Betrayal of an Army

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Betrayal of an Army Page 17

by N S Nash


  the succession of telegrams which General Townshend despatched from Kut during December. In these he urges, as reasons for his immediate relief, the dangers of enemy reinforcements and of determined onslaught by superior numbers, the impaired morale of his troops, heavy losses in British officers, anxiety as to ammunition, etc., etc. But it is noteworthy that throughout he never, except on 5 December, puts forward deficiency of supplies as a reason for accelerating relief.201

  It is extraordinary that a soldier of Townshend’s experience and grasp of military history did not call for a complete inventory of his food stocks until late in the siege. Similarly, there was an abundance of horsemeat available for all, except for those Indian soldiers whose religion proscribed horsemeat. Mellis and Delamain both urged Townshend to order the Indians to eat horsemeat, assuring him that they would comply, but he refused and, as a consequence, until late in the siege the Indian soldiers had little or no meat.

  Turkish shelling caused a steady stream of casualties, and in an attempt to eliminate Townshend’s headquarters the hospital was hit. ‘Casualties now varied between 26–36 daily.’ There were a total of about 2,000 men who were incapacitated in some measure, a number added to by Turkish snipers using hollow point ammunition, ‘of the fashion and calibre of the Snider’, which caused soldiers and Arab civilians to suffer horrible wounds.202

  1916 brought with it any number of changes. General Nixon was ailing, and had been for over a month. His ill health made him more irascible and unapproachable, but he was determined to see the campaign through to a successful conclusion. Unfortunately his judgement, sometimes questionable, was further adversely affected. He should have been cheered by the arrival of Sir George Buchanan, a civilian, who had hitherto been the official in charge of the major port of Rangoon. He was a man with a wealth of experience in Port Management and, on the face of it, a valuable new asset on Nixon’s staff. The intention was that he should become Director General of the Port of Basra, with the task of reorganising the facilities and traffic flow. It was not quite like that, and the Mesopotamia Commission Report observed:

  It was unfortunately left to Sir John Nixon to arrange exactly what the duties of his position were to be. Differences naturally ensued. Sir George Buchanan’s powers were so limited by Sir John Nixon that the former considered that his services were not put to their proper use. After a short stay he returned to India.

  It is not difficult to imagine the interface between these two men. Nixon was not temperamentally suited to the receipt of unwelcome advice and Buchanan was a subject matter expert who did not expect his advice to be disregarded. Nixon decided to limit Buchanan’s role to that of ‘survey, conservancy and dredging work’.203 The management of the port was not to be in his aegis, and Captain Huddlestone of the Royal Indian Marine retained that responsibility. Buchanan was not a man to trifle with; he promptly returned to India, where he drafted a report on what he had seen in Basra. Predictably, his report was damning. In it he said:

  I found it difficult to realise that we had been in occupation of Basra for a year, as the arrangements for the landing and storing of goods and stores of every description were of the most primitive order and in the absence of roads, the whole area was a huge quagmire. To a newcomer appearances were such that troops and stores might have been landed, for the first time, the previous week. … The military expedition to Basra is, I believe, unique, inasmuch as in no previous case has such an enormous force been landed and maintained without an adequately prepared base.204

  On the river, things were getting better, at least in offensive terms, and Captain Nunn’s command had been much reinforced by the arrival of Butterfly, Cranefly, Dragonfly and Gadfly. Later in the year, Grayfly, Greenfly, Mayfly, Sawfly, Snakefly and Waterfly would also join the flotilla. These Fly class ships were 126 feet long with a 20-foot beam and they drew between 2 and 3 feet of water. They mounted a 4-inch gun, a 12-pounder and four Maxim guns. They were crewed by two officers and twenty ratings.

  January 1916 was a black month for the British and Indian armies. The MC observed sadly that, ‘the history of the attempts to relieve Kut is melancholy reading enough – a record of prolonged struggle carried on with inadequate means under abnormal conditions of atrocious weather and terminating in failure.’205

  History reveals that the fate of Kut and its garrison was really settled in January 1916. A series of small but costly actions were to be fought in that month, marked only by the appalling losses and the suffering of the British and Indian soldiers who were engaged. The betrayal of this army was not yet complete.

  The first optimistic move of the Tigris Corps to relieve Kut was an advance up both banks. This commenced on 4 January, in heavy rain, over muddy ground, and was the precursor to the Battle of Sheikh Saad. The bad weather had prevented any aerial reconnaissance and Aylmer had no accurate intelligence as to the size of the force opposing him. Townshend had signalled that he had seen two Turkish divisions, bypassing Kut and heading downriver. Further signals advised Aylmer of major Turkish troop movements. Despite these omens, Aylmer was not inclined to change; he went ahead with his plan and decided that Major General G.J. Younghusband,206 in command of the advanced 7th (Meerut) Indian Division, would lead the Corps.

  Younghusband took passage in Gadfly with Nunn. Contact with the enemy was not established that day and 7th Division camped for the night about 5 miles from the village. The weather temporarily cleared and aeroplanes could operate; they supplemented further intelligence reports that indicated that Nureddin had 30,000 men and forty guns around Kut, and that he intended to defend Sheikh Saad with about 10,000 men, who were entrenched on both sides of the river.

  51. The area fought over in order to save the 6th Division. (Map by Geographia Ltd)

  The settlements along the river are no more than reference points, as in themselves they had no strategic or tactical value. They provided no defensive advantage to the occupying force.

  Aylmer’s instructions to Younghusband were not entirely clear, and nor was visibility the following morning when a thick mist enveloped the area. 35th Brigade (Rice) was to move up the left bank and 28th Brigade (Kemball) up the right bank. The GOC would follow in Gadfly, heading a flotilla bearing stores, ammunition and food. The earlier rain had exacerbated the quagmire and, for the infantry, it was very hard going.

  The protective mist suddenly cleared and, about 2 miles away, both brigades could just discern what appeared to be a line of Turkish trenches. The infantry moved into extended line and marched resolutely towards the foe. It was very brave, but foolish; the Turkish artillery soon came into play. As the lines, now with many gaps, got closer, the enemy engaged them with small arms and the casualties started to accumulate. At 500 yards from the trench line it was clear that enough was enough, and the survivors went to ground and tried to scrape a hole. If they were successful, the hole filled, quickly, with water.

  Younghusband’s orders had been ‘to hold the enemy in their positions’. But, by his unsophisticated march to contact and the exposure of both brigades to heavy fire and severe casualties without effective response, he had committed Aylmer ‘to a course of action from which there was no turning back’.207 This was the first of Younghusband’s professional errors but by no means the last.

  A British asset was a boat bridge that, correctly used, would allow the British force the flexibility of switching its thrust from one bank to the other. As bridges go it was a pretty poor specimen but, in a theatre where nothing much worked, beggars could not be choosers. Aylmer told Younghusband to do nothing until the following morning, 7 January, and to meet him at the bridge.

  It was an unpleasant morning, very humid and hot; more heavy rain seemed likely. The men of 7th Division had tried to rest but nocturnal thunderstorms and torrential rain had precluded sleep. The generals conferred, but the sole product of the conversation was a decision to resume the attack at noon.

  52. The opening battle in the campaign to relieve Kut. (A.J
. Barker)

  Rice would hold his position with 35th Brigade while 19th Brigade (Denny) would sweep around Rice’s right and, supported by 16th Cavalry, roll up the Turkish left flank. 21st Brigade (Norrie) would follow Denny and act as a reserve. That was the plan, and Younghusband’s men were to move across open country with visibility now hampered by mirages.

  When the attack went in on the left bank, 28th Brigade (Kemball), with the addition of 92nd Punjabis, was to advance ‘vigourously’ on the right bank. In the rear of 28th Brigade was the Corps reserve under the direct command of Aylmer, the GOC-in-C. Unfortunately, the objectives for the attack were difficult to identify, as the Turks were very skilled in concealing their trenches. They did not throw the spoil up to form a parapet, so in a flat landscape the only sign of the enemy might be their heads and, at 500 yards, that is difficult to spot. The ever-present mirages made it impossible.

  19th Brigade (Denny) started at noon as ordered, and led by the Seaforths, headed out into the desert. Their enthusiasm, however, took them too far north and a large gap opened up between 19th and 35th Brigade. Norrie’s 21st Brigade, the reserve, had stopped to eat when a mounted staff officer galloped up and invited the Brigade to close up to the 35th.

  The attack now went in. The objective was a line of Turks who were busy digging. When they sighted the British they dropped their shovels and disappeared from sight. Soon thereafter, the advancing British infantry came under fire from two directions. The attackers were exposed on a flat, featureless plain, they had no artillery support and the only option was to sprint for the enemy. The Black Watch had just been shipped in from Marseilles and in their journey to this war had marched 22 miles from Al Gharbi the previous day. The Jocks doubled forward, as did the Jats. The Seaforths too, but they were all halted about 300 yards short of the objective when they reached the killing ground.

  The slaughter was immense.

  The Seaforth Highlanders lost twenty officers and 380 men, and of the 485 6th Jats who had gone into action, only 150 were unwounded. The Black Watch had losses of similar proportions. Nothing had been gained, other than temporary possession of a few square miles of useless morass.

  The Turks took advantage of this situation by making an attempt to get right round the British right flank; they had a large body of mounted Arabs in support. To counter this, Denny committed his small reserve and called on Norrie’s 21st Brigade for assistance. 41st Dogras and 9th Bhopals extended the British line to thwart the encircling movement and finally, but far too late, the British field artillery came into effective action, as did the 4-inch gun of HMS Cranefly. The effect was to halt the Turkish/Arab movement, and the Arabs turned tail and fled the scene. The Turkish infantry dug in about 400 yards from the hastily established British line and did not threaten further. They probably did not need to do so because aerial reconnaissance revealed that a new, large, mixed force of Turks and Arabs was massing out to the British right. The situation was temporarily stable, but there was no doubt as to the danger to the British right on the left bank.

  Kemball’s 28th Brigade had enjoyed some success on the right bank. By 1600 hrs he had carried the forward Turkish positions, and the Indian soldiers of 92nd Punjabis, 51st and 53rd Sikhs had performed with great dash and commitment. On the far left of his attack, the 2nd Battalion, the Leicestershire Regiment, excelled; but at day’s end, sixteen officers and 298 men did not answer to their names. ‘28th Brigade suffered more than 1,000 casualties in the day’s fighting. Six hundred prisoners were taken and more than 350 Turkish bodies were buried.’208 Given the circumstances and the extreme fatigue of the men, the burial of enemy dead seems to be a laudable but unnecessary gesture.

  Night fell, it got very much colder and, of course, it rained. Life for the Tommies and sepoys was grim and there was even the possibility of a painful death tomorrow.

  The next morning was as hot as expected, with great mirage activity. The British dug to improve their trenches and received sporadic small-arms fire. At about the time any civilised gentlemen would be thinking about a cup of coffee, Kemball signaled Aylmer and said the Turks were withdrawing. Aylmer received the news with caution as he estimated that he faced 7,500 enemy on the left bank and 4,500 on the right bank.

  While the generals were busying themselves planning the next move, water and food were brought forward. The walking wounded had struggled down to the riverbank, where a Red Cross flag hung limply. The hope was that there, at the very least, they would be tended by skilled doctors and crisp, sympathetic nurses. A hot meal and change of clothes would be wonderful. That was all but a pipedream.

  The post-battle situation at Ctesiphon had been awful and a disgrace – this was worse, much worse.

  7th Division had five field ambulances; unfortunately, they were still aboard ships heading for Basra, so only three doctors were available to deal with the 250 casualties anticipated by Nixon/Aylmer and their staff. The reality was that there were about 3,000 men in need of urgent treatment. The medical staff were overwhelmed. Only the most serious cases could have attention – and those likely to die were left to do just that. The wounded lay, under the sun, in rows:

  Pathetic bundles of humanity lay on the riverbank clutching at the feet of anyone who walked past imploring, ‘Sahib, Sahib, the blood will not stop … a blanket Sahib … water …’ in the manner of the beggars who roamed Bombay and Calcutta. As they waited for treatment their wounds became septic, gangrene set in and many died even before they could be carried to the boats that were to evacuate them, downstream, to the already congested hospital at Amara.

  Eleven days after the battle, a field ambulance hospital unit from Meerut on its way to the front found nearly 200 British and 800 Indians still lying on the muddy ground behind Sheikh Saad. Only a few had the first field dressing, applied on the battlefield, changed. Over 100 were suffering from dysentery: there were no proper sanitary arrangements and those unable to walk lay in their ordure, past caring and without hope. Sacks of food had been dumped in the open for their sustenance, but much of which was perishable had been ruined by rain; what was edible was hardly enough to go round. As there were only one or two cooks, and only few of the miserable casualties could help themselves, its [the food] availability was of little consequence.209

  Aylmer decided that with the balance of his battered force his next attack would be at night. He brought forward those units that had not been overly exposed and Denny’s brigade was to lead the march. As they set off, a strong cold wind, accompanied by heavy rain, kept them company. The night march was a shambles. The guides lost their way and after hours spent trudging through clinging mud, 21st Brigade arrived at the location of 35th Brigade. The men were exhausted, cold and wet. As it happens, all the effort was unnecessary as the Turks were withdrawing. On the morning of the 9th it was discovered that the Turks had moved about 10 miles upriver to a position near the Ora ruins on the left bank of the Tigris and behind the modest Wadi River.

  Sheikh Saad was occupied – for what it was worth.

  This Turkish withdrawal, ordered by Nureddin, cost him his job; he was summarily sacked by von der Goltz and was unexpectedly replaced by his aggressive second-in-command, Khalil Pasha. This incident illustrated the relationship of the senior Turkish officers with von der Goltz. He was firmly in command and the campaign was to be fought on his terms.

  The river was mined at Sheikh Saad, but the weapon was dismissed as ‘a somewhat amateur home-made type, which the enemy had used before Kurnah’210 the previous year. The so-called Battle of Sheikh Saad had been one of attrition. Command and control was weak, the tactics lacked any form of subtlety, the fighting was ferocious and it was a portent of things to come. At this point, enemy losses during the three days of the operation, including prisoners, was estimated at about 4,500.

  The downside was that British losses were 4,007, and it can be assumed that up to 1,000 of these were killed. ‘The results of the premature advance with a hastily collected force were becom
ing very evident. As regiments arrived in the country they were being hurried to the front, thrown into brigades often not their own, to find themselves within a short while in action with lack of guns, munitions etc., while the Turks had command of the air.’211

  It was Nixon’s extraordinary decision that, as units arrived at Basra, the fighting men were dispatched to the front, and their equipment followed by their ‘first-line’ transport. The third priority was medical provision, ambulances, medical staff and their specialist equipment. ‘Second-line’ transport carried the soldiers’ blankets, tents and camp essentials. This second line was the lowest priority and, in practical terms, this meant that in the face of severe weather conditions, the men spent several weeks without anything as basic as a blanket. An old soldier’s first rule is, ‘never get separated from your bed roll’. In this case, old soldiers or not, they were all widely separated and for far too long.

  The very first duty of a British officer is the well-being of his soldiers, and that is a priority that overrides all else. Nixon, and the Staff he directed, had clearly forgotten that, and emphatically did not do their duty. As a result of this dereliction, the men (and their officers) endured miserable life-threatening conditions, even before they went into action. Once again, the medical arrangements were utterly unacceptable.

  This had been an inauspicious start in the quest to relieve Kut, and Captain Wilfred Nunn RN, a sailor fully engaged in these actions, was able to watch a debacle unfold and engulf his soldier comrades. Although the reader may find this litany repetitive, even depressing, Nunn deserves to be quoted in full. At page 204 of his book, he wrote:

 

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