The Temple of Set I

by Michael A Aquino

  those terms whose elusiveness has made it all too susceptible to casual and cursory use. “He’s an

  ethical person,” we say - and leave it at that. What are ethics? How can we identify them, and

  how should we judge them?

  Ethics, alternatively called moral philosophy, seeks to distinguish what is good from

  what is bad and to formulate justifiable reasons for making such distinctions.

  As a branch of philosophy, ethics is a normative science; that is, it seeks to identify

  principles of good and evil that transcend social, cultural, or political convention (social contract

  theory).

  Beyond a merely normative approach to ethics is metaethics, which seeks to investigate

  normative currency-terms such as “good”, “evil”, “justice”, “ought”, “right”, and “wrong”. The

  neutrality and objectivity of metaethics presume that such terms are not dependent upon moral

  beliefs (such as religion). The metaethical concept of naturalism, advanced by theorists such as

  John Dewey and Herbert Spencer, posits that moral terms have a basis in scientific fact.

  Intuitionists agree that moral terms have an external, reliable basis but attribute it to self-

  evident (“I know it when I see it”) qualities.

  Challenging intuitionists and naturalists are moral skepticists who insist that moral

  terms are completely arbitrary. Emotivists claim that such terms have no capacity for being

  true or false in themselves, and that the people who use them are simply stating their emotions

  about an issue. Subjectivists maintain that moral judgments state subjective facts only about

  attitudes, not the objects of those attitudes. And Imperativists insist that moral judgments are

  actually “commands” in another guise, hence do not focus at all on criteria of truth or objectivity.

  When even its basic language terms are so fraught with controversy, normative ethics is off

  to a rough start. Beyond this are arguments over the criteria for making any kind of moral

  judgment. Teleologists maintain that the morality of an action is determined solely by its

  consequences. Some teleologists, such as Plato, insist that the perfection of the self is the correct

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  consequence; hedonists say that it is mere pleasure; utilitarians counter that it must be the

  greatest benefit to society. Theologians, such as Aquinas, Luther, et al. , dispense with teleology

  altogether in favor of obedience to proclaimed or perceived morality from a God or gods.

  The sharpest attack on ethics generally comes from egoists such as Thomas Hobbes and

  Friedrich Nietzsche (cf. his Genealogy of Morals) [and Ragnar Redbeard!], who consider all

  ethics as verbal camouflage to conceal the reality that all actions are merely in the interest of the

  stronger (who by that same strength dictate all definitions of “justice”, “right”, etc.). The egoist

  position was represented in the Platonic Dialogue The Republic by Glaucon, and went on to form

  the basis for Enlightenment “social contract” theories (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), wherein

  “justice” and related terms became just matters of agreement and contract between the people of

  a society.

  Accordingly it is not surprising that practical problem-solvers shy away from metaethical

  issues and try rather to address questions in terms of what are generally called descriptive

  ethics - the customs and standards of a given culture which serve as measurements of rightness

  and wrongness within that culture. An acceptance of descriptive ethics as ethics leads to an

  attitude of ethical relativism, according to which there is no standard for judging right and

  wrong apart from the cultural environment of specific situations. Hence the killing of humans by

  humans may be “ethical” if sanctioned by a judge or national sovereign, but the identical act may

  be “unethical” if undertaken by an individual, regardless of reasons.

  Until the Enlightenment of the late-17th and 18th centuries, ethical philosophy was

  completely metaethical; standards of good and evil were accepted as being prescribed by one or

  more divinities or divine principles ( neteru, Forms). It was humanity’s task not to determine

  ethics, but rather to understand and obey divinely-ordained ethics.

  To reprise an important point in Chapter #3, the ancient Egyptians perceived the universe

  as actively controlled by conscious, natural principles or “gods” ( neteru in hieroglyphic). To the

  Egyptians, all of “nature” (derived from neteru) was alive and the direct consequence of the wills

  of the neteru. Nature was intelligible not just through inanimate, automatic, general regularities

  which could be discovered via observation, but also through connections and associations

  between things and events perceived in the human mind. There was no distinction

  between “reality” and “appearance”; anything capable of exerting an effect upon the mind

  thereby existed. Justice and virtue were sought in manifestations of beauty, symmetry, and

  harmony, and were personified by the goddess Ma’at.

  In contrast to the Egyptian view of humanity as being a harmonious component of nature -

  symbolized by the pharaoh’s position as half-divine deputy of the neteru - ancient

  Mesopotamian tradition posited humanity as something estranged from the gods. Virtue in

  Mesopotamia was thus understood as obedience to the willful desires of the god(s), not harmony

  with their natural principles. Mesopotamian kings sought the “right ruling” of their communities

  in accordance with the Akkadian principle of shulmu (later the Hebrew shalom), a term meaning

  not just “peace” but the community well-being that engenders peace. In the Hebraic system, God

  is not intelligible through reason or logic, but rather through prophecy and the history of events,

  whether or not the events’ outcomes seem situationally appropriate (theodicy). The Hebraic

  presumption of a “covenant” between mankind and a divinity reflected the notion that mankind

  is given a “mission” and/or a “destiny”, and that virtue lies in the fulfillment of that mission/

  destiny - whether or not it is æsthetically palatable or even understandable. Herein lie the roots

  of a certain kind of “outcome-justified” thinking that is prevalent in modern culture.

  The ethics of Plato reflect his commitment to teleology, the doctrine that purpose and

  design are apparent in nature, and that natural phenomena move inexorably towards certain

  goals of ultimate self-realization. [The opposite of teleology is mechanism, which describes

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  phenomena in terms of prior causes rather than presumed destination or fulfillment. Modern

  science is thus mechanistic.]

  In his Dialogues Plato, through the character of Socrates, endorsed the Egyptian and

  Pythagorean model of human virtue as a particularization of universal principles (an application

  of his famous “Theory of the Forms”). Such Forms or principles could be apprehended through

  rigorous exercise of the higher faculties of reason ( dianoia), leading to an intuitional or nœtic

  apprehension of the good - and a simultaneous veneration of it for its own sake. This process

  Plato referred to as the dialectic, meaning self-teaching through the examination and refutation

  of logically- or factually-imperfect concepts.

  In Plato’s Republic Socrates is unable to directly refute Glaucon’s egoist charge that justi
ce

  is merely a rationalization for the prevailing of the interests of the stronger. Socrates can only

  suggest, through the analogy of a perfectly-harmonious “republic”, that it is more natural for a

  man to be just if his psyche is healthy and each part is doing its proper work. The virtuous state

  is held up as “the psyche writ large”.

  Aristotle, the most famous of the early mechanists, laid the groundwork for situational

  ethics by denying that virtue, truth, beauty, and the other Pythagorean/Platonic Forms existed in

  an absolute sense. Such values, as they applied to humanity, were rather to be sought in

  moderation between unacceptable extremes in specific situations: Aristotle’s doctrine of the

  “golden mean”.

  Until this point in human history, ethics and politics were inseparable; the individual’s

  good and the community’s good had to be pursued together; there was no such thing as

  “personal ethics within an unethical state”, nor “an ethical state comprised of unethical citizens”.

  The sins of Œdipus necessitated not only his blinding but his exile, and Socrates’ challenge to the

  harmony of Athens was considered sufficient grounds to condemn him to death. Socrates

  himself acknowledged this principle, accepting his execution as a “cure” of his function as a kind

  of social “illness” - albeit one whose impact would ultimately strengthen the Athenian political

  culture.

  In the Hellenistic era - the period following the conquests of Alexander the Great - ancient

  mankind lost its innocence. Elaborate philosophical systems dependent upon specific cultural

  deities were discredited when other cultures with different philosophies and different gods were

  seen to be doing just as well - and perhaps better. Materialism was the order of the day, and the

  power of ethics to influence society was denied by the Cynics and Skeptics. If virtue had any

  place in human affairs, it was in one’s personal conduct. Epicureanism held that virtue could

  be found in the happiness of the soul, and that such happiness was to be pursued not by mere

  hedonistic indulgence, but rather by disassociating oneself from the corruption of society.

  Stoicism also despaired of social ethics, but insisted that personal ethics were to be pursued by

  one’s labors within the social fabric rather than apart from it.

  The importance of Stoicism to the subsequent path of Western civilization can scarcely be

  overemphasized. Stoics, like Aristotle, sought validation of knowledge in sense-experience rather

  than through abstract logic or intuition. A wise man, said the Stoics, can distinguish reliable

  impressions ( kataleptika phantasia = “grasping impressions”) from ethereal ones. Humanity is

  integral with nature; virtue is to be found in reason-based endurance of the natural flux. Thus if

  evil comes to the good man, it is only temporary and not really evil, since in the greater sense it is

  natural. The Stoic thus accepts the fortunes and misfortunes of life calmly, seeking to avoid

  passionate loss of objectivity. The Stoics’ ideal was a gradually-evolving “world

  society” ( cosmopolis) transcending geographic and cultural divisions.

  Stoicism was the primary ethical force in the Roman Republic and Empire, and it is not

  surprising to find its core principles adopted by early Christianity. Augustine’s doctrine of the

  “two cities” reflected the Stoic notion of a virtuous soul coexisting with a flawed social system. By

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  the medieval era, the “two cities” had been refined into Thomas Aquinas’ “hierarchy of laws”,

  with social and political “human law” placed firmly beneath [church-] revealed “divine law” and

  Stoic-derived “natural law”. The contradictions and corruptions of such a climate spawned

  Machiavelli.

  Niccolo Machiavelli (after whom the Devil began to be called “Old Nick”) sought to

  prescribe wise conduct ( virtu) for Italian princes faced with unavoidable problems ( necessita)

  brought about by factors beyond their control ( fortuna). Contrary to his church-propagandized

  image, Machiavelli was constantly and intensely concerned with the establishment of the ethical

  society, and his manipulative techniques were justified in his eyes by the “best political results

  under the circumstances” that he expected as the eventual outcome. Precisely quoted, the

  famous passage from Chapter #18 of The Prince reads:

  In the actions of all men, and especially of princes who are not subject to a court of appeal,

  we must always look to the end.

  While Machiavelli advocated the tacit manipulation of society for deliberate [and ultimately

  virtuous] ends, early Protestant theorists such as Martin Luther and John Calvin regarded ethics

  as being beyond the rational reach of mankind. The basis for ethical behavior, they said, is that a

  righteous man will automatically incline towards such behavior, not because it is logically or

  empirically justified in itself. Salvation (=attainment of righteousness) is attainable only through

  the complete surrender of oneself to Christ. This constituted a rejection of medieval

  scholasticism, and of the “logical ethics” arguments of Aristotle (whom Luther called “this

  damned, conceited, rascally heathen”) and Aquinas. The impact of the Protestant Reformation

  was to remove the rational basis and responsibility for either personal or social ethics, replacing

  these with the notion of ethics as a suprarational article of religious faith - to be selectively

  invoked by spokesmen for that religion.

  With the social-contract theorists of the 17th- and 18th-century “Enlightenment” came a

  renaissance of reason - including as the negotiated basis for ethics. Thomas Hobbes, after

  Glaucon, denied the religious tenet of a “supreme good”, seeing in its place only material self-

  interest and gratification. Hobbes’ prescribed social contract was thus a negative one,

  establishing an atmosphere of truce between citizens who would otherwise savage one another

  mercilessly. Such a contemptuous view of humanity evolved forward into many “lower”

  ideologies of contemporary society, most conspicuously communism. “Hobbes,” Karl Marx is

  said to have muttered, “is the father of us all.” It should be pointed out, however, that Hobbes’

  reputation for harshness came not from personal preference, but rather from a coldly practical

  analysis of what makes human beings behave unpleasantly towards one another. Previously

  “evil” had been excused as a theological force, or as the result of “original sin”, i.e. something for

  which rational individuals could not be held exclusively responsible. Hobbes denied such

  excuses.

  In contrast to Hobbes, John Locke suggested that social-contract nations could exist on a

  positively cooperative basis of mutual interest. It is important to note that Locke’s

  prescription was based not on idealistic abstractions (such as ethics), but rather on attainable

  material objectives: “life, liberty, and estate”. Like Hobbes, he sought to design a society

  reflecting “basic man” rather than one espousing unattainable ideals and expectations. Locke’s

  positively-cooperative assumptions and prescription for limited government based upon

  majority rule formed the philosophical basis for the American Declaration of Independence and

  Constitution, to include the latter’s Bi
ll of Rights [against the government]. Locke recommended

  a “reasonable Christianity” - a faith which, while satisfying personal religious desires, would play

  only a symbolic and ceremonial role in political decision-making.

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  The history of social-contract ethics does not cease with John Locke, but his ideas, as

  immortalized in the aforementioned documents, ordained the ethical atmosphere of United

  States political culture, in which the Temple of Set is principally based, to the present day. This

  atmosphere may be summarized in five general maxims:

  (1) Government based on law is a positive institution, not something to be

  eliminated in an ideal society.

  (2) Good government is a construct of the people and is responsible to them (social

  contract theory), not to a higher religion, destiny, or ideology.

  (3) The will of the people is best ascertained through the opinion of the majority,

  which thus determines “political truth”. [It is precisely because there is no

  authority superior to such majority opinion that Locke placed certain “inalienable

  rights” of all humanity beyond the reach of government.]

  (4) As society is based upon cooperative self-interest, so the attractions of such self-

  interest - for example, private property - must be preserved and enhanced as

  beneficial and indeed vital features of that society.

  (5) There is an intrinsic dignity in the individual human life which must be accepted

  and respected as an article of faith.

  To the Lockean frame of mind, these values are, in the words of the Declaration of

  Independence, “held to be self-evident”; they are beyond debate, beyond compromise.

  Nevertheless many other cultures do not accept them in whole or part - and do not

  necessarily see this as a deficiency in their social structures.

  As the United States aged sufficiently to develop a sense of and regard for its own history,

  “pure” Lockean theory became leavened with a measure of ethical conservatism: an

  acceptance of certain things as “good” simply because they have continued to be tolerated over

  an extended period of time.

  Conservatism was elevated to a deliberate ethical philosophy by David Hume, who defined