The new arrangements potentially undermine community cohesion, which has traditionally been a vital but intangible function of the JIC. The presence of the agency heads at meetings is useful in binding the joint intelligence community together – so important in the committee- and consensus-oriented British system. It remains to be seen whether monthly meetings will attenuate this long-held function. One could also argue that the agency heads’ presence at the NSC undermines the role of the JIC Chairman. It is, of course, the latter’s responsibility to represent the voice of the intelligence community. NSC meetings do, however, start with an overview of the latest JIC intelligence, following which the Prime Minister and others ask questions and offer feedback. The agency heads are there in an operational capacity and in case they are asked to take action.
Whilst there is an argument that agency heads are too busy for both committees, this is also about natural human behaviour. The heads of the three security and intelligence agencies ‘are in attendance at the NSC and are invited to speak, and they speak frequently’. Although they always enjoyed good access to Downing Street, the NSC has given them greater opportunity to talk to ministers and the Prime Minister. Naturally, they prefer to attend weekly NSC meetings rather than the weekly JIC. Perhaps their new elevation is symptomatic of the growing importance of intelligence generally over the last two decades within the UK system. 11 More cynically, the NSC also operates as a marketing tool for each intelligence agency to promote its work to the highest consumers in the land.
The review clarified issues of agenda setting. As its principal consumer, the NSC agenda now broadly drives that of the JIC. Accordingly, the NSC(O) has become a key, but not the sole, setter of JIC papers. Demonstrating continuity with JIC tradition, the committee’s assessments can still be tasked and sponsored by departments to meet their own priorities. However, Whitehall’s JIO will challenge these if they are out of kilter with overall NSC requirements. The JIC is now docked squarely beneath the NSC. Whilst increasing impact, this creates a problem dubbed the ‘tyranny of the tactical’. The JIC must keep pace with myriad NSC requirements. NSC direction can potentially skew intelligence towards myopic short-termism by neglecting longer-term strategic issues on which no immediate policy decision is necessary. This is an issue of which the committee must be aware as it settles into the new system.
The National Security Strategy sets the broad strategic direction of intelligence and the JIC then offers more detailed prioritisation. This is then overlaid by the NSC, which dictates the more immediate repositioning of resources in response to developing events. The ISC has welcomed this change and clarification. 12 It should also be noted that the NSC has now discussed those priorities established through the JIC process, thereby giving them formal ministerial endorsement.
Although this sounds complicated, Iain Lobban, the director of GCHQ, has described how it works in practice:
The Joint Intelligence Committee has continued to provide us, through its Requirements and Priorities process, with our annual priorities and focus. That tends to be quite a stable, quite a static, process. Then the National Security Council, with its weekly rhythm gives an opportunity for a more dynamic flexing of the system and of the information required from the agencies. 13
It should also be noted, however, that despite this close monitoring of the committee’s agenda, the JIC is also expected to provide early warning of issues of its own accord. This seems somewhat optimistic. Policymakers want the best of both worlds.
The Rimmer–Martin review also shaped the presentation and dissemination of intelligence. According to Peter Ricketts, the JIC had become too ‘stately and formal’ over the years. Assessments needed to be much faster, more nimble and more flexible. 14 The JIC now offers fewer memoranda. Lengthy papers which characterised the Cold War era are a thing of the past. Almost like a consultancy company, it instead provides a more diverse range of tailored products to meet consumer needs. Building on Lord Butler’s recommendations, these publications are more accessible to senior readership, including the Prime Minister himself.
The most controversial aspect of the review concerned the JIC’s relationship with policy. Closer relations enhance relevance and policymakers’ access to intelligence. Senior ministers can now see where intelligence comes from, whilst it can simultaneously be inspiring for the intelligence community to witness its product being debated at the highest level. The NSC gives impact to intelligence and ensures it passes the ‘so what’ test. This is vital. No matter how accurate or insightful, an unread intelligence assessment is pointless.
Closer relations, however, risk politicisation and the abuse of intelligence. Debating the issue in the House of Lords, Peter Hennessy expressed concern that ‘some of the key elements of the JIC tradition might fade under the new dispensation’. JIC analysts should not ‘fall into the trap either of advocacy or of telling their customers what they wish to hear’. 15 Defending the system, William Hague has refuted such warnings. The Foreign Secretary argued that JIC papers do not say ‘Well then, these are the policies that follow from that [assessment]’. The committee, therefore, does not present a ‘blurring of the lines’. Although Hague’s defence went some way to alleviating ISC concerns about the subject, the committee still felt compelled to issue a warning: ‘It is imperative that policy implications and analytical judgments remain separate in any intelligence assessment provided to Ministers.’ 16 To be fair, the JIO was always alive to these issues. For a variety of reasons, JIC papers no longer contain a policy implications box.
The JIC is now closely tied to the most senior policymakers in the land. Building on the committee’s ascent of the Whitehall hierarchy since 1936, the new reforms put the JIC in a potentially impressive position. The committee is at the forefront of providing essential intelligence decisions to support policy at the highest levels of government. This is a far cry from the days of Suez when its reports were marginalised. Its future is certainly brighter than it was a decade ago. At the same time, moreover, the JIC model has been much admired by Britain’s allies over the last seventy years. As Hennessy warns, ‘Its tradition […] should never be allowed to slip towards the margins.’ 17
Supporting the National Security Council (NSC): The central national security and intelligence machinery
The establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) was one of the earliest decisions of this Government and represents one of the most significant changes to the national security and intelligence machinery at the centre of British Government in recent years.
In January 2011, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary asked the National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to review how the central national security and intelligence machinery and structures can best support the NSC, building on the Butler report of 2004. The terms of reference for the review can be found on the Cabinet Office website.
In summary, the key recommendations from the review are:
On the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee:
i. The NSC’s priorities should be the lead driver of the JIC agenda , following as closely as possible the NSC’s agenda and timetable. The NSC (Officials) meeting (NSC(O)) is best placed to oversee the tasking of the JIC, in line with its core role of setting strategic direction for the NSC. The NSC(O) should therefore task the JIC. However, the JIC must retain the latitude to provide early warning on issues outside of the immediate cycle of the NSC agenda.
ii. The needs of the NSC are best supported by the JIC meeting in two formats, at a Principals and a Sub-Principals level. This will better balance high level strategic judgments on NSC priorities with those less immediately before the NSC, of importance to policy Departments or more tactical short term assessments. So senior JIC members should meet monthly as “JIC Principals” to focus on key NSC issues, judgements and papers. Otherwise the JIC should meet at a Sub-Principals level to agree papers in between.
iii. The JIC should produce a wider ran
ge of tailored intelligence products. The number of full JIC papers should be reduced, and replaced by more current briefs and summaries , making them more focussed and more accessible to the Prime Minister/Ministerial readership.
On the UK’s wider assessment capability:
iv. The wider assessment capability, including Defence Intelligence (DI) and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), should be put more directly at the disposal of the NSC where appropriate. The Cabinet Office’s Chief of Assessment (CoA) should be responsible for commissioning materials from the wider assessment capability to support NSC discussions and those of its subcommittees, as well as signing off, or “kitemarking”, the product to go to the NSC.
v. The leadership of the Joint Intelligence Organisation should be charged with ensuring that the collective business plans of HMG’s assessment bodies align with the NSC’s priorities. This is in line with the SDSR commitment on assessment. It will need to be done in a way that respects the operational independence and links to other organisations of those assessment bodies.
vi. In supporting the NSC, the policy implications of analytical judgements should be identified in significant assessments given to Ministers. This could be achieved through closer working between assessment and policy expertise in the Cabinet Office while respecting the independence of intelligence assessment from policy.
vii. The Joint Intelligence Organisation should implement the recommendations of its open source audit. This includes recruitment of a dedicated information specialist to improve the way that the JIO exploits open source, and its ability to support the use of open source material across the intelligence community.
On briefing intelligence to Ministers:
viii. Clearer processes should be established to ensure that Ministers receive timely, well-chosen and auditable intelligence reports consistent with the principles set out in Lord Butler’s report of 2004. These should also enable everyone handling intelligence for Ministers to understand what sets it apart from other reporting, to understand the range of intelligence products, and to know where to go to for training and guidance.
Notes
1 . Peter Hennessy, Distilling the Frenzy: Writing the History of One’s Own Times (London: Biteback, 2012), p. 94.
2 . Private information.
3 . Jonathan Powell, The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World (London: Vintage, 2011), p. 286; private information.
4 . Philip Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, Vol. 2: Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), pp. 306–7; Hennessy, Distilling the Frenzy , p. 95.
5 . Sir John Scarlett quoted in Mark Phillips, ‘Failing Intelligence: Reform of the Machinery’, in Michael Codner and Michael Clarke (eds), A Question of Security: The British Defence Review in an Age of Austerity (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), p. 262.
6 . Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States , p. 308; Sir John Sawers, ‘Britain’s Secret Front Line’, speech to the Society of Editors, 28 October 2010.
7 . Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States , p. 309.
8 . Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report, 2010–2011 , Cm 8114 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2011), p. 40.
9 . Ibid., pp. 40, 4; Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report, 2011–2012 , Cm 8403 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2012), p. 11.
10 . Hennessy, Distilling the Frenzy , p. 94.
11 . Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010 , HL Paper 265 / HC 1384 (London: The Stationery Office, 2012), para. 93, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtnatsec/265/26506.htm#a19 (last accessed 12 November 2013).
12 . Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report, 2011–2012 , p. 12.
13 . Iain Lobban quoted ibid.
14 . Peter Ricketts quoted ibid., p. 11.
15 . Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, December 2011, quoted in Distilling the Frenzy , p. 99.
16 . Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report, 2011–12 , pp. 9–10, 13.
17 . Hennessy, Distilling the Frenzy , p. 99.
22
THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
T HE SELF-IMMOLATION OF a Tunisian street vendor in late 2010 sparked turmoil across the Middle East. A series of turbulent uprisings have since swept the region, deposing leaders in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen. Protests in Syria, beginning in the spring of 2011, gradually escalated into a protracted and militarised civil war pitting President Bashar al-Assad’s forces against armed rebels.
The security situation deteriorated throughout 2012 and 2013, creating a humanitarian emergency and a spiralling refugee crisis. By September 2013, the United Nations estimated that two million Syrians had been forced to leave their country. A further four and a quarter million had been displaced within Syria. 1 Meanwhile, evidence of chemical weapons attacks – a self-proclaimed ‘red line’ for President Obama – piled up on government desks. On the morning of 21 August 2013, a particularly heavy chemical attack indiscriminately killed hundreds of civilians in east Damascus. David Cameron, Britain’s Prime Minister, sought military intervention.
With developments moving at a fast pace in the last week of August, intelligence became central. In deliberating military intervention, governments needed to know whether Assad’s forces had in fact used chemical weapons, who actually ordered this use, and why. With Parliament recalled ahead of a vote on the principle of military intervention, Cameron’s government made a striking decision. Echoing Tony Blair eleven years earlier, the Prime Minister decided to publish Joint Intelligence Committee material. Accordingly, the Cabinet Office released the JIC’s conclusions on the reported use of chemical weapons in Damascus alongside a covering letter from the committee’s Chairman, Jon Day. These are both reproduced below.
Intelligence and Iraq had proved highly controversial, thrusting the JIC into the media spotlight. Why then did Cameron seek to follow suit? In truth there was no escaping the legacy of Iraq and the WMD saga. Despite the differing contexts, its echo reverberated around the parliamentary debate about intervention in Syria. Indeed, David Cameron acknowledged that ‘I am deeply mindful of the lessons of previous conflicts and, in particular, of the deep concerns in the country that were caused by what went wrong with the Iraq conflict in 2003’. 2 Similarly, Ed Miliband, leader of the opposition, stressed the need to ‘learn the lessons of Iraq’. 3 This extended to issues of intelligence and proof of Syrian chemical weapons use.
David Cameron faced a similar dilemma to Tony Blair. Back in 2002, Blair was confronted by a maelstrom of media and parliamentary questions about the justification for military intervention. As discussed in Chapter 19 , he opted to publish a dossier based on sanitised intelligence. Eleven years later, Cameron felt similarly obliged to publish declassified intelligence as the debate gathered pace and Britain, alongside the United States, appeared to be heading towards another unpopular military intervention. 4 Given the legacy of Iraq, Cameron’s government may have felt even greater pressure to release the intelligence assessment. Indeed, the Prime Minister was all too aware that ‘we must recognise the scepticism and concerns that many people in the country will have after Iraq’. 5
Although seeking intervention, Cameron expressed caution. Fully aware that weapons of mass destruction were never found in Iraq, political leaders in both Whitehall and Washington had to be careful not to prematurely accuse Assad of using chemical weapons. Evidence had to be found. And more importantly, a wary public had to be convinced that the evidence had been found. The various investigations, from Butler to Chilcot, into flawed intelligence and politicisation surely soured public perceptions of both the value of intelligence and how policymakers used it.
As a result of these various factors, JIC material again became central. On 27 August 2013, the committee concluded it was ‘highly l
ikely’ that the Syrian regime was responsible for the chemical weapons attack, which, according to the JIC, resulted in at least 350 fatalities. The reasons underpinning this assessment are clearly visible in the document below and need not be repeated here.
Despite demonstrating some similarities with intelligence regarding Iraq, the Syria assessment reveals four key differences. The government had learnt from earlier mistakes. Firstly, and most obviously, the Syria assessment was not a government dossier. It clearly maintained JIC ownership, whilst Day’s letter emphasised that conclusions ‘were agreed by all committee members’. These two factors allowed little room for accusations of political spin and ‘sexing up’ reminiscent of those that hounded Blair and Alastair Campbell in the aftermath of the Iraq dossier.
Secondly, the Syria assessment was introduced by a letter from the JIC chairman. This lies in stark contrast with Tony Blair’s foreword which headed the Iraq dossier. As noted in Chapter 19 , the foreword was highly criticised for stretching the available intelligence to its limits and Blair has since expressed regret at having written it all. With hindsight the former Prime Minister wished he had simply published the sanitised material. Learning from Blair, this is exactly what Cameron did. By publishing the JIC’s conclusions, introduced by Day, Cameron once again reduced the potential for criticisms of spin, politicisation and manipulation.
Spying on the World Page 49