15 . Cabinet minutes, 5 December 1968, CC(68) 49th Conclusions. TNA: CAB 128/43.
15
THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
T ERRORISM CURRENTLY FEATURES prominently in government defence and security discourse. Whitehall machinery, such as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, is designed to counter the threat in a coordinated manner. This, however, was not always the case. Although the United Kingdom has endured a comparatively lengthy experience of modern terrorism, the JIC traditionally focused on the conventional Cold War. In the 1960s, most eyes looked towards Moscow at Soviet military activity. Any encounters the JIC had had with terrorism were predominantly of the anti-colonial variety. Even then, the committee was reluctant to characterise certain insurgents as ‘terrorists’. Fearing that the term held connotations with British defeat in Palestine, the JIC warned against using the label to describe the Malayan insurgents. Despite this, nationalist attacks were sporadically described as terrorism throughout the era of decolonisation.
By the late 1960s, terrorism found a regular place on the JIC agenda. Security in Northern Ireland deteriorated dramatically from 1969 (as discussed in the following chapter). At around the same time, the threat of international terrorism in the Middle East escalated. The aftermath of Israeli victory in the 1967 war, which so unambiguously confirmed Israel’s conventional military superiority over the Arab states, provided the opportunity for the emergence of Palestinian resistance movements as a political force. From among this disparate grouping, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash, rose to gain notoriety. International terrorism, and specifically incidents of aviation hijacking, rose sharply between 1967 and 1976.
The year 1970 was particularly intense. The most notorious incident came in September when terrorists hijacked four planes, taking the passengers hostage in the Jordanian desert. The UK was not immune from the terrorist threat. In May 1970, for example, two Molotov cocktails were thrown at the US embassy in London. The following October, two parcels containing grenades addressed to the Israeli embassy and the Israeli airline El Al were found in the London office of the British Overseas Airways Corporation. 1
Whitehall was unprepared. In 1968 Burke Trend, a Cabinet Secretary particularly interested in intelligence, established a working party to examine attacks on aviation. More, however, was needed. MI5 was still primarily a counterespionage service, hunting Soviet moles. Indeed, the JIC did not formally establish MI5’s lead role in counterterrorism until late in 1972. Even then counterterrorism fell under the jurisdiction of MI5’s countersubversion branch until the mid-to-late 1970s, when an independent department was established. 2 Meanwhile, GCHQ similarly focused on the Soviets. Although Britain’s signals intelligence targets were more diverse than those of the American National Security Agency, Soviet military activity remained the highest priority in Cheltenham. Therefore whilst GCHQ had large-scale intelligence collection programmes operating in the Middle East, these were focused on Soviet activity or the likelihood of a conventional conflict between Israel and her neighbours. 3
To complicate matters further, the rise of international terrorism muddled the intelligence community’s operating procedures that had evolved alongside the Cold War. Terrorism crossed departmental boundaries and transcended national borders. It even eroded the state’s monopoly on national security by involving private companies in activities such as transport and oil infrastructure. Accordingly, countering international terrorism involved diverse and myriad actors. On the one hand these included the intelligence agencies and the Foreign Office, which were well accustomed to the workings of the secret world. On the other hand, counterterrorism involved actors such as the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Transport, which were far less experienced in handling intelligence. Various Cabinet committees were also formed to deal with different aspects of the ‘threat’.
The document reproduced below focuses on a specific but highly instructive case. 4 In 1970, set against the background of accelerating international terrorism, rumours of impending maritime terrorist attacks circulated around Whitehall. Officials feared that terrorist tactics were evolving. As governments grew increasingly wise to the dangers of aviation hijacking, the PFLP would apparently switch its attention to the sea. Fragmented and flawed intelligence was disseminated in a haphazard and contradictory manner. Speculation created unfounded panic not only amongst certain government officials, but also within private oil and shipping companies operating in the Mediterranean. Corporations, as well as British military forces in the region, were left confused and frustrated.
A coordinated, all-source intelligence assessment was vital. According to the Foreign Office, the JIC desperately needed to compose an assessment which would ‘pull the threads of existing and future reports together and provide us with a better evaluation on which to base our own countermeasures and to advise the commercial interests involved’. 5 The document reproduced here fulfilled this function. It was issued at the end of October 1970, roughly six weeks after the first rumours were received in Whitehall and the confusion had begun. This particular document is also interesting as it is a rare example of a declassified Current Intelligence Group (CIG) report. The vast majority of JIC current intelligence has not yet been released, primarily owing to its sensitivity and the difficulty in camouflaging sources derived from both signals and human intelligence. Created from the Heads of Sections in 1964, CIGs were, and remain, composed of the relevant specialists from Whitehall’s intelligence agencies and government departments. Organised functionally or geographically, each CIG was usually chaired by a Deputy Chief of the Assessments Staff (the JIC’s report-drafting body). This particular report was drafted by the Middle East CIG. In short, CIGs were expert groups which drafted current intelligence reports for the main committee. 6
CIGs reflected the organisation of both MI6 and GCHQ. Originating as JIC sub-committees, they proliferated during the 1970s and 1980s with groups on Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Far East/south-east Asia, Europe, Northern Ireland, the Soviet Union and terrorism. The creation of new CIGs reflected areas of major concern: typically in the early 1990s a Balkans CIG was created to address the multiple wars in the former Yugoslavia. Meeting weekly, their business was not unlike a university seminar and could be combative. Sir Michael Butler, who looked after the CIGs in the mid-1960s, recalls that they were constituted from appropriate departments in the Foreign Office, the Defence Intelligence Staff, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, with participating observers from the CIA and other ‘Five Eyes’ services. They met every Tuesday to prepare drafts for submission to the JIC on Thursday, reviewing what had come in during the week in their area. But during a crisis in their region they might be in almost permanent session. CIGs constituted a core component of the Joint Intelligence Organisation. 7
Sir Robin Hooper, the Chair of the Working Party on Acts of Violence against Civil Aircraft, requested this JIC paper. Like the Foreign Office, he sought a thorough and interdepartmentally agreed assessment, from which action could be recommended. 8 Moreover, Hooper argued that the report was necessary because it was ‘reasonable to expect that the terrorists would seek new targets now that Arab Governments had announced themselves hostile to aircraft hijacking and security at airports had improved’. 9
The report was an important development. It brought together all available intelligence to assess not only whether a terrorist attack was possible, but, crucially, whether it was likely. It added intentions to capabilities – vital for accurate assessments. The CIG also inserted qualifications regarding the quantity and reliability of intelligence, whilst discrediting some of the earlier rumours. The report is therefore an excellent example of the JIC reviewing the available evidence and attempting to issue an authoritative threat assessment. The committee was able to provide a fresh perspective on the problem and escape the earlier incremental analysis and perseveration by examining the b
ody of evidence as a whole and in a detached manner. All-source analysis utilised in a coordinated and interdepartmental approach helped restore a sense of realism and counter the forces of threat exaggeration.
Hooper’s working party discussed the JIC’s intelligence the following week. Hooper was grateful for the intelligence and summed up the conclusions for his colleagues. The JIC had found that whilst a risk of sabotage existed, hijacking proved a lesser danger and there was very little evidence of any attacks planned against passenger ships. Moreover, the JIC had discredited the rumours which had alarmed the oil companies. Interestingly, however, Hooper was cautious about one particular JIC conclusion. The intelligence report asserted that ‘it does seem that the PFLP – the largest and most important extremist group – is now less interested in the hijacking of aircraft and the same may be true of the other extremist groups’. Hooper and his colleagues were wary of lowering the threat level in accordance with this assessment. The working party claimed that whilst the JIC assessment could be taken as ‘one indication that the risk of aircraft hijacking had diminished […] for practical purposes, it was best to treat the risk to aircraft as continuing the same’. 10 Today, it is still politically more difficult for governments to decrease threat levels than to raise them.
The JIC’s report and the working party’s discussion were useful in countering confusion. The assessment ‘had the virtue of highlighting the risk to shipping and showing the need for interdepartmental co-operation’. 11 Indeed, interdepartmental coordination in dealing with the international terrorist threat was swiftly enhanced. Departmental responsibilities and channels of communication were strengthened to ensure that a similar incident of threat exaggeration was less likely in the future. The first six months of 1971 saw practical improvements in terms of sharing intelligence and the use of JIC machinery. Similarly, the declassified files demonstrate increasing examples of departments commenting on other departments’ reports before they were formally issued.
SECRET
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT)
GEN 9(70) 22 COPY NO 38
30 October 1970
CABINET
WORKING PARTY ON ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVIL
AIRCRAFT
THE ARAB TERRORIST THREAT TO SHIPPING AND OIL INSTALLATIONS
Note by the Secretaries
…
At the request of the Chairman of the Working Party the attached assessment has been produced by JIC(A). It will be considered at a meeting of the Working Party on Monday 2 November at 4 pm in Conference Room A, Cabinet Office.
(Signed) T D O’LEARY
B M WEBSTER
Cabinet Office, SW 1
30 October 1970
SECRET
ARAB TERRORIST THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS (DELICATE SOURCE)
…
The Middle East Current Intelligence group met at 2.30 pm on THURSDAY 29 OCTOBER 1970 to consider the Arab Terrorist threat to Western Interests. The following is their report.
…
1. In this assessment, which has been requested by the GEN 9 Working Party on Acts of Violence against Civil Aircraft, we consider the potential threat to shipping and to oil installations from the Arab terrorist groups. We consider the potential threat to Western interests and particularly oil installations both in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. The evidence on terrorist intentions so far available is slight but we hope to obtain some useful information based on captured fedayeen documents in the near future.
The Evidence
2. Earlier this month there were 2 reports suggesting that the terrorists were considering operations against oil tankers and oil installations. The first report, derived from CALTEX in New York, indicated that a 5-man commando team had left the Lebanon on 9 October for the Persian Gulf with the intention of destroying a major oil installation and of hijacking an oil tanker. The second report, from a Director of Mobil in London, was to the effect that Palestine guerrilla activities were likely to be extended to ocean tankers in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that guerrillas had “probably obtained” 2 torpedo boats, together with fast craft, with the aim of taking over a tanker, emptying some of its oil into the sea, and exploding it. The captains of Mobil tankers had on 13 October been advised to be on their guard. However, in neither case has the threat in fact materialised and we understand that the Mobil report was based on speculation within the company. At about this time we also had a report from an apparently good source indicating that the PFLP were feeling disillusioned about the hijacking of aircraft, in view particularly of the very adverse reaction of Arab governments, and were now thinking more in terms of sabotage operations.
3. We have now just received a further report, obtained from the Jordanians, about the morale and plans of the PFLP. This reflects the result of questioning by the Jordanian security services of captured members of the organisation. According to this report the hijacking of aircraft has been “dropped as a technique” in view of the hostility of Arab governments. It was also observed that the Chinese government had warned Habbash (the leader of PFLP) during his visit to Peking that hijacking was likely to damage fedayeen relations with Arab governments. The Jordanians expected the PFLP to move on to sabotage and kidnapping. They had evidence that a sabotage plan exists but did not know the details. They believed that the Americans would be a priority target but that attacks might also be attempted against British interests. Gulf oil installations were thought to be a likely prime target, but there might also be “terrorising small time bomb attacks” in the UK and in the Lebanon. (Lebanon was considered the most likely place for this type of activity in the Arab world, as other Arab states would, in the Jordanian view, react too violently for the PFLP to be willing to take the risk). We have also had other indications that members of the PFLP have plans for kidnapping. The Jordanian view that the PFLP would drop hijackings is supported by a reported recent conversation between Mr Anthony Nutting and Yasin Arafat, in which the latter stated that he had received a written undertaking from Habbash not to engage in further hijackings (meaning presumably of aircraft).
4. We next attempt to define more precisely the possible targets for the terrorist groups.
Sabotage Operations
5. Although theoretically the most attractive target for the PFLP and the other terrorist groups who have gone in for sabotage would be oil installations inside Israel or the occupied territories, they are well aware of the formidable difficulties this would involve. Israeli oil terminal facilities in the port of Eilat could be attacked by fedayeen operating from the opposite Jordanian port of Aqaba. However, this would be no easy task given the close surveillance which the Israelis exercise and in any event the Jordanian authorities have for long taken measure to prevent such fedayeen activities in the knowledge that any Arab attack on Eilat are [sic] likely to be followed by harsher Israeli retaliation against Aqaba. In view of these considerations we think that the extremist fedayeen will go for American targets in the first instance, followed by other Western interests which can be identified with Israel. Pipelines represent a relatively easy target, but they can be repaired fairly quickly, and sabotage operations against those other than Israeli pipelines are open to the charge that they harm Arab interests as much or more than Western interests (as in the case of the PFLP’s sabotage of Tapline last year). All types of US, and to a lesser extent British and other Western European oil installations in all parts of the Middle East must be reckoned to be at some risk. However, it seems likely that the terrorists will be tempted to concentrate their efforts in areas where they would hope that police counter-measures would be the least effective. In this respect US and to a lesser extent other Western oil installations in the Gulf area may seem a particularly inviting target. Kuwait may be a partial exception to this rule as the PFLP and other extremist fedayeen groups would stand to lose if, as a result of their actions in Kuwait, their substantial financial support from Kuwaiti sources w
ere placed in jeopardy. Although we believe that the American and British oil companies operating in the Gulf have adopted fairly elaborate precautionary measures, the large Arab labour forces employed by the oil companies give the terrorists obvious scope for this kind of activity.
6. It certainly cannot be excluded that terrorist groups may contemplate sabotage operations against oil installations outside the Middle East, although there is at the present moment no evidence of such planning. They might be attracted by the consideration that security precautions in some countries are likely to be much less stringent than in the Middle East, where they know that the companies are to some extent alerted to the risks. However, they would face greater practical difficulties in organising sabotage and making a success of it.
7. We believe that the reports of terrorist plans to carry out acts of sabotage against oil tankers deserve to be taken seriously. In the Mediterranean and in Europe the most likely target might be Israeli tankers or other ships carrying oil from, or trading with, Israel. However, in the case of Israeli ships the terrorists will be aware of the far-reaching security precautions the Israelis are believed to have instituted. In the Persian Gulf the terrorists may be interested in US, British and other Western European-controlled ships, particularly tankers, even though these are not trading directly with Israel. One particularly inviting target would be the tankers, most of which are registered in Panama but belong to American companies, which carry oil to Eilat.
8. Sabotage attempts can be expected to take place while ships are in harbour or at anchorage. The terrorists could either attempt to plant explosives after insinuating themselves onto a ship or to blow them up by placing limpet mines.
Hijacking
9. If Arab terrorists wished to attempt to hijack a tanker or other ship it is possible that they might seek to do this by acquiring high-speed vessels on which they might place armaments. They might also, in the Gulf, use distressed dows as a way of getting hijackers aboard a vessel. We have however no evidence, other than the tenuous Mobil speculation that they might be planning this. Another possibility is that they might seek to board vessels while in port and to take them over by holding hostages. This would be the obvious method if a passenger vessel was involved. In such an operation the terrorists’ object might be either to blow the ship up as a demonstration or to demand ransom in the form of ransom of fedayeen prisoners held in Europe or in Israel. We are inclined to think that the likelihood of such hijacking operations, which are open to some of the same political objections as the hijacking of aircraft, is less than that of sabotage. However, it cannot be altogether discounted.
Spying on the World Page 40