by N S Nash
‘Why are you doing that, Sir?’ enquired a bemused Boggis.
‘He was sleeping with you,’ growled Townshend as he continued to belabour the small creature. ‘He’s my dog and he’s got to learn.’134
Townshend ordered his entire division to abandon and stack all its surplus equipment, mess silver, clothing and personal possessions not needed in battle. He intended to travel light, defeat the Turks and return for the mountain of kit later.
Meanwhile, Nixon was determined not to miss the triumphal entry into Baghdad, so he and his entire staff had embarked in a steamer and sailed upriver as if to a picnic. For Townshend, slow progress of the river transport was a constant frustration, as was the shortage of equipment. At one point he decided he wanted a boat bridge so that he could send out a foray on the far bank. He was engaged in conversation with the major who was dealing with the problem when Nixon strolled by. Nixon enquired of the major if the boats he had were satisfactory.
‘No, Sir,’ replied the officer.
‘Why don’t you use pontoons?’ asked Nixon.
‘Only eighteen are authorised, Sir.’
‘Wire India for more,’ Nixon ordered, turning to one of his staff officers. Then, addressing the major, he continued, ‘How many do you want?’
A pontoon cost over £100 and the major wondered if he could ask for twenty. He was well aware of the parsimony of the Indian Government.
Nixon, exuding authority, said, ‘100?’
The major was amazed and did not answer at once.
‘200?’ interrogated Nixon.
‘Fifty, Sir,’ responded the major eventually.
Nixon instructed the staff officer to wire for the pontoons at once.135
It was an absurd moment of military theatre. As Braddon wrote, ‘He might as well have wired for a million because there were none available in India.’
On 12 November, Hardinge penned a petulant letter to Chamberlain objecting to the Secretary of State’s suggestion that Nixon should reconsider his next move. There were more than sufficient dark clouds on the military horizon, but Hardinge wrote defensively as follows:
Nixon will act as he thinks best. He is in command, and we have full confidence in him to perform his duties properly, and if he needed our interference in such matters, we would not think him fit to hold his post and would remove him … Nixon is a very fiery little man and nobody would resent it more than he.136
The tone of this indicates that Nixon’s strong personality was a factor in the decision-making and that, despite Hardinge’s use of the royal ‘we’, Nixon was on a very loose rein and probably difficult to control.
Townshend was as ready as he was likely to be when finally his long-awaited supply ships arrived on 18 November. With their welcome arrival, but from an identified source, came the unwelcome news that, ‘a Turkish advance, five or six thousand strong, was closing on Zeur.’ Zeur, a mere dot on the map and of no particular significance, was some 14 miles distant and Townshend responded vigorously. He formed his force into two columns and marched them, about 3 miles apart, towards the enemy, who promptly withdrew.
A bloodless victory? Well, perhaps.
But Townshend was now about 104 miles from the security of Kut and in close proximity to a well-prepared enemy. He bivouacked for the night and the following morning moved further upriver to Lajj, with its groves of tamarind and casuarina.137 The Turks had ample time to prepare their positions and, as the British force looked to its front, on its right-hand side (the left bank, looking downstream) were two very strongly fortified lines, each anchored on the Tigris and over 5 miles long. There was a gap of about 3½ miles between the lines. On the other bank were similar, shorter fortifications but in front of those the ground was broken by old watercourses and abandoned canals. It was impossible going for either cavalry or horse gunners.
Behind the Turks and parallel to their position, the Diyala River flowed into the Tigris. It was a bar to a withdrawal, and Townshend took note of that. He hoped to trap retreating Turks on the banks of the Diyala when he drew up his plan. Nixon, who was a mere spectator to the preparations, realised fully to what extent his career and reputation rested on Townshend’s shoulders. He asked him if he was confident of winning. Townshend provided the right measure of reassurance to his commander and said that he expected success.
In simple terms, Townshend’s plan was a rerun of his tactics at Kut in that he would initiate a turning attack on the right bank (looking upstream) to outflank the Turkish left, at the same time holding in position Turkish troops on their right in order to prevent them moving once contact had been made.
There were several features on the battlefield that had to be accommodated. The first of these was the Great Arch of Ctesiphon,138 which was between the Turkish front and second lines. This venerated structure had to be safeguarded and the hope was that the enemy would not fortify it. Another feature was ‘High Wall’, the remnants of an old structure. In desert conditions a 12-foot wall counts as high ground; a 50-foot wall, as in this case, affords commanding views and provides an invaluable firing point. The third feature was what Townshend called Vital Point, or VP. This consisted of two redoubts at the northernmost point of the first line. Taking the VP was the key to victory.
Chapter notes
126 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.143.
127 Moberly, F.J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia. 1914–1918, Vol. 1, p.47.
128 Wilhelm Leopold Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843–1916) was a Prussian field marshal and military writer. His extreme brutality in Belgium in 1914–15 was much admired by Adolf Hitler, for whom he was a role model.
129 Nunn, W., Tigris Gunboats, p.166.
130 MC Report, p.29.
131 Ibid.
132 Raynor, C.A., Lieutenant Colonel, in an interview with Braddon, 1968.
133 Hansard, 3 November 1915.
134 Boggis, Mr J., in an interview with Braddon, c. 1968.
135 Sandes, E.W.C., In Kut and Captivity, 1919.
136 Hardinge to Chamberlain, 12 November 1915, Chamberlain papers 62/1.
137 Spackman, Colonel W.S., Never come back no more, private papers.
138 Ctesiphon is located approximately at Al-Mada’in, 20 miles south-east of the modern city of Baghdad. Ctesiphon was once a great city; it dates back to AD 540 and covered an area of 18 square miles. The only visible remains today are the great arch (Taq-i Kisra) located in what is now the Iraqi town of Suleiman Pak.
Chapter 9
The Pyrrhic Victory at Ctesiphon
‘The object is not the occupation of a geographical position, but the destruction of the enemy force.’
(General Pyotr A. Rumyantsev, 1725–96)
The force opposing 6th Division was composed of 18,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, two regiments of camelry, an uncounted mob of Arabs, certainly numbering several thousand, all supported by fifty-two guns and nineteen machine guns. So much for Nixon’s ‘appreciation’ that had identified an enemy force of only 4,000 Turks with low morale. There was also the prospect of further large Turkish reinforcements joining the battle in the near future.
Townshend had an enhanced division; numerically he had 13,700 infantry, five batteries of guns (thirty-five) and eleven squadrons of cavalry. In addition, the Royal Navy was present and its guns might come into play. The naval force consisted of HMS Firefly, Butterfly, Comet, Shaitan, Sumana, Shushan and Massoudieh. Captain Nunn was in command and for a ‘blue water’ sailor, he was a long way from home.
* * *
As 6th Division prepared for action, in London an MP, Sir Mark Sykes, was drafting a letter to The Daily Telegraph.
Sykes had seen active service in South Africa and commanded a militia regiment. He was affected by what he saw when he visited the theatre of operations and wrote:
There are paddle steamers which once plied with passengers, and now waddle along with a barge on either side, one perhaps containing a portable wireless station and the other
bullocks [to draw] heavy guns; there are once-respectable tugs which stagger along under a weight of boiler plating, and are armed with guns of varying calibre; there is a launch which pants indignantly between batteries of 4.7in looking like a sardine between two cigarette boxes. There is a steamer with a Christmas tree growing amidships, in the branches of which its officers fondly imagine they are invisible to friend or foe … and this fleet is the cavalry screen, advance guard, rear guard, flank guard, railway, General Headquarters, heavy artillery, line of communication, supply depot, police force, field ambulance, aerial hanger and base of supply of the Mesopotamia Expedition. [Author’s italics]139
38. Colonel Sir Mark Sykes Bt MP (1879–1919).
In his short letter, Sykes had encapsulated everything that had made Townshend and his soldiers so vulnerable as they prepared for battle. The letter prepared Daily Telegraph readers for stormy water ahead but it was far too late to effect any change.
* * *
The Mesopotamia Commission observed that, after the capture of Kut, ‘there was a spirit of intense optimism, and over confidence as to what could be achieved overcame General Nixon and his Headquarters Staff.’140 Townshend, in his memoir, written five years later and with the benefit of hindsight, said:
I knew nothing about this ‘intense optimism’. All I do know is that I was determined to carry through the operation if it could possibly be done, and it was my plain and simple duty to carry out the orders of my superior to the best of my ability, although his orders were against my better judgment. Personally, I had no doubts in my mind as to the extreme gravity of the results of this advance, an offensive undertaken with insufficient forces, and not only that, but an offensive undertaken in a secondary theatre of war, where our strategy should have been to have remained on the defensive with minimum forces sufficient for that purpose. All my study indicated disaster to me. However, the die was cast. And so when Sir John Nixon asked me on the eve of battle, ‘Are you confident of winning, Townshend?’ I replied, ‘Yes, I shall win all right.’ And I did.141
In military circles, the rule of thumb is that the attacker needs a numerical advantage of 3:1 or better if he is to succeed. Here the forces were about numerically equal; moreover, in this case the attack would be across a flat desert, in good light, into well-constructed redoubts, fifteen in total. The flank attack had to carry the day or 6th Division would be slaughtered.
Operations started on the night of 21/22 November with a night march from Lajj. Townshend had again divided his command into four columns and the first into action was Column ‘C’ (Brigadier General Hoghton), with the task of engaging the enemy in the area of the so-called ‘Water Redoubt’ and ‘High Wall’ in the middle of the Turkish first line. The object of the exercise was to pose sufficient threat to cause Nureddin to move troops to that redoubt.
The remainder of the force, Columns ‘A’ and ‘B’, marched through the night to develop Townshend’s signature ‘turning attack’. They were under the command of Brigadier Generals W.S. Delamain and W.G. Hamilton; the latter was newly appointed, having relieved Major General Fry in 18th Brigade.
The cavalry ‘Flying Column’, or Column ‘D’, was commanded by Major General Mellis. Townshend did not trust Brigadier General Roberts after the abject performance of the cavalry at the Battle of Kut and so had summarily reduced his responsibilities. Roberts was superseded and was required to serve under Mellis, which must have been difficult for both men. In Mellis, Townshend had a profane, robust, hard-charging, unsophisticated warrior and a man to be relied upon. An infantry battalion was added to the Flying Column, but quite how Mellis was to employ and deploy foot soldiers when the bulk of his force was mounted was not immediately obvious but became clear later on.
Hoghton’s approach across the almost featureless desert did not draw the expected fire, much to the surprise of the participants. The enemy were clearly prepared to wait and engage at a shorter and more lethal range. The lack of response from the Turks was discommoding Hamilton, who was to launch his attack on the Turkish second line behind the Vital Point, but only when he heard that Hoghton was in contact with the enemy.
It was when Hoghton and Hamilton were fully engaged that Delamain was to sweep forward and take the VP. There was no contact and so Hamilton marked time, and eventually had to ask for permission to crack on with his part of the plan.
The Battle of Ctesiphon then unfolded, initially, much as Townshend planned. As the attacker, the initiative was his to exploit, and this he did. What neither he nor Nixon had anticipated was the stout and heroic defence put up by Nureddin’s troops. The battle was noted for the ferocity of the hand-to-hand fighting and the brutal losses on both sides. These Turks were every bit as obdurate as their fellows who were winning at Gallipoli.
It will aid the reader if they consider two sketch maps of the battle from different sources. The first of these is taken from Townshend’s book at page 156, produced in 1920. It shows the Diyala River, against which he expected to trap the remnants of Nureddin’s force. It should be compared with the second map of much the same ground on page 102.
The VP was carried by troops of 30th Brigade under the command of ‘the gallant Climo’,142 as the defenders streamed back to their second line. Delamain, seeing his objective already taken, presumed that the whole Turkish front line had collapsed and so he swept on to the second line. Unfortunately he left a substantial body of enemy behind him. These unforeseen changes left Hoghton to face a well-entrenched enemy. A frontal attack was so clearly suicidal that Hoghton opted to move his formation across the battlefield at 90°. This was an extreme manoeuvre, very hazardous, and Hoghton’s column was punished as it moved across the Turkish front. Townshend watched horrified as his master plan started to unravel. A counter-attack swiftly followed the taking of any position and the dead started to pile up around the breast works. Gurkha and Punjabi dead were unhappily abundant.
Townshend rode across the shell-swept battlefield to discuss the situation with Delamain, now back at the VP. Townshend commented in his book (p.173) that,
A mass of tangled wire and deep trenches compelled us to dismount … and in getting to Delamain with whom I wanted to speak … I had to traverse a length of trench. The dead lay so thick that we literally walked on the bodies. I found him behind a small sand hillock, for the spot was under fire from some Turks cut off from retreat and installed in a redoubt some 700 yards south of the VP.
Delamain briefed Townshend, who was really on top of his game as he responded quickly and calmly. His demeanour under fire was noted by many of his officers and soldiers and there is no doubting the physical courage of ‘Charlie’. He seemed inured to the eleven dead Gurkhas at his feet and to the products of their kukris – each with his head split open or severed. He sent a message to Hoghton to bring up his left shoulder and move at once on the VP because he saw ‘that the battle was by no means finished’. Battered Hoghton strove to comply.
Unfortunately, the guns of the Royal Navy could not be brought to bear; they were held up at Bustan by the menace of heavy Turkish artillery at the bottom of the river loop on the right-hand bank.
39. The Battle of Ctesiphon (1). (C.V.F. Townshend)
Townshend moved his headquarter to the VP and it was not a bonus when Nixon and his acolytes came to join him, just in time to hear that strenuous opposition had bogged down Hamilton’s column. He had taken the second line but was facing tenacious counter-attacks. Mellis was unable to come to the rescue as his cavalry formation was also having difficulties. The cavalry were now in a dismounted role and being held up by a strongly held trench line. At this point, ‘Mellis sent in 76th Punjabis [who were in support of his cavalry] with the bayonet and they carried the position in fine style.’143
Townshend called out, ‘Boggis.’
‘Sir,’ responded his batman, who was never far away.
‘A change of clothing.’
‘Now, Sir?’
‘I always change at this time.�
��
John Boggis was committed to making a hazardous journey of about a mile, on foot, across a very active battlefield to the river to collect clean clothes for his general. He had then to retrace his steps. Boggis stepped out of the trench and he was lost to view. There was a lengthy pause, but Boggis returned safely bearing the fresh linen.
‘Your clothes, Sir.’
‘Thank you, Boggis.’
Townshend stripped and stood naked, surrounded by the dead and the dying and in the sight of his staff officers. Deliberately, he donned a silk vest, silk underpants, a khaki shirt, his riding breeches, boots and his solar topee. A junior officer passed to him a piece of plum cake, of which he was very fond. The death and destruction all about him continued unabated.144
Lieutenant Colonel C.A. Rayner, who had witnessed this performance, endorsed John Boggis’s account of this extraordinary event when both were, later, interviewed by Braddon. Quite what was in Townshend’s mind is unknown. It was either a demonstration of incredible sang-froid or exhibitionism. What it certainly showed was his complete disregard for the life of the young soldier who ministered to his needs, and that perhaps overshadows the theatre of the change of clothes.
The day wore on and the sun blazed down on men lying in pools of their own and their comrades’ blood. The tenor of the hand-to-hand fighting was ghastly, and in the confusion units became mixed and command and control weakened. There was fighting all along the front and a series of small, almost self-contained actions. The officer casualties in the Indian battalions were particularly heavy and particularly critical. Cohesion started to evaporate and at this point the Turkish reinforcements, which had been so airily dismissed by Nixon, made their appearance on the field.