by N S Nash
At this early stage Townshend’s position enjoyed the support of Hardinge and Duff. The issue of river transport, in particular, exercised Duff. However, that topic was inconvenient and so Hardinge simply skated over the issue.
London signalled Nixon direct on 8 October and asked him most urgently to reply to the question, ‘to both occupy and hold Baghdad what addition to your present force are you confident will be necessary?’ Nixon responded immediately, saying, ‘No additions are necessary to my present force to beat Nureddin and occupy Baghdad; of this I am confident.’ He added that he would need an additional division and a cavalry regiment to hold the city.
Over the next fifteen days telegrams flowed to and fro, most of them marked ‘Private’ and thus not archived like all other routine correspondence. The MC did, however, obtain some and in its Report the escalation of the 6th Division’s task was laid bare.
In the meantime, events in the Dardanelles were flowing Turkey’s way. Its very stout defence of its territory was causing vast casualty lists and the tactically inept General Sir Ian Hamilton had no ideas, aims or ambition. Defeat was on the cards and if that were to take place, the Turks would then be able to move large bodies of battle-hardened troops to Mesopotamia.
On 21 October, the Secretary of State advised the Viceroy that Turkish forces confronting 6th Division consisted of:
only 9,000 troops and some irregulars to deal with for the next two months. The Turkish forces may be somewhat increased by the end of the year and they could conceivably reach a total of 60,000 by the end of January 1916 and an even larger figure during 1916. On this basis, it is thought to be unwise to occupy Baghdad … Arabs are wavering and will probably join the Turks unless we can offer them great inducements. … we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leaders that we favour creation of Arab states independent of Turks … unless you consider possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable and we are prepared to order it.
This was a curious message and the last sentence is at odds with the earlier argument. However, this was just the encouragement that Hardinge wanted and he replied blandly, assuring his reader that, ‘We believe General Nixon has a fair prospect of being able to hold his own against 60–70,000 Turks provided that he has occupied Baghdad as soon as he is ready.’122
Hardinge probably did not draft this assertion and General Sir Beauchamp Duff and his staff must have been involved. Nevertheless, Lord Hardinge signed it and so ownership of this arrant nonsense is his.
The statement is so utterly absurd as to be off the scale of stupidity.
Even more worrying is that it was not challenged. Any soldier, of any rank, of any generation, of any nationality would know that to ‘hold one’s own’ against odds of, say, 7:1 (or worse), with hopelessly inadequate medical cover, at the end of a very vulnerable 500-mile single line of communication, dependent entirely upon the vagaries of the Tigris and inadequate resupply transport, was quite impossible. Hardinge did acknowledge the possibility of a withdrawal but the human and materiel implications of a contested withdrawal were brushed aside.
General Barrow, the Military Secretary to the India Office, wrote a memorandum in which he expressed the opinion that to attempt to go to Baghdad with the forces currently available was to incur unjustifiable risk. He was the military adviser to the India Office. Then Barrow moved his position, having been assured of the availability of the two new divisions at some unspecified date in the future. Barrow was an experienced soldier, operating at the highest level, but at no point did he give any indication that he had considered time and geography.
The MC turned its attention to the committee that had been set up to consider the future policy of British Forces in Mesopotamia. Sir Thomas Holderness, the Permanent Under Secretary of State in the India Office,123 chaired this body. His colleagues were General Sir Edmund Barrow, Vice Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, from the Admiralty, Sir Louis Mallet and Mr Lancelot Oliphant, both Foreign Office officials, Colonel Talbot and a Captain Paddon, from the War Office. The latter was probably the secretary. The MC expressed disquiet over the composition of the committee and was singularly underwhelmed by its performance. Holderness admitted that the assurances received from Nixon were taken at face value. The kindest judgment on Holderness was that he was ingenuous. It is not necessary to labour the point but the MC Report said, acidly:
It was the promise of reinforcements that alone induced this Committee to advocate an advance on Baghdad but, as in the case of other authorities consulted, they apparently passed over the all important problem of how these reinforcements, after arrival at Basra, were to be conveyed as fighting units to the front, a distance of some 500 miles. We lay stress upon this serious omission … the despatch of troops from France or Egypt could not affect any fighting around Baghdad after its capture, unless they were conveyed as an organised force to the scene of the action. The arrival of troops in Basra, without transport or their proper medical complement with their headquarters staff scattered and disorganised, was not a reinforcement in the sense defined by the Viceroy in his private telegram of 9 October in which he expressed himself thus, ‘We may add that the reinforcing troops should reach Baghdad not later than a month after the capture of the city, and this is the period which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could concentrate in strength to attempt its re-capture.’124
34. General Sir George de Symons Barrow GCB KCMG.
Chamberlain looked to this committee for guidance and he was badly served, especially by General Barrow, the senior military figure who, by dint of his calling, would have had great influence on this strategic military issue. To Barrow must be accorded a significant degree of blame for the events that followed. In the face of all the rational and practical reasons not to advance on Baghdad, on 23 October 1915 the die was cast. The fate of thousands of men was decided when Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, sent the following telegram:
If Nixon is satisfied that the force available is sufficient for the operation he may march on Baghdad. Two divisions will be sent to him as soon as possible, but owing to relief and transport arrangements, reinforcements will take time to despatch. Probable date will be wired later.125
35. The line of advance of the 6th Division. (The War at Sea)
Had the two promised divisions suddenly arrived upriver in Kut, fully armed and equipped, with ample river transport, then Townshend could have taken Baghdad and probably Constantinople as well. However, this was another case of ‘jam tomorrow’ and the stark fact was that Townshend was not strong enough for the task he was to be set.
Chapter notes
108 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.121.
109 Ibid, p.144.
110 Ibid, p.121.
111 MC Report, p.19.
112 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.42.
113 It was Townshend’s unquestionable duty to express a view. His shallow servility was unnecessary and not to the credit of a general in command of a major formation.
114 An ‘appreciation of the situation’ is the time-honoured manner in which a commander weighs up all the factors affecting him and his command. From this examination of the factors he draws conclusions and from those he develops his plan. If his information is inaccurate, then the appreciation will be flawed and so will any plan based upon it.
115 Davis, P.K., Ends and Means, p.115.
116 General Sir William Napier KCB (1782–1860), soldier and historian.
117 Twenty-seven years later, in 1942, Lieutenant General A.R. Godwin-Austen resigned command of XIII Corps, while on active service in North Africa and in the face of the enemy, as he disagreed with his Army Commander (Ritchie). Curiously, he suffered no penalty. He was later General Sir Alfred Godwin-Austen KCSI CB OBE MC (1889–1963). He went on to be Quarter Master General of the Indian Army (see Nash, N.S., Strafer – Desert General, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2013, p.164).
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118 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.128.
119 MC Report, p.22.
120 Ibid.
121 Viceroy Telegram No. 1148 to Seccretary of State, 9 October 1915, Hardinge papers, 99/No. 655.
122 MC Report, p.24.
123 Sir Thomas William Holderness, 1st Baronet GCB KCSI (1849–1924), was the first former member of the Indian Civil Service to be appointed to the post of Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India. He was vastly skilled in Indian domestic affairs but had no military experience – and it showed.
124 MC Report, p.25.
125 Ibid, p.24.
Chapter 8
Advance to Ctesiphon
‘A good general not only sees the way to victory: he also knows when victory is not possible.’
(Polybius, Histories, 125 BC)
While all the political manoeuvres were being conducted by telegram and in various committees, for six weeks after the taking of Kut, the 6th Indian Division rested in a concentration at Azizieh, some 90 miles further upriver. Here it erected suitable defences and Townshend requisitioned from Basra the myriad items of stores he required. Incredibly, the Staff in Basra, with the concurrence of Nixon, refused to supply among many items, for example, wire cutters and Very lights. The Staff deemed them to be unnecessary.
36. Khalil Pasha, the aggressive leader of Turkish forces in Mesopotamia in the autumn of 1915.
The Division made do without the kit and applied itself to the absorption of its piecemeal reinforcements. The pre-war British battalions composed of regular soldiers had suffered serious loss and the corporate skill level of these battalions had been diluted by the absorption of less experienced replacements. The losses incurred by the Indian infantry had been no less severe but the quality of reinforcements caused Townshend concern. He recorded that, ‘I have never seen such a wretched class of recruits in the whole of my Indian experience and the battalion commanders did not mince their words on the matter.’ The quality was such that Townshend sent back to Basra an entire battalion’s worth of unsatisfactory trans-border soldiers from the north-west of India.126 This decision was on the basis of ‘numerous desertions to the enemy’.
On the night 23/24 October an incident occurred which led to the withdrawal from the 16th Infantry Brigade of the 20th Punjabis and to their replacement by the 66th Punjabis from the 12th Division at Amara. The Turks were making great efforts by propaganda to seduce Indian Mahomedan troops from their loyalty and at this particular period were making much capital out of the fact that the British were approaching the tomb of Suliman Pak, a servant of the Prophet, which was one of the Islamic Holy Places. The Turkish propaganda had, however, no great effect. Whatever their religious scruples may have been, the Indian Mahomedans as a whole proved thoroughly loyal, the few exceptions being generally Pathans of trans-frontier tribes; and they were not always swayed by purely religious factors. The 20th Punjabis had one and a half companies of transfrontier Pathans; and, on the night in question, one of their Afridi sentries shot the other sentry and the non-commissioned officer of his piquet — both Sikhs — and, pursued by the fire of the remainder of the piquet, deserted to the enemy with another Afridi.127
It was customary, in Indian regiments, to enlist different races and to mix these races in all guards, piquets, etc., in order to minimise the dangers arising from racial or religious scruples such as that described above. In practical terms each race policed the others.
Charlie was an officer of the Indian Army but, unlike the overwhelming majority of British officers of that army, he did not admire his Indian soldiers and whenever possible depended upon their British counterparts. It was a curious attitude but then Townshend was a curious man. To be fair it must be noted that Delamain had told Townshend at the conclusion of the battle for Kut that he did not think his ‘soldiers would storm trenches again if they were put to it’. This had the effect of endorsing Townshend’s negativity.
As the Division waited for its orders, the GOC, comfortable aboard ship, got down to his letter writing. He was an assiduous correspondent and shared his views with a wide circle of civilian and military associates. The civilians tended to be theatricals and the military were senior and career enhancers.
It was on 22 October that, for the second time, Nixon was warned in a direct telegram from London that 30,000 Turkish troops, under the command of Khalil Pasha, were on their way to the theatre. Further intelligence revealed that the German Field Marshal von der Goltz128 was also in transit and that he would assume command on his arrival. This German had a track record as a brutal and ruthless individual. He was going to be a formidable adversary.
37. Field Marshal von der Goltz.
Nixon, in a display of extraordinary insouciance, decided to ignore the intelligence reports and did not deviate from his crusade to Baghdad.
This was folly of the very highest order.
Nixon issued his orders on 26 October and Nunn observed that ‘they had an excellent effect on our men who though suffering a good deal from sickness and worn with the long summer campaign, were confident of beating the Turks and of capturing Bagdad.’129 The Mesopotamia Commission some months later, and with the advantage of hindsight, observed:
A spirit of intense optimism animated the headquarters and administrative staff. This is shown by their estimate of impending casualties, preparations being made for only 500 severely wounded. Two river steamers, the Mosel and the Julnar, were put on one side to be temporarily fitted up by Surgeon General Hathaway for the reception of wounded, the arrangements being that the more seriously wounded would be moved down to Kut in these vessels and the more lightly wounded located in Baghdad.
No apprehension of an effective repulse or our inability to reach Baghdad seems to have been entertained by those directing the advance.130
Townshend was 30 miles short of the Turkish defence line at Ctesiphon. A valuable asset peculiar to the British was its few last surviving aeroplanes, one flown by a courageous officer called Yeates Brown. Hitherto, he had carried out invaluable reconnaissance and his reports to Townshend were as gold dust. It was he who had alerted Townshend to the disposition and strength of the Turks at Kut and most recently at Ctesiphon. He volunteered to overfly the enemy position and cut their telephone lines to Baghdad. This he accomplished but he was shot down and captured. The loss of this one officer was as serious as the loss of a battalion.
Townshend penned one important letter, privately, to the Viceroy on 2 November. Townshend had a track record of bypassing the chain of command and this was just another example. He told Hardinge that the morale of his division was ‘very low, and the men had their tails down. The Mohomedans are not pleased at approaching the sacred precincts of Suleiman Pak at Ctesiphon – the troops are not confident and have had enough. Now the British soldier and the sepoy look over their shoulders and are fearful of the distance to the sea. In consequence they go down with every imaginable disease.’ He added that the British battalions ‘could be relied upon but the Indians are now shaken and unreliable.’ On the day he wrote those words, only fifty-four Indian but seventy-five British soldiers had reported sick.
This was all very negative and in writing in these terms to the Viceroy, one wonders if he was hoping that Hardinge would abort the plans to advance. Townshend’s opinion of his troops was disputed. Others said that the Division had won a famous battle and the morale of the survivors was predictably high. The MC, in observing on his letter to Hardinge, remarked that, ‘These are not the words of a general commanding a force in the field who has confidence in the capacity of his troops to achieve the task assigned to them.’131
Townshend, not for the first time, had misled Hardinge when he spoke of his Indian soldiers’ reluctance to go to Suleiman Pak. This was not the case; the sepoys were in ignorance of their objective, which was always referred to as Ctesiphon (known to the British soldiers as ‘Pissedupon’). Religious matters were never an issue and Townshend’s motives are un
clear. What is clear is that he was disloyal to his Indian soldiers who, in earlier days, had been paid in salt. This was the origin of the expression to be ‘worth one’s salt’ or Nimak hilal. It was the Indian soldier’s creed and he would follow his British officer anywhere.132
It was on also on 2 November that the Prime Minister, Asquith, told the House of Commons, ‘General Nixon’s force is now within measurable distance of Baghdad. I do not think that in the whole war there has been a series of operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly executed, and with a better chance of final success.’133
These remarks by the Prime Minister, delivered with the authority of his post, were well received but, time would show, ill-judged.
At El Kutunie, 7 miles above Azizieh, the Turks had established a defensive position, but on the approach of the leading British brigade, the Turks encamped there promptly fled. This augured well for the battle ahead. Townshend burnt the Turkish installations and destroyed all the equipment that was found. He was obliged to send a gunboat downstream to protect the journey upstream of mahailas, under sail, bearing his supplies, of which he needed 208 tons per day but received only 150 tons. The danger from the Arabs had increased as the line of communication lengthened, and any river journey was now dangerous – despite the arrival of several of the new ‘Fly’ class of river gunboat, of which HMS Firefly was the first. Townshend continued to bombard Nixon’s supine headquarters with requests for his misemployed infantrymen – to no avail.
It was at this point that Townshend first started to display some irrational behaviour. With his immediate staff he was taking passage in the steamer Mejidieh. In this position there were creature comforts to enjoy and among these was a warm bed. Not so for Private John Boggis who, at night, curled up in his blanket outside Townshend’s cabin door. Townshend bestowed much of his affection on his small dog called Spot, in recognition of his one engaging black eye. Spot was a Jack Russell, or closely related to that breed. One very cold night Spot curled up against Boggis, and man and dog shared such body heat as they could conjure up. In the morning, a furious Townshend thrashed the dog unmercifully.