those terms whose elusiveness has made it all too susceptible to casual and cursory use. “He’s an
ethical person,” we say - and leave it at that. What are ethics? How can we identify them, and
how should we judge them?
Ethics, alternatively called moral philosophy, seeks to distinguish what is good from
what is bad and to formulate justifiable reasons for making such distinctions.
As a branch of philosophy, ethics is a normative science; that is, it seeks to identify
principles of good and evil that transcend social, cultural, or political convention (social contract
theory).
Beyond a merely normative approach to ethics is metaethics, which seeks to investigate
normative currency-terms such as “good”, “evil”, “justice”, “ought”, “right”, and “wrong”. The
neutrality and objectivity of metaethics presume that such terms are not dependent upon moral
beliefs (such as religion). The metaethical concept of naturalism, advanced by theorists such as
John Dewey and Herbert Spencer, posits that moral terms have a basis in scientific fact.
Intuitionists agree that moral terms have an external, reliable basis but attribute it to self-
evident (“I know it when I see it”) qualities.
Challenging intuitionists and naturalists are moral skepticists who insist that moral
terms are completely arbitrary. Emotivists claim that such terms have no capacity for being
true or false in themselves, and that the people who use them are simply stating their emotions
about an issue. Subjectivists maintain that moral judgments state subjective facts only about
attitudes, not the objects of those attitudes. And Imperativists insist that moral judgments are
actually “commands” in another guise, hence do not focus at all on criteria of truth or objectivity.
When even its basic language terms are so fraught with controversy, normative ethics is off
to a rough start. Beyond this are arguments over the criteria for making any kind of moral
judgment. Teleologists maintain that the morality of an action is determined solely by its
consequences. Some teleologists, such as Plato, insist that the perfection of the self is the correct
- 217 -
consequence; hedonists say that it is mere pleasure; utilitarians counter that it must be the
greatest benefit to society. Theologians, such as Aquinas, Luther, et al. , dispense with teleology
altogether in favor of obedience to proclaimed or perceived morality from a God or gods.
The sharpest attack on ethics generally comes from egoists such as Thomas Hobbes and
Friedrich Nietzsche (cf. his Genealogy of Morals) [and Ragnar Redbeard!], who consider all
ethics as verbal camouflage to conceal the reality that all actions are merely in the interest of the
stronger (who by that same strength dictate all definitions of “justice”, “right”, etc.). The egoist
position was represented in the Platonic Dialogue The Republic by Glaucon, and went on to form
the basis for Enlightenment “social contract” theories (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), wherein
“justice” and related terms became just matters of agreement and contract between the people of
a society.
Accordingly it is not surprising that practical problem-solvers shy away from metaethical
issues and try rather to address questions in terms of what are generally called descriptive
ethics - the customs and standards of a given culture which serve as measurements of rightness
and wrongness within that culture. An acceptance of descriptive ethics as ethics leads to an
attitude of ethical relativism, according to which there is no standard for judging right and
wrong apart from the cultural environment of specific situations. Hence the killing of humans by
humans may be “ethical” if sanctioned by a judge or national sovereign, but the identical act may
be “unethical” if undertaken by an individual, regardless of reasons.
Until the Enlightenment of the late-17th and 18th centuries, ethical philosophy was
completely metaethical; standards of good and evil were accepted as being prescribed by one or
more divinities or divine principles ( neteru, Forms). It was humanity’s task not to determine
ethics, but rather to understand and obey divinely-ordained ethics.
To reprise an important point in Chapter #3, the ancient Egyptians perceived the universe
as actively controlled by conscious, natural principles or “gods” ( neteru in hieroglyphic). To the
Egyptians, all of “nature” (derived from neteru) was alive and the direct consequence of the wills
of the neteru. Nature was intelligible not just through inanimate, automatic, general regularities
which could be discovered via observation, but also through connections and associations
between things and events perceived in the human mind. There was no distinction
between “reality” and “appearance”; anything capable of exerting an effect upon the mind
thereby existed. Justice and virtue were sought in manifestations of beauty, symmetry, and
harmony, and were personified by the goddess Ma’at.
In contrast to the Egyptian view of humanity as being a harmonious component of nature -
symbolized by the pharaoh’s position as half-divine deputy of the neteru - ancient
Mesopotamian tradition posited humanity as something estranged from the gods. Virtue in
Mesopotamia was thus understood as obedience to the willful desires of the god(s), not harmony
with their natural principles. Mesopotamian kings sought the “right ruling” of their communities
in accordance with the Akkadian principle of shulmu (later the Hebrew shalom), a term meaning
not just “peace” but the community well-being that engenders peace. In the Hebraic system, God
is not intelligible through reason or logic, but rather through prophecy and the history of events,
whether or not the events’ outcomes seem situationally appropriate (theodicy). The Hebraic
presumption of a “covenant” between mankind and a divinity reflected the notion that mankind
is given a “mission” and/or a “destiny”, and that virtue lies in the fulfillment of that mission/
destiny - whether or not it is æsthetically palatable or even understandable. Herein lie the roots
of a certain kind of “outcome-justified” thinking that is prevalent in modern culture.
The ethics of Plato reflect his commitment to teleology, the doctrine that purpose and
design are apparent in nature, and that natural phenomena move inexorably towards certain
goals of ultimate self-realization. [The opposite of teleology is mechanism, which describes
- 218 -
phenomena in terms of prior causes rather than presumed destination or fulfillment. Modern
science is thus mechanistic.]
In his Dialogues Plato, through the character of Socrates, endorsed the Egyptian and
Pythagorean model of human virtue as a particularization of universal principles (an application
of his famous “Theory of the Forms”). Such Forms or principles could be apprehended through
rigorous exercise of the higher faculties of reason ( dianoia), leading to an intuitional or nœtic
apprehension of the good - and a simultaneous veneration of it for its own sake. This process
Plato referred to as the dialectic, meaning self-teaching through the examination and refutation
of logically- or factually-imperfect concepts.
In Plato’s Republic Socrates is unable to directly refute Glaucon’s egoist charge that justi
ce
is merely a rationalization for the prevailing of the interests of the stronger. Socrates can only
suggest, through the analogy of a perfectly-harmonious “republic”, that it is more natural for a
man to be just if his psyche is healthy and each part is doing its proper work. The virtuous state
is held up as “the psyche writ large”.
Aristotle, the most famous of the early mechanists, laid the groundwork for situational
ethics by denying that virtue, truth, beauty, and the other Pythagorean/Platonic Forms existed in
an absolute sense. Such values, as they applied to humanity, were rather to be sought in
moderation between unacceptable extremes in specific situations: Aristotle’s doctrine of the
“golden mean”.
Until this point in human history, ethics and politics were inseparable; the individual’s
good and the community’s good had to be pursued together; there was no such thing as
“personal ethics within an unethical state”, nor “an ethical state comprised of unethical citizens”.
The sins of Œdipus necessitated not only his blinding but his exile, and Socrates’ challenge to the
harmony of Athens was considered sufficient grounds to condemn him to death. Socrates
himself acknowledged this principle, accepting his execution as a “cure” of his function as a kind
of social “illness” - albeit one whose impact would ultimately strengthen the Athenian political
culture.
In the Hellenistic era - the period following the conquests of Alexander the Great - ancient
mankind lost its innocence. Elaborate philosophical systems dependent upon specific cultural
deities were discredited when other cultures with different philosophies and different gods were
seen to be doing just as well - and perhaps better. Materialism was the order of the day, and the
power of ethics to influence society was denied by the Cynics and Skeptics. If virtue had any
place in human affairs, it was in one’s personal conduct. Epicureanism held that virtue could
be found in the happiness of the soul, and that such happiness was to be pursued not by mere
hedonistic indulgence, but rather by disassociating oneself from the corruption of society.
Stoicism also despaired of social ethics, but insisted that personal ethics were to be pursued by
one’s labors within the social fabric rather than apart from it.
The importance of Stoicism to the subsequent path of Western civilization can scarcely be
overemphasized. Stoics, like Aristotle, sought validation of knowledge in sense-experience rather
than through abstract logic or intuition. A wise man, said the Stoics, can distinguish reliable
impressions ( kataleptika phantasia = “grasping impressions”) from ethereal ones. Humanity is
integral with nature; virtue is to be found in reason-based endurance of the natural flux. Thus if
evil comes to the good man, it is only temporary and not really evil, since in the greater sense it is
natural. The Stoic thus accepts the fortunes and misfortunes of life calmly, seeking to avoid
passionate loss of objectivity. The Stoics’ ideal was a gradually-evolving “world
society” ( cosmopolis) transcending geographic and cultural divisions.
Stoicism was the primary ethical force in the Roman Republic and Empire, and it is not
surprising to find its core principles adopted by early Christianity. Augustine’s doctrine of the
“two cities” reflected the Stoic notion of a virtuous soul coexisting with a flawed social system. By
- 219 -
the medieval era, the “two cities” had been refined into Thomas Aquinas’ “hierarchy of laws”,
with social and political “human law” placed firmly beneath [church-] revealed “divine law” and
Stoic-derived “natural law”. The contradictions and corruptions of such a climate spawned
Machiavelli.
Niccolo Machiavelli (after whom the Devil began to be called “Old Nick”) sought to
prescribe wise conduct ( virtu) for Italian princes faced with unavoidable problems ( necessita)
brought about by factors beyond their control ( fortuna). Contrary to his church-propagandized
image, Machiavelli was constantly and intensely concerned with the establishment of the ethical
society, and his manipulative techniques were justified in his eyes by the “best political results
under the circumstances” that he expected as the eventual outcome. Precisely quoted, the
famous passage from Chapter #18 of The Prince reads:
In the actions of all men, and especially of princes who are not subject to a court of appeal,
we must always look to the end.
While Machiavelli advocated the tacit manipulation of society for deliberate [and ultimately
virtuous] ends, early Protestant theorists such as Martin Luther and John Calvin regarded ethics
as being beyond the rational reach of mankind. The basis for ethical behavior, they said, is that a
righteous man will automatically incline towards such behavior, not because it is logically or
empirically justified in itself. Salvation (=attainment of righteousness) is attainable only through
the complete surrender of oneself to Christ. This constituted a rejection of medieval
scholasticism, and of the “logical ethics” arguments of Aristotle (whom Luther called “this
damned, conceited, rascally heathen”) and Aquinas. The impact of the Protestant Reformation
was to remove the rational basis and responsibility for either personal or social ethics, replacing
these with the notion of ethics as a suprarational article of religious faith - to be selectively
invoked by spokesmen for that religion.
With the social-contract theorists of the 17th- and 18th-century “Enlightenment” came a
renaissance of reason - including as the negotiated basis for ethics. Thomas Hobbes, after
Glaucon, denied the religious tenet of a “supreme good”, seeing in its place only material self-
interest and gratification. Hobbes’ prescribed social contract was thus a negative one,
establishing an atmosphere of truce between citizens who would otherwise savage one another
mercilessly. Such a contemptuous view of humanity evolved forward into many “lower”
ideologies of contemporary society, most conspicuously communism. “Hobbes,” Karl Marx is
said to have muttered, “is the father of us all.” It should be pointed out, however, that Hobbes’
reputation for harshness came not from personal preference, but rather from a coldly practical
analysis of what makes human beings behave unpleasantly towards one another. Previously
“evil” had been excused as a theological force, or as the result of “original sin”, i.e. something for
which rational individuals could not be held exclusively responsible. Hobbes denied such
excuses.
In contrast to Hobbes, John Locke suggested that social-contract nations could exist on a
positively cooperative basis of mutual interest. It is important to note that Locke’s
prescription was based not on idealistic abstractions (such as ethics), but rather on attainable
material objectives: “life, liberty, and estate”. Like Hobbes, he sought to design a society
reflecting “basic man” rather than one espousing unattainable ideals and expectations. Locke’s
positively-cooperative assumptions and prescription for limited government based upon
majority rule formed the philosophical basis for the American Declaration of Independence and
Constitution, to include the latter’s Bi
ll of Rights [against the government]. Locke recommended
a “reasonable Christianity” - a faith which, while satisfying personal religious desires, would play
only a symbolic and ceremonial role in political decision-making.
- 220 -
The history of social-contract ethics does not cease with John Locke, but his ideas, as
immortalized in the aforementioned documents, ordained the ethical atmosphere of United
States political culture, in which the Temple of Set is principally based, to the present day. This
atmosphere may be summarized in five general maxims:
(1) Government based on law is a positive institution, not something to be
eliminated in an ideal society.
(2) Good government is a construct of the people and is responsible to them (social
contract theory), not to a higher religion, destiny, or ideology.
(3) The will of the people is best ascertained through the opinion of the majority,
which thus determines “political truth”. [It is precisely because there is no
authority superior to such majority opinion that Locke placed certain “inalienable
rights” of all humanity beyond the reach of government.]
(4) As society is based upon cooperative self-interest, so the attractions of such self-
interest - for example, private property - must be preserved and enhanced as
beneficial and indeed vital features of that society.
(5) There is an intrinsic dignity in the individual human life which must be accepted
and respected as an article of faith.
To the Lockean frame of mind, these values are, in the words of the Declaration of
Independence, “held to be self-evident”; they are beyond debate, beyond compromise.
Nevertheless many other cultures do not accept them in whole or part - and do not
necessarily see this as a deficiency in their social structures.
As the United States aged sufficiently to develop a sense of and regard for its own history,
“pure” Lockean theory became leavened with a measure of ethical conservatism: an
acceptance of certain things as “good” simply because they have continued to be tolerated over
an extended period of time.
Conservatism was elevated to a deliberate ethical philosophy by David Hume, who defined
The Temple of Set I Page 41