1. There are a number of courses of action, consistent with the assumptions of this paper (paragraph 4) which Her Majesty’s Government might announce at the time of the imposition of Direct Rule or which the Communities in Northern Ireland might be led to expect. The spectrum of possibilities is a wide one, but people in Northern Ireland would probably see these reduced in general terms to three options for Her Majesty’s Government: the restoration of an independent Stormont together with constitutional devices to protect the interest of the minority; radical changes indicating an intention that Northern Ireland should in the future be fully integrated into the United Kingdom; and changes similar to those in the first alternative but including elements suggesting a desire to facilitate a closer relationship with the Irish Republic. There would in practice probably be little difference between the second and third possibilities in terms of the actual reforms introduced. Reactions will be chiefly determined by what the Communities understand Her Majesty’s Government’s ultimate intentions to be. As regards the reaction of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the RUC, in particular, we consider that our assessment in paragraph 11 and 12 of the main report is likely to remain valid under each option.
Restoration of an Independent Stormont
2. Even if the IRA were forced to abandon violence and were discredited with the Catholic working class, the Catholics would not acquiesce in continued Unionist rule. The SDLP and Catholic moderates are not totally blind to the need eventually to come to terms with the Protestants, but civil disobedience and their withdrawal from Parliamentary and other office would be likely to continue so long as they believed Stormont would remain permanently dominated by the Unionist Party.
3. It would be possible to devise constitutional means of protecting the interests of the minority in Stormont. Nonetheless, the Unionist Party would, if it held together, be able to retain a permanently dominating position in any elected central decision-making body like Stormont. In these circumstances non-sectarian parties would have little influence. A period of peace and the implementation of current reforms, together with Faulkner’s “green paper” proposals, could perhaps do something to alter this situation and permit the emergence of parties based on the general, rather than the communal, interest. But the hope would be a slim one. Without radical reform a resurgence of violence in the next few years would be looked on as a virtual certainty even if the IRA can be suppressed this time round.
Northern Ireland Permanently Integrated into the United Kingdom
4. This might take a number of forms but the essential points would be the complete subordination of Stormont to Westminster and the transfer of responsibility for security. It would be possible on this hypothesis to secure by legislation at Westminster the introduction of various reforms in Northern Ireland similar to those in the previous alternative, in order to protect the position of the minority. Nevertheless Protestants might well fear that concessions to Catholics would lead in the end to reunification and their becoming a minority in the South, while Catholics might continue to see reunification as their only guarantee in the long run from domination by the Protestants. The touchstone, so far as Protestants were concerned, for judging whether reforms were or were not a step towards reunification would be whether Stormont, under whatever name, remained and whether they thus retained the power to decide this basic question. Catholics would judge the situation similarly. All would turn on how Her Majesty’s Government expressed their policy towards reunification.
Reforms Looking Towards Eventual Reunification
5. This alternative would include reforms similar to those indicated above, and also institutional measures to encourage co-operation with Dublin. The Catholics would be encouraged to co-operate in Direct Rule and to negotiate seriously with the Protestants about what arrangements should follow if they believed this could open the way to reunification in the longer term. Most Catholics probably would not press for it immediately, partly because of the immense problem of integrating the Protestants into the Republic and partly because of the economic and social benefits of continued British citizenship. As a long-term aspiration, however, it would be important, and steps towards it, however small, would undercut the appeal of the IRA and diminish the risk of resumed violence after the end of the current campaign. Nor would most Protestants be likely to react with violence if it became evident that Her Majesty’s Government’s ultimate and long term aim was to negotiate with the South. One possible effect of Direct Rule might indeed be to encourage the discussion that has just begun about the possible future constitution of a united Ireland. If it became apparent to both Communities in Northern Ireland that Her Majesty’s Government was prepared to encourage such a debate, Catholics would probably be prepared to co-operate, while Protestants could perhaps overcome their present fears of an immediate sellout to the Roman Catholic South.
RESTRICTED
UK EYES ONLY
JIC (A) (71) 54
THE PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF DIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
…
DISTRIBUTION
UNITED KINGDOM
Cabinet Ministers (if approved by the Secretary of the Cabinet)
Secretary of the Cabinet
Secretary, Counter Subversion Committee
Chiefs of Staff: to take note
Metropolitan Police Office, Mr P E Brodie
Ministry of Defence: D of DOP
Secretary, Defence Policy Staff
Director, Communications
Electronic Security Group
Joint Intelligence Committee (A)
Joint Intelligence Committee (B)
Secretary, Official Committee on Northern Ireland (For issue to Committee)
Secretary, Official Committee on Northern Ireland
Sub-Committee on Contingency Planning (For issue to Committee)
MILITARY COMMANDS
Secretary CICC (West)
Secretary, UK Cs–in–C Committee
UNITED KINGDOM NORTHERN IRELAND AUTHORITIES
Director of Operations, Northern Ireland (Lieut-Gen Sir Harry Tuzo)
Director of Intelligence, Northern Ireland
UK Representative, Northern Ireland (Mr H F T Smith)
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH POST
Dublin, BE
Cabinet Office
7 January 1972
Notes
1 . Eunan O’Halpin, ‘“A Poor Thing but Our Own”: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Ireland, 1965–72’, Intelligence and National Security 23/5 (2008), pp. 665–6.
2 . Eunan O’Halpin, ‘The Value and Limits of Experience in the Early Years of the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1969–1972’, in Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (eds), Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 189–90.
3 . Initially, these assessments overwhelmingly focused on the nationalist groups.
4 . ‘The Situation in Northern Ireland to the end of 1971’, 10 September 1971, JIC(A)(71)44, TNA: CAB 186/9.
5 . Prime Minister to Home Secretary, 24 September 1971, TNA: PREM 15/481.
6 . Home Secretary to Prime Minister, 4 October 1971, TNA: PREM 15/482.
7 . Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister, ‘Northern Ireland’, 5 October 1971, TNA: PREM 15/482.
8 . Confidential annex to Chiefs of Staff minutes, 26 October 1971, CoS 36th Meeting 1971, TNA: DEFE 4/261.
9 . ‘The Probable Reactions to the Introduction of Direct Rule in Northern Ireland’, 6 January 1972, JIC(A)(71)54, TNA: CAB 186/9.
10 . Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister, ‘Northern Ireland, Annex: Detailed Elements of the Proposed Reform’, 26 January 1972, TNA: PREM 15/1001.
11 . The Home Secretary’s plan involved more of a direct approach from Westminster. This included reassurances regarding the border, a redefinition of the powers of government in Northern Ireland and a change in the composition of the government.
12 . Cabinet Secretary to Prime Min
ister, ‘Northern Ireland’, 19 January 1972, TNA: PREM 15/1001.
13 . William Beattie Smith, The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis, 1969–73: From Violence to Power-Sharing (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), p. 192.
14 . Paul Carmichael and Robert Osborne, ‘The Northern Ireland Civil Service under Direct Rule and Devolution’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 69/2 (2003), p. 207.
17
THE FALKLANDS WAR
O N 2 APRIL 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. Although the ensuing war lasted only until mid-June, it became the defining event of Margaret Thatcher’s long premiership. Sir Frank Cooper, permanent under-secretary at the Ministry of Defence, believed that Thatcher ‘regard[ed] it as the high peak of her whole prime ministerial life’. 1
The invasion famously took Thatcher by surprise. ‘The war’, she recalled, ‘was very sudden’ and ‘no one had predicted the Argentine invasion more than a few hours in advance.’ 2 The factors explaining this make the Falklands War a highly instructive case study when considering intelligence and policy. The threat framework constructed by intelligence between the mid-1970s and early 1982 allowed the Falklands to escape ministerial attention. The JIC failed to provide warning and ministers were caught unawares.
The Argentine threat to the Falkland Islands had long been on the JIC’s agenda. The committee concluded as early as March 1965 that invasion was unlikely, and this pattern continued throughout the mid-to-late 1970s when JIC assessments became more regular as tension increased. 3 Throughout this period, JIC members were in consensus and broadly argued that Argentina would not do anything rash until faced with a clear breakdown in negotiations. 4 Moreover, the JIC had established a model whereby escalation would occur gradually. Argentine intentions towards the Falklands, however, remained a low priority until October 1981 – and even then additional resources were not found to meet the growing importance. 5
The last full JIC assessment before the invasion came in July 1981. According to the Franks inquiry, it had ‘considerable influence on the thinking of Ministers and officials’. 6 Demonstrating continuity with previous assessments, the JIC judged that Argentina still sought sovereignty of the Falklands. Once again, however, intelligence suggested that Buenos Aires hoped to achieve this through peaceful means – but would turn to force as a last resort. Although noting some concerning trends, the JIC ultimately concluded that ‘extreme Argentine reactions’ were not imminent. 7 Unfortunately, the JIC paper remains classified and a Freedom of Information request has proved unsuccessful. This is surprising given that the conclusions have already been summarised in detail by Lawrence Freedman in his official history.
Nonetheless, the JIC paper proved influential in policy circles. It shaped government thinking. Firstly, the assessment reinforced the Foreign Office assumption that Argentina would follow the standard escalation path, beginning with the withdrawal of services. 8 Nicholas Ridley, the FCO minister with responsibility for the Falklands, echoed these conclusions just days after the report was published. He warned that if negotiations broke down, the UK ‘must expect retaliatory action’, beginning with withdrawal of Argentine services and escalating in the longer term towards ‘some sort of military action’. 9
Secondly, the JIC assessment influenced ministers and senior officials when they discussed a draft paper for the Defence Committee in early September 1981. Reinforced by the intelligence assessment, the draft paper recommended three choices of action ranging from opening negotiations with Argentina without the islanders’ consent to setting contingency preparations in motion. Officials decided that it was a poor moment to put such unpalatable decisions to the Defence Committee, not least because the Argentine government was changing and more talks were due in December. Accordingly, the draft paper turned into a minute on the current situation. 10
Thirdly, the MoD explicitly built on JIC conclusions. On receiving the report, defence officials judged that there had been a marginal increase in the threat, ‘but not enough for us to alter our position from 1979’. 11 The following September, they did, however, compose a paper considering the defence implications of seeking to deter or counter by military means options available to Argentina which had been put forward by the JIC. The MoD’s conclusion is worth quoting at length:
Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and possibly on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistic difficulties. To deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of national resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistic problems of such an operation would be formidable. 12
Fourthly, the JIC assessment created a threat framework which influenced ministerial thinking up until the invasion. As late as 24 March 1982, Lord Carrington and Thatcher were still reliant upon on the JIC’s July assessment. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary explicitly informed his Prime Minister that Argentine options remained as set out in the JIC paper. Moreover, the threat levels and model of escalation also remained in place. Military action might take place as a final resort if negotiations broke down, but the more immediate response would see Argentina cutting off essential services to the islands. 13 Influenced by the JIC’s model and framework, no meeting of the Defence Committee was held to discuss the Falklands during this period, and there was no reference to the islands at Cabinet level until 25 March. 14
It is perhaps surprising that the JIC’s July 1981 assessment and model remained in place for so long. The Latin America Current Intelligence Group met eighteen times between July 1981 and March 1982 – but did not discuss the Falklands. On four separate occasions officials considered whether or not to update the JIC assessment, but invariably decided against it. When assessing the Argentine threat to the Falklands, the Assessments Staff relied on four criteria. Firstly, progress in Argentina’s dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel; secondly, the political and economic situation in Argentina; thirdly, the state of interservice rivalry in Argentina; and fourthly, Argentina’s perception of the prospects of making progress by negotiation. Information received after July 1981 was not thought to indicate any significant change in these factors. 15
This approach opens up the JIC to two counts of intelligence failure: perseveration and an overreliance on secret intelligence. For example, the British ambassador in Argentina, Anthony Williams, sent an acute warning to the Foreign Office in autumn 1981. Based largely on open sources, the warning did not break the committee’s cognitive rigidity. Overly dependent on secret intelligence, officials in London were not persuaded. 16 Similarly, the acquisition of power by Leopoldo Galtieri in December 1981 did not warrant a new assessment or a challenge of the existing intelligence consensus. The change of government was discussed neither in the ‘Weekly Survey of Intelligence’ nor in a JIC note. Officials broadly assumed that Galtieri would maintain the position of his predecessor, thereby making the crux of the JIC’s 1981 paper valid. 17 Again this is surprising as, to achieve the presidency, Galtieri was forced to rely upon the support of the Argentine navy, whose commander-in-chief held a particularly hardline view about Argentine claims to the Falklands. Other new intelligence was also assessed within this framework. Accordingly, single pieces of material were dismissed on the grounds that each did not increase the risk beyond the JIC’s report of July 1981. 18 The JIC was left unaware of a top secret Argentine national security directive circulated in January 1982. This stated that the junta ‘resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain the political objective’. 19
The Franks inquiry criticised the Joint Intelligence Organisation for overemphasising secret intelligence, which was more reassuring ab
out prospects of early moves towards confrontation. Whitehall’s central intelligence machinery overlooked open source intelligence and the weight of the Argentine press campaign in 1982. For example, the JIO dismissed material arising from the press by believing it was probably designed to exert pressure on the UK in negotiations. 20 The Falklands War emphasised the importance of a genuinely all-source intelligence assessment machine.
At the end of March 1982, the Latin America Current Intelligence Group put together an immediate assessment at very short notice. It was so highly classified that only Thatcher and her most senior colleagues saw it. Although concerned with events in South Georgia, where Argentina had established a presence, it concluded that the possibility of Argentina escalating the situation by landing a military force on another dependency of the Falklands could not be ruled out. According to the CIG, however, Argentina did not wish to be the first to adopt forcible measures. Once again, the model of escalation beginning with diplomatic pressure remained in place. Thatcher was left feeling deeply uneasy by the JIC assessment but still did not expect an imminent invasion. Uncertainty reigned. Only afterwards did a separate piece of intelligence, obtained through an intercept, confirm that an Argentine task force was on its way to the islands. A gloomy and confused atmosphere descended on Thatcher’s room in the House of Commons. 21
The JIC did not predict the Falklands invasion. The Prime Minister was ‘deeply disturbed’ about the JIC’s performance. She summoned Patrick Wright, the newly appointed Chairman, to Chequers to be ‘dressed down at considerable length for failing to predict the attack’. The meeting left Wright in need of ‘a very strong drink’. 22 The JIC did, however, assess the situation once underway. This was done through current intelligence and immediate assessments. From January 1967, the JIC’s current intelligence was augmented with special assessments and notes. The former covered important issues of immediate interest, whilst the latter examined longer-term matters of less urgency or expanded on a topic already covered by a special assessment. In September 1974, immediate assessments replaced special assessments. They remain classified. 23
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