5. We previously judged that as a last resort Saddam may seek to pursue a scorched earth policy, including the destruction of oil wells. There is no conclusive intelligence on Iraqi plans but they could:
• defend oil wells against attack;
• set fire to them to stop production, cause pollution and disrupt coalition forces; and
• cause long-term, possibly irreparable, damage to prevent others benefiting from future production.
The potential environmental disaster, coupled with the possible use of CBW against coalition forces and the local population, could cause widespread panic and contamination. This could result in hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees, many needing immediate help.
Systems currently deployed in Southern Iraq with possible CBW capabilities
–at least 20 155mm-artillery pieces (range: up to 39km).
–at least 10 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers (range: 20km).
–at least 2 Ababil-100 missile units (range: 150km)
6. […] Interruption of food supplies under the Oil for Food (OFF) programme, upon which 60% of the Iraqi population depends, could boost the number of displaced persons and refugees throughout Iraq. There may be strong international demands for the immediate provision of food and clean water to millions of Iraqis as well as an immediate environmental clean-up operation. Tackling such problems in Southern Iraq will be complicated by possible CBW contamination. While UN contingency planning has started, some UN officials and outside observers question whether the UN will be fully ready to meet these requirements. The UN will be particularly badly placed if a humanitarian disaster occurs in the South while fighting continues in close proximity.
Shia Reactions
7. Reporting has previously indicated that the regime is concerned about a Shia uprising in the South after the outbreak of hostilities. One report from August 2002 indicates Iraqi plans to use CBW in Southern Iraq to cause mass casualties among the Shia in the event of a US-led attack. The regime would seek to pin the blame for the resulting high level of casualties on the coalition. Another report noted the concerns of the close relatives of senior Shia clerics that the regime might attempt to arrest or assassinate senior Shia clerics in the event of war.
8. Recent reporting confirms our judgement [...] that the Shia will be cautious in opposing Saddam until they see the regime is finished and its capability to retaliate is substantially weakened. The experience of 1991 will be a major influence. The Shia will fear the regime’s use of CBW to crush any uprising and will also remember that their earlier expectations of support from external forces were dashed. Even if the initial severity of any coalition attack makes clear that the regime is finished, the Shia may still fear what the regime could do to them in its dying days. As in 1991, the timing and scale of any uprising is likely to vary between localities, depending upon the level of local tribal and religious leaders’ encouragement. Overall we judge there will be no immediate, unified Shia response to a coalition attack .
Iranian policy
Badr Corps
The Badr Corps is trained and equipped by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and based in camps in Iran. We assess it to be at least 3-5000 strong, but with the addition of reservists this may increase up to 20,000. The Badr Corps operates in Southern, Central and Northern Iraq (There have been reports of a recent incursion in Northern Iraq).
9. Iranian aims in Iraq include preventing refugee flows across its borders; ensuring a leading role for its proteges among the Iraqi Shia (the Supreme Council for an Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI] and its armed wing the Badr Corps); minimising the size and duration of a US presence post-Saddam; and destroying the Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK), an armed terrorist opposition group supported by Saddam’s regime. Iran has interests throughout Iraq, but may consider it has greatest influence to pursue them in the South through armed Shia groups, such as the Badr Corps.
10. Intelligence on Iranian activity [...] indicates that in early 2003 the Iranians have increased their support for Shia opposition groups and have upgraded their intelligence effort targeted at Southern Iraq. [...] Their national and cultural ties to other Iraqi Arabs outweigh their religious links to Shia Iran. [...] Iran has accepted that there is little support among Iraqi Shia for an Iranian-style theocratic regime.
11. [...] If the coalition does not deal with the MEK, Iran may make limited cross-border rocket attacks on them. [...] The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might act to undermine any post-Saddam peace that did not take Iran’s concerns into account. Recent reporting indicates that the IRGC is continuing to support incursions of the Badr Corps into Iraq. We judge that both Iranian conservatives and reformers are anxious to avoid provoking a US-led attack on Iran. We therefore assess that Iranian-inspired terrorist attacks on coalition forces are unlikely, unless the Iranians thought the US had decided to attack them after an Iraq campaign.
12. The Iranians have espoused a policy of “active neutrality” on Iraq. But this is not well developed and there is little regime agreement on what “active” means. The regime is pre-occupied with domestic concerns and is not in a strong position to project its power into Iraq. Different elements of the regime may pursue very different policies. Hardliners will oppose cooperation with a US-led post-Saddam regime. Some moderates, however, will wish to establish a good working relationship with the international community to ensure Iran plays a major role in reconstruction. The Iranians will react negatively, however, if they feel we are attempting to marginalize them.
The Political and Security Landscape post-Saddam
13. We know very little about the Iraqi Shia. [...] They are not politically organised above the local, tribal level and there are no clear candidates for overall Shia leadership. They are very diverse, straddling the urban/rural and secular/Islamist divides. They have had little opportunity to discuss their preferred political arrangements. Shia politics post-Saddam therefore look highly unpredictable.
14. Saddam’s regime has centralised power and stifled opposition. The only networks of influence in the South that exist outside of the Ba’ath party are the tribes and the followers of some of the senior Shia clerics. Once the regime has collapsed, coalition forces will find the remains of the state’s bureaucratic structures, local tribal sheikhs and religious leaders. There will also be a number of fractious armed groups, some strengthened by arms seized during the collapse of the regime. The external opposition will attempt to assert authority, but only those with armed forces on the ground or support from senior Shia clerics, such as SCIRI or Da’wa, another Shia Islamist group, are likely to succeed to any extent. [...]
15. Given that the Shia in Southern Iraq have borne the brunt of regime oppression since 1991, there is a high probability of revenge killing of Ba’ath officials, both Sunni and Shia. This could be particularly widespread and bloody, if the regime collapses quickly and few Ba’ath officials have the chance to escape. Beyond that the extent of any further breakdown of law and order is difficult to predict. But there will be large numbers of armed groups and some potential for tribal score-settling, including between those who have opposed and collaborated with Saddam’s regime. There may also be competition for limited food. Overall there is a risk of a wider breakdown as the regime’s authority crumbles. There are no indications, however, of Shia preparations for an all-out civil war against Sunni Iraqis. Coalition forces may be forced to impose peace in Southern Iraq, including the disarmament of armed groups. As we previously judged Iraqis may not welcome coalition military forces, despite welcoming the overthrow of Saddam. The establishment of popular support for any post-Saddam administration cannot be taken for granted. It could be undermined by:
• damage to holy sites;
• major civilian casualties;
• lack of a UNSCR authorising a post-Saddam administration;
• heavy-handed peace enforcement;
• failure to meet popular expectations over human
itarian aid and reconstruction;
• failure rapidly to restore law and order;
• failure to involve the Shia adequately in a post-Saddam administration; and
• failure to be seen to run the oil industry in the interests of the Iraqi people.
16. There are factors, however, that could work in our favour:
• surviving networks of influence with whom we could work, including remains of state bureaucracy and food-distribution networks, tribal leaders and religious figures; and
• receptivity of the population to information from external media and leaflet drops.
Notes
1 . This chapter was written before the Iraq inquiry led by Sir John Chilcot reported.
2 . ‘Sir David Omand, Transcript’, Evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, 20 January 2010, p. 40.
3 . JIC, ‘Iraq: The Initial Landscape Post-Saddam’, 16 April 2003.
4 . ‘Sir John Scarlett, Transcript’, Evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009, pp. 13, 14, 15, 24; ‘Sir David Omand, Transcript’, Evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, 20 January 2010, pp. 15, 17.
5 . ‘Rt Hon. Tony Blair, Transcript’, Evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, 21 January 2011, pp. 120–1.
6 . Ibid., p. 122.
7 . Ibid., p. 123.
8 . Ibid., pp. 121, 153.
9 . Ibid., p. 151.
10 . See Peter Mandelson and Tony Blair quoted ibid., pp. 122, 123–4.
11 . Andrew Mumford, The Counter-insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 128–9.
12 . ‘Evidence of Mr Martin Howard, Lt General John McColl, Major General Nick Houghton and Major General Bill Rollo, 26 January 2005’, in House of Commons Defence Committee, Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-conflict Operations, Vol. II: Oral and Written Evidence , HC65-II (London: The Stationery Office, 2005).
13 . ‘Post-invasion Iraq: The Planning and the Reality after the Invasion from Mid-2002 to the End of August 2003 – A Witness Statement by Major General Tim Cross CBE’, 7 December 2009, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/39160/timcross-statement.pdf (last accessed 12 November 2013).
14 . Mumford, The Counter-insurgency Myth , p. 130.
15 . Andrew Rathmell, ‘Planning Post-conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?’, International Affairs 81/5 (2005), p. 1031.
21
THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL
O N BECOMING PRIME Minister in 2010, David Cameron quickly began tinkering with Britain’s national intelligence and security apparatus. Desperate to distance himself from his Labour predecessors, Cameron’s much-vaunted ideas revolved around establishing a new National Security Council (NSC). He wasted little time, creating the body less than a week after the election. The inaugural meeting was held on 12 May 2010 to discuss Afghanistan, Pakistan and the terrorist threat to the UK.
The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister himself – a keen consumer of intelligence. Other members include the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the International Development Secretary. Bringing the intelligence and policy worlds closer together, the JIC Chairman and the heads of all three intelligence agencies also regularly attend meetings (as does the Chief of Defence Staff – although the Chief of Defence Intelligence unfortunately does not). Unlike its various predecessors (under both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown), the formal NSC meets regularly every week. It is supported by an official-level committee, known as the National Security Council (Official). In addition to attending the weekly NSC, the JIC Chairman also attends the NSC(O). The new format institutionalises the relationship between intelligence and policy. It formalises instant policy impact.
Unsurprisingly, Cameron’s reforms have affected the workings of the JIC and the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) more broadly. Peter Hennessy, a particularly experienced Whitehall watcher, has gone as far as to argue that the impact has been
at least as important as the 1957 and 1968 developments and, perhaps, even on the scale of 1940–1 when Winston Churchill used the demands of total war to bring the JIC fully and continually into the highest councils of the Second World War machine after an indifferent first five years of its institutional life. 1
Since 1936, Britain’s central intelligence machinery has evolved to acquire an impressive and prestigious status at the heart of Whitehall.
The NSC raises important questions about the committee’s role and future direction. Does it slightly eclipse the JIC? Is the JIC in danger of being forced to take a back seat? Or does such institutionalised contact with senior policymakers leave the JIC in enviable shape? Whitehall insiders are quick to point towards the latter, saying that the two bodies complement each other well and that the NSC has given the JIC a new lease of life. 2
The JIC was not in great health in the 2000s. Tony Blair was uninterested in intelligence unless it conformed to his world view. With the spectre of Iraq hanging heavily, the JIC found it difficult to engage the Prime Minister in its work. Even before the WMD fiasco, Blair’s informal ‘sofa government’ style posed a problem for the 21st-century JIC. His Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, has since dismissed the committee as producing ‘lowest-common-denominator-type reports, hedging their bets and failing to give a clear steer in any direction’. Accordingly, some policymakers sought to bypass the JIC altogether and receive more raw intelligence. Unsurprisingly, the JIC learnt different lessons from the Butler review. It was keen to limit Blair’s access to this raw material. 3
The JIC fared little better under Gordon Brown – another broadly uninterested consumer. He removed the committee’s long-standing remit for the day-to-day coordination of the intelligence community. In late 2009, Brown also abolished the long-standing Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services, which oversaw the dialogue between intelligence priorities and budgets, transferring its remit to the national security machinery. In the same year, JIC meetings temporarily became fortnightly for the first time in its history. Even after weekly sessions were resumed, attendance by the heads of MI6 and GCHQ remained patchy. The committee had lost some of its shine. 4
Successive chiefs of MI6 reported that the JIC’s status had diminished. In November 2008 for example, John Scarlett made it clear that ‘the JIC priorities are not gospel as far as SIS is concerned’. 5 Just under two years later, his successor, John Sawers, publicly downgraded the JIC further still. He described the committee’s role as merely offering ‘context’ to intelligence information. Sawers went on to emphasise that he did not answer to the JIC, reporting instead to the NSC. 6
The NSC reforms have since redefined the JIC’s role and place within Whitehall. This, however, was not without problems and, although welcoming the creation of the NSC, the Intelligence and Security Committee expressed concerns. How would the JIC fit into the new system? One particularly muddy area involved setting priorities and requirements, for which the JIC had long held responsibility. Cameron’s NSC and National Security Strategy potentially challenged this. Indeed, the latter included a separate assessment of priority threats, whilst, towards the end of 2010, the JIC was instructed merely to ‘contribute to the formulation’ of national intelligence requirements. 7 Meanwhile, the chief of MI6 declared that ‘we take our direction from the National Security Council’. 8 It should be noted, however, that these National Security Strategy priorities were compiled with assistance from certain JIC members and the JIO more broadly.
The situation remained complicated. In addition to the NSC and (theoretically) the JIC, intelligence agencies also took direction from the Strategic Defence and Security Review, their own existing agency strategic objectives, and Treasury targets. With no single tasking process, the potential for contradiction and confusion was rife. 9
A review was desperately needed. In January 2011, therefore, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary, Gu
s O’Donnell, commissioned a report into the situation. They asked Alex Allan, the JIC Chairman, and National Security Adviser Peter Ricketts (himself a former JIC Chairman) to examine the impact of the NSC on the workings of the JIC. The task was conducted by Paul Rimmer, chief of the Assessments Staff, and Ciaran Martin, then of the Cabinet Office’s Intelligence and Security Secretariat. 10
Rimmer and Martin’s report was issued ten months later and signed off by the Prime Minister himself. Its recommendations are reproduced below. As a result of the review, the JIC now operates on two levels: principals and sub-principals. Senior members (the principals), including the heads of the intelligence agencies, meet only monthly (although they can attend other meetings if they so wish). In theory they focus on key issues relevant to the National Security Council. By contrast, the sub-principals (less senior members or representatives of the directors) meet more regularly, supposedly to discuss papers of less immediate concern, issues of interest to one particular department, and tactical short-term issues. Insiders believe the new practice works well, albeit slightly differently from how the review initially suggested. In reality, the deputy-level meetings tackle the normal JIC agenda (including the important issues), whilst the principal level takes a more strategic view.
Some context here is necessary. This is not the first time in the committee’s history that the JIC has operated on two levels. In the late 1940s and into the mid-1950s the JIC was also split into director- and deputy-director-level meetings. The same departments were represented on both, simply at a slightly lower level. It operated in a similar manner to that prescribed by Rimmer and Martin.
Spying on the World Page 48