by N S Nash
100 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.82.
101 Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, Thoughts on War, Faber, London, 1944.
102 Moberly, F.J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918, Vol. 1, pp.323–4.
103 Kipling, R. (1865–1936), The Feet of the Young Men.
104 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.85.
105 MC Report, p.65.
106 Townshend recorded that seventeen enemy guns were captured (p.120). However, Barker said, ‘fourteen, including one of 1802 vintage’ (p.88). The Official History settled for thirteen.
107 Nunn, W., Tigris Gunboats, p.163.
Chapter 7
What Next?
‘Principles of strategy should never transcend common sense.’
(Motto of the German Army Staff College prior to 1914)
Townshend had started his campaigning in April 1915 with three battalions of British soldiers. These were the 1st Battalion, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry; the 2nd Battalion, the Dorsetshire Regiment; and the 2nd Battalion, the Norfolk Regiment. The three British battalions, one in each brigade, were the rocks upon which Townshend’s victories, thus far, were built.
In every engagement since April, these battalions had suffered attrition in their ranks and they were now significantly weaker. For example, on 9 October 1915, the Dorsets numbered only 297,108 or about 50 per cent of their strength. Nixon had exacerbated matters by appropriating the services of many of these valuable infantry assets to staff his administrative tail, and that was a constant irritation to the GOC 6th Division, who recorded in his memoirs that he made ‘repeated efforts to induce Headquarters at Basra to send back to my battalions the scores of British soldiers of the Norfolks, Dorsets and Oxfords who were employed in every imaginable kind of billet in Basra – as police, extra clerks, batmen for officers (including staff officers of the Indian Army, who were not entitled to British soldiers as servants), improvised chauffeurs for a regular fleet of motor launches, marines on gun boats, extra hands to strengthen reservist crews of blue jackets – all taken from the bayonets of my division!’109
Despite his entreaties to Nixon and his staff, those well-trained, regular infantrymen continued to be misemployed and Townshend’s anger can be readily understood. However, a Norfolk man himself, Townshend asked the Norfolks to furnish him with another batman when Private Whitmore, his long-serving soldier servant, collapsed. Private John Boggis, who had volunteered for the job, drew the short straw. Boggis was a valuable source for Russell Braddon and, when interviewed, gave an interesting view of his commander’s behaviour.
Townshend reflected on his victory at Kut and, when he wrote his memoir in 1920, he said:
The Battle of Kut-al-Amara can be said to have been one of the most important in the history of the British Army in India. There had been nothing of its magnitude either in the Afghan war or the Indian mutiny. For it was fought against troops equally well armed and of equal numbers to ourselves. In addition we ejected them from a very strong and up-to-date position, commanding ground as flat as a billiard table with nothing to check their fire-sweep.110
Townshend’s judgement may well be correct, but what he did not know was that this was the high water mark of his career and from this point it was downhill all the way, ultimately to failure and disgrace.
His wounded and their treatment were not mentioned. The battle had been concluded on 29 September but the journey back to Basra took over a week, and for the unfortunates packed into ill-equipped ships and barges that journey was a misery and a worrying prelude to things to come. The Indian Medical Service, under the leadership of Babtie and Hathaway, was failing. At Kut the medical personnel allocated to 6th Division were barely sufficient. Any further forward movement up the river with a commensurate level of casualties was almost certain to convert the existing deficiencies in medical personnel and materiel into total breakdown of the whole system. That is, ‘unless continuous good luck should attend the new offensive movement.’111 The availability of ‘good luck’ is not the basis upon which war should ever be waged but Nixon was to set a precedent by depending upon it.
31. Wounded Indian soldiers.
The Mesopotamia Commission Report was not expected to comment on undeniable success. It merely summarised the capture of Kut in one paragraph:
On September 14 the Headquarters of Sixth Division reached Sheikh Saad, and on 15th, Abu Rummanah, which had been very strongly fortified by the Turks was captured by us. On 29th, after severe fighting, the Turks were in full flight and our cavalry had entered Kut-al-Amara. During the fight we captured more than 1,700 prisoners and thirteen guns, and inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel. This part of the campaign was brilliantly executed by General Townshend and the Sixth Division of the Indian Army and the whole series of military operations during the past three months had been so extraordinarily successful that it is not surprising that a spirit of optimism and over-confidence as to what could be achieved overcame General Nixon and his Headquarters Staff.
Mention has been made of the Marsh Arabs and their malign and cruel presence on the fringes of all of the engagements of this campaign. Proximity to loot was their incentive and, along the way, they added to the fatalities of both sides. Colonel A.J. Barker wrote of them in 1967 and his judgement was that, ‘In theory, they made their living as herdsmen of water buffaloes or fishermen, or as odd job men, but their environment and natural traits produced a highly developed predilection for any form of thieving and dirty work – so much so, that even to people who regarded robbery with violence as a gentlemanly pastime, the Marsh Arabs had the reputation of being degraded villains.’112
Wounded soldiers, on both sides, fell victim to these people who were merciless and rapacious. On 1 October 1915, an ill-informed King George V telegraphed General Nixon and said, ‘I warmly congratulate you and my troops under your command upon the marked success which they have achieved under difficult and trying conditions. I trust the sick and wounded are doing well.’
King George, ‘the Sailor King’, set an example that few of his generals could match, because his concern for the rank and file and the lower deck was genuine. Nixon replied with weasel words that did him no credit. He telegraphed back to his Sovereign, ‘Sick and wounded well and it is hoped many will be back in the ranks shortly.’ Hardinge telegraphed similar sentiments and he too received the same bland and misleading assurances from Nixon, who had now added ‘economy with the truth’ to his portfolio of misjudgements. His conduct was dishonourable.
On 3 October 1915, Townshend, who never wavered in his opinion, sent a telegram to Nixon’s Chief of Staff, Major General Kemball. The MC Report described that communication as ‘important’ (p.27). Given the content of the telegram and the subsequent course of events, it was shrewdly worded and timed. Townshend wrote:
By the aviator’s report attached you will see that the chance of breaking up the retreating Turkish forces, which by now have taken up a position at Salman [Suleiman] Pak [Ctesiphon], no longer exists. The position is astride the Baghdad road and the Tigris and is estimated to be 6 miles of entrenchments … my opinion, if I may be allowed to express it,113 is that up to the Battle of Kut our object has been to occupy the strategical position of Kut and to consolidate ourselves in the Vilayet of Basra. Ctesiphon is now held by the defeated Turkish forces.
Should it be considered politically advisable by the Government to occupy Baghdad? At present, on account of the doubtful situation at the Dardanelles and the possibility of our small force being driven out of Baghdad by strong forces from Anatolia which would compel us to retire down a long line of communications teeming with Arabs, at present more or less hostile, whose hostility would become active on hearing of our retreat, then I consider that on military grounds we should consolidate our position at Kut. The sudden fall of water, which made the advance of our ships most difficult and tiresome, upset our plans of entering Baghdad on the heels of the Turks while they were retreating in disord
er.
If on the other hand it is the desire of the Government to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run [author’s italics], it is in my opinion, absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut should be carried out methodically by two divisions or one Army Corps or by one division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive [author’s italics] of the garrisons of the important places of Nasariyeh, Ahwaz and Amara.
This was a perfectly reasonable, professional opinion and he was entirely correct in airing it. However, ‘there’s none so blind as them’s can’t see’, and Kemball replied the same day. He said that Townshend had not taken into account Sir John Nixon’s ‘appreciation of the situation’114 in which the Army Commander calculated that Townshend faced a Turkish force of only 4,000 bayonets, 500 sabres and twenty guns, and that this force was inferior in strength and morale to that defeated at Kut. He believed it was Nixon’s intention ‘to open the way to Baghdad as he understands that another division will be sent here from France and he would like your plan for effecting this object.’
Townshend’s telegram found its way into the public domain. The author, who was already a darling of British citizenry as a result of his sequence of victories, found himself the subject of discussion in both Houses of Parliament. Later events would endorse Townshend’s stated caution and his averred need for a second division that, of course, he expected to come under his command.
32. Major General George Vere Kemball DSO (later Sir George KCMG CB DSO). Kemball went on from being Nixon’s Chief-of-Staff to command of 28th Brigade.
Nixon denied any knowledge of the telegram. In his evidence to the MC he stated that, ‘If he says he sent it in, I suppose that he did. … Personally I have no recollection of that appreciation and I’m not sure that it arrived. I never saw it.’ Kemball said he was sure Nixon must have seen it. Hardinge and Duff were unaware of Townshend’s advice. Later, Duff wrote and said that he had not seen the telegram and if he had he would have ignored it. Duff added that such a communication would carry no weight at all. ‘I never take the opinion of a junior officer in a case of that sort who had no more responsibility than a lance corporal. I would as soon go to the officer commanding a battalion.’115
Townshend, who kept a diary, noted accurately on receiving Kemball’s reply that, ‘There is nothing definite known about this, and no earthly chance of it [the additional division] being in this country in time.’ He could recognise ‘pie in the sky’ when he saw it but it is an indication of the level of his moral courage that, despite his plainly stated professional objections to a further advance and the absurd response to his objections, he nevertheless wired straight back to Kemball, saying, ‘You did not mention the arrival of a division from France in this country and that makes all the difference to my appreciation.’ It was a very weak volte-face.
The MC Report observed wryly, on page 27, that, ‘These two statements are not easy to reconcile but General Townshend, like many other born fighters, was somewhat mercurial and changeable in his views.’
That was an overly generous summation. Townshend did not challenge his orders when eventually they were given. He justified this by saying that, as a soldier, he was obligated to follow orders no matter how much he disagreed with them.
Townshend was quite right; an army, any army, will degenerate into a leaderless rabble unless there is strict discipline, at all levels, and a strict adherence to orders legally given. Napier116 hit the spot when he said, many years before, that, ‘Soldiers must obey in all things. They may and do laugh at foolish orders, but they nevertheless obey, not because they are blindly obedient, but because they know that to disobey is to break the backbone of their profession.’
That is the received wisdom. In this case Townshend stood on the threshold of history and one could speculate that if he had declined to advance further, unless supported, he may well have been sacked; but his sacking and the reason for it would have brought him public acclamation. It would have drawn notice to the nonsense about to be perpetrated by Nixon, and the likelihood is that Nixon too would have been sacked. Thousands of soldiers would not have been killed and the world would be a different place.117 On the other hand, Townshend would not have won the promotion he craved and his career would probably have been over – he would not take that chance, and who can blame him?
Compliance with ‘orders’ is a two-edged sword and can be ill-used. It was to be the refuge of criminals in the wars to come. In this campaign and in this case, it was a sorry excuse for disaster.
A complication in all of this was that Townshend had a track record in crying ‘wolf’. He had emphasised at Kurnah, Amara and Kut how difficult it would be to achieve his aim and this of course added to the lustre of his victories, particularly when he had succeeded so effortlessly. It would be understandable if Nixon thought that his subordinate was, once more, ‘overegging the pudding’.
Townshend may have been a self-obsessed personality but he was probably better educated in military strategy than most of his contemporaries and he was aware that lessons learned by one generation have to be relearned by generations that follow. Military history is cyclic and on that basis he reflected, in 1920, on the lines of communication situation he faced at Kut and compared it to that facing Napoleon in 1812 when he advanced on Moscow. He wrote, ‘Moscow was 570 miles from the Nieman River. 213,000 men actually marched with the Emperor; the remainder of the 600,000 men garrisoned Germany and guarded the line of communication to France.’118 He made the valid point that the proportion of Napoleon’s force assigned to the defence of the lines of communication was vastly different to the parlous allocation made by Lieutenant General Sir John Nixon along the Tigris more than 100 years later.
Napoleon lost anyway!
Sir Percy Cox, the Indian civil servant sent to the theatre of operations with Nixon, was an important opinion former. He had no executive power but he had the ear of those who had that power. The Arabs named him ‘Supposi Kokus’. Not all of Cox’s advice was well judged and mention was made earlier of his ill-considered suggestion that the British occupation of Basra would be a permanent feature of the post-war world. Unabashed by that, he was a firm supporter of Nixon, his boss, and they shared an ambition to attack Baghdad – practicalities ignored.
In early October 1915, Kut was secured, the Shatt-al-Hai was sealed at both ends and the 6th Indian Division was receiving battle casualty replacements. There was considerable telegraph traffic between India and London to which Townshend was not privy. On 4 October, the Cabinet met and decided:
The position was reported yesterday to the Cabinet, and they have decided to appoint a committee of the Foreign Office, General Staff, Admiralty and India Office, to consider in all its possibilities and policy for an advance on Baghdad.
If forces are available to take and hold the place, political reasons were thought to make occupation desirable … it is thought that we might be able to capture Baghdad but that forces weakened by further losses would be insufficient to hold it against counter-attacks and maintain communications. Kitchener can hold out no hope of reinforcements from Europe and Egypt.119
33. Enva Pasha with unknown German officer.
Common sense was alive and well and living in London. Townshend’s views were supported and Kitchener’s categoric advice that troops could not be found in other theatres seemed to put the lid on the matter. On 6 October, the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, saying, ‘Orders to stop further advance were telegraphed yesterday to General Nixon.’120
Nixon, however, would not be thwarted and the following day he advised the Secretary of State that, ‘navigation difficulties had been overcome’ and, ‘the enemy is shaken, short of ammunition and has lost 13 guns.’ His final remark was, ‘Should we let such an opportunity slip by us, I can see no arguments by which we could justify ourselves.’
The phrase that is underlined above was subject to very detailed scrutiny and the MC claimed that ‘misundersta
nding arose from the first sentence of the telegram’. Nixon later said that he was referring to the passage of ships to Kut through the now shallow water. He did not mean that he had resolved the broader transport issue. He was misunderstood and that misunderstanding had serious implications.
The air component at Azizieh at the beginning of October consisted of three aeroplanes under the command of Major H.L. Reilly, and the first reconnaissance flight over Baghdad took place on 6 October.
By 5 November, reinforcements of the Royal Flying Corps, with four B.E.2.C aeroplanes, reached Basra and reorganised as No. 30 Squadron RFC. Reconnaissance flights over Baghdad continued until 13 November, when an aeroplane, sent to cut the telegraph lines north and west of Baghdad, was damaged in landing and was captured by the Turks. The pilot, Major Reilly, was taken prisoner and paraded through the streets of Baghdad.
General Nixon, with his headquarters, arrived that same day at Azizieh. When he was told of the loss of Reilly and his machine, he feared further attrition among his few aeroplanes and so gave orders that no more longdistance reconnaissance was to be undertaken.
Soldiers, the world over, believe that ‘time spent in reconnaissance is never wasted’ and the same applies to ‘effort spent’. To abandon reconnaissance was shortsighted, overly defensive and entirely illogical. Nixon’s first need was for an accurate estimate of enemy forces. From this he could make a balanced ‘appreciation of the situation’, and from this in turn would flow a cohesive plan.
Hardinge was encouraged by Nixon’s assurances on ‘navigation difficulties’ and was still sufficiently enthused by the golden prize that, on 9 October 1915, he sent a telegram to Chamberlain saying, ‘I still hope to be the Pasha of Baghdad before I leave India.’121 There can be no doubt whatsoever of the Viceroy’s position. For him it was Baghdad or bust – and let’s not worry about the details.