Secret Alliances

by Tony Insall

  The Security Service carried out several security reviews of the case, which they did not expect to last for long. So they developed a series of plans designed to push over one more deception before its credibility was destroyed. However, for over two years these deceptions built up, rather than destroyed, the case. Moreover, the Germans continued to respond to requests for further supplies and explosive materials. In February 1943, they dropped another transmitter to Mutt, and a further drop took place at the end of May when they provided money and explosives to be used to blow up an electricity station near Basingstoke. Interestingly, the explosives included six MD1 magnetic clams which had been filled with plastic explosive by SOE and were still in their original SOE wrappers! Mutt told the Abwehr that the consignment had been discovered and asked for another one. This was subsequently provided, and the case continued. However, over the next few months, the Security Service gradually detected a loss of German interest and by 1944 it was no longer productive. Chapter 8 goes into further detail on how an Abwehr source later provided some insights into the reasons for this.

  Not many Double-Cross agents were permitted to undertake sabotage to enhance their credibility with the Germans, though the staged and phony attack on the de Havilland Mosquito factory by Eddie Chapman (Zigzag) in early 1943 is a well-documented exception. However, Mutt was helped to undertake a series of sabotage operations, the first of which was actually genuine. Carried out in November 1941, it was called, with some humour, Operation GUY FAWKES, and involved setting off two bombs in a flour store in Wealdstone. Another example of a staged attack was Operation BUNBURY, where the plan was to sabotage a generating station at Bury St Edmunds in Suffolk. It took place in August 1943, with the prior agreement of the local authorities and the connivance of the manager of the station, and was described as a complete success.

  The value of this aspect of Mutt’s work is shown in a paper of September 1943, which stated that the counter-sabotage section wanted to obtain information on German sabotage activities. It noted that the only sure sources of intelligence on this subject came from ISOS, the Gibraltar Double-Cross network – and Mutt and Jeff. But while this was an important task it was not their only contribution, for they played a part in deception too. They reported on troop movements and civilian morale, with Mutt purporting to have joined the army and Jeff allegedly being used as an interpreter during the questioning of refugees who had arrived from Norway. They also played a part in deception before Operation TORCH, the invasion of French North Africa in November 1942.

  Mutt and Jeff provide the only example of Norwegian involvement in the Double-Cross network. However, there were quite a few other cases where it was considered: several Abwehr agents such as Brodersen were assessed as potential candidates before they were judged unsuitable. Some work was also done to explore the feasibility of sending deception messages to Ernst Kirkeby Jacobsen, passing on rumours of a possible Allied landing in Norway, and to consider whether Gulbrandsen could be used to send misleading messages to his Abwehr contacts. Neither was straightforward: Jacobsen’s return scotched the first plan, and Wilson discouraged the use of Gulbrandsen because of his concern about the possibility of misleading the resistance as much as the Germans.

  The fertile minds of B1 also came up with at least one other idea using Norwegians, which had not been tried before. This was plan Prudential, where Harmer envisaged the possibility of sending an agent back to Norway to give himself up and offer to work for the Germans. He broached it with Wilson and John Senter (the head of SOE’s security section) in April 1943. He discovered, not unexpectedly, that Wilson was not very keen on the idea, and could not think of an agent who might be suitable. Wilson also raised a series of practical difficulties concerning timing (the short summer nights would soon be a hindrance), and the risk of arrest by the Swedes if they tried to send such an agent through Sweden. He did not wish to use one of his existing courier routes because of concerns that it would be given away to the Germans – and also foresaw a problem of devising a safe means of getting a wireless set safely into Norway. The idea was not taken forward.44

  What did the Abwehr achieve?

  So, what was the Abwehr in Norway hoping to achieve through their operations in Britain, and how far did they get? One assessment of their objectives compiled by the Security Service shows that there was a lack of consistency in what they sought from their Norway-based agents, as well as a lack of coordination with tasking given to agents operating from elsewhere. One of the main reasons for this was the lack of central control. Each Abwehrstelle (Ast) or station was independent, and there was no division of targets between them.45 Thus, while there was considerable interest in obtaining weather reports from Greenland and Svalbard, only one pair of Norwegian agents had been tasked to provide weather data in Britain – though, for example, Gander, the codename of a German who arrived in October 1940 and was briefly used as a double agent, did have such tasking. The main focus appeared to be on penetration of British or Allied services leading to a return to Norway as a British agent, and sometimes the commission of minor acts of sabotage. An updated assessment in June 1942 observed that an earlier prediction that the main German interests would be in supplies coming to Britain from the United States, naval shipping and intelligence on the northern route to Russia, and the strength and equipment of British Army and British food supplies, had been partially correct.

  There was a careful examination of the tasking which has been given to double agents Mutt and Jeff: it was noted that they had been asked for a report on the 4.5-inch anti-aircraft (AA) gun and the use of the Kerrison Predictor with the 4cm Bofors gun and had also been asked urgently and in great detail for a report on the organisation of AA command, how many corps were included in it, how many brigades formed a normal AA division, whether the personnel were drawn from the Royal Artillery or also from the Royal Engineers, and whether there were still AA battalions and companies attached to the reserves. It acknowledged that perhaps this flood of questions was produced by the fact that Mutt was ostensibly now in the army and in a good position to report this kind of information, but the persistent recurrence of the same question put month after month to different agents implied a very high level of German interest – and a lack of other well-placed sources too.

  Abwehr operations – particularly during the early period in 1940 – were generally quite clumsy. Their main objectives were very short-term and linked to an invasion of Britain, so would have been arranged in a hurry. They gradually acquired a rather greater degree of sophistication, not always necessarily matched in their selection of agents, and took greater care in the methods they used to try to infiltrate their Norwegian agents into Britain, and by equipping them with means of communication, which (especially secret writing materials) had a better chance of success. They were frustrated by two insurmountable disadvantages. First, the success of the Double-Cross operation. Unlike Britain and her Allies in their operations in many parts of occupied Europe, they could not depend on agents in Britain to give them reliable information to help them plan more effectively: their only information came from Double-Cross agents which would have misled them. Secondly, ISOS reporting gave the Security Service an enormous advantage, by alerting them to most of the operations which the Abwehr was planning, and enabling them to be wrapped up before they could cause damage.

  In 1945, E. J. Corin, who had spent much of the war in B1B, wrote a report on the work with the Norwegians, Danes and Dutch. He observed that Security Service liaison with the Norwegians was smooth from the outset and was never seriously troubled:

  We had complete confidence in their officers and were able to pass them information which one would have hesitated to give to certain other allied security services. Internal political troubles arose in Norwegian circles, about which we were frequently consulted, and so friendly was the atmosphere that we were invariably able to give advice without committing ourselves and in cases not directly connected with security, were able to t
ell the Norwegians the British channels through which they should apply for assistance.

  He added that the Norwegians were very security minded, and frequently embarrassed them by making requests for the detention of Norwegian nationals who had been connected with NS in Norway. The Home Office, however, were unwilling to detain aliens unless evidence could be brought showing that they had continued their anti-Allied activities in Britain. With the exception of a few very bad cases, which became the subject of detention orders under the Aliens Order, the Security Service had to explain to the Norwegians that any action which they might want to take would have to wait until after the war. Corin also observed that relations with the Norwegians were much more straightforward than they were with their Dutch and Danish counterparts. Cross-currents and intrigues within the government created problems for them with the Dutch, and since the Danish king and government had remained in Denmark, they had to rely on some rather delicate contacts within the Danish community in London.46

  It should be pointed out that we have very little information about the Norwegian view of this relationship. There are notes on most of the KV case files drawn on here, which show that at least a summary report was passed to them. These also reveal that in many – though not all – cases a Norwegian officer was permitted to interview detained Norwegians, though usually at the Oratory schools and never at Camp 020. However, a diligent search of the likely hiding places in the Riksarkiv and the Hjemmefrontmuseum has failed so far to unearth documents describing Norwegian policy or reactions. If the papers have indeed been retained somewhere, then the most likely explanation was possibly Norwegian awareness in the early post-war period of British sensitivity to any public mention of Camp 020. This lasted for some time after the war, and might have influenced a decision that they should not be released. There would not have been a sensitivity to ISOS and ISK reporting, as this subject had carefully been excluded from all material passed to the Norwegian side, so they would not have been aware of it.

  Notes

  1 M. R. D. Foot, ‘SOE in the Low Countries’, in Mark Seaman (ed.) Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 83.

  2 TNA, KV 3/7. Reports on the Abwehr up to March 1942. KV 3/4 contains an updated version of this report, completed by J. C. Curry in August 1942. There are a number of generally small discrepancies between the details contained in these reports or similar histories and the individual subject files. In such circumstances, I have tended to rely on the subject file because it was compiled contemporaneously, except in a small number of instances where common sense dictates otherwise.

  3 Ulstein, Vol.1, p. 83.

  4 Whatever papers SOE had on Johansen – and there are references to them on Security Service files – have not been released either in the HS 9 series containing personal files, or elsewhere. The main Security Service case file in TNA is KV 2/371, and there are summaries with some limited additional information on KV 4/8, a history of Camp 020. Many of the papers on KV 2/371 have been redacted, although the file register gives a few further details.

  5 TNA, Milmo case study, March 1943, KV 3/75.

  6 RA, Nagell papers, box 12.

  7 TNA, Milmo case study March 1943, KV 3/75.

  8 http://www.wwiinorge.com/our-stories/kristian-fougner/

  9 Order from Vice-Admiral Wells, office of Admiral Commanding Orkney and Shetland, 10 March 1943. TNA, HS 8/790.

  10 TNA. Sætrang’s personal file has not been released. However, there are detailed references to his investigation in TNA on KV 3/7, KV 3/76–77 and KV 4/8.

  11 TNA. Wallem’s case file in TNA is KV 2/3282. There are also some further details on KV 3/7, describing Abwehr history up to 1942.

  12 TNA. Larsen’s case file in TNA is KV 2/2628, and there are further details on KV 4/15.

  13 This provides an example of discrepancies between two different files. KV 2/2628 shows that the original information drawing attention to Larsen came from Norwegian counter-intelligence. The entry in the Camp 020 history, KV 4/15, attributes the tip off to ISOS, which cannot be correct.

  14 TNA, WO 141/3/5. There are also references to him in KV 4/248. There is a file on Hagn’s case in the Riksarkiv, Boks 481, Rets A.1.

  15 TNA. Brodersen’s case files in TNA are KV 2/447–451, and there is also a brief history on KV 4/14 which contains additional material. CRIM 1/1604 describes preparations for his trial at the Old Bailey.

  16 His case files in TNA are KV 2/1303–1306; see also KV 3/7.

  17 Vera Eriksen’s case file in TNA is KV 2/14. There is a detailed account of Eriksen’s explanation of her background in Hinsley, Vol. 4, pp. 323–325.

  18 TNA, KV 2/20 (Lund) and KV 2/21–22 (Edvardsen).

  19 There is no case file for Øien or Hanssen. Details in TNA are on KV 3/7.

  20 There is no case file for this operation, but there are details in TNA on KV 3/7, KV 3/76–77 German espionage objectives in Britain since 1939, and KV 4/8.

  21 The case file in TNA is KV 2/727, and there are also substantial details on KV 3/7.

  22 There are no details available about Hammerun, apart from a brief reference in TNA on KV 3/7.

  23 TNA, KV 2/553–554.

  24 TNA, KV 2/1164.

  25 TNA, KV 2/2246–2249. There is also an account of his release, and of an interview conducted with him by the Norwegians, among the Nagell papers in the Riksarkiv, box 10.

  26 The Camp 020 history in TNA, KV 4/14, notes that in 1943 Hansen was the only one of sixty-five people admitted to Camp 020 who had entered Britain illicitly.

  27 TNA, KV 2/1936. See also HO 382/374 for consideration about his continued detention. There are also details on KV 3/77, KV 4/8 and KV 3/5. Some of Hansen’s story is also described by Hinsley, op. cit. p. 345.

  28 The case file on Fanger in TNA is KV 2/2142.

  29 TNA, KV 4/14.

  30 TNA, KV 3/75.

  31 TNA, HS 2/136.

  32 TNA, HS 2/149 Anchor.

  33 TNA, Harmer minute, 23 November 1942, KV 2/829 Tor Gulbrandsen.

  34 TNA, KV 2/826.

  35 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 4 (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 336.

  36 It seems as though the idea to take Gulbrandsen back to Norway on Operation SUNSHINE, to protect Norwegian strategic installations, may have originated with Leif Tronstad. See Njølstad, Professor Tronstads Krig 9. april 1940–11. mars 1945 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2012), p. 344, also HS 2/167, the interrogation of Gulbrandsen.

  37 TNA, KV 2/289.

  38 Details of this protracted saga are contained in TNA on KV 3/75, KV 2/2260 (Lark), HS 2/243 (Interrogation reports), HS 2/170–171 (Sunshine) and HS 9/1114/3 (Nygaard’s PF). It is also described by Christopher J. Murphy, Security and Special Operations: SOE and MI5 during the Second World War (London: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 99–101, 103, 106–109 and 130–131. See also Njølstad, op. cit. pp. 231–233. While Tronstad was briefed by Wilson on the progress of the investigation of Nygaard, there are no grounds for believing that he was able to intervene on his behalf. Nygaard himself wrote an account of the investigation after his escape, but not the Vinmonopolet incident, in Tortur, flukt og gisler – til tross (Trondheim: self-published, 1982). See also Rolf Dahlø, A Typical SOE Story: The Unknown Warriors of the Norwegian Resistance (London: Createspace Independent Publishing, 2017), an account of how he found that his father was Evald Hansen, Nygaard’s wireless operator.

  39 NHM, SIS progress reports, September and October 1944.

  40 NHM, SIS progress report.

  41 NHM, Report by Mack, 3 June 1945, FO II.8.5 – Daea 0005 Stasjonsrapporter: Otto II, giving details of his deployment.

  42 Anyone interested in learning more might start with J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System (London: Granada, 1979). Masterman was the chairman of the committee, so was well placed to describe how it worked. Ben Macintyre, Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies (London: Bloomsbury 2012) gives a very readable update.

&nbs
p; 43 Tore Pryser, Svik og gråsoner: Norske spioner under 2. verdenskrig (Oslo: Spartacus, 2010), p. 113.

  44 TNA, Harmer minute to Robertson, 18 April 1943, KV 2/1068.

  45 Hinsley, op. cit. p. 298. It was therefore possible for two Asts to have agents in the same place without either being aware of it.

  46 TNA, KV 4/47, report on the operations of E1AS in connection with the Norwegians, Danes and Dutch in the later part of the war.

  * A word of clarification is needed. The nature of ISOS and ISK, and the differences between them, were explained in the previous chapter. Outside GC&CS, they were generally referred to as MSS (Most Secret Sources) and it is not usually clear which type of intercept produced the intelligence. For our purposes the distinction does not greatly matter, so ISOS, the most common source, will be used as a generic description.

  † Allowing for inflation, the equivalent of about £800 at 2019 prices.

  ‡ The equivalent of about £3,600 at 2019 prices.

  § The equivalent of £1,000, £800, £2,000 and £20,000 respectively at 2019 prices.

  ¶ The equivalent of about £1,800 at 2019 prices.

  || Approximately £750 at 2019 prices.

  ** David Howarth, The Shetland Bus (London: Fontana 1955), p. 43. The fact that Howarth, deputy commander of the Shetland base, wrote about Johansen in these terms is an indication that he was never briefed about his links to the Abwehr, and that this knowledge continued to be tightly held.

  †† There is no record of what subsequently happened to Gisvold. He continued to be of interest to both the Security Service and SIS, but subsequent records have also been retained.

  ‡‡ The interrogation centre for captured German agents in Latchmere House in Ham, south-west London, run by Colonel Robin ‘Tin Eye’ Stephens. (He was known as ‘Tin Eye’ because he wore a monocle.)