by Tony Insall
The Norwegians were perhaps as concerned about the quantity of broadcast time as they were about editorial control. It was the only subject raised by Nygaardsvold during his first meeting with Churchill in January 1941, when he complained that the BBC had reduced their main evening broadcast from fifteen to ten minutes.15 Churchill undertook to look into this.† (This was at a time when Norway was allocated fifty minutes a day, while Denmark was allocated only ten.16) There were protracted discussions in the Foreign Office about the extent to which the Norwegians should be allowed responsibility for their own broadcasting, and how much time they should be allowed. They concluded that part of the problem was that Ivone Kirkpatrick in the Ministry of Information was not willing to respect Norwegian wishes. They believed he was concerned that allowing them more responsibility could result in ‘an inferior output of news and propaganda’ and that the Norwegians could not be trusted to align their broadcasts to the general policy of British government. This led to some tetchy exchanges, with arguments over the extent to which some Norwegian scripts had required censorship. When Kirkpatrick declined to accept Foreign Office suggestions, they invoked the instruction from Churchill. This enabled them to reach an agreement in April which both the Norwegians and Kirkpatrick accepted. It gave Norwegians the time they wanted, and sufficient control over output, while the Ministry of Information and the BBC retained ultimate responsibility for security and general policy. Peace did not last long, however, because the broadcasting section of the Ministry of Information influenced the BBC to change Norwegian broadcasting times to take account of Double Summer Time. Neither the Norwegians nor the Foreign Office were consulted. Christopher Warner, who had taken over Northern Department when Collier left to become minister to the Norwegian government, admitted that they had broken a definite assurance to the Norwegian government. The matter quickly escalated. Lie wrote to Collier to say that his government was seriously dissatisfied with the attitude of the BBC. When matters were not resolved, Lie complained again, saying that the Norwegians were not being given their full entitlement of broadcasting time, allegedly because of a need to service the transmitters. He added that Norwegian engineers did not accept this, and claimed that the arguments being used were ‘typical BBC humbug’.17 This produced an emollient letter from Warner, and the restoration of the time which had been taken away.
The Norwegian Freedom Station
The best example of a British propaganda measure taken without Norwegian knowledge was the Freedom Station set up by SO1 (predecessor to PWE), which started transmitting in February 1941. The PWE historian commented that the need for such a station was strongly felt as the Norwegian government had complete control over talks, and the BBC bulletin was entirely given up to news: ‘There was therefore no method of educating the Norwegians in the part they might have to play in liberation.’18 After its establishment, PWE continued to run it, and the station put out more than 600 programmes before it closed down in December 1942. By a clever feat of wireless subterfuge, the station appeared to be transmitting from within Norway, but was actually located in England. Some of the programmes merely encouraged passive resistance, but a few were more activist. There was speculation that some of its transmissions in August and September 1941 might have incited Norwegian trade unionists to strike, an action which led to the execution of two of their prominent leaders, Viggo Hansteen and Rolf Wickstrøm, though this was denied by Barman. He emphasised that the Freedom Station had consistently refrained from inciting its listeners to greater opposition – maintaining that, on the contrary, they had told listeners to be extremely careful. Lie reacted strongly to the executions and told Hambro that ‘if there is anything which can be considered as an effective reply to the Oslo incidents it is bombing, bombing and more bombing – and that immediately’. Hambro asked the Air Ministry whether this could be arranged, and combined with a leaflet drop to explain why the attack was being made, but the response was slow to come.19 The Norwegians eventually worked out that it was PWE which was responsible for the Freedom Station. This came after a series of transmissions attacking the Norwegian legation in Stockholm because it was failing to do enough to support the Norwegian cause, an accusation which could reasonably be justified at that time. In September 1941 Lie confronted Barman, who admitted that the broadcasts originated in England. He undertook to keep him informed in future about plans for broadcasting. The station was closed in December 1942 because the Norwegian government refused to allow Norwegian staff to continue working there unless it was permitted to assume control over the running of the station.20
Despite their personal differences, Barman wrote a handsome (though possibly resigned) compliment about Lie in his autobiography. ‘Of all the foreign ministers in London, none was more active or more pugnacious in his country’s interest than Trygve Lie. No one resisted pressure, even Churchill’s pressure, with greater vigour or determination.’21
Propaganda in Norway
PWE was responsible for disseminating white propaganda, which did not hide its origin or nature. SOE accepted responsibility for the distribution of propaganda in enemy-occupied countries – generally described as black propaganda – which disguised its origin to discredit an opposing cause. Its early attempts to cooperate with PWE to organise propaganda activities came to nothing, but progress began to be made when the Norwegian authorities were involved. Discussions took place in the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee (see below) during the summer of 1942, which led to the creation of the operational propaganda fieldwork scheme. This envisaged dividing southern Norway into ten districts, each of which would have its own three-man propaganda team. It was agreed that Milorg should be consulted about this plan, and Gunnar Fougner (Petrel) was sent to Norway in November 1942 to meet them. He reported that their reaction was positive. However, in February 1943 Milorg reversed its decision, and sent a letter stating that there was no need for such a measure, because they were better equipped to carry out propaganda than anyone who might be sent from Britain. They asked for just one instructor to be supplied.22 Most of the agents who had been trained for propaganda were reassigned to other tasks. Some, in particular Max Manus and Gregers Gram, returned to Norway to carry out sabotage missions, but retained an interest in propaganda. Manus and Gram produced a series of reports on attitudes among the Norwegian population. Their first highlighted the extent of the apathy shown by many towards taking part in the war effort. Worryingly for SOE and PWE, they also commented on the lack of information about the British war effort, and observed that Russians appeared to be more widely admired in Norway than the British.23 RAF Bomber Command, and later Coastal Command, did drop leaflets and occasionally small supplies of tobacco and coffee, but competing priorities elsewhere meant that these activities were never extensive enough to generate much attention or achieve a great deal.
After Barman had been replaced by Brinley Thomas, PWE made further unsuccessful attempts to gain Norwegian agreement for their more direct involvement, which, from November 1943 onwards, also included that of the American equivalent of SOE, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Although they were still unable to obtain the consent they sought, they did obtain a licence to work to undermine the morale of the German occupying forces. They had been doing some of this already. For example, a poster was put up in Oslo in September 1943. Purporting to have been signed by Terboven, it appealed to German military and civilian personnel to protect the Fuhrer by reporting and quashing any rumours regarding the state of his health and his failing capacity to direct the German war effort. The SOE Norwegian section history noted that it was subsequently sent to most of the large towns in Norway and that ‘this particular work was undertaken with some enthusiasm’.24 In the summer of 1943 SOE had also arranged for a series of posters to be put up, with a forged proclamation from the commander of German forces in Norway, von Falkenhorst, calling on his soldiers not to desert to Sweden in the hour of Germany’s greatest need. They were effective, and desertions increase
d. Von Falkenhorst issued a statement that the posters were forgeries, but this was seized on by some Swedish newspapers which wrote that German denials of this kind deceived nobody, and it prompted derisive editorials.25 There were other clever ideas to encourage desertion, too. In May 1944, Sefton Delmer of PWE drew attention to an SIS report about a PWE list of streets and towns in Germany which had been bombed, found by a Norwegian in a small town near Oslo. At the same time Delmer received a report of an Austrian soldier who had just deserted from Norway, who had in his possession exactly the same document, which Delmer described as very effective feedback.26 There were other more hare-brained ideas, for example the spreading of stories about a new type of highly infectious Japanese gonorrhoea capable of being caught from infected clothing or towels, that do not appear to have had much effect.27
In early 1944 Manus and Gram developed Operation DERBY to attempt the systematic undermining of German morale, by the circulation of illegal newspapers and posters across the south of Norway. Their organisation grew to nearly 500 people, and they produced two newspapers in German, Beobachter and Im Westen nichts Neues. A similar operation, DURHAM, was carried out in the Trondheim area, though on a smaller scale. Both these operations were known to the Norwegian government, and to the Milorg leadership, but the latter were not involved in supporting their activities.
It is never easy to judge the effectiveness of propaganda. It is very rare to find out when and how propaganda actually has an effect, and examples of feedback such as those quoted by Delmer are quite unusual. It was dangerous for those involved in circulating propaganda, for they tended to be less well trained and security aware than those involved in sabotage. Many were arrested. Moreover the Germans, not surprisingly, reacted more sharply against those whom they suspected of involvement in spreading anti-German propaganda. There were mixed views within SOE about the value of propaganda work, with or without the assistance of governments in exile. The evaluation of SOE work in Norway concluded that ‘owing to circumstances outside the control of the Norwegian section the history of propaganda operations in Norway was not so successful as most other branches of SOE activity’.28
Combined Operations raids on the Norwegian coast and Norwegian reactions
The spring of 1941 saw the beginning of Combined Operations raids on the Norwegian coast. The first was CLAYMORE, carried out in the Lofoten Islands in March. Its objective was to damage German controlled industry, to capture Germans and quisling collaborators, and to evacuate Norwegian volunteers back to Britain. The main force consisted of commandos, with some small assistance from the Norwegian Independent Company No. 1 (NORIC). It was judged to have been a complete success. The Norwegian High Command was neither informed about this operation in advance, nor any of the other major Combined Operations raids in Norway.
Combined Operations continued to plan and execute operations in Norway with larger forces which included NORIC participation. HEMISPHERE, in April, was an exception to the practice of excluding the Norwegians from planning, because the Norwegian High Command was briefed. This was a smaller operation which destroyed an important herring oil plant in Øksfjord. The attack was conceived by SOE but carried out by the naval destroyer Mansfield. No prisoners were captured, though the local quisling leader escaped. When the destroyer was sighted, he tried to shoot the lock off the door of his house in his haste to get away, but the bullet ricocheted and accidentally killed his wife.29 December 1941 saw two further operations, ANKLET and ARCHERY. ANKLET was an ambitious plan to establish a temporary base on the Lofoten islands, from which attacks could be launched against German naval communications. The force was landed on 26 December and achieved limited success, but returned after just two days because it lacked air support. The force commander was concerned about his vulnerability to German air attack once he was informed that the Germans had moved a force of dive bombers to Bodø – about 100 miles or thirty-five minutes flying time away, with further reinforcements planned.‡ ARCHERY was an attack on Måløy on 27 December, which succeeded in destroying fish oil production factories, as well as securing further cypher materials and equipment which were of great value to the codebreakers at Bletchley. However Martin Linge, the inspirational commander of NORIC, was killed during the raid.
These operations helped to convince Hitler of the potential vulnerability of the Norwegian coast to Allied attacks, and led to his decision to send more troops there. They also produced a very strong Norwegian reaction. Lie had already approached Eden in November 1941, requesting that the Norwegian government should be informed in advance if any military operation was planned in Norway. Eden forwarded the request to Lord Louis Mountbatten, who reported that the Chiefs of Staff were strongly opposed on operational grounds, despite Eden’s assurance that Lie was reliable. They eventually softened enough to agree that he should be told at the last moment, but only in the most general terms. Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was authorised to inform Lie of ANKLET and ARCHERY a few days beforehand on 11 December. Lie did not take it well. He suspected that not just German bases, but also herring oil factories, would be attacked, and that Norwegian volunteers would be enticed to leave Norway, which would invite German reprisals. When asked, Sargent also told him that so far as he knew, no Norwegians would take part in these raids. This turned out to be incorrect, as Norwegians from NORIC took part in both operations. The strength of the Norwegian reaction was demonstrated when their naval attaché refused to supply an English-speaking officer for ARCHERY when asked to do so by the Naval Intelligence Division. Jakobsen told SOE that he had explicit instructions not to supply any English-speaking Norwegian, no matter who might request it, unless the purpose for which he was required was set out in detail.30
Northern Department suggested that a single Norwegian should be selected to be briefed on all such planned operations in advance in future. The departmental head, Christopher Warner, believed that Norwegian irritation was caused not just because they disliked not being trusted, but also because they were concerned that the British might choose objectives to which they would actively object. To try to make amends, he arranged for Lie to be briefed on the outcome of the Måløy raid. Lie brought Johan Nygaardsvold and Oscar Torp with him. (Torp had replaced Ljungberg as Minister of Defence on 18 November.) Nygaardsvold expressed very strongly the view that such raids were futile, and that they provoked reprisals and involved matters of policy on which the Norwegian government should be consulted.31 He expressed himself so forcefully that his secretary rang to apologise to the briefing officer for the position he had been put in, though made clear that the Norwegian government felt it had cause for complaint. His remarks certainly made an impact. Warner recommended that in future Torp should be briefed on such operations, and Cadogan wrote accordingly to the Chiefs of Staff. They agreed that Mountbatten would brief Torp, except for those matters in which he was not informed, when Ismay (secretary of the Chief of Staff Committee) would do so himself.32 In order to try to ensure greater Norwegian participation, Torp also requested that a joint planning committee should be formed to consider future operations. This was agreed, though it did not meet often and never became a very effective tool.
Establishment of the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee
After the second unsuccessful Lofoten raid, and the death of Linge, morale sank among Norwegians working for SOE. Many of those in the Linge Company were unwilling to carry on without some sort of assurance from their own government that SOE’s proposed activities had its approval. In fact, the British had already started to consider this. SOE had prepared a paper on ‘Anglo-Norwegian collaboration regarding the Military Organisation in Norway’, which was sent to Torp on 25 November. This reflected their growing awareness of the need to work together with Milorg, rather than in parallel with it, and for greater coordination of resistance activities.33 When Hambro and Torp met to discuss it on 27 November, Torp said that it was essential that the Norwegians should have closer cooperation
with the British. He believed this was prevented because the British believed that they could not do so without risk of leakage. Hambro agreed. Torp retorted that working under such a cloud was intolerable and that he would be willing to dismiss staff in order to ensure British trust. This led Hambro to warn Ismay that ‘if we do not take the Norwegians to a certain extent into our confidence we shall lose their cooperation and we may lose the benefit of those specially trained Norwegian troops who have been so valuable in the past’. It was this frank exchange which opened the way for negotiations leading to the formation of the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee (ANCC), a body for the discussion of SOE operations with equal British and Norwegian representation, and with a British chairman. When, on 14 January 1942, Hambro wrote to Torp to confirm in principle their agreement to the ANCC, he provided an undertaking that SOE would not initiate operations in or against Norway without the knowledge and consent of the Norwegian members of the committee. The ANCC first met on 16 February 1942 and, after a short period of fortnightly meetings, met monthly thereafter. It added a welcome degree of coherence and structure to the development of common policies. There were two other significant personnel changes during this period. In January, John Wilson was appointed as head of a new SOE Norwegian section, which was to be separated from the Scandinavian section to which it had previously belonged.§ Also in January, the comparatively junior Major Wilhelm Hansteen was promoted to Major-General and made Commander in Chief of the Norwegian armed forces, which also proved to be an effective appointment.¶