Secret Alliances

by Tony Insall

  The Linge Company on one of their final parades in Oslo before being stood down in July 1945. © NHM

  The aftermath

  In the months after liberation, SOE spent much time trying to find out what had happened to those of its agents who had been captured or killed by the Germans. A total of 530 men had been recruited into the Linge Company, of whom 245 were on active service on 8 May 1945. Fifty-one had been killed by the Germans, and six had died on training or while in Britain. There were eight men initially unaccounted for, of whom seven were later released from prison. It was not initially possible to establish the fate of the eighth, Johnny Pevik, a long-serving member of the Linge Company, who had carried out numerous courier trips to Trondheim. He went back to Norway on Wagtail, whose mission was to kill the notorious collaborator Henry Rinnan. Pevik was captured in November 1943, badly tortured (by Rinnan, among others) and hanged without trial in Trondheim in November 1944.† 20 A notable survivor was Jan Herman Linge, the son of Martin Linge, who was dropped in January 1945 with the task of killing a collaborator near Eidsvold. He was captured and subjected to a lengthy interrogation, during which the Germans asked him about Joe Adamson, suggesting that they may still have had suspicions about both of them. However, his story was believed, and he was sent to a POW camp in Germany. He escaped in late March, was rescued shortly afterwards by American troops and returned to Britain in time to join the last Linge Company detachment returning to Norway on 14 May.21

  After the final parade and disbanding of the Linge Company, Wilson travelled around the country visiting the sites where some of the major operations had taken place and meeting both former resistance members as well as those who had supported its work. The diary of his trip contains some noteworthy details and personal insights. For example, he visited the Hardanger plateau where the FRESHMAN gliders were to have landed and saw the hill where the Eureka transponder had been placed. ‘It was still functioning four months previously, and should be a museum piece.’ Sønsteby took him on a tour to see the aftermath of some of his sabotage in the Oslo district, where in all thirty-five actions were undertaken. He was struck by the extent of NORIC’s careful reconnaissances and simplicity of action. Haugland took him to the Rikshospital and the scene of his escape, pointing out bullet marks in the walls. His escape had been almost miraculous. One of the Gestapo fired six shots at him from a range of five yards, but had missed every time as his arm was shaking with fright. He also visited Måløy, where Martin Linge had been killed in 1941. Finally, when he was in Trondheim, he visited the cathedral and was told that one of the rooms in the tower had housed a wireless set and even an illegal printing press!22

  Within days of the liberation Eric Welsh and other officers from SIS and FO.II were back in Norway to check up on the welfare of their agents. The final SIS progress report of early June noted that they had met and accounted for members of sixteen stations who had been caught by the Germans and who had survived captivity. Only those from Leporis III were, at that stage, unaccounted for. All the remaining stations closed down by the end of May, with the exception of Gudrun, which remained open a little longer to act as a link with northern Norway.23

  Acknowledgements

  Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, wrote to Gubbins on 31 May to thank him for the valuable contribution made by SOE in developing an effective resistance across occupied Europe. He observed that there had never previously been a war where resistance forces had been so closely harnessed to the military effort. He added:

  I consider that the disruption of enemy rail communications, the harassing of German road moves and the continual and increasing strain placed on the German war economy and internal security services throughout occupied Europe by the organised forces of resistance, played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory. In Denmark and Norway, the commanders concerned have already reported on the great help which they have received from the resistance forces in maintaining law and order during the early stages of the liberation … Finally, I must express my great admiration for the brave and often spectacular exploits of the agents and special groups under control of SF HQ.24

  In July, SHAEF produced a comprehensive assessment of the impact of SOE operations in Norway. This paid SOE a handsome compliment for their work, noting that until December 1944 it had been SHAEF policy not to interfere with troop movements which might reduce the German garrison there. It added:

  However, in December 1944, the importance of German forces in Scandinavia increased as they became one of the few remaining sources of reinforcement. SOE were therefore directed to hinder the evacuation of German forces from Scandinavia to the greatest extent possible. Action in Norway was designed to force the enemy to take the sea route from Trondheim, where they could be attacked by allied naval and air forces. The results were striking and resulted in a reduction in the rate of movement from Norway from four divisions to less than one division per month. A number of transport vessels … were sunk … The striking reduction in the flow of troops and stores from Norway early in 1945 undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the reinforcement and reforming of units which the enemy had to undertake for the battles east and west of the Rhine.‡ 25

  This was heartfelt recognition of a significant achievement.

  Notes

  1 TNA, CAB 66/60/22.

  2 TNA, FO 371/47528.

  3 Tønne Huitfeldt, in Salmon (ed.), Britain and Norway in the Second World War, p. 235.

  4 TNA, PREM 3/328/11A.

  5 Ibid.

  6 TNA, FO 371/47505.

  7 TNA, letter from Ministry of War Production, 12 February 1945, FO 371/47515.

  8 Sir Peter Thorne in Salmon, pp. 213–214.

  9 TNA, HS 2/234.

  10 NHM, Wilson history, p. 164.

  11 TNA, HS 2/170.

  12 TNA, HS 2/215.

  13 TNA, HS 7/174.

  14 TNA, HS 2/138.

  15 TNA, HS 2/204.

  16 For the background, see TNA, FO 371/47506.

  17 NHM, FO.II 8.2 E5.4.

  18 TNA, HS 8/197.

  19 NHM, FO.II 8.2 E5.4.

  20 TNA, HS 2/212.

  21 TNA, HS 2/243.

  22 TNA, HS 9/1603/3.

  23 NHM, FO.II 8.2 E5.4 E5.4.

  24 TNA, HS 8/379.

  25 TNA, HS 8/378.

  * Sønsteby commented after the war that this visit ‘seemed almost foolhardy to me, but that wasn’t my affair’. He also noted that he had long been in touch with Øen’s family in Oslo, who had greatly helped him by harbouring radio operators and other ‘dangerous’ visitors. (Sønsteby, Report from No. 24, p. 170.)

  † The Gestapo officer Gerhard Flesch, who ordered the hanging of Pevik, was himself executed by the Norwegians in Trondheim in 1948. Pevik’s brother Arthur was also a member of the Linge Company and took part in several operations, including Sønsteby’s removal of evidential material from the police and Ministry of Justice described above. He was among those who eventually helped to establish the fate of his brother.

  ‡ Chapter 10 explained that there is some doubt about the accuracy of SHAEF’s estimate of the reduction which railway sabotage caused to German troop movements – though not about its impact.

  CHAPTER 14

  RETRIBUTION, RECOGNITION AND COMPENSATION

  THE AFTERMATH

  What did the resistance achieve in Norway?

  Some historians have been quite dismissive of the effectiveness of SOE in meeting Churchill’s picturesque challenge to ‘set Europe ablaze’, observing that the organisation made little progress in fomenting the sort of revolution which such an instruction might have been expected to produce. Others note, perhaps rather more to the point, that until the eve of D-Day in June 1944, SOE lacked a clear strategy setting out the ultimate purpose of stimulating resistance. Directives to SOE for specific operations could come from Combined Operations Headquarters, Admiralty, Air Ministry or elsewhere. However, much of its tactical direction was provided by the
Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), whose purpose was to disrupt the German economy by supplementing the usual means of warfare in order to promote the Allied war effort. But our knowledge about the relationship between MEW and SOE, and of the extent to which SOE thereby supplemented Britain’s economic war effort, remains frustratingly limited.1 Historians have yet to examine this important aspect of the war.* We have little information about the intelligence which the MEW received from occupied Europe, and how they used it to develop strategy and work out which targets could be most effectively attacked by sabotage rather than by other more traditional means such as bombing. Although SOE’s Norwegian section history describes in some detail its relations with the Foreign Office, SIS, Combined Operations and naval authorities as well as other government departments, it does not mention MEW (with whom, of course, it shared a minister) at all in this context. It merely acknowledges that after the end of combined operations on the Norwegian coast, SOE collaborated closely with General Hansteen and the MEW in working out policies to reduce Norwegian industrial production for German benefit, without unduly endangering Norwegian morale, life or property.

  It has therefore generally only been possible to consider specific examples where the MEW provided tasking and requested SOE to take action to destroy the means of production or to prevent the export of specific minerals of value to the German war effort. And the MEW was certainly quick off the mark to identify some of its Norwegian targets. Before SOE had even been established and before the German conquest of Norway was completed, the MEW wrote to the Admiralty in May 1940 to identify six plants producing or refining ferro-alloys such as nickel, tungsten and molybdenum. It wanted production to be disrupted and asked whether the Admiralty could arrange this through naval action. SOE took over the tasking and successfully disrupted production at most of the sites. It was unable to attack the molybdenum mine at Knaben, but contributed at least by providing details of intelligence about the deep snow conditions which guided the Mosquito pilots of RAF 139 squadron when attacking it at low level with limited success in March 1943.

  It took time for both SOE and SIS to develop productive working relationships with their Norwegian counterparts: both sides had plenty to learn about the art of developing mutual trust and working together. In particular, we should not underestimate the seriousness of the problems caused after the second Lofoten raid, when Anglo-Norwegian relations in the resistance field reached their nadir. But this setback provided the necessary impetus which led to the creation of the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee. It provided a model for effective cooperation which was never really matched elsewhere. Thereafter, SOE’s Norwegian operations ranged from spectacular achievements, of which the sabotage of the heavy water plant at Vemork was the most outstanding, to a profusion of the workmanlike and effective. The most significant element of these, once SHAEF lifted its embargo and permitted operations to take place, was the extensive sabotage of the railway system which greatly slowed down the rate at which German troops were able to be transported out of Norway to provide reinforcements elsewhere. But during the last nine months of the war, other extensive operations mounted partly by SOE but mainly by Milorg, against fuel dumps, arms depots and factories, played an important part in degrading the German capacity to wage war. Eisenhower made a telling comment when he observed that there had never previously been a war where resistance forces had been so closely harnessed to the military effort – and he was, after all, the one best placed to judge.

  It is rather easier to evaluate the contribution of SIS and its agents in Norway. Its main task was to provide intelligence on the movements and status of German warships and marine traffic. Operational and actionable intelligence about ships’ movements (being time-sensitive) would have been the most valuable, and probably the most difficult, to obtain. After an understandably slow start while it began to establish networks, SIS began to earn approval for the extent and quality of its coverage from both Godfrey and his successor as DNI, Rushbrooke, as well as from senior admirals in the Home Fleet.2 We cannot judge very precisely the extent to which its reporting assisted in the sinking of merchant traffic, because its contribution was often complemented by Ultra reporting and aerial reconnaissance. Sometimes too, specific reporting could not be acted upon because of poor weather or the lack of availability of naval or air assets to attack suitable targets. But Ole Snefjellå’s comment, that Welsh had credited Crux with responsibility for reporting which led to the sinking of twelve ships, provides a fair indication of the sort of success which SIS achieved – even if he suspected that Welsh’s estimate was somewhat exaggerated. And while SIS agents might have valued the praise from admirals, had they known about it, they would surely have appreciated more the comment of an officer in the Naval Intelligence Division who had seen daily evidence of the quality of their reporting, and who later wrote:

  One of the most remarkable successes in Naval Intelligence in the last war was the reporting of the Tirpitz and other big ships from Altafjord, Trondheim and other ports in Norway. So reliable was this service … that the OIC [Operational Intelligence Centre] had complete faith in their accuracy and regularity.3

  SIS also provided a range of reporting on coastal and port defences, as well as airfields. It was much less successful in providing political intelligence, on which the chairman of the JIC, Cavendish-Bentinck, commented quite disparagingly. SIS did not consider this to be a high priority – but the deficiency was anyway to some extent remedied after XU, established in Norway but later supported from Britain by FO.II and with training provided by SIS, began to provide reporting.

  Norwegian intelligence organisation XU picture – prisoners from Grini prison camp doing hard labour. © NHM

  There are also other factors to take into consideration – particularly those which helped to support Norwegian morale, and the will of the vast majority of the population to continue to endure their isolation, privations and the continuing threats of German oppression or forced mobilisation, whether they were involved in passive or active resistance. The activities of SOE in this respect, many of which were quite well publicised, certainly played their part in strengthening morale. On the Norwegian side, the roles of King Haakon, and of the BBC, which broadcast not only his speeches but provided regular news (as well as specific messages for the resistance) were of paramount importance. And the Norwegian government, after an uncertain start, managed to strike an effective balance in maintaining the confidence of Milorg in Norway (helping to ensure that it accepted reasonable strategic direction from Allied commanders) and asserting itself with the British sufficiently to be able to exercise a degree of control over the conduct of much of the war in Norway. There were significant exceptions early on, before trust and an adequate degree of coordination were established. Even then there were still occasional problems caused by Allied initiatives such as the bombing of Vemork. Although the Norwegians complained, they usually took these setbacks in their stride and did not allow them to affect relations too much or for too long. Eden’s compliment with which this book begins was not hyperbole. It was an acknowledgement of the contribution of a government whose pragmatism and tolerance stood favourable comparison with the other governments in exile.

  Retribution

  After the war the Norwegian government, which had reintroduced the death penalty, brought to trial the most prominent members of the Quisling government and collaborators on charges of treason. The prosecution sought the death penalty in fewer than 100 cases. The death sentence was handed down in thirty of them, and carried out in twenty-five, which included Quisling, as well as Henry Rinnan and other members of his gang who betrayed resistance members. Thousands more Norwegians were convicted of lesser crimes and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, though the appetite for such punishments gradually diminished. Twelve Germans, including Gestapo officers Siegfried Fehmer and Gerhard Flesch, were also executed by the Norwegians for war crimes.

  The British authorities also launched a seri
es of exhaustive investigations to establish who was responsible for the murder of the British troops involved in FRESHMAN and other commando raids, as well as the Norwegian and British crew of MTB 345 who were captured while on a naval mission off the coast and shot shortly afterwards. All of them were wearing naval uniform. They achieved some results, especially when dealing with those involved in FRESHMAN. Erich Hoffmann and Werner Seeling, who brutally tortured and murdered four badly injured prisoners in Stavanger prison on November 1943, were found guilty. Seeling was shot in Oslo, while Hoffman was hanged in Hamburg. Friedrich Wilkens, the Gestapo chief in Stavanger who might also have been complicit in those murders, was killed by Norwegian SIS agents when he was taking part in the capture of Sabor in April 1945. General Karl von Beeren, and his subordinate Erwin Probst, were charged with killing the fourteen commandos who were shot one by one outside Slettebø camp. Von Beeren was acquitted while Probst, who had commanded the detachment which carried out the killings, died of cancer before he could be brought to trial. Oscar Hans was sentenced to death by a Norwegian court for supervising the shooting of more than three hundred Norwegians, including the prominent trade unionists Viggo Hansteen and Rolf Wickstrøm in September 1941. His sentence was commuted, but he was then tried by a British court for the killing of five commandos from FRESHMAN, as well as Able Seaman Evans, at Trandum in January 1943.† He was once more sentenced to death, but again the sentence was commuted. Hans Wilhelm Blomberg was found guilty and executed for the killing of the crew of MTB 345. It did not prove possible to identify those responsible for the killings of the commandos involved in MUSKETOON and CHECKMATE, who died in German concentration camps. General von Falkenhorst, who remained in command of German troops in Norway until 1944, was tried by a joint British-Norwegian court on a charge of implementing Hitler’s Commando order and insisting that commandos should be handed over to the SD (the Nazi Party’s intelligence service, Sicherheitsdienst) for execution within twenty-four hours of their capture. He was sentenced to death, but this was later commuted to twenty years’ imprisonment.