by N S Nash
Both of the two great rivers had burst their banks, as they did routinely every year. The melt water flowed down from the mountains to the north and the flood covered an area of more than 10,000 square miles. Townshend was faced with the task of taking enemy positions at the far side of a vast lake of uncertain depth. It would involve a painfully slow advance with absolutely no cover from sight or from fire. It was an extraordinary situation that called for an extraordinary solution, and an extraordinary man to put that solution into effect.
Townshend was that man.
His first objectives were 2 miles away and the only way to close with the enemy would be by boat. These could only be the local, unpowered bellums, some of which were 30–40 feet long.
There followed one of the most extraordinary feats of arms in the annals of the British Army. Townshend was separated from enemy positions, which occupied ‘dry’ ground as opposed to the tactically more desirable ‘high’ ground by this vast flooded plain. The water could be 3 feet deep in some places but where there was a fold in the ground it might be 15 feet deep. In these conditions any soldier on foot or who was wounded would almost certainly drown.
It is alleged that soldiers said that Mesopotamia had too much water and the Navy said it had too little. Townshend and his troops would have endorsed that in late May 1915. Despite the extensive flooding, the ships were, of course, confined to the deeper water only to be found in the rivers. The difficulty for them was deciding the line of the navigable stream because the river, most inconveniently, did not have raised banks.
18. HMS Espiègle. An elegant vessel that played a major role in the river campaign. (Nunn)
Townshend asked that Captain Wilfred Nunn RN, the senior naval officer (SNO), and his ships be placed under command of 6th Division, and when Nixon concurred, Townshend moved to HMS Espiègle, which became his mobile advance headquarters.
Captain Nunn later commented that, on meeting Townshend for the first time, he ‘found the General, very talkative – indeed loquacious – and he constantly referred to Napoleon’s campaigns, maxims and doings … the one thing about Townshend that I did not care for was his rather pompous and boastful style of conversation.’65 Chitrál Charlie was not everyone’s cup of tea for just those reasons.
Townshend trained his troops in the propulsion of the bellums and he assembled 328 of these craft. Townshend’s ‘fleet’ was sufficient to carry one full brigade of 2,560 men. Ninety-six of the bellums were fitted with rudimentary armour as protection from small-arms fire. Seventy-five bellums were allocated to carry the impedimenta of war for this extraordinary operation.
Townshend did not have anything like his entire division for the task as he swiftly discovered that General Nixon had ruthlessly hived off many of 6th Division’s soldiers to staff his headquarters and his messes. Valuable bayonets were being employed as batmen, waiters, clerks, signalmen and a host of other line of communication jobs. In addition, Nixon had withdrawn 18th Brigade and deployed it in defensive positions around Basra. Townshend asked for his soldiers back and got a very dusty answer from Nixon. In effect he had only the weakened 16th and 17th Brigades to carry out the operation. Neither of the brigade commanders relished the prospect of what lay ahead.66
19. The flooded battlefield and the site of Townshend’s Regatta, 30–31 May 1915, showing the strategic importance of Kurnah. (World War I at Sea)
The bellums were to carry ten fully armed men, some with machine guns and others with the guns of a mountain battery. One man was to punt the craft and another was deputed as assistant punter, to be employed on the demise of the first. Each bellum carried picks, shovels, ammunition, paddles and caulking material to plug the anticipated bullet holes.
The soldiers had no illusions about the dangers of punting slowly, in reality very slowly, for 2 miles into entrenched enemy positions. This operation, which became known as ‘Townshend’s Regatta’, started on 30 May 1915. Heavy and expensive defeat was on the cards. Even Townshend, who had an overprovision of self-confidence, confided to his batman, Whitmore, that he ‘felt anxious’. As well he might, because the whole operation flew in the face of reason.
The bellums with their well-rehearsed crews poled through the reeds, and it was discovered that the armour hung over the side snagged on any vegetation waving in the muddy water. It was a brutally hot day, about 110°F, and clouds of flies tortured the men during their journey.
Townshend, now ensconced in his waterborne headquarters, climbed to the crow’s nest on the foremast of Espiègle and, from there, he was able to survey the whole battlefield. The Turkish positions showed up as low-lying islands but nevertheless readily discernible targets for the artillery. These targets were named as One Tree Hill, Shrapnel Hill, One Tower Hill, Gun Hill and Norfolk Hill.
Nunn directed matters naval from Espiègle and had under command the three sloops, HMS Clio, Odin and Lawrence. In addition were HMS Miner, Shaitan and Sumana, all three of which were ‘armed launches’. They all had a part to play and took their place to the rear of the convoy. Nunn also mentions the presence of HMS Comet, Shushan and Muzaffari.67 It was at the rear of the convoy that the logistic support bellums took station. There was also a collection of barges upon which were installed the mountain guns, machine guns and field ambulances.
This motley force kept pace with the infantry-carrying bellums as the artillery engaged the islands. The point might be made at this stage that although various craft could and would be described as ‘His Majesty’s Ship’, all were small, unarmoured, of shallow draft and, in reality, ‘His Majesty’s Boat’ would be a more accurate nomenclature.
Enemy opposition was ineffective. 22nd Punjabis grounded their bellums on One Tree Island and took the position at the point of their bayonets. The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (Ox and Bucks) stormed Norfolk Hill, and Captain Brooke, who led, was the first man to die on the position. It is trite to say that there were only ‘light casualties’. To the family of Captain Brooke, his was a very heavy loss.
20. The recently promoted Captain Wilfred Nunn DSO RN (later Vice Admiral CB CSI CMG DSO). He commanded a collection of vessels and is, perhaps, unique in fighting naval battles in the middle of a desert. (Nunn)
The ‘Regatta’, thus far, was a crashing success. All the first objectives were taken and Townshend ordered his brigade to bivouac on their captured objectives. The Brigade spent the night among the putrefying enemy corpses. The flies were attracted to the dead but took time out to torment the living.
The following day, 17th Brigade (now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S.H. Climo) ‘continued the movement’ and Gun Hill fell to 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry. An aeroplane, the first to be seen in the theatre, overflew Bahran (not on the map) and Maziblah and reported that the enemy had fled from both places. A bag of 300 prisoners had to be evacuated back to Kurnah and dry land.
Townshend’s stock was sky high. He had achieved his aim in the most exemplary manner. Nixon, who had played no part in the operation and whose headquarters functioned ‘as little more than a post office’,68 embarked in a motorboat and came to share in the success of Townshend and Nunn, his naval subordinate.
Nunn’s book chronicling these events makes no criticism of anyone, but having been a participant in a conference with Nixon and Townshend, he wrote later:
I must confess that the arrangements of the Military High Command in this and other parts of the campaign were – and still are – a puzzle to me. I suppose that having confided this operation to Townshend’s division, it would be – or [he] thought that he would be – committing some military discourtesy if he (Nixon) took over and ran the show himself. The force engaged however was very much more than General Townshend’s division and further was engaged in an expedition which if successful – as was most likely – would develop into an advance of many miles and would result in the capture of important towns and the acquisition of a great area of Turkish territory. Surely, therefore, it would have been better if he h
ad taken over the direct control of the whole affair.69
Although Nixon had no intention of taking command, nevertheless he was bullish and insistent on the advisability of taking advantage of the success already gained. He was anxious that pursuit of the enemy should start immediately. Smoke from their retreating ships could be seen fading away to the north. Nunn recorded that, ‘It was General Nixon’s energy in urging this course, which decided Townshend after a little hesitation.’ Amara, the next significant town on the river, lay 90 miles ahead. The MC took evidence as to the state of the river and noted (at page 9) in its Report:
Beyond Kurnah the river Tigris narrows rapidly and between Ezra’s Tomb and Kelat Sala, a stretch of 28 miles, the navigation of the river is very difficult. It twists and turns with sharp bends and hairpin corners leaving at certain places little or no room for vessels towing a barge on either side to pass each other. The stream is strong, about 4 knots an hour, and it is difficult for steamers without independent paddles to avoid striking the banks when going round corners downstream. Vessels under such conditions occasionally turn completely round and it is a common experience to see lighters breaking adrift under the strain.
Nunn went on ahead to reconnoitre the blockage in the river at Ruta and found that a large iron lighter had been sunk across the river and mines had been laid to complete the barrier. Sumana cleared the mines and, having done so, found that there was room for a passage. Shaitan and Sumana led the pursuit; Espiègle with Clio and Odin followed in their wake. Espiègle was able to bring her bow guns to bear and engage the two Turkish ships Mosel and Marmarice, which were fleeing north to Amara, but several hits were not enough to stop either ship.
The river had narrowed from a width of 270 yards to about 70 and navigation, always difficult, was now very difficult. Espiègle could not go much further and already she was the largest ship to penetrate so far up the river. Darkness fell, with Townshend’s force about 20 miles north of their last action. By now it was close to Ezra’s Tomb, where three large lighters full of munitions were captured and 300 Turks surrendered without a fight.
21. Marmarice after the pursuit. Photographed on 2 June 1915. (Nunn)
Townshend left his General Staff Officer (Grade 1),70 Colonel Gamble, in command here and, in moonlight, pressed on in Espiègle, which grounded several times and on the sharp bends ran into the riverbank. Despite the navigational difficulties, at 0420 hrs Espiègle’s gunfire hit Marmarice, some way further north, and set her on fire. She lost way, stopped and in due course the British force caught up with her.
River conditions were such that it was clear that HMS Espiègle could go no further and Townshend transferred to HMS Comet, a small paddle-wheel armed steamer. Leaving his force to deal with Marmarice and her survivors, he then continued his journey with Shaitan, Samana and Lewis Pelly in company with a handful of soldiers. The party was estimated as being forty-eight strong. That the official arithmetic differed is only of academic interest because the events that followed were either a demonstration of inspired generalship of the very highest order or grotesque and unnecessary folly.
The small flotilla sailed on, and along both banks Arab villages flew white flags and the occupants came out to line the river. It was midday when, at Qalat Salih, a nondescript settlement halfway to Amara, there was a brief flurry of activity. A small mixed force of Turkish cavalry and infantry came into sight. Several well-directed rounds from Comet’s 12-pounder discouraged any hostile action on the Turks’ part and the group headed for the distant shimmering horizon.
At this point a local sheikh came aboard Comet and submitted to Townshend. It was an unasked for gesture but indicative of the impact Townshend’s excursion was having, not only on the Turks but also on the indigenous population.
Townshend played his trump card when he blustered to the sheikh that he had ‘15,000 men coming up behind me’. He directed the sheikh to start assembling food for the mythical, oncoming host and generously offered to pay for whatever was provided. Townshend did not hold out much hope of getting the food but he calculated, correctly, that news of the 15,000 men would be widely broadcast.
In warfare, over the ages, deception, bluff and misinformation in their many guises have been used. There never was a better example than this masterly performance by Charles Townshend.
Military wisdom of the previous 2,000 years or so favoured Charlie’s unsupported foray to Amara. Sun Tzu,71 who wrote the Art of War II in about 500 BC, opined that, ‘if the enemy leaves a door open you must rush in.’ The Emperor Maurice, writing in AD 600, agreed, and said that, ‘In war, opportunity is fleeting and cannot be put off at all.’72
The consensus is that Townshend was right to press on. He and his small, lightly armed party duly reached Amara without mishap. The MC certainly favoured ‘inspired generalship’ and commented briefly:
On 3 June Amara was reached and General Townshend with twenty-two sailors and soldiers achieved the surrender of a garrison of 700 Turks. As a military operation this action was audaciously planned and well timed, and it deserves high praise as it achieved great objects with comparatively small loss of life.73
The phrase ‘audaciously planned’ is ill-chosen because the dash upriver was not planned at all. It was unsupported opportunism. The reality is that Townshend put himself and his party at great risk; nevertheless, his gamble came off in the most spectacular manner. The last word rests with Clausewitz, who wrote, ‘Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity.’74
For his part, Townshend was aggrieved at the degree of acclaim he received. He wrote, five years later, ‘It has always struck me that no one, except the officers and men of 17th Brigade and the naval officers, seems to have recognised the difficulty of the operation and the possibility of disaster.’75 Clearly, Nixon was insufficiently laudatory, but then the Corps Commander was already looking ahead as he had different fish to fry. However – did he have the means?
Major General Gorringe, one of his senior subordinates, believed that the major factor that determined the outcome of the initial phase of the campaign from 1914 to mid-1916 was the stringent financial constraints imposed by the IG on the conduct of military operations in Mesopotamia.
He had no doubt that officials in Delhi, led by the powerful Finance Member, Sir William Meyer, consistently refused to sanction expenditure on the port facilities or other infrastructural works, such as a proposed railway from Basra to Nasariyeh to take the strain off the river, unless and until it was decided to make the occupation of Mesopotamia permanent. Later, Gorringe gave evidence to the MC and in the Report he is quoted as saying:
I have no doubt that great improvements could and should have been effected during the first twelve months and so on in proportion afterwards. There was reluctance to spend money on improvements, which would partake of a permanent character.76
That view is interesting because, as far as Hardinge, Duff and Nixon were concerned, the permanent annexation of Mesopotamia was the aim. This suggests that, although Meyer was at the centre of the IG, he was unaware of the political ambition of Hardinge.
The campaign was being conducted as cheaply as possible and in line with the limited budget available. On that basis, funding the building of railways was unlikely to win financial support. Meyer has been cast as the dead hand of inertia on the tiller of military success, but he did not set the Government of India budget – he administered it. Gorringe was damning when he said, in evidence, that there was:
No improvement in the unloading wharves for ships was made until December 1915, when the reinforcements for two divisions were coming out.77
Notwithstanding Nixon’s ambition and Townshend’s undoubted flair, IEF‘D’did not have, readily to hand, the means to fry those other ‘different fish’.
22. Major General G.F. Gorringe DSO, later, Lieutenant General Sir George KCB KCMG DSO.
Chapter notes
57 The Army List 1914, HM Stationery Office.
58 Napoleon, 9 December 1817, B.E. O’Meara, Napoleon in Exile, 1822.
59 MC Report, p.15.
60 Townshend, Sir C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.41.
61 MC Report, p.17.
62 Later, Vice Admiral Wilfred Nunn CB CSI CMG DSO, author of Tigris Gunboats.
63 Sir Joseph Austen Chamberlain KG (1863–1937). He was Secretary of State for India 1915–17 and, as such, a key player in the military debacle in Mesopotamia.
64 Hardinge papers, 26 May 1915, 93/No. 10.
65 Nunn, W., Tigris Gunboats, p.98.
66 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.62.
67 Nunn, W., Tigris Gunboats, p.105.
68 Ibid, p.174.
69 Ibid, pp.107–108.
70 General Staff Officer Grade 1. In this case, his senior staff officer.
71 Sun Tzu (544–496 BC) was a philosopher, soldier and military strategist. He is credited with the authorship of the influential book The Art of War.
72 Maurice (539–602) was a Byzantine emperor and prominent general of his time. George Dennis translated Maurice’s Strategikon in 1984.
73 MC Report, p.18.
74 Major General von Clausewitz, Principles of War, 1812.
75 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.72.
76 MC Report, p.55.
77 Ibid.
Chapter 6
The Capture of Kut
‘The most essential quality of a general is firmness of character and the resolution to conquer at any price.’
(Napoleon, Gourgaud, Journal inédit de 1815 à 1818, Vol. 11, 1816)
It will assist the reader at this stage to provide a simplistic summary of the geography of that part of Mesopotamia covered by this book. First, one should place the right hand flat on a table, palm downwards, all fingers extended. On this basis, ‘the wrist is the Persian Gulf; the vein running up the back of the hand is the Shatt al-Arab – running past Abadan to Basra; the little finger is the Karun River – at its tip Ahwaz and oil; the thumb is the Euphrates – at its tip is Nasariyeh. The junction of the thumb and first finger is Kurnah; the first finger is the Tigris – at its first joint Amara and at its tip Kut–al-Amara. Running sluggishly down from the tip of that first finger, is the shallow Shatt-al-Hai.’78