by N S Nash
In the latter stages of the assault on the fort at Nilt, Aylmer and a small party of sappers found that access to the walls was barred by a series of abattis.190 Aylmer found his way through these obstacles to a small door set in the curtain wall of the fort. The door was forced, with the loss of only one man, despite persistent enemy fire. Aylmer found cover and was able to prepare a demolition charge that he planned to place against the main doors of the fort. He lit his fuse and, under fire, ran to his target and laid his charge. After a wait it became clear that the fuse had failed. Aylmer ran back to the target doors, was wounded, but the fuse was reignited. The enemy was now fully alerted to Aylmer’s intentions and he was wounded a second time. The charge blew and the two great doors to the fort collapsed. Aylmer charged through the smoke and was at once engaged in hand-to-hand fighting.
He was wounded a third time. A company of Gurkhas arrived, stormed the breach and the fort was taken after a battle that had lasted only twenty minutes. British losses in the engagement were six killed and twenty-seven wounded; the enemy had eighty killed. Aylmer won a well-merited Victoria Cross. Four years later, Aylmer was part of the force that relieved Townshend at Chitrál. The two men were near contemporaries and knew each other quite well.
* * *
The arrival of fresh troops at Basra was to be welcomed, but their organisation thereafter was hasty. There was little time for theatre training and acclimatisation. The haste was generated by Townshend’s estimate of the time he could hold Kut and the big issue was food. On 3 December, and before a detailed inventory could be made, the commander sent a signal saying that he only had food for one month for British soldiers and two months for Indians. Relief was needed by early January 1916.
This estimate had the effect of generating a great sense of urgency but, until the divisions arrived, nothing could be done. On 7 December, Townshend revised his estimate and claimed food enough for sixty days for both ethnic groups. He could hold until early February. A further amendment on 11 December advised Nixon that he had sufficient for fifty-nine days – other than for meat. He could hold until 8 February. From there on, the British relief plan was based on an absolute requirement to take Kut by that latest date. The urgency with which relief operations were put in place impacted directly on their effectiveness, or lack of it. The artificial urgency was manufactured by Townshend for his own ends.
The one thing Aylmer lacked was time. Although it was no substitute, he was to have regular messages from Townshend emphasising the plight of his garrison and offering patronising, gratuitous advice on how to conduct his operations.
Aylmer’s Tigris Corps, when it was fully assembled, would be composed of the 7th (Meerut) Division, commanded by Major General Younghusband CB,191 and 3rd (Lahore) Division, commanded by Major General Henry D’ Urban Keary DSO.192
On 7 December there was a major Turkish artillery stonk. This damaged the defences of the fort, inflicted thirty casualties and softened up the British first line, which faced a major assault the following afternoon. Then the Turks made a frontal attack across the flat desert. There was no guile but lots of raw courage; the Turks paid a high butcher’s bill but did not breach the first line. The combined German/Turkish generalship did not excel.
Townshend was alert to the mixed blessing of the boat bridge shown on the map (page 127 with the date 8.12.15). That bridge was moved from its original position (6.12.15) because of its vulnerability near the first line. Initially, the GOC viewed the bridge as an exit from his confinement that allowed him to strike out at his besiegers, and to that purpose he had established a bridgehead with a double company of 67th Punjabis under the command of a Captain Gribbon. The Turks responded by sending a large detachment across the dry Shatt-al-Hai to capture or destroy the bridge.
On 9 December, Gribbon led an assault on the Turks who were positioned on some adjacent sand hills. He was successful but, when counter-attacked, was forced to retire back over the bridge. In the process the officer was wounded three times, and he fell and died on the right bank.
General Mellis, at his aggressive best, would have none of this and he at once re-crossed the bridge and took possession of the far end, where he established a small beachhead. However, he quickly realised that his position on the right bank was neither tenable nor supportable and reluctantly ceded control to the enemy. The Turks now established themselves at the water’s edge and commanded that end of the bridge, where they dug in. This change in fortunes raised the possibility that the Turks might mount an assault across the bridge into the very heart of the garrison. Hitherto, Townshend had identified the bridge as his route to offensive operations and had not perceived it as a potential danger.
The acceptance of its commander that the entrapped 6th Division could only be defensive was a watershed in this campaign. Hereafter, Townshend paid only lip service to the possibility that he might break out and assist those trying to relieve him. He contrived to construct a scenario in which he appeared to be prepared to break out, but by presenting sufficient difficulties, he was ordered by Nixon not to attempt a break-out. This deceit and his inaccurate forecasts of food stocks, in combination, were to cost thousands of lives. Chitrál Charlie deceived his soldiers; he gave them false hope and they believed him. Charles Townshend was a well-read student of warfare and knew full well that the writing was on the wall. He was well aware that ‘an army, which thinks only in defensive terms, is doomed. It yields initiative and advantage in time and space to the enemy … it loses the sense of the hunter, the opportunist.’193
In the new circumstances he decided that the bridge had to be destroyed at the mooring point on the right bank so that, when freed from constraint, the remnants of the bridge would be swung by the current on to the garrison’s left bank. The Turks had swiftly dug trenches overlooking the bridge and any sally against the far side of the bridge would be very hazardous. Two volunteers came forward and offered to place demolition charges at the Turkish end of the bridge on the right bank. Lieutenants Alec Mathews RE and Roy Sweet 2/7th GR took on the task of leading a mixed party of Gurkhas, miners and sappers. Chitrál Charlie wrote (p. 223) that:
this was a most gallant affair, the two officers going to the enemy’s side of the river across the bridge, which had sagged in places under the swift–running current owing to waterlogged pontoons and laying the saucisson,194 while the others stood by to cut the anchor cables. With the explosion the bridge broke up. The enemy were for some time too dazed to open fire and the whole party escaped. I recommended the two British officers for the Victoria Cross195 and the men for Indian Order of Merit.
Fenton Aylmer signalled Townshend on 10 December, saying, ‘Have assumed command Tigris line. Have utmost confidence in defender of Chitrál and his gallant troops to keep flag flying till we can relieve them. Heartiest congratulations on brilliant deeds of yourself and your command.’ Townshend replied, saying he was proud to serve under Aylmer. He may have said it but it is unlikely that he meant it.
That same day, Chamberlain wired to ask Townshend for a ‘sitrep’. He was promptly given the facts, such as ‘199 casualties yesterday and 800 sick at present’. Chamberlain was also given a short essay on siege warfare in which Hannibal, Charles XII and Napoleon all got a mention.
10 December brought with it a further serious frontal assault. It was repulsed and again the Turks suffered heavy losses, but it was not all one way; the garrison had 202 casualties. The fighting strength was further reduced and a prodigious amount of ammunition had been used.
The Indian battalions had lost a disproportionate number of their British officers, and Townshend offered a commission to any of his 2,700 British soldiers who might like to apply. W.D. Swan was one of those invitees and he recalled a conversation with a fellow Norfolk, a man called Ormiston. They agreed that the Turks gave especial attention to the Caucasian officers of an Indian regiment, and that made the offer a deal less attractive. Nevertheless, Ormiston applied, was selected and emerged as an instant s
econd lieutenant.196
Several accounts make mention of a camel that wandered across no-man’s-land and paid the penalty. Its rotting carcass produced the foulest of odours and added to the discomfort of both sides for some weeks.
This pattern of Turkish attacks was repeated and on the 13th, the enemy again sustained dreadful losses but did establish trenches, never more than 600 yards from the first British line. The position of the defenders was that with every success there was a reduction in ammunition stocks that could not be replenished, and an increase in the load of the medical staff. Equally, the Turkish soldier’s lot was not a happy one. The officers ruled by fear and physical violence, medical support was minimal and a serious wound was tantamount to death. Even a minor wound became serious when it was inexpertly treated – or not treated at all. Food was at subsistence level and the supply chain was creaking as it sought to sustain a major force overland on unmade roads. Those trenches at 600 yards now became the base for energetic ‘sapping’ as the Turks zigzagged across no-man’s-land. However, the fort at the north-east corner of the first line was the priority target for the Turkish guns. This area was in the aegis of Brigadier General Hoghton’s 17th Brigade. He had under his command 103rd Mahrattas, 119th Indian Infantry, fifty ‘bombers’ (grenadiers) of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, two 15-pounders, a battery of six Maxim guns and a company of sappers and miners.
During the night of the 23rd, an artillery stonk was focussed on the fort and lasted without respite until the following morning. By then the two 15-pounders had been knocked out and most of the mud walls had been demolished, all the telephone lines were cut and the occupants of the fort withdrew to nearby trenches. When the expected Turkish assault, by their 52nd Division, was launched, its serried ranks faced the blistering fire of the remaining four Maxim guns commanded by Captain C. Stockley. The execution was dreadful but the Turks pressed on and, despite the fifteen rounds a minute discharged at them by the Indian infantry, they reached the first line. Edward Mousley recalled:
The Turk was evidently merely demonstrating on our sector and intended to attack through the fort. All our available guns in turn switched on to their Fort lines i.e. for a barrage already prepared, just over the walls of the Fort.
We increased our range and searched, getting in among the Turkish reserves all piled up and awaiting ready to support.197
Grenades were hurled into the Turkish ranks at only 10 yards’ range, but the savage fighting became hand-to-hand. Both sides used grenades, bayonets and knives. Shovels were put to a different use. The ferocity of the fight matched that at Ctesiphon and a breakthrough here could have swung the siege in the Turks’ favour. To their utmost credit, the Indian soldiers gave no ground and exacted a very high price from their adversaries. The intensity of the fighting and the carnage that ensued could not last and, after a frantic thirty minutes or so, the Turkish ranks had been reduced to small knots of men who, seeing that the day was lost, ran, leaving piles of their dead heaped in front of the British first line and all across the plain.
Among the British dead was Second Lieutenant Ormiston.
It was alleged that von der Goltz himself had planned this unsophisticated attack. If this were the case, he would have learned the same lessons as those learned by generals on the Western Front. Bravery is simply not enough in the face of machine guns.
The day was not done and shelling continued until about 2000 hrs, when the Turks tried again – this time led through the dark by ‘bombers’. The first line was breached and more murderous hand-to-hand followed. The battle was not going well and ground was being lost until, just after midnight, reinforcement arrived in the shape of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. They turned the tide and, very badly bruised, the Turks withdrew.
Came the dawn and 907198 Turkish corpses littered the ground. Back in Turkish lines there must have been 2–3,000 wounded. It was a major defeat, but at a cost; British/Indian dead amounted to 315, and the bravest and best were among them. The 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry and the 43rd Ox and Bucks LI drew especial praise in the Official History for the part they played in this particular conflict. The British casualties since 3 December now amounted to 1,625 and the hospitals were overrun.
The battlefield was a gruesome sight; the Turkish wounded cried for help and when men went forward, Turkish snipers engaged them. The mercy missions ceased until dark. About twelve hours later, those Turks who could be moved without a stretcher were helped in; the remainder had to be left where they lay – and there they died, in the dark and the biting cold, abandoned by their comrades and now by their reluctant enemies.
This was to be the last major assault of the siege and the Turks now put their effort into sniping, at which they were very proficient. With their excellent optical sights they achieved kills from up to 700 yards and in one case 1,000 yards. Major Booth of the Army Signal Company organised a counter-sniping detachment, and his energy and the skill of his small body of men helped to restore the balance. Many Kuttites developed a stoop as a consequence of their exposure to Turkish sniping. But even a stoop was no defence against enemy artillery and there was daily attrition from the sporadic artillery fire.
50. The fort at Kut – the scene of savage hand-to-hand fighting in December 1915 and held at great cost. (Prepared by the historical section of the Committee for Imperial Defence. Ordnance Survey, 1924)
Unsung heroes of this siege were the bhistis (water carriers). These were Indian labourers/porters whose function was to fill vessels with water at the riverbank and deliver it to the soldiery. Any number of these people were killed as they went about their unglamorous but very dangerous business. Turkish marksmen showed them no mercy, nor did they spare the civilian women and children, sent out by their craven menfolk to draw water. The British soldiers found it difficult to admire the Arab men with whom they were incarcerated.
The weather was now brutally cold and Sergeant Munn of the Ox and Bucks LI said that he habitually wore a pair of long trousers over his puttees and shorts, a British warm199 around his body, a balaclava cap and a scarf around his head, mitts and woollen gloves – then he wrapped himself in two blankets. Quite how he could ‘stand to’ if needed, he did not explain.
Chapter notes
174 Minutes on Viceroy telegram to Secretary of State, 30 November 1915, L/P&S/10/524. Reg no. 4388 and Cabinet meeting 25 November 1915, Cab 42/5/22.
175 Hardinge to Duff and reply, both 17 December. Enclosed in Hardinge to Chamberlain 24 December, Chamberlain papers, 63 2/2.
176 Ibid.
177 Hardinge to Chamberlain, 7 January 1916, Chamberlain papers, 62/2.
178 Chamberlain to Hardinge, 9 and 16 December 1915, Chamberlain papers, 62/2.
179 Chamberlain to Hardinge, 3 December 1915, Hardinge papers, 121/No. 70, Secretary of State telegram to Viceroy, 17 December 1915, Hardinge papers, 99/No. 835.
180 Hardinge to Chamberlain, 31 December 1915, Hardinge papers. To Cox, 28 December 1915, Hardinge papers, 94/No. 155.
181 Hansard, 8 December 1915.
182 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.119.
183 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.211.
184 The Emperor Maurice, The Strategikon, AD 600. Translated by George Dennis, 1984.
185 Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Military Institutions of the Romans, c. AD 378.
186 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.213.
187 MC Report, p.169.
188 Moberly, F.J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918, Vols. 1–4, p.140.
189 Townshend, C.V.F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia, p.227.
190 A barricade of felled trees with branches pointing towards the enemy, sometimes laced with barbed wire. A well-constructed abattis was impassable.
191 Later, Major General Sir George Younghusband KCMG KCIE CB (1859–1944).
192 Later, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Keary KCB KCIE DSO (1857–1937).
193 General Sir Davi
d Fraser, And we shall shock them, 1983.
194 A saucisson is a sausage-shaped demolition charge.
195 Both officers were awarded the DSO. Townshend wrote later, saying, ‘I am convinced that never has the VC been more fairly and squarely won than in the case of these two young officers. They volunteered for what appeared to be certain death and waited all day in cold blood to carry out the operation under cover of darkness.’
196 Swan, Mr. W.D., as recorded by Braddon, p.144.
197 Mousley, E.O., The Secrets of a Kuttite, p.40.
198 Barker, A.J., The Neglected War, p.124. Some unfortunate was obviously detailed to count the corpses.
199 A British warm is a very heavy, camel-coloured Crombie woollen overcoat, usually worn by officers both in uniform and in mufti.
Chapter 12
January 1916 The Battles of Sheikh Saad and the Wadi River
‘Without supplies no army is brave.’
(Frederick, the Great, Instructions to his Generals, 1747)
In Kut, the dearth of firewood was an increasing problem. Edward Mousley wrote that, ‘there is only enough available to cook one meal a day for the men and provide hot water besides for breakfast. Sometimes there is not even that. Theft of wood is punishable with death.’200 On New Year’s Day there was an unpleasant incident when a sentry of the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry not only deserted his post but shot at an officer. He missed and, as he tried to get to the Turkish lines, was captured. The miscreant was swiftly tried by court martial, found guilty and summarily shot.
The weather broke on 3 January. It started to rain and the desert ‘sand’ slowly turned into a morass of glutinous consistency. It was to get a great deal worse in the weeks ahead.
General Aylmer’s task had become immeasurably harder as he strove to impose order on his troops, who were arriving piecemeal. Aylmer was under pressure from and being driven by Nixon to commence operations at the earliest possible date. This haste was the direct result of: