Spying on the World
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Different departments have conceptualised security differently. In the immediate post-war period the military, for example, continuously pushed traditional defence issues upon the JIC. By contrast, the Foreign Office was keen to challenge narrow understandings of security and examine political issues. Meanwhile, the Colonial Office understood the Cold War threat in a very different way from both the military and the Foreign Office. Turf wars between the Colonial Office and the joint intelligence machinery were common throughout the 1950s. But there is no sense of this in the available JIC papers. To get a real sense of the animosity, the historian must dig through various Colonial Office files instead.
The same is true regarding the rise of terrorism in the 1970s. The core debates are not in the JIC files, they are in the equivalent Foreign and Commonwealth Office papers. Once again, JIC files offer only the final papers and historians are left ignorant of the sources, debates and bargaining which underpinned the ultimate conclusions. The processes of intelligence go unnoticed. By examining the papers of the FCO’s Maritime and Transport Department, for example, the historian can start to assess how the JIC reached the conclusions it did and why intelligence grossly overestimated the threat from maritime hijacking in 1970. 29 Importantly, the government weeders are less strenuous in such seemingly mundane departmental files. There are no strict rules underpinning declassification, and a good deal of subjectivity guides the process. Accordingly a paper from MI5, MI6 or the FCO’s secretive Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department occasionally appears in full in the most random of places.
A government conspiracy to rewrite history?
Swathes of JIC material are now available, but overreliance on them can create a distorted impression. An important question, therefore, is whether the government has deliberately constructed a skewed narrative of the JIC. Have the weeders attempted to rewrite history through careful information management? The simple answer is no.
Any misleading accounts of the JIC are simply a by-product of broader issues. For example, one assumes that current intelligence is strictly classified because of the reliance on sensitive signals and human intelligence. Unlike the strategic longer-term JIC papers, it is much more difficult to camouflage the sources of this intelligence. This is an area in which twenty-first-century JIC papers differ from their predecessors. The longer-term JIC assessments issued during the Cold War made very little reference to the intelligence on which they drew. This is a stark contrast with the heavily annotated papers produced today. Like earlier current intelligence assessments, this development has significant implications for the future release of JIC material.
Moreover, the authorities have clearly acknowledged the JIC’s long-standing involvement in current intelligence. That this particular missing dimension is a ‘known unknown’ renders government conspiracy highly unlikely. Similarly, the operational dimension has been classified because it is more sensitive than intelligence assessments. Any reduction of JIC members to a caricature of bean-counting passivity is a side effect. Whether or not the government should be suppressing such covert activity in the first place is another debate.
Intelligence liaison is a particularly sensitive subject, as is anything that impacts upon British relations with independent countries. It is unclear whether it is the Americans or the British who are behind the excising of the likes of Chester Cooper from JIC records. Regarding the regional JICs, it appears that the bulk of this material was destroyed during decolonisation and Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez. Again, there is no evidence of a government conspiracy to rewrite history. The final area is more confusing. It is unclear why sub-JIC documentation is not in the archives. Such material is far too important to warrant destruction, for it offers invaluable insight into the Whitehall mind in all its complexity. It reveals how threats were constructed and understood. Any government conspiracy again seems unlikely, for a lot of this material is decentralised and available in the parallel files of the JIC’s constituent departments. Similarly, certain papers which are redacted in the JIC series lie buried elsewhere as a glistening prize for the intrepid historian. Scholars just need to know where to look – which is easier said than done. It can be assumed, however, that the government is aware that there is more to the JIC than the declassified material suggests. It has, after all, commissioned an official history using secret sources.
Notes
1 . David Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 262.
2 . For an early reflection on these issues see, Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Did Waldegrave Work? The Impact of Open Government upon British History’, Twentieth Century British History 9/1 (1998), pp. 111–26.
3 . Your Right to Know: The Government’s Proposals for a Freedom of Information Act , Cm 3818 (The Stationery Office, 1997), available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/caboff/foi/foi.htm (last accessed 13 November 2013).
4 . Tony Blair quoted in Martin Rosenbaum, ‘Why Tony Blair thinks he was an idiot’, BBC News website, 1 September 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/opensecrets/2010/09/why_tony_blair_thinks_he_was_a.html (last accessed 13 November 2013).
5 . Aldrich, ‘Did Waldegrave Work?’, p. 124; Richard J. Aldrich, ‘“Grow Your Own”: Cold War Intelligence and History Supermarkets’, Intelligence and National Security 17/1 (2002) p. 148. See also Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Policing the Past: Official History, Secrecy and British Intelligence since 1945’, English Historical Review 119/483 (2004), pp. 922–53.
6 . Lord Butler of Brockwell, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report , HC 898 (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p. 13.
7 . ‘Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Committee: Assessments and Notes’, CAB 189, The National Archives, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=3&CATID=60582&SearchInit= 4&SearchType=6&CATREF=CAB+189 (last accessed 13 November 2013).
8 . Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 152.
9 . ‘Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities’, 23 July 1948, JIC(48)9, TNA: CAB 158/3.
10 . ‘Intelligence and Security Services: Joint Intelligence Committee Records’, The National Archives, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/intelligence-records.htm#16184 (last accessed 13 November 2013).
11 . Len Scott, ‘British Strategic Intelligence and the Cold War’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 145.
12 . See for example, Record of a meeting held at Admiralty House on 15 September 1960, TNA: DEFE 13/15.
13 . AC(O) minutes, 1 March 1950, TNA: CAB 134/4; Robert Joyce, ‘Final Meeting in London with British Foreign Office and SIS Representatives’, 20 December 1951, Executive Secretariat, Psychological Strategy Board Working File, 1951–53, Box 6, RG59. We are indebted to Thomas Maguire for this file.
14 . Rory Cormac, ‘Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South Arabian Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 36, No. 5, 2012, pp. 692–717.
15 . Ibid.
16 . The body was known as the South Arabian Action Group. For more details see Cormac, ‘Coordinating Covert Action’.
17 . Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins – Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), p. 111; Philip Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, Vol. 2: Evolution of the UK Intelligence community (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), p. 193.
18 . Chester L. Cooper, The Lion’s Last Roar: Suez, 1956 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 70.
19 . Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 128, 279.
20 . Private information.
21 . ‘
Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee’, 26 August 1955, JIC(55)57, TNA: CAB 158/21.
22 . Rory Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 217–19.
23 . JIC minutes, 13 July 1967, JIC(67) 29th Meeting, TNA: CAB 159/47; ‘Operations in South Arabia after Independence’, draft Foreign Office/Ministry of Defence paper, 10 July 1967, TNA: DEFE 24/570; ‘Liaison Staff’ (Appendix 2 to Annex A to CINCFE33/67), 27 September 1967, TNA: DEFE 24/571.
24 . Committee on Counter-Subversion in the Colonial Territories minutes, 16 March 1956, GEN. 520/1st Meeting, TNA: CAB 130/114.
25 . ‘Overseas Joint Intelligence Groups: Fragmentary Records’, CAB 191, The National Archives, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/details/redirect/?CATLN=3&CATID=60711&CATREF=CAB+191 (last accessed 13 November 2013).
26 . Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States , p. 16.
27 . ‘Transcript of Sir John Scarlett Hearing’, Oral Evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009, p. 18, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/40665/20091208pmscarlett-final.pdf (last accessed 13 November 2013).
28 . Cradock, Know Your Enemy , p. 261.
29 . See for example TNA: FCO 76/18, which is a Maritime and Transport Department file discussing the terrorist threat to British shipping in 1970.
APPENDIX: CHAIRMEN OF THE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
Desmond Anderson 1936–7
Roger Evans 1938
Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt 1938 –9
Ralph Skrine Stevenson 1939
Victor Cavendish Bentinck 1939 –45
Harold Caccia 1945 –6
William Hayter 1946 –9
Patrick Reilly 1950 –3
Patrick Dean 1953 –60
Hugh Stephenson 1960 –3
Bernard Burrows 1963 –6
Denis Greenhill 1966 –8
Edward Peck 1968 –70
Steward Crawford 1970 –3
Geoffrey Arthur 1973 –5
Richard Sykes 1975 –7
Antony Duff 1977 –9
Antony Acland 1980 –1
Patrick Wright 1982 –3
Antony Duff 1983 –5
Percy Cradock 1985 –92
Rodric Braithwaite 1992–3
Pauline Neville-Jones 1993–4
Paul Lever 1994–6
Colin Budd 1996–7
Michael Pakenham 1997–2000
Peter Ricketts 2000–1
John Scarlett 2001–4
William Ehrman 2004–5
Richard Mottram 2005–7
Alex Allan 2007–11
Jon Day 2012–
DOCUMENT SOURCES
Chapter 2
Document 1 DCOS 4, ‘Central Machinery for Co-ordination of Intelligence’, 1 January 1936. TNA: CAB 54/3.
Document 2 ‘The Organisation of Intelligence’, Report by F Beaumont-Nesbitt and cover note to Hollis, 21 December 1938. TNA: CAB 21/2651.
Chapter 3
JIC(42)304(0)(Final), ‘Operation “TORCH” – Intelligence Appreciation’, 7 August 1942. TNA: CAB 81/109.
Chapter 4
Document 1 V. Cavendish-Bentinck and D. Capel-Dunn, ‘The Intelligence Machine. Report to the Joint Intelligence Committee’, 10th January 1945, CAB 163/6.
Document 2 JIC(44)86(O), ‘The British Intelligence Organisation’, 3 March 1944. TNA: CAB 81/121.
Chapter 5
JIC(44)467(0)(Final), ‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions from the Point of View of Her Security’, 18 December 1944. TNA: CAB 81/126.
Chapter 6
JIC(48)19 (0) (2nd Revised Draft) ‘Sigint Intelligence Requirements – 1948’, 11 May 1948, L/WS/1/1196, India Office Library and Records.
Chapter 7
Document 1 JIC(48)42(0)Final, ‘Indications of Russian Preparedness for War’, 18 June 1948. TNA: CAB 158/3.
Document 2 JIC(48)78(0), ‘Measures to Prevent the Russians Obtaining Strategic Surprise’, 16 July 1948. TNA: CAB 159/3.
Chapter 8
Document 1 JIC(50)88(Final – Revise), ‘Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities – 1950/51’, 11 October 1950. TNA: CAB 158/11.
Document 2 JIC/2162/50, ‘Korea – Situation Report Number 90’, 1 November 1950. TNA: DEFE 11/202.
Chapter 9
Document 1 JIC(48)104, ‘Soviet Intentions and Capabilities 1949 and 1956/7’, 8 November 1948. TNA: CAB 158/4.
Document 2 JIC(51)6(Final), ‘The Soviet Threat’, 19 January 1951. TNA: CAB 158/12.
Chapter 10
JIC(55)28, ‘Colonial Intelligence and Security’, 23 March 1955. TNA: CAB 158/20.
Chapter 11
JIC(56)80(Final)(Revise), ‘Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company’, 3 August 1956. TNA: CAB 158/25.
Chapter 12
Document 1 JIC(62)99, ‘Likely Soviet Response to an American Decision to Invade or Bomb Cuba’, 27 October 1962. TNA: CAB 158/47.
Document 2 JIC(62)101(Final), ‘Soviet Motives in Cuba’, 6 December 1962. TNA: CAB 158/47.
Chapter 13
JIC(64)26, ‘Consequence of Deeper US Involvement or Withdrawal’, 12 March 1964. TNA: CAB 158/57.
Chapter 14
JIC(68)54(Final), ‘The Soviet Grip on Eastern Europe’, 2 December 1968. TNA: CAB 158/71.
Chapter 15
GEN 9(70)22, ‘Arab Terrorist Threat to Western Interests (Delicate Source)’, JIC Middle East Current Intelligence Group report, 30 October 1970, TNA: CAB 130/475.
Chapter 16
JIC(A)(71)54, ‘The Probable Reactions to the Introduction of Direct Rule in Northern Ireland’, 6 January 1972. TNA: CAB 186/9.
Chapter 17
JIC(82)(IA)29, ‘Falkland Islands’, 17 April 1982. National Security Archive, USA.
Chapter 18
Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Annual Report, 1995’, December 1995. Available via Intelligence and Security Committee website.
Chapter 19
‘Iraqi use of Chemical and Biological Weapons – Possible Scenarios’, JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002. Available via the website of Sir John Chilcot’s Iraq Inquiry.
Chapter 20
‘Southern Iraq: What’s in Store?’, JIC Assessment, 19 February 2003. Available via the website of Sir John Chilcot’s Iraq Inquiry.
Chapter 21
‘Supporting the National Security Council: The Central National Security and Intelligence Machinery’, Cabinet Office report, October 2011. Available via the Cabinet Office website, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/supporting-the-national-security-council-nsc-the-central-national-security-and-intelligence-machinery .
Chapter 22
JP 115, ‘Syria: Reported Chemical Weapons Use’, 29 August 2013. Available via the No. 10 website, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-reported-chemical-weapons-use-joint-intelligence-committee-letter .
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