by N S Nash
11. The Battle of Shaiba. (Map prepared by the historical section of the Committee for Imperial Defence. Ordnance Survey 1924)
12. Mountain guns at Shaiba, April 1915.
Later, Lord Crewe, in giving evidence to the MC, remarked that he ‘was sorry the change had been made.’ Nixon, clearly not everyone’s choice, duly arrived with his Staff in Basra on 9 April. He bore with him his orders from General Sir Beauchamp Duff. The orders were lengthy and specific but, in the interests of brevity, the key elements were that Nixon was ordered to take Sir Percy Cox,49 the political officer, under his command. He was to ‘Report on the requirement for river transport’ and the desirability of building a railway with 137 miles of track. He was, in addition, to ‘plan an effective occupation of Basra Vilayet’50 and ‘plan for a subsequent advance on Baghdad.’
Percy Cox was in a very influential position. He was, in effect, the Viceroy’s personal representative and had a background in colonial administration. His function was to advise Nixon on civilian issues and governance. He ranked alongside Major General Kemble, Nixon’s Chief of Staff.
Nixon had no time to play himself in as a reconnaissance in force was being made towards Nukhaila. An Arab force was encountered but the ensuing skirmish was indecisive and unsatisfactory. Major General Sir Charles Mellis VC, temporarily General Officer Commanding (GOC), 6th Division, was thrust into more serious action on 12 April when about 4,000 Turks attacked his forces, predictably from the west and by way of Barjisiya Wood. For the next three days there was intense and savage fighting, during which Major Wheeler won the first VC of the campaign.51
13. Major G.G. Wheeler VC.
The battles were both bloody affairs; British casualties were 1,000 killed and wounded, including eighteen officers killed and forty-two wounded. Usually the proportion of killed to wounded is from 1:3 to 1:4, so the probability was that there were 700–750 or more Indian soldiers needing medical treatment. ‘As in all battles, the dead and wounded came chiefly from the best and bravest.’52 It was ever thus.
The opposition lost about 3,000, and 800 prisoners (who had to be fed, watered, accommodated and guarded). The wounded of both sides were the first test of the Indian Medical Service. The MC Report commented on medical care with the following:
Another defect … was the failure to supply the expedition with suitable vehicles for carrying the wounded. The only land ambulance transport provided were stretchers and riding mules. Stretchers are not suitable for distances over 2½ miles. Whenever it became necessary to carry the wounded any distance, resorts had to be to the ordinary army transport cart [ATC], which is without springs, has no cover to give protection against rain or the direct rays of the sun; and the bottom of which consists of bars of iron, which, even when liberally covered with mattresses or other paddling, renders the placing of a wounded man, especially cases of fracture, in such a conveyance, a practice which can only be described as barbarous and cruel.53
The treatment of the wounded is a topic that will be revisited at regular intervals. As the opposition gained in strength and effectiveness, so there was a commensurate rise in the number of casualties. In the case of the engagements around Shaiba, the distances were relatively short and water transport could be employed across the flooded plain.
Major General Mellis,54 who had briefly commanded the Division, described Shaiba as ‘a real soldier’s battle’. He rather hoped that his command would become permanent but it was not to be and he reverted to the command of a brigade – not unusual for a major general at the time. Nevertheless, over the next year Mellis, a notable warrior, would demonstrate that he was not only a physically brave man but that he also had moral courage of a high order. He was one of very few general officers to emerge from the misery of Mesopotamia with his reputation enhanced. The brigade commanded by Mellis now became a component of the 12th Division commanded by Major General George Gorringe.
At the time Duff’s orders were given to General Nixon, the home authorities knew nothing about them. As far as ‘an advance to Baghdad’ was concerned, this was not even a consideration in London and quite what induced Duff to issue such instructions was never satisfactorily explained. He exceeded his remit by a margin – a very wide margin.
It was not until 2 May 1915 that a copy of these instructions reached London, by which time the Battles of Barjisiya and Shaiba had been fought and won against a mixed force of Arabs and Turks, over the period 12–14 April. Suleiman Askeri, who had clearly chosen sides, led the Arabs.
Duff’s orders were the first time that ‘Baghdad’ was mentioned in any official communication and a glance at the map reveals why. Advancing to Baghdad should have been, at best, an aspiration because it was 502 river miles from Basra and that river was the only effective line of communication on offer. It also presented all manner of navigational difficulties, even if appropriate, shallow draft shipping was available. Nixon’s orders were quite specific and planning the river transport was high on the list of priorities imposed upon him by General Duff.
At Simla Sir Beauchamp Duff, as Commander-in-Chief, was in absolute and untrammelled control of every branch of military administration. The General Staff was in no sense a separate or independent branch.55
14. Major General Sir Charles Mellis VC KCB. He was one of the few generals to return from Mesopotamia with his reputation enhanced.
The IEF‘D’ was now composed of two divisions, 6th and 12th, the latter being very weak and without artillery. It has to be said that any division without integral artillery is ineffective. Artillery is the ‘Queen of the Battlefield’ (as any gunner will tell you, probably at great length) and on the Western Front about 58 per cent of casualties on both sides were inflicted by artillery in its various forms.56 Thus the new Mesopotamian Corps was, in effect, one and a half divisions at best and deficient in the most effective of modern weaponry.
Major General C.V.F. Townshend CB DSO was appointed to command 6th Indian Division in Barrett’s place and arrived in Basra on 22 April 1915. He was to be a very important player in the campaign and it is appropriate to consider him in some detail. The author wrote his biography. They say ‘no man is a hero to his valet’; similarly, few men are heroes to their biographers – certainly not in this case.
Chapter notes
36 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.34.
37 MC Report, p.15.
38 Hardinge papers, 93/No. 9a, Gould, D., p.930.
39 Lord Morley of Blackburn OM PC (1838–1923). Liberal politician elected MP in 1883. Secretary of State, India Office, 1905–10. Lord President of the Council 1910–14. Resigned from the government in protest at the declaration of war in August 1914.
40 Hardinge papers, 94/No. 33.
41 MC Report, p.15.
42 Busch, B.C., Hardinge of Penshurst, p.232.
43 Ibid, p.232.
44 MC Report, p.11.
45 Hardinge to Nicholson, 4 February 1915, HP 93/No. 290.
46 Gould, D., ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamia Commission and Inquiry 1914–17’, The Historical Journal, December 1976.
47 Wilson, Sir A., Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914–1917, p.33.
48 Barrett went on to greater things. He died in 1926, at the age of 69, as Field Marshal Sir Arthur Barrett GCB GCSI KCVO ADC.
49 (Honorary) Major General Sir Percy Zachariah Cox GCMG GCIE KCSI (1864–1937).
50 Vilayet is an administrative region and, in this case, it included an area that encompassed Amara and Nasariyeh.
51 Major G.G.M. Wheeler VC, 7th Hariana Lancers (1873–1915). He is buried in the Commonwealth War Cemetery in Basra.
52 Field Marshal Lord Carver, El Alamein, Batsford, London, 1962.
53 MC Report, p.70.
54 Later, Major General Sir Charles Mellis VC KCB KCMG (1862-1936).
55 MC Report, p.109.
56 Corrigan, G., Mud, Blood and Poppycock, p.116.
Chapter 5
Chitrál Charlie, his Regatta and the Capture of Amara
‘Leadership is that mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion, which makes men do what you want them to do.’
(FM Viscount Slim, Courage and Other Broadcasts, 1957)
Townshend was an interesting character. He was known as ‘Chitrál Charlie’ as a result of his command of the besieged fort of Chitrál, on the North-West Frontier, in 1895. In that siege he was a captain and he did no more than his duty but, nevertheless, he was appointed a Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) after the siege was lifted. This was a decoration vastly out of proportion to his rank and, at that time, more normally awarded to general officers (colonel and above). The award had a strong political tinge but it made Townshend something of a celebrity, and for a man who was already an egotist it was very heady wine.
Townshend was a student of the business of arms and he studied his profession avidly. He was an admirer of Napoleon and believed that he shared some of the Emperor’s martial characteristics.
Townshend was a gregarious, positive personality. He sang and accompanied himself on the banjo and found most of his friends in the theatre. He was married to a wealthy French woman and spent as much time in Paris as he did in London. He was intelligent, well read, entertaining, quick witted, fluent, capable and inventive. He was also insensitive, utterly selfish, overwhelmingly ambitious and impossibly immodest. One of his other unattractive characteristics was his constant criticism of his superiors. However, his lack of moral courage usually prevented him from challenging them directly.
He was fully aware of his position in the ‘Army List’.57 This is a document few officers will admit to perusing but, at some time, all do. C.V.F. Townshend was at the top end of the Army, which in 1914 was officered by:
11 field marshals (+ 3 Royal)
18 generals (+3 Royal)
28 lieutenant generals
114 major generals
15. Major General C.V.F. Townshend CB DSO (later Sir Charles KCB DSO).
Seniority is really only of academic interest as it was not one of the criteria for promotion. Nevertheless, if Townshend had counted (he probably did) he would have found that he was 66th on the major generals’ list. He realised that, with the normal casualties from ‘death, disablement or dishonour’ among those above him, in the now rapidly expanding army, elevation to lieutenant general and the knighthood that went with it were both firmly on the cards.
Townshend also entertained ambition to succeed to a peerage and become the 7th Lord Townshend. It was a reasonable ambition given that the 6th Marquess was older and unmarried. Charles Townshend was heir apparent. Active service in the bleak wastes of Mesopotamia in command of a division was just what the doctor ordered and Townshend was overjoyed.
His chain of command was through Nixon to Duff and ultimately to Hardinge. It was an unfortunate combination. Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon GCMG KCB, who had been selected to command Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’, was fifty-seven and had had an exemplary career to date. He had been part of the force that had relieved Chitrál in 1895 and so Townshend was well known to him. He had seen active service in India, Afghanistan and South Africa. He seemed to be just the man for the job. At least his superior, General Sir Beauchamp Duff GCB GCSI KCVO CIE, thought so.
16. Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon KCB.
Duff was in a vastly influential post as Chief of the Indian General Staff in Delhi, and he advised the Viceroy on matters military. He had command over and responsibility for hundreds of thousands of lives. Duff was a seasoned soldier and, like most Victorian soldiers, he had a wealth of active service behind him. All of his campaigning had been against irregular or tribal opposition. In 1914 he was exposed to a conflict for which he had direct command responsibility but for which he was ill-equipped. He chose to exercise that responsibility at long range, as noted by the Mesopotamia Commission. To be fair, he had appointed what he believed to be the best senior officers at his disposal and it would have been incorrect for him to breathe down their necks. He could not be too ‘hands on’ but, Napoleon remarked, ‘a general who sees with the eyes of others will never be able to command an army as it should be.’ These wise words, from 1817,58 were extraordinarily prescient when applied to Duff.
The recent victories at Barjisiya and Shaiba had allowed the British to consolidate their position, but the thin cloak of success concealed a serious deficiency. The MC commented:
Although the force was doubled the medical equipment sent to the last two brigades was not up to the authorised scale of equipment, and practically two divisions had medical equipment for only one and that on the Indian and not the British scale.
Neither was there made such an addition to the river steamer transport as to bring its proportions up to the requirement of the increased forces. These deficiencies do not seem to have had sufficient recognition by the Government of India.59
The oil supply was secure and the original aim of IEF‘D’, set by His Majesty’s Government, had been achieved. At this point the initiative for future operations slipped from the distant hands of Lord Crewe in London and was seized by General Nixon, with the tacit approval of the Indian Government in the persons of Hardinge and Duff.
On 19 April 1915, Nixon asked the IG to furnish him with a further cavalry brigade and a battalion of pioneers but the Viceroy, certainly advised by Duff, rejected the request outright.
It was in April 1915 that Surgeon General (Major General) H.G. Hathaway CB was appointed Principal Medical Officer in Mesopotamia. In this post he answered to Surgeon General Sir William Babtie VC KCMG CB MB KHS, the Director of Medical Services, India, on medical matters but was under the regimental command of Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon. Hathaway was to be a key player in the campaign, with awesome responsibility for the sick and wounded. He was a well-meaning man but, as events showed, he was over promoted and out of his depth. Babtie had wider responsibilities for both the Dardanelles and Mesopotamian theatres and he, too, was later found wanting.
17. Major General William Babtie VC (later Lieutenant General Sir William VC KCB KCMG). He had overall responsibility for medical matters in Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles.
Meanwhile, at Townshend’s initial briefing at Corps headquarters in Basra on 23 April, he was told that his orders were not only to drive the enemy from his present position between Pear Drop Bend (see map on page 44) and Kurnah and capture his guns but also to push upriver to attack and occupy Amara (87–90 river miles further north) – the operation to be continuous.60 The country was under floods and in those conditions movement in any direction was going to be challenging.
On the following day, 24 April, the Secretary of State concurred with the decision made by Hardinge on the matter of the cavalry brigade and added three critical paragraphs to his message, which read:
Any advance beyond the present theatre of operations will not be sanctioned by the Government at the moment and I presume Nixon clearly understands this. During the summer we must confine ourselves to the defence of oil interests in Arabistan and of the Basra Vilayet.
If an advance to Amara, with a view to establishing an outpost for the purpose of controlling tribesmen between there and Karun, thus adding to the security of the pipe-line, is possible after smashing the enemy in the direction of Karun I should, if such a proposal received your support, be prepared to sanction it. Any proposal involving possible demands for reinforcement or undue extension is to be deprecated, however.
Our present position is strategically a sound one and we cannot at present afford to take risks by extending it unduly. In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.61
On the face of it, that statement of HMG policy appears crystal clear, but it was promulgated in ignorance of the orders Nixon had already been given from India and perhaps in ignorance of the physical extent of the Basra Vilayet. Nixon had already been authorised, in principle, to advance to a position just short of Kut on the Tigris, and to that end, Townshend was actively planning his attack on Amara.
H
itherto, advances north up the Shatt al-Arab had been to consolidate the hold on Abadan but by April 1915 the seizure of Baghdad had become the stated aim of the IG and for that to be achieved the shape and size of the river transport fleet had to be determined and assembled.
By April 1915, the Royal Navy had assembled an extraordinary collection of shallow draft vessels, many of which were ‘taken from Trade’. The only feature that the ships had in common was their shallow draught. Civilian ships were adapted for Service use and in many cases they were still commanded by their civilian masters.
The role of this flotilla was ill-defined, initially, and its role developed until eventually it was required to provide gunfire, logistical support and casualty evacuation. The Royal Navy river craft were a combination of floating packhorses, artillery batteries and ambulances. The senior naval officer was Captain Wilfred Nunn.62 The need for shipping of specific proportions and the delays in their provision was a constant refrain in the later MC Report but, in the meantime, Nunn had to make do with what he had.
On 27 May 1915, Lord Crewe left the India Office. Prime Minister Asquith replaced him with Austen Chamberlain,63 who at once endorsed his predecessor’s policy. Hardinge was relieved at the appointment; as confided to a correspondent, he feared, ‘some creature like Winston’64 might become his new chief.
That same day, Nixon advised the IG that the paddle steamers and tugs sent to him had a draught that precluded them working the river above Kurnah. He said, specifically, that 3 feet 6 inches was the maximum practical draught. As it was, shipping that conformed to the shallow draught criteria had to be carefully tasked in order to use it to best advantage.