Thirdly, the prominent references to open-source intelligence in the Chairman’s letter are noteworthy. Day attempted to emphasise how intelligence was not, for the most part, based on secret sources unavailable to the public. For example, he highlighted the ‘considerable’ degree of ‘open source reporting’ alongside the committee’s consultations with experts outside government to assess whether the footage of the attack could have been faked. In doing so, the letter reveals an apparent attempt to ensure credibility, build consensus beyond the Whitehall ‘securocrat’ bubble, and move away from a ‘trust us’ attitude which might have proved unsuccessful given the mistakes over Iraq. Indeed, Cameron drew heavily upon this in the debate, telling the House of Commons that ‘there is an enormous amount of open-source reporting, including videos that we can all see’. 6
These efforts reflect Lord Butler’s recommendations about mistakes in Iraq. He expressed concern about secret intelligence being given undue weight in JIC assessments and suggested ‘occasional external peer review’. 7 Alongside these attempts to emphasise open-source intelligence, however, Day’s letter to the Prime Minister also referred explicitly to ‘highly sensitive’ intelligence to which Cameron had access – this was probably a reference to signals intelligence material including intercepts of Syrian political and military traffic. A combination of open and secret sources is essential to the JIC’s all-source intelligence.
Fourthly, Day’s covering letter clearly states what the JIC did know and, crucially, what it did not. It acknowledges the limitations of intelligence and gives confidence ratings to the various conclusions. For example, Day conceded that the JIC had ‘high confidence in all of its assessments except in relation to the regime’s precise motivation for carrying out an attack of this scale at this time’. Again, this demonstrates progression from the time of Iraq when, according to Lord Butler, ‘it [was] not the current JIC convention to express degrees of confidence in the judgement’. 8 Accordingly, this contrasts heavily with Blair’s foreword and accompanying parliamentary performance, which reinforced the impression that firmer intelligence underpinned the dossier than was actually the case. Indeed, Cameron explicitly stated that ‘I do not want to raise, as perhaps happened in the Iraq debate, the status of individual or groups of pieces of intelligence into some sort of quasi-religious cult’. 9
How, then, did the JIC assessment impact upon policymaking? On one level, alongside published legal advice, it helped support the government’s case for war. The JIC paper directly informed National Security Council discussions, whilst Day personally briefed NSC members to provide ‘further background and a summary of the most recent reporting, analysis and challenge’. The JIC enjoyed direct access to policymaking at the highest level. Moreover, the day after the NSC meeting the Prime Minister explicitly quoted the committee’s key judgements in the parliamentary debate. He then argued that
all the evidence we have – the fact that the opposition do not have chemical weapons and the regime does, the fact that it has used them and was attacking the area at the time, and the intelligence that I have reported – is enough to conclude that the regime is responsible and should be held accountable. 10
On another level, the JIC report also influenced parliamentarians. This is unusual in so far as assessments traditionally only influenced senior policymakers but, owing to the Iraqi precedent, it will perhaps become more common. During the parliamentary debate one Conservative MP lamented:
On the intelligence, those of us who were here in 2003, at the time of the Iraq War, felt they had their fingers burnt. The case for war was made and Parliament was briefed on the intelligence, but we were given only part of the story and, in some cases, an inaccurate story. A summary of the intelligence has been published [on Syria], but it is the bare bones, and I urge the government in the following days to consider how more intelligence can be provided. 11
Even Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary in 2003, conceded that ‘Iraq has made the public much more questioning and more worried about whether we should put troops in harm’s way, especially when intelligence is involved’. 12
The JIC’s assessment of ‘highly likely’, reliant on a ‘limited but growing body of intelligence’, seemingly did not convince MPs. One Labour member argued that ‘“highly likely” and “some evidence” are not good enough to risk further lives, to risk counterattack, to inflame the whole region, to risk dragging other states into this war and, at the same time, to increase the risk of terrorism on British streets.’ 13 In a humiliating blow to the Prime Minister’s authority, the House of Commons rejected Cameron’s plea for military intervention in principle.
The parliamentary debate reveals how publishing JIC intelligence is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is useful for transparency and for explaining the factors driving important political decisions. On the other hand, however, intelligence rarely deals in certainties and publishing JIC material risks raising the required burden of proof beyond realistic levels. Despite this, the French government published an intelligence dossier the following week, whilst the Americans also spelt out the conclusions of their intelligence. It is too soon to say whether this is a new trend but a future role of intelligence, including that of the JIC, will perhaps be to inform public debate on key issues.
Joint Intelligence Organisation
Cabinet Office Open +44 (0)20 7276 1234
70 Whitehall
London SW1A 2AS
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk
From the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee
Ref: Jp 115
Prime Minister 29 August 2013
SYRIA: REPORTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE
Following the widespread open source reports of chemical weapons (CW) use in the suburbs of Damascus in the early hours of 21 August 2013, the JIC met on 25 August to agree an assessment. At a subsequent meeting on 27 August we met again to review our level of confidence in the assessment relating to the regime’s responsibility for the attack. The JIC’s conclusions were agreed by all Committee members. The final paper informed the National Security Council meeting on 28 August, at which I provided further background and a summary of the most recent reporting, analysis and challenge. The paper’s key judgements, based on the information and intelligence available to us as of 25 August, are attached.
It is important to put these JIC judgements in context. We have assessed previously that the Syrian regime used lethal CW on 14 occasions from 2012. This judgement was made with the highest possible level of certainty following an exhaustive review by the Joint Intelligence Organisation of intelligence reports plus diplomatic and open sources. We think that there have been other attacks although we do not have the same degree of confidence in the evidence. A clear pattern of regime use has therefore been established.
Unlike previous attacks, the degree of open source reporting of CW use on 21 August has been considerable. As a result, there is little serious dispute that chemical attacks causing mass casualties on a larger scale than hitherto (including, we judge, at least 350 fatalities) took place.
It is being claimed, including by the regime, that the attacks were either faked or undertaken by the Syrian Armed Opposition. We have tested this assertion using a wide range of intelligence and open sources, and invited HMG and outside experts to help us establish whether such a thing is possible. There is no credible intelligence or other evidence to substantiate the claims or the possession of CW by the opposition. The JIC has therefore concluded that there are no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility.
We also have a limited but growing body of intelligence which supports the judgement that the regime was responsible for the attacks and that they were conducted to help clear the Opposition from strategic parts of Damascus. Some of this intelligence is highly sensitive but you have had access to it all.
Against that background, the JIC concluded that it is highly likely that the regime was responsible for the CW attacks on 21 August. The JIC had h
igh confidence in all of its assessments except in relation to the regime’s precise motivation for carrying out an attack of this scale at this time – though intelligence may increase our confidence in the future.
There has been the closest possible cooperation with the Agencies in producing the JIC’s assessment. We have also worked in concert with the US intelligence community and agree with the conclusions they have reached.
Jon Day
JIC assessment of 27 August on Reported Chemical Weapons use in Damascus
A chemical attack occurred in Damascus on the morning of 21 August, resulting in at least 350 fatalities. It is not possible for the opposition to have carried out a CW attack on this scale. The regime has used CW on a smaller scale on at least 14 occasions in the past. There is some intelligence to suggest regime culpability in this attack. These factors make it highly likely that the Syrian regime was responsible. Extensive video footage attributed to the attack in eastern Damascus (which we assess would be very difficult to falsify) is consistent with the use of a nerve agent, such as sarin, and is not consistent with the use of blister or riot control agents. There is no obvious political or military trigger for regime use of CW on an apparently larger scale now, particularly given the current presence in Syria of the UN investigation team. Permission to authorise CW has probably been delegated by President Assad to senior regime commanders, such as [*], but any deliberate change in the scale and nature of use would require his authorisation.
There is no credible evidence that any opposition group has used CW. A number continue to seek a CW capability, but none currently has the capability to conduct a CW attack on this scale.
Russia claims to have a ‘good degree of confidence’ that the attack was an ‘opposition provocation’ but has announced that they support an investigation into the incident. We expect them to maintain this line. The Syrian regime has now announced that it will allow access to the sites by UN inspectors.
There is no immediate time limit over which environmental or physiological samples would have degraded beyond usefulness. However, the longer it takes inspectors to gain access to the affected sites, the more difficult it will be to establish the chain of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Notes
1 . UNHCR, ‘Number of Syrian Refugees Tops Two Million Mark with More on the Way’, UNHCR News , 3 September 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/522495669.html (last accessed 5 September 2013).
2 . David Cameron MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1427, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
3 . Edward Miliband MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1443, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
4 . An Opinium/Observer poll conducted in August 2013 found 60% of Brits opposed military intervention in Syria. Toby Helm, ‘Poll finds 60% of British public oppose UK military action against Syria’, The Guardian Online , 31 August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/31/poll-british-military-action-syria (last accessed 3 September 2013).
5 . David Cameron MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1440, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
6 . David Cameron MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1437, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
7 . Lord Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p.146
8 . Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction , p. 145
9 . David Cameron MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1437, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
10 . David Cameron MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1432, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
11 . Richard Ottaway MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1460, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
12 . Jack Straw MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1450, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
13 . John McDonnell MP, Hansard , 29 August 2013, Column 1461, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm#1308298000001 (last accessed 3 September 2013).
23
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
ILLUSIONS OF OPENNESS AND THE
STUDY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE
M ANY OF THE JIC’s files are open. They are seemingly comprehensive and can seduce the unwary historian with a siren song of ‘top secret’ intelligence. Certainly a book such as this would have been impossible until relatively recently. New declassification benchmarks have resulted in a veritable archival feast for historians and political scientists.
The available records do, however, shape our understanding of the committee in certain ways. This book has predominantly drawn upon JIC memoranda. These present fascinating insights into intelligence thinking on myriad issues, as well as on intelligence successes and failures. From here, it is possible to consider the relationship between intelligence and policy throughout much of the twentieth century. However, the declassified files construct a particular narrative of the JIC’s role since 1936. Firstly, they offer a narrow account of a reactive body cumbersomely dealing with long-term issues. Historians are left unaware of current intelligence and the committee’s responses to crises. Secondly, the files create an impression of JIC passivity, neglecting both the committee’s active and global roles. Thirdly, by focusing on the JIC at the expense of other actors operating beneath the committee, the available files skew interpretations of the Joint Intelligence Organisation as a whole. Arguably Current Intelligence Groups, staffed by amazing subject and regional specialists, were a key part of this machine, but they are not well represented in the extant archive. Above all JIC papers give a misleading sense of interdepartmental unity and intelligence hermeticism. This is not the result of some strategic government conspiracy, but merely the by-product of classification policy and a fragmented record.
Government openness
Intelligence studies are perennially dogged by a core epistemological frailty – government secrecy. At best, scholars are faced with a disjointed self-assembly kit that lacks instructions and has core pieces missing. At worst, scholars are given no pieces at all and intimidating blanket bans on declassification impede entire areas of research. In terms of the JIC, however, whole series of papers are now neatly lined up at the National Archives. Indeed, since the dark days of the Cold War, much-vaunted progress has been made regarding government openness, especially on intelligence assessment.
In July 1993 John Major’s Conservative administration announced the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government. MI6 and GCHQ were formally ‘avowed’ the following year. This approach formed a notably stark contrast with Margaret Thatcher’s famed love of secrecy and her incessant desire to stifle debate through the wielding of the Official Secrets Act. 1 The Open Government programme oversaw the accelerated declassification of volumes of archival files to the Public Records Office, and the government proudly lauded it as nothing short of a revolution in official attitudes towards secrecy. However, the move has been criticised as a cynical, if skilful, attempt at information management by the keepers of history. 2 Intelligence scholars are all too familiar with the dreaded red stamp of exemption: ‘This document has been retained under subsection 3(4) of the Public Records Act, 1958.’ Moreover, certain files, notably those of MI6, remain permanently locked away. Covert action in
particular remains a mostly missing dimension in British post-war history.
Ideas of open government and mutual trust supposedly expanded under the Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Arguing that ‘openness is fundamental to the political health of a modern state’, 3 Blair brought in the much-heralded Freedom of Information (FOI) Act in 2000. The Prime Minister, however, quickly regretted his decision. He later ranted colourfully (almost quaintly) at his own innocence: ‘You idiot. You naive, foolish, irresponsible nincompoop. There is no description of stupidity, no matter how vivid, that is adequate. I quake at the imbecility of it.’ 4 Historians can request JIC files under the Act. As with the Waldegrave initiative and the Public Records Act of 1958, however, sensitive intelligence files are exempt from FOI releases. The Freedom of Information Act therefore does little to circumvent the distortions assessed below.
The committee’s post-war assessments and minutes began to be released from 1994. The Secretary’s files, which contain more detail and flavour, were slower in appearing but began to drip into the public domain from 2000. Assessments and minutes dating from 1969 were added in 2002 and declassification is now moving towards a twenty-year rule. Taken together, the committee’s files appear comprehensive and they are indeed a wonderful resource. Various series span contemporary British history and offer the researcher intelligence history on a plate.
But there are problems. Levels of weeding leave professional historians with a sense of unease. It is therefore important for those wanting to fully understand intelligence history to draw upon sources outside the preselected and processed material of the National Archives. 5 Certain insiders have privately stated that writing intelligence history is pointless without full access to all records, which, outside official histories, is impossible. There is some logic in this stance, for fragmented evidence can often lead to inaccurate assumptions. And yet it is imperative to try. Intelligence history is too important to be forgotten until all records are publicly available (if that ever happens). Historians must be wary of the methodological and epistemological frailties of lazy overreliance on the government’s declassification process. It is of course essential to cast one’s net as widely as possible and draw upon oral history and private papers to supplement the ‘history supermarket’. Occasional archival ‘accidents’ can illuminate these issues. The JIC paper on sigint targets reproduced in this volume was uncovered in 1987 in the India Office Records now held at the British Library but remains classified in the Cabinet Records at Kew.
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