The JIC was the key provider of intelligence to the War Cabinet. Shortly after the invasion, the committee decided to disseminate a daily intelligence briefing which included sections on Argentine military dispositions and intentions, as well as reaction from other Latin American countries and the Soviet Union. The JIC issued a total of seventy-five daily assessments and twenty-three more detailed notes between 4 April and 18 June. Although the committee met twice a week during the war, the bulk of the work was conducted by the Latin America CIG. As Lawrence Freedman points out, the greatest challenge was not content but timing, given that Argentina was four hours behind London. 24
One JIC immediate assessment of the Falklands War has, however, slipped through the net after being sent to the Americans. It is reproduced below. 25 Prepared by the Latin America CIG a couple of weeks after the invasion, it offers a unique insight into JIC current intelligence. The assessment was received through the top secret cable known as UMBRA, which signified highly sensitive communications or signals intelligence. It also sheds intriguing light on the relationship between the UK and the US. American attempts to show impartiality over the conflict caused ‘incessant irritation’ in London. The document reveals how Britain anxiously awaited the American response to an Argentine request to access the civilian Landsat satellite so as to provide images of the Falklands area. According to the CIG, the political ramifications of American agreement would be far greater than the military. From 21 to 23 April, NASA duly programmed the civilian Landsat satellite to take the required pictures. From the American perspective, Landsat was a civilian programme without intelligence value. If the US acquiesced to British requests then it would jeopardise the project by implying it had espionage functions. 26
The CIG assessed that the quality of images from Landsat would not offer the Argentines much intelligence. Britain expressed concern to Washington nonetheless. After some negotiation, America decided to use technical problems as a reason for not giving satellite material to Argentina. The following month, however, some material was transmitted to Buenos Aires. It revealed little. 27
As well as creating a threat framework upon which policymakers relied, the JIC’s performance (especially prior to the invasion) had longer-lasting implications. Although Franks ultimately cleared the JIC of failing to provide warning, the inquiry recommended a number of reforms to the committee’s structure. Franks argued that the chair of the JIC should be a full-time position and a more critical and independent role. Consequently, he recommended that the Chairman should be appointed by the Prime Minister and be a member of the Cabinet Office. 28 This challenged JIC tradition, whereby the Chairman had long been drawn from the Foreign Office. In practice, Franks’s recommendation did not make a great deal of difference and several subsequent Prime Ministers have chosen to appoint Chairs from the Foreign Office. 29
TOP SECRET CODEWORD
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02 DTG: 171715Z APR 82 PSN: 044079
JIC JIR 1011 SIT276 TOR: 107/1910Z
DISTRIBUTION: NONE /001
[…]
INFO CSE
TOP SECRET […] – DELICATE SOURCE – (UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED)
DATED 17 APRIL 1982
[…]
THE FOLLOWING IS AN IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT/JIC(82)(IA)29 PREPARED BY THE LATIN AMERICA CURRENT INTELLIGENCE GROUP AT THEIR MEETING WHICH ENDED AT NOON ON 17 APRIL 1982
FALKLAND ISLANDS – 17 APRIL 1982 – TOP SECRET UMBRA – DELICATE SOURCE (UNITED KINGDOM CLASSIFIED)
MAIN POINTS
A LARGE PART OF THE ARGENTINE FLEET IS BELIEVED TO BE AT SEA. ARGENTINA HAS REQUESTED LANDSAT PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FOR 21-23 APRIL. TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS HAVE THREATENED BRITISH CITIZENS AND INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY. ARGENTINA HAS PREPARED A DRAFT NOTE FOR INVOKING ACTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY. THE SOVIET UNION IS REPORTED TO BE READY TO OFFER ARGENTINA SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND LAND BASED MISSILES IN EXCHANGE FOR GRAIN. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS DENIED IN A TELEGRAM TO THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN VENEZUELA THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL. THE HIGH LEVEL OF SOVIET PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE AREA IS UNUSUAL.
ARGENTINE MILITARY
1. A GROUP OF FOUR ARGENTINE WARSHIPS WAS NOTED TO BE ABOUT 70 MILES SOUTH EAST OF THEIR BASE PORT OF PUERTO BELGRANO ON THE EVENING OF 16 APRIL; THEY WERE POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN GUNNERY FIRING AND TACTICAL EXERCISES. WE BELIEVE ANOTHER GROUP OF SHIPS WHICH PROBABLY INCLUDES THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, IS AT SEA. WE DO NOT KNOW ITS POSITION. THERE IS NOW EVIDENCE THAT SHORT RANGE GROUND TO AIR MISSILES HAVE BEEN SITED CLOSE TO PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD.
2. ARGENTINA, WHICH IS A SUBSCRIBER TO THE LANDSAT PROJECT, HAS MADE A REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE LANDSAT PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITE TO BE TASKED TO COVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON 21–23 APRIL. THE SATELLITE WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE NO INFORMATION OF MILITARY VALUE AND IT PRODUCES VERY LOW RESOLUTION PHOTOGRAPHS (80 METER). THE COVERAGE WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES AND A FEW MILES OF SURROUNDING SEA. WE DOUBT WHETHER ARGENTINA WOULD BE ABLE TO DERIVE ANY MILITARY INFORMATION OF VALUE FROM THIS REQUEST. THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE WOULD OUTWEIGH THE MILITARY.
ARGENTINE INTERNAL.
3. THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED IN ARGENTINA APPARENTLY ON CHARGES OF SPYING. REPORTS INDICATE THAT TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AND OTHER POLITICALLY MOTIVATED GROUPS FROM LATIN AMERICA MIGHT TAKE ACTION IN BRITAIN OR AGAINST BRITISH MISSIONS ABROAD. THE STAFF OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO ARE AT PARTICULAR RISK.
INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS
4. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS PREPARED A DRAFT NOTE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE OAS REQUESTING A SPECIAL MEETING TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS ON ACTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY. (SUCH CONSULTATIONS IN THE OAS GOVERNING BOARD MAY PRECEDE A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE RIO TREATY STATES, ACTING AS THE RIO TREATY ORGAN OF CONSULTATION). THE MINISTRY HAS NOT AS YET INSTRUCTED ITS REPRESENTATIVE TO PRESENT THE NOTE; WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT ARGENTINA IS LIKELY TO DO THIS WHILE MR HAIG’S MISSION CONTINUES.
Notes
1 . Frank Cooper quoted in Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 412.
2 . Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 173.
3 . Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (Franks report), Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO, 1983), paras 19, 305.
4 . Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. I: The Origins of the Falklands War (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 156. For an overview of the various JIC assessments see Franks report, paras. 50, 77.
5 . Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 155; Franks report, para. 311.
6 . Franks report, para. 306.
7 . Ibid., para. 95; Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 137.
8 . Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 151.
9 . Ridley to Carrington, 20 July 1981, Thatcher Foundation Archive.
10 . Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 137.
11 . Ibid., p. 148.
12 . Falklands: MOD draft paper, ‘Defence Implications of Argentine Action against the Falkland Islands’, 14 September 1981, TNA: PREM 19/643.
13 . Carrington to Thatcher, 24 March 1982, PM/82/23, Thatcher Foundation Archive.
14 . Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 262.
15 . Franks report, paras 307–8.
16 . Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperPress, 2011), pp. 392–3.
17 . Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , p. 156.
18 . For examples see Franks report, para. 151; note by H. Lowles (DIS), 10 March 1982, Thatcher Foundation archive.
19 . Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Vol. 1: Not for Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013), p. 661.
20 . Franks report, para. 316.
21 . Ibid.,
para. 310; Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands War , pp. 206–7; Moore, Margaret Thatcher , p. 665.
22 . Moore, Margaret Thatcher , p. 670.
23 . National Archives, ‘CAB 189 Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Committee: Assessments and Notes’, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=C15827 (last accessed 11 November 2013).
24 . Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II: War and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 28. This volume offers good descriptions of some of the JIC assessments throughout the war.
25 . JIC(82)(IA)29, 17 April 1982; see also Carlos Osorio, Sarah Christiano and Erin Maskell (eds), ‘Reagan on the Falkland/Malvinas: “Give [] Maggie enough to carry on …”’ National Security Archive website, 1 April 2012, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB374/ (last accessed 11 November 2013).
26 . Ibid., pp. 165, 384–5.
27 . Ibid, pp. 384–5.
28 . Franks report, para. 319.
29 . Len Scott, ‘British Strategic Intelligence and the Cold War’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 146.
18
CHANGING REQUIREMENTS AT
THE END OF THE COLD WAR
‘ N OTHING IS ETERNAL in this world.’ 1 Mikhail Gorbachev’s words of June 1989 about the Berlin Wall proved prophetic: it was torn down the following November. Germany reunified just under a year later. In 1990, Russia declared sovereignty from the Soviet Union and was quickly followed by other members of the communist bloc. After nearly half a century of Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union was remarkably swift. This rapidity, however, belied the huge significance. It marked a major shift in international politics.
The end of the Cold War had a major impact on the British intelligence community. For the entire careers of most serving intelligence officers, the Soviet Union and international communism had been the primary target of their activity. Unsurprisingly, the JIC had spent the bulk of its existence watching Moscow, counting nuclear weapons and assessing the likelihood of future wars. And yet between 1989 and 1990, that threat suddenly crumbled. It was a rare cause for a typically understated JIC celebration. On hearing that the Soviet Communist Party had been proscribed, Sir Percy Cradock, Chairman of the JIC, invited his colleagues on the committee to join him for champagne. Raising his glass, Cradock toasted: ‘We didn’t have a war, and we did win.’ 2
Western intelligence agencies were caught off guard by the manner in which the Soviet Union collapsed. The CIA, however, has staunchly defended its record. Releasing many of its national intelligence assessments and estimates from the period for scrutiny, the agency has attempted to counter criticisms that the end of the Cold War was an intelligence failure. Even so, a number of senior American officials, from Lawrence Eagleburger, US Secretary of State in 1992, to Robert Blackwell, the CIA’s Soviet specialist in the 1980s, have since admitted to being taken by surprise. 3
British policymakers must have been surprised too, for the JIC seemingly did not foresee the Soviet bloc’s implosion. 4 On 8 December 1989, Charles Powell, Margaret Thatcher’s foreign policy adviser, confessed: ‘We are finding that we are almost daily being taken by surprise by the pace of developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.’ 5 In stark contrast to the Americans, however, the British government has refused to release any JIC document relating to the end of the Cold War. It is therefore unclear where the JIC went wrong and how its assessments were used by policymakers. Younger members of the Assessments Staff were keenly aware of the importance of the changes made by Gorbachev, but it appears the ‘grandees’ who dominated the JIC were more sceptical. 6 One potential explanation, put forward by Cradock, looks to the JIC’s obsession with missile counting and a consequent tendency to overlook broader economic and political indicators. 7 Detailed analysis however, is a task for future historians.
What is abundantly clear, however, is that the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the landscape of security. It ushered in a new era of instability and uncertainty. In the absence of the long-standing Soviet threat, intelligence actors faced a fundamental reappraisal of priorities and requirements. They had to determine the nature and direction of any new threats, whilst becoming more flexible so as to meet increasingly diverse targets. Forced to justify their existence in the post-Cold War world, this, in practice, meant severe budget cuts. MI5 was forced to make compulsory redundancies for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Similarly, by 1995, GCHQ’s budget had been slashed by £200 million a year. MI6 did not escape either. The Treasury inflicted poorly handled compulsory redundancies on the service. Overall staff levels dropped by 25 per cent, with cuts to senior management going even deeper. This left MI6 with a notably young senior management team. Young talent also formed part of the drive towards flexibility. Instead of retaining permanent and expensive assets on the ground across the world, MI6 sought to insert officers at short notice into a target country. 8
The end of the Cold War also led to a new era of openness and oversight of the intelligence services. The British intelligence machinery emerged from the shadows. Whitehall’s ‘open government’ programme included the gradual release of JIC documents for the first time in history. Meanwhile, the 1994 Intelligence Services Act placed MI6 and GCHQ on a legal footing for the first time. The Act also created the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). This was, and remains, a committee of senior parliamentarians (now chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and is charged with overseeing the expenditure, administration and policy of the UK’s intelligence agencies.
The document reproduced below illustrates these two core themes: changing priorities and increasing oversight. It is an extract from the first ISC annual report, which draws heavily on testimony from the diplomat Paul Lever, then JIC Chairman. Half a decade on from Cradock’s champagne toast, Lever was well aware of the shift in intelligence requirements that had taken place. He informed the new oversight committee that the United Kingdom now faced challenges that were a great deal more varied than those which had characterised the Cold War. Termed ‘functional’ topics, these myriad threats included terrorism, nuclear proliferation, international sanctions, and serious organised crime (such as drug trafficking and money laundering). Towards the end of the 1990s, the challenges of peacemaking and humanitarian interventionism had likely been added to the list. It was a decade of greater uncertainty in terms of threats – sandwiched between the dominance of the Cold War and the so-called war on terror. Lever’s was a similar sentiment to that expressed more poetically by a former US Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey. He famously stated in 1993 that ‘having slain the Soviet dragon, the intelligence community now found itself in a jungle full of snakes’. 9
Lever, however, emphasised the JIC’s lack of complacency towards the more traditional threats. The JIC assessed that neither Russia nor any other state belonging to the former Soviet Union posed a direct military threat to the United Kingdom. Despite this, it was certainly not forgotten that Russia still possessed a nuclear arsenal, vast strategic capabilities and the largest armed forces in Europe. Interestingly, Stella Rimington, Director General of MI5, reported that Russian espionage against the United Kingdom was again on the rise by 1995. Similarly, the conflict in Northern Ireland was another threat which transcended the end of the Cold War – although this is unsurprising given its disconnection to the Soviet Union and international communism. Nonetheless, it remained high on the JIC agenda and MI5 was able to approach the Irish challenges with renewed vigour.
Given that the JIC was responsible for tasking Britain’s intelligence agencies, Lever’s articulation of the changing nature of the threat is important. As outlined in the annexed document, in the mid-1990s the committee set requirements annually prior to ministerial endorsement. The JIC’s assessment of the changing priorities in the post-Cold War world therefore had ramif
ications for targeting and the activity of the individual agencies.
Placing the JIC at the apex of the British intelligence machinery, the ISC report is again interesting because it indicates how each intelligence agency responded to the JIC’s changing priorities. Despite the challenges of uncertainty, change and budget cuts, the heads of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ all recognised the importance of refocusing their efforts. Accordingly intelligence on eastern Europe was dramatically slashed, as revealed in the document.
Demonstrating the new oversight regime, the ISC’s report reached John Major, the Prime Minister. It was then laid before Parliament. Major responded by expressing his encouragement that the British intelligence community had responded rapidly and with flexibility to the changing world scene since the end of the Cold War. 10 This document also recalls the last full decade in which the JIC retained an important coordination function for the UK intelligence community, something which it no longer enjoys. 11
Intelligence and Security Committee
Annual Report 1995
Chairman:
The Rt Hon Tom King CH MP
Intelligence Services Act 1994
Chapter 13
Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister
by Command of Her Majesty
Spying on the World Page 44