets decided to intervene militarily. It is unclear exactly when this decision was taken, but Kremlin hawks were pressing for military action as early as April 1968. 2 The operation was a military success. Czechoslovakian forces did not resist and the Warsaw Pact troops swiftly occupied Prague. Although the invasion proved more problematic politically, Dubček was ultimately replaced by a more amenable candidate the following year. As Percy Cradock, a former JIC Chairman and Chief of the Assessments Staff, put it, ‘“socialism with a human face” was effectively snuffed out’. 3
The JIC failed to provide warning. Despite monitoring Soviet military exercises near the Czechoslovakian borders in the months before August, the committee endorsed the Foreign Office view that an invasion was unlikely. Policymakers were therefore taken by surprise – although the more senior amongst them had previously acknowledged that should the JIC be wrong Western reprisals would have been impractical anyway. 4 Despite being caught off guard, Cabinet members insisted to each other that ‘we had been aware that forces were being concentrated on the borders of Czechoslovakia and were not therefore taken by surprise’. 5 The first half of this statement is true; the second is not.
The JIC struggled to believe that the Soviets would find the use of force politically acceptable. Guilty of mirror-imaging, in transferring British values and constraints onto Soviet thinking, the committee overestimated the value placed by Moscow on world opinion. This view was strongly held by the JIC Chairman, Denis Greenhill, underlining the important role that a consumer department can sometimes play in shaping assessments. An in-house post-mortem of JIC intelligence failures conducted in 1981 concluded that ‘in March to August 1968 the JIC consistently took the view that the USSR was unlikely to invade Czechoslovakia because of the effect a move would have on world opinion (not least in the world communist movement) and on détente’. 6
This was not the only cognitive error of which the JIC was found guilty. Committee members decided ‘very early’ on that the Soviets would not invade Czechoslovakia. Remaining committed to that view, the JIC refused to alter this assessment despite growing evidence to the contrary in the form of military manoeuvres. Warnings that Russia would be prepared to ‘flout world opinion’, such as that given by the British ambassador in Moscow, were overlooked in favour of the prevailing mindset. As a result, the JIC’s Current Intelligence Group prepared a draft note for the Top Secret Red Book in late July, which suggested that the Soviet leaders would try to avoid military intervention if they could. Policymakers in the Foreign Office generally agreed that the Russian leaders would seek instead to increase pressure on the Czechs. The JIC therefore dismissed Soviet preparations as mere military exercises and bullying. This psychological flaw is known as ‘perseveration’, or belief in the virtue of consistency. 7
The aftermath of the invasion raised serious questions for policymakers in the United Kingdom (and for NATO more broadly). It is some of these which are assessed in the document reproduced here. What impact did the surprise have on existing warning procedures? Where did the invasion leave East–West relations? In which other territories might the Soviet Union attempt something similar? How tight was the Soviet grip on eastern Europe? The JIC sought to consider the importance of eastern Europe to the Soviet Union economically, politically and militarily, and how Moscow would maintain control in the future. The paper was disseminated in early December 1968, just over three months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
A first point of note arising from the report was that the JIC had learnt the dangers of mirror-imaging the hard way. Now under a new Chairman, the diplomat Edward Peck, the assessment clearly stated that ‘developments in Eastern Europe might make [Moscow] feel obliged to use force there again, even at the risk of provoking a reaction from NATO countries’. 8 The committee did not want to make the same mistake twice.
Secondly, despite acknowledging that the Soviet grip on eastern Europe had tightened, the JIC’s conclusions were generally calm, prudent and noninflammatory. The committee reassured policymakers that the invasion was a defensive action inside Warsaw Pact territory. 9 It did not render the Soviet Union any more likely to use force in a more volatile area of East–West confrontation, such as the Middle East. Moreover, there was no reason to believe that the strategic balance between East and West had changed. The JIC continued to espouse optimism. Despite acknowledging that he could be replaced by a more pliable leader, intelligence suggested that Dubček would implement only the minimum of Soviet requirements. As explained in detail in the document, the JIC also predicted that various internal forces, from nationalism to economics, would continue to put pressure on the Soviet Union. In short, policymakers had no cause for alarm. Echoing the Foreign Office’s Northern Department, the JIC optimistically assessed that some reformist elements established under Dubček, especially in the economic sphere, would continue owing to weaknesses amongst the hardliners. 10 By March 1969, however, Dubček had been replaced by a hardliner – Gustáv Husák. The new pro-Soviet regime lasted until the Velvet Revolution of November 1989. 11
The one area of uncertainty lay in Soviet attitudes to Romania and Yugoslavia. Bucharest and Belgrade had vigorously condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. If the same thing had happened in one of these other ‘dissident’ states, the leaders might have resisted, thereby causing serious conflict. Indeed, both strengthened their self-defence accordingly. 12 The JIC acknowledged that the events in Prague created uncertainty about the Soviet attitude towards the use of force – although Whitehall had learnt that fear of international condemnation would not serve as a deterrent. Possible action against Romania prompted a war scare during August 1969, triggering partial mobilisation. 13
Nevertheless, during 1968, the JIC remained calm and senior British policymakers did not treat the e
vents in Prague as a crisis. They received little Cabinet attention and had limited impact on Britain’s trade and defence policies. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, remained focused on Soviet trade prospects and sought to return to business as usual, once the furore over the invasion had died down. The government refused to reverse cuts in military expenditure and opposed economic sanctions against the aggressor countries. 14 Three days after the JIC assessment was disseminated, and upon receiving a provocative note from the Soviets about the British response to Czechoslovakia, Wilson’s Cabinet agreed that ‘Britain should not over-react, and should maintain correct relations without indulging in petty pinpricks’. 15
JIC (68) 54 (Final)
2nd December 1968
THE SOVIET GRIP ON EASTERN EUROPE
Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee (A)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The aim of the paper is to assess the importance to the Soviet Union of Eastern Europe, and the ways in which the Soviet government will seek to maintain its grip in the foreseeable future. The paper deals with the political, military and economic requirements of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the implications of likely Soviet policies for the countries in the area, and for East-West relations. Likely trends are assessed against the background of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
2. Since the end of the Second World War, successive Soviet governments have imposed political, military and economic requirements on the East European governments. Political requirements have included a monopoly of power for the Communist Party, and absolute obedience to the Soviet Union in all matters of substance. Military requirements have involved making the national territory of each country available to the Soviet Union when needed; accepting Soviet assessments in military affairs and Soviet domination of the country’s armed forces and defence policy; and where necessary the stationing of Soviet forces on its territory. The threat of military force has always been implicit behind Soviet demands, and has been a significant factor in gaining their acceptance. Economic requirements have meant collaborating with the Soviet Union and other East European countries in the work of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA), and running the economy of each country in accordance with Communist practice in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the national interests of the countries of Eastern Europe often conflicted with Soviet requirements, and Soviet policy towards the countries of the area was never consistent or carefully planned.
3. However, in Soviet eyes, the most important of these requirements were called into question by the Czechoslovak reform programme and the results of the liberalising trends which stemmed from the election of the Dubcek leadership in January 1968. The official reform programme, which advocated separation of Party and government functions and an apparent withdrawal of Party control over aspects of security policy and the armed forces, as well as the end of censorship was regarded in Moscow as prejudicial to the maintenance of the leading role of the Communist Party in the country. The replacement of tried and experienced political, military and security officials by the Dubcek regime may have worried a Soviet leadership which traditionally laid great stress on the selection of key personnel in East European countries. The end of censorship and the licence to criticise Party thinking and to explore liberal ideas was regarded as dangerously “infectious” throughout the area and even in the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet military leaders probably feared that a serious gap in the Warsaw Pact defence structure might develop either by the defection of Czechoslovakia from the Pact, or through a decline in the efficiency of her armed forces. In economic affairs the Russians feared that the more radical economic ideas on the need for greater economic freedom and closer contacts with the West could have led to a weakening of the Party’s power in economic matters and a growth of Western, especially West German, influence, with a corresponding loosening of Czechoslovak ties with their communist allies.
4. The Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia effectively destroyed the possibility, never very strong, that the present Soviet leader would tolerate the loss of orthodox communist party control in an active member of the Warsaw Pact. The effect of the invasion in Eastern Europe will, in the short term, be to strengthen the influence of the countries and personalities most loyal to the Soviet Union, and to induce fear of Soviet military might and Soviet readiness to use it against actual or potential dissidents in the area of the Warsaw Pact. In the longer term, the invasion may strengthen currents of unrest in Eastern Europe which could cause concern to the East European governments. Thus, one important effect may be to focus Soviet attention inwards on to the problems of Eastern and Soviet relations with the countries of the area; for the Russians will be anxious to ensure that any future moves for change, e.g. economic reforms, do not develop in the kind of political atmosphere which appeared in Czechoslovakia in the first part of 1968.
5. In the short term, at least, the outlook for Czechoslovakia is bleak. A Soviet military presence in the shape of a group of Soviet forces will continue for some time, and Soviet forces will always be available in neighbouring countries to intervene again if necessary. The Dubcek regime will try to cushion the Czechoslovak people against the worst effects of the Soviet intervention, but what appears to be the gradual erosion of the regime’s freedom of manoeuvre by Soviet policy may ultimately lessen and perhaps destroy the popularity which the leadership has so far enjoyed with the Czechoslovak people. However, some elements of the Dubcek reform programme, notably the economic proposals and the establishment of a federal structure for the State, will continue, and the fact that the Soviet Union agreed to the return to power of the legitimate government of the country under the Moscow protocol of 27th August suggests that the Russians still want to work within the terms of this arrangement.
6. The present leaders of East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria will be relieved that the danger of “infection” to their countries has been eliminated, at least temporarily, and their loyalty to the Soviet Union will have been strengthened. In Hungary, where much sympathy for the Czechoslovak reforms existed, the intervention was undoubtedly a personal blow to Kadar, who will probably have to proceed more cautiously. The Rumanians, while maintaining their criticism of the Soviet action, will aim at preserving the essence of their independent stand: their economic freedom of action and their independent foreign policy, on both of which the Rumanian leaders’ nationalist policy largely depends, at the expense, if necessary, of political gestures on international issues where Rumanian interests are not directly concerned. But Soviet economic and political pressures will continue with the long-term intention of subverting the present Rumanian leadership. Yugoslavia will continue her opposition to Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia; she is alarmed by recent Soviet talk of the overriding interests of the “Socialist Commonwealth” and the potential effect on national sovereignty. A prolonged period of cool relations with the Soviet Union is likely.
7. Militarily, the Czechoslovak occupation has eliminated the Soviet fear that the Czechoslovaks might defect from the Warsaw Pact. Thus the situation in which Czechoslovakia is regarded, in Soviet eyes, as a buffer zone between the West and the Soviet frontier, has been restored. However, the effective loss of the Czechoslovak armed forces in the potential offensive role means that Soviet operational plans will have to be re-assessed and their own military commitments extended. In addition, events leading up to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia will make future proposed Warsaw Pact exercises extremely delicate political issues and may complicate, at least in the short term, plans for improving the structure of the alliance. The Soviet Union may aim to achieve even tighter control over the East European armies.
8. In the economic field, the occupation has restricted potential Czechoslovak moves towards closer economic and technical co-operation with West Germany and the West in general, but it has not altered the basic economic problems of Czechoslovakia or Eastern Europe, which remains dependent on the Soviet Union, particularly for sup
plies of raw materials (crude oil and iron) and also in some cases grain and electrical energy. The possibilities for strengthening CMEA may even have been improved in the post-invasion circumstances, for the Soviet Union will be anxious to correct CMEA’s shortcomings, if only as a counterbalance to the political and military effects of the invasion, and a number of East European proposals are in existence which might be taken up at future meetings of the Council. There is also the continuing attraction for the East European countries of economic links with the West, and this is a trend of which the Soviet Union will have to take account. Much depends therefore on the Soviet Union, but its leaders may decide in the longer term to take more account of national economic ambitions and existing economic differences between the members of CMEA.
9. The implications for East-West relations involve a set-back to hopes of the growth of a more liberal Eastern Europe which could play an important part in bringing about a comprehensive European settlement. While the evidence suggests that the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was essentially to preserve an orthodox Communist regime, it has introduced new uncertainties about Soviet actions and the situations in which the Russians may be prepared to use armed force. It seems unlikely that because the Soviet Union used force in Czechoslovakia she will be more willing to do so henceforth in order to extend her influence in the Mediterranean or the Middle East. However developments in Eastern Europe might make her feel obliged to use force there again even at the risk of provoking a reaction from NATO countries. We believe that the strategic balance between the super-powers will not be affected, and Soviet-American contacts on political and defence matters will continue. Indeed, the Soviet Union has an interest in restoring a “business as usual” relation with the West, and is anxious that its actions in the Warsaw Pact area should not affect East-West relations elsewhere.
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