Spying on the World

by Richard J Aldrich

  17. One of the important factors in assessing the future course of events in Eastern Europe is the effect which the resort to force in Czechoslovakia will have on the Soviet leadership itself. It is impossible to tell whether or not the Soviet Politburo was divided on the issue, or if it was, which members of the leadership supported military action and which opposed it. While military factors described below in para. 45 ff. must have weighed heavily with the leadership, there is no evidence that the Politburo came under strong pressure from the Soviet military to intervene. We are inclined to the view that as the crisis developed and in Soviet eyes came increasingly to endanger the continuation of orthodox Communist rule in Czechoslovakia and of Soviet security arrangements in Eastern Europe, the Politburo probably closed ranks, and achieved unanimity at the moment of decision-making. Any divisions of opinion and hesitations within the Politburo were probably not over the desirability of putting an end to the development of liberal communism in Czechoslovakia, but over ways and means of doing so.

  18. At the culmination of this crisis, at all events, the Soviet collective leadership showed a capacity to act decisively, as it has done on other occasions, for example, the decision to extend military aid to North Vietnam in 1965. The fact that the Soviet leaders resorted to force in Czechoslovakia may encourage them more readily to use force or the threat of force again within the Warsaw Pact area in order to bring recalcitrant leaders to heel.

  19. This general hardening of the line in Moscow appears to have been reflected in attitudes towards Communist doctrine and the rights and obligations of ruling Communist Parties. The article on this subject in “Pravda” of 26th September 1968 laid down that a Communist country has the right to self-determination only so far as this does not jeopardise the interests of other Communist states (“the Socialist Commonwealth”), that each Party is responsible to the other fraternal Parties as well as to its own people, and that the sovereignty of each country was not “abstract” but an expression of the class struggle, e.g. that the Soviet Union had the right to define each country’s sovereignty.

  20. While the Soviet leaders have tightened their direct control over events in Czechoslovakia, restated their political requirements for Warsaw Pact countries and demonstrated their readiness to use military means to enforce then, the Russians must also be aware of the miscalculations which they made in the political preparation of the occupation. It is very likely that they expected to find sufficient numbers of collaborators with whose help a pro-Soviet government could be formed as soon as the occupation became effective, and they were certainly taken aback by the unity and resourcefulness of the Czechoslovak people, and by the absence of political figures willing to serve in a Soviet-sponsored government. The Soviet Union’s resumption of dealings with Dubcek and the legal Party and State leadership at the end of August 1968 suggests that the Russians abandoned their attempt to instal a regime of collaborators, and decided to compromise rather than make Czechoslovakia a military province, and to present their demands for the rectification of the political situation in Czechoslovakia to the regime which they had originally hoped to overthrow.

  21. The reaction of the Soviet leadership to their occupation of Czechoslovakia may therefore be three-fold:–

  (a) that their capability to use military means within the Warsaw Pact area in pursuit of political objectives has been supported by the will to act, and this demonstration, they may believe, will promote a greater sense of conformity with Soviet demands in Eastern Europe;

  (b) that Soviet understanding of, and intelligence on, the East European countries, Party leaderships and national aspirations was faulty, and could lead in the future to further miscalculations;

  (c) that nationalism is strong even within the friendliest Communist countries in Eastern Europe, and that it may not be worth insisting on complete compliance with Soviet wishes provided that the main Russian requirements are met.

  The Russians may conclude that while their capability and determination to take firm action has been successfully demonstrated, their ability to take appropriate preventive action at the political level before the last resort is reached should be improved. The Soviet leaders may therefore decide to complete the restoration of orthodox Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, using, as long as possible, the legal Dubcek Party leadership to implement Soviet requirements. The Russians may complement their policies towards Czechoslovakia by a longer term overhaul of their relations with each East European country in the light particularly of the political miscalculations which emerged from their handling of the Czechoslovak crisis. But in the short term, we should be in no doubt that the Soviet loaders will insist that their requirements are met in Czechoslovakia.

  22. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider internal developments in the Soviet Union, but it is necessary to stress that the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe is so tight and so important to the Russians that it is unrealistic to expect any major change in Eastern Europe without the agreement or acquiescence of the Soviet Union. Since the status quo suits the Soviet Union well, the Russians are unlikely to agree to major changes unless there are moves for change inside Russia. Whatever evolution does take place spontaneously in the Soviet Union, other strong pressures are likely to come from the countries of Eastern Europe themselves. For Eastern Europe is very vulnerable to change: it is closer to the West and its countries lack the long-standing Soviet traditions of Communist bureaucracy. The East European pressures for change which include nationalism, the drive for greater economic and administrative efficiency, and more freedom of action and individual responsibility are bound to have important long term effects in the Soviet Union. Among young people in Eastern Europe, a process of resentment against the existing order may appear which may ultimately be expressed by methods of protest already used by the younger generation in the West, and even this may spread to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders, we believe, will continue to fight change, but in the long run they may not be able or willing to do more than to slow down and delay the process.

  Czechoslovakia

  23. There is little hope that the Czechoslovak leadership under Dubcek can do more than fulfil the requirements of the Soviet Union, while trying, in increasingly adverse conditions, to retain the loyalty of the Czechoslovak people. Certainly the regime will hope to salvage something from the Action Programme and to soften the impact of the reintroduction of censorship, of Soviet personnel into key Ministries (if this should happen on any large scale) and of a prolonged military presence in the country under the terms of the treaty signed on 16th October 1968. Although the Russians have agreed to remove the bulk of their forces, leaving a “Group of Forces” behind on an indefinite stay, Dubcek and his colleagues must be aware that they cannot regain such independence as they enjoyed before the invasion. Indeed, the room for manoeuvre of the Czechoslovak regime (whether under Dubcek or a more amenable successor, or even Soviet military rule) has been diminishing steadily, and depends effectively on decisions taken in Moscow.

  24. While the Russians hold nearly all the significant cards in Czechoslovakia, their policy since the Moscow agreement of 27th August 1968 has contained elements of hesitation and delay. Having achieved some of their immediate political aims, e.g. the abandonment of the 14th Party Congress originally scheduled for 9th September 1968, and the annulment of the Extraordinary Congress held in the week of the invasion, the Russians may have been content to take their time in achieving “normalisation”. Provided he was willing to meet Soviet policy requirements, such an approach might help Dubcek in his relations with the Czechoslovak people, and, in the longer term, it might provide a better atmosphere for the emergence of a pro-Soviet political group with whom, presumably, the Soviet leaders would prefer to work.

  25. The future of the Czechoslovak armed forces is another problem which faces the Russians. Their loyalty to the Dubcek regime throughout the crisis renders them, in the Soviet eyes, of doubtful value as an ally of the Soviet Union. Disbandme
nt of the Czechoslovak forces now seems to be out of the question. However, the Russians may consider it necessary to replace the more liberal minded officers and to make some organisational adjustments although not on the scale applied to the Hungarian forces after the 1956 uprising. The most likely solution is some reduction in size, consequent on the removal of the liberal elements, followed by a gradual resumption of their former role within the Warsaw Pact, under close Soviet supervision.

  26. Among elements in the Czechoslovak reform programme which may survive will be some of the economic proposals. While any proposals believed by the Russians to be disruptive of CMEA will be banned, it seems possible that measures of internal flexibility such as those introduced at the beginning of 1967 and normal East-West trade will be approved. The Russians will be anxious not to impede a rise in the standard of living in Czechoslovakia or to veto methods of improving efficiency in industry and trade, so long as these do not threaten to disrupt established Soviet practices and commitments.

  27. Nevertheless it is hard to see Czechoslovakia attaining any substantial measure of independence of Soviet policy. Liberalising currents are likely to continue, however and pressures will continue within the country for internal reforms.

  East Germany

  28. In many important respects the East German Party and Government has gained from the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. This is partly due to the fact that Ulbricht’s position has been strengthened by the tough Russian action, for no Soviet government would now be interested in replacing a man of Ulbricht’s dedication to the Soviet cause, even though he may not last very long in power because of his age. East Germany has also gained because the invasion has halted, for some time at least, possible expansion of Czechoslovakia’s economic and political contacts with West Germany; although the West German trade mission is still in Prague, the East Germans probably believe that Czechoslovak-West German ties will dwindle, and that all chances that the Dubcek regime would respond favourably to Bonn’s Ostpolitik have disappeared. Such a response was probably viewed in East Germany as the most pressing danger in the Czechoslovak crisis. The East German regime is also doubtless relieved that the process of liberalisation in Czechoslovakia has been stopped; the East German leaders showed signs of nervousness during the summer that their own population might become infected.

  29. The relationship between Czechoslovakia and East Germany is a particularly delicate one: it is fragile for emotional and historical reasons, yet important to both in the economic field. To some extent the success of one works to the detriment of the other. East Germany may appear in Moscow to be a model of loyalty combined with efficiency. Its economy is strong, its relatively small numbers of known intellectual dissidents seem to be under control, and its armed forces appear to be disciplined and of high morale – all of which are important Soviet requirements.

  30. On the other hand, East Germany still represents something of a liability to the Soviet Union. The country is still an artificial creation, born of the Soviet Union’s refusal to permit the subordination of all Germans to one government, and the East Germans’ preoccupation with German affairs cannot easily be reconciled with this long-term Soviet aim. Moreover, the East German press reaction to the Czech liberalisation programme was harsher than the Soviet, and there is evidence that Ulbricht consistently urged a tough line on Moscow. Yet when the invasion took place, East German popular reaction was hostile to the Soviet action: local and industrial Party organisations failed to produce the necessary resolutions of approval, demonstrations in support of Dubcek took place, and citizens called at the Czechoslovak Embassy in East Berlin with petitions opposing the occupation. The authorities have since taken strong measures to deal with opponents of the invasion. East Germany’s development of its own nationhood and a more articulate public opinion, combined with its economic stability, efficiency and rising standard of living, may in the longer run generate more tensions with the Soviet Union than its present ideological correctness and political loyalty to the Russians may suggest.

  Poland

  31. Reports from Poland before the occupation of Czechoslovakia suggested that the Polish leadership generally upheld Soviet criticism of the Czechoslovak reforms, and since 21st August have given full public support to the invasion and the official reasons for it. The latter have included military reasons, the alleged threat from West Germany and the danger of Western subversion inside Czechoslovakia, though no doubt the fear of infection in Poland had the Dubcek reforms been accepted by Moscow played an important part in securing Polish support for the occupation.

  32. The reaction of Polish intellectuals, however, to the invasion was one of great hostility, of which the open letter by the Polish novelist Andrzejewski, expressing solidarity with the Czechoslovak writers, was one remarkable example. The majority of students, too, probably opposed the invasion, and the danger of unrest by the younger generation is probably assessed by the Polish authorities as still high. It may increase when Gomulka finally steps down especially if, in the course of a struggle for the succession, one or more contenders rely on the support of younger people or anti-Russian elements. Poland has a tradition of freedom and nationalism with which the Russians have always had to reckon, and their preoccupation with this factor may increase in the longer term.

  33. At the top, however, the Soviet grip on Poland is not likely to be shaken in the short or medium term, and the present Polish regime will hardly query or evade Soviet political or military requirements. On the economic side, too, Poland is unlikely to cause the Russians undue concern. For its part, the Soviet Government will no doubt underline, in its dealings with Poland, the security which the Warsaw Pact offers to Poland, and the Russians’ proved ability and intention to act firmly and quickly in defence of their requirements. In the longer term, when Gomulka is no longer in power, the future of the Soviet-Polish relationship may depend in part on whether the Polish leadership falls under the modernising influence of Gierek, or the nationalist influence of General Moczar.

  Hungary

  34. During the development of the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis the Hungarian party leader, Kadar, seemed to play a dual role, approving the Czechoslovak reform programme, which was relevant to the reform policies which he was implementing in Hungary in a more subdued and cautious atmosphere, and at the same time remaining loyal to the Soviet Union. Kadar was clearly anxious to avoid armed intervention, but in the last resort, when his mediation failed to produce a compromise acceptable to the Soviet leaders, he was obliged to side with the Russians and send Hungarian units into Czechoslovakia.

  35. The invasion was a personal blow to Kadar’s position both domestically and in his relations with the Soviet leaders. The Hungarian Press has maintained that Hungarian policies will be unaffected, but the Hungarians may now proceed rather more cautiously with their reforms, and the growth of economic ties with the West may be slowed down. It may even be that Kadar’s own position as leader of the Hungarian Party could be in doubt. In general, however, the effect of the Soviet action is likely to be similar in Hungary to that in Poland: in both countries, which are by tradition anti-Russian, the current mood in Moscow will be carefully assessed, and existing censorship and security regulations will be even more rigorously enforced.

  Bulgaria

  36. Little requires to be said about Bulgaria whose unswerving loyalty to all Soviet Governments since Stalin’s day has been one of the permanent features in Eastern Europe. The nominal Bulgarian Army contingent which participated in the occupation of Czechoslovakia was no doubt willingly provided on Soviet request, and there is every reason to believe that the Bulgarian Government viewed the Czechoslovak political reforms with hostility, although they themselves have approved a programme involving some reform of the economy of the country.

  37. The loyalty of the Bulgarian leadership to Soviet policies and the primacy which the Soviet Union enjoys in Bulgarian decision-making are unlikely to be altered by the Czechoslovak crisis.
If anything, the Bulgarian Party leadership will be encouraged to take stronger action against their own dissident intellectuals (about one third of whom were reported to have been critical of the invasion) and students by the display of Soviet military power, and the long-term Soviet-Bulgarian relationship is likely to remain undisturbed.

  Rumania

  38. Rumania’s recent opposition to Soviet policy, with its strong undercurrent of nationalism, began in 1962–63 in the economic field, and was later extended to intra-Bloc affairs (the Sino-Soviet dispute), foreign policy (relations with West Germany and Israel) and the country’s military obligations to the Warsaw Pact. The Rumanian Government, which maintained a tight grip on the country’s internal affairs and operated a strict censorship, was not favourably disposed towards the Czechoslovak liberalisation movement, but was excluded from the series of conferences called by the Soviet Union to deal with the problem – in Moscow, Dresden, Warsaw and Bratislava – because of the Rumanians’ known opposition to interference in the affairs of other countries. The Rumanians criticised Soviet pressures on Czechoslovakia and condemned the military invasion. They ordered partial mobilisation and made clear their determination to resist an invasion of their own country. In spite of rumours of troop movements on their frontiers and fears of Soviet military intervention, the Rumanian leaders have upheld, though with diminishing intensity, their criticism of Soviet policy.

  39. The Rumanian Communist Party, however, is not likely to relax its control over the country or weaken its monopoly of decision-making; and while this can be used to reduce Soviet influence in Rumania, it is difficult for the Russians to level accusations against the Rumanian leadership on this score. Nor is the Rumanian domestic model likely to prove attractive to other East European countries. But the Soviet Union will be sensitive to any sign that Rumanian foreign policy is attracting these countries, and will do her best to counteract any trends in this direction. Rumania’s natural resources and her strategic position (with no common border with a NATO country), set her apart from her allies and make it unlikely that, even if they wished to, the other East European states could follow Rumanian policies in practice.