by N S Nash
The units of 3rd and 7th divisions had arrived at Basra in no regular order. When they left France it had been understood that they would be reorganised in Egypt – which they certainly were not. They had merely been packed into steamers as steamers became available. Some units were incomplete. There was a lack of staff officers, as some of the Staff had not come with the troops from France while others had not yet arrived. The deficiencies had to be filled by any officers available on the spot and from India. In addition, many of the units had been trained on different lines.
The inadequate river transport resulted in units going upriver at odd times, sometimes without their full equipment. Then, again, land transport at the front was lacking: the Supply and Transport Corps [Army Service Corps] were under their establishment [planned strength]. High explosive shell was scanty; aeroplanes were far too few to allow regular artillery observation; there were, for a long time, no proper anti-aircraft guns; while many of the guns and howitzers were of old patterns and the telephone equipment was both ancient and inadequate.
The force was short of sappers and miners; the bridging train material was inefficient. Medical personnel and equipment was short and sadly restricted. The generals represented these matters most strongly in the right quarters but felt bound to expedite the advance, relieve Townshend without delay and take the risks involved.
It was little wonder that morale was low. It was lowered further when an anonymous jobsworth decreed that the special allowance paid to Indian soldiers in France and hitherto drawn by the Indians of 3rd and 7th divisions should be discontinued on the irrefutable basis that Mesopotamia was not France.
The single trigger of the precipitate, ill-considered action by the Tigris Corps and the loss of 4,000 men so far, was Charles Townshend’s inaccurate estimate of his food stocks. Early on in December he had ruthlessly played the starvation card, and in so doing manipulated Aylmer and induced him to proceed in undue haste. Townshend’s estimates of his survivability were made in December. On 5 December, he estimated fifty-five days, on the 7th he raised it to sixty days and said he could hold out until early February. On 16 January, he endorsed his earlier estimate and said he had twenty-one days’ worth of rations left for British troops, seventeen for Indians. This confirms that he would run out of food on or about 7 February. The actuality was that the siege lasted until 29 April – 147 days, and well over twice Townshend’s estimate. The MC Report remarked:
It is strange that neither General Nixon nor General Aylmer seem to have thought of asking General Townshend how long his supplies would hold out; nor did General Townshend himself definitely ascertain this most important fact till several weeks after he was shut up in Kut. No doubt he had received positive assurances that he would be relieved within two months at the outside, and as he was satisfied that his supplies would easily last for that period he did not attach as much importance to the food factor as he ought to have done. However, this may be, telegrams from General Aylmer on 25 January and General Lake on 29th indicate the neglect of General Townshend to intimate his true position as regards supplies was one of the main factors in the hurried advance.212
The reference to ‘one of the main factors’ is inaccurate. It was indisputably the main factor. However, when the MC took evidence, Townshend was comfortably housed as an honoured guest of the Turkish Government and so he was unavailable to explain himself.
The new Turkish defences behind the Wadi River were 3 miles in front of the Hanna Defile – that easily defended narrow piece of ground between the Tigris and the Suwaikiya Marsh. The Wadi operation was carried out from 12 to 14 January 1916 (see map on page 156). The British would be advancing over the same ground that Townshend had taken back in September 1915, but now facing a much more formidable foe; one that was certainly not going to allow a repeat of previous British tactics. This engagement was fought in extreme conditions of cold, rain, mud and poor visibility.
This second engagement is justifiably described as the Battle of the River Wadi. Success at the Wadi depended upon the British being able to outflank the Turkish left on the left bank (as always, looking downstream) but the Suwaikiya Marsh was a major feature, quite impassable and a factor to be carefully considered (see map on page 156). Aylmer had massive naval superiority and his gunboats were expected to inflict damage on enemy positions in the Hanna Defile.
The Turks, having withdrawn from Sheikh Saad, had established themselves behind the high-banked but shallow Wadi River, which flowed into the left bank of the Tigris. It was a modest obstacle for infantry and pack animals but of significance to wheeled vehicles, and in particular, the guns. The Turkish position was alongside the river and provided an obstacle to the British on their route, via the Hanna Defile, to Kut.
The weather was a negative factor and Aylmer’s soldiers had to cope with the worsening conditions. Nixon’s attitude was a further factor. This was not a man with flair, imagination or tactical awareness. He held the enemy in low regard and believed that the courage and training of the Indian Army were sufficient to ensure success. He was hopelessly out of date, logistically illiterate, and the stern lessons learnt on the Western Front were lost on him. His replacements from France well knew the folly of charging into the maws of machine guns, and readily dug in when an advance was suicidal. To Nixon, this was a manifestation of being what he termed ‘trench-minded’, the implication being that the troops lacked an offensive spirit. Unfortunately, Nixon was firmly in command and his writ still had time to run.
53. The Battle of the River Wadi. (Map was prepared for the Historical Section of the Committee for Imperial Defence and Ordnance Survey, 1924)
Younghusband realised that, if he crossed the Wadi, he had an opportunity and the space to outflank the Turkish line and seize the Hanna Defile. Accordingly, he based his plan on that premise but, unfortunately, there were several deficiencies. The first of these was the unavailability of accurate maps and, this being the case, he had no idea what hazards or features his troops would face. Secondly, Younghusband had insufficient men to effect his plan to envelop the position, and thirdly, there was to be that aforementioned difficulty of getting wheeled vehicles across the Wadi.
Kemball and his 28th Brigade were deputed to make a frontal attack and, by so doing, hold the Turks in position. 19th, 21st and 35th brigades were to be the encircling force. The Cavalry Brigade was to ‘operate’ beyond the infantry brigades in open country, but it was not given an objective and, without an aim, the Brigade contributed nothing to the battle. This was another of Younghusband’s errors.
Reconnaissance on 12 January yielded little in the way of firm intelligence on the lay of the land, which spread like beige carpet to the horizon. Old watercourses, canals and natural folds in the landscape were not obvious. What was obvious was that these modest features, wherever they were, could be exploited and would assume disproportionate value. They say that ‘In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king’, so in this flat, apparently featureless land, the concealed soldier was king.
Under cover of darkness, the three infantry brigades, led by the 35th, moved up to the line of the Wadi as part of the plan to extend the British right flank. There were 1,000 yards between the formations, which moved in columns. The approach to the ‘start point’ took most of the night and, when dawn broke, visibility was severely limited by mist. This was better than a smokescreen, but Younghusband did not take advantage and actually delayed his operation until the mist had cleared.
It was another serious error of judgement.
It was 0900 hrs before the cavalry splashed through the shallow water of the Wadi and climbed the steep opposite bank. 21st Brigade followed, but it was only now that the difficulty of getting wheeled vehicles across the river was appreciated. Ramps had to be constructed on both banks and these were dug by hand, from the unpromising local material. Delay was inevitable.
The need to get the artillery across the Wadi has been questioned by earlier historians, and the sketch ma
p on page 156 shows why. Younghusband might well have sited his guns on the left bank of the Tigris River and short of the Wadi River with no significant increase in range, with minimal effort, and the attack could have been made earlier. As it was, Younghusband made his third poor decision of the day and, as a result, it was past noon before the gunners were able to join the infantry.
Meanwhile, Norrie’s 21st Brigade had set its sights on the Hanna Defile and headed in that direction, led by 1st/9th Gurkhas. At about 1100 hrs, while ramps were still being constructed behind them, the Gurkhas came under artillery and then small-arms fire. They halted and dug in about 200 yards short of what appeared to be the main Turkish position. The remainder of the Brigade and the 19th coming up behind changed direction and moved over to the right. The outflanking movement was still viable if the impetus was maintained. It was not.
21st and 19th brigades were in position to assault the enemy but then Younghusband made his fourth error – and it was still only early afternoon. He ordered both brigades to stand fast until the artillery was ready to provide support. The pause gave the Turkish commander time to reorder his defences and prepare for the attack.
Eventually, and when Younghusband had all of his force deployed to his liking, the two brigades advanced into a veritable torrent of fire and another expensive attritional battle ensued. Some Turks were seen to be withdrawing, and the conclusion was drawn that now was the time to commit 35th Brigade to sweep in from the far right and catch the enemy between the 35th and 28th brigades.
It came as an unwelcome shock when, as 35th Brigade moved in, it came under heavy fire from an unsuspected Turkish position. The assault was checked but, by late afternoon, 35th and 19th brigades had linked up.
There were countless acts of extreme bravery during this engagement, many of which went unnoticed and unrewarded. Sepoy Chatta Singh, of the 9th Bhopal Infantry, was the epitome of soldierly conduct. The London Gazette recorded in a citation that his award of the Victoria Cross was:
for the most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty in leaving cover to assist his Commanding Officer who was lying wounded and helpless in the open. Sepoy Chatta Singh bound up the officer’s wounds and then dug cover for him with his entrenching tool, being exposed all the time to very heavy rifle fire. For five hours, until nightfall, he remained beside the wounded officer shielding him with his own body on the exposed side. He then, under cover of darkness, went back for assistance and brought the officer into safety.213
54. A representation of Sepoy Chatta Singh winning his Victoria Cross. (Internet source)
The Turks were proactive and, in the face of the move to encircle them, they pushed their left flank deeper into the desert towards the Suwaikiya Marsh. By unhappy chance, they found an old irrigation channel that provided a readymade defensive position. The British cavalry brigade, who could and should have influenced affairs, did nothing and its members were little more than interested spectators.
Nightfall brought the fighting to a close, and what should have been a decisive victory turned out to have been an unsatisfactory and expensive day for the 7th Division. It had suffered 1,600 casualties, of whom 218 were killed. 28th Brigade had accepted a disproportionate share of the casualties. Initially, its role was to hold the Turks in place but, later in the day, it was committed to a frontal assault over open ground. The apparently flat terrain concealed not only a larger force than anticipated but also one particularly well placed, lining the steep bank of the Wadi. Just in front of the Wadi and parallel to it, was a dry watercourse. When men of the 28th Brigade reached this obstacle it slowed the assault, confused the attackers and they were easy pickings for the Turks concealed along the riverbank.
During the night, von der Goltz withdrew his force to the formidable Hanna Defile and, on the 16th, allegedly visited the Turkish positions in front of Kut. His party was observed and a gunner officer called down fire on the party. The first and, as it happens, only round was well directed, but Townshend recorded:
I was very annoyed with the officer who ordered the gun to be trained on the Field Marshal and fired without my orders for I had great respect for the man whom I considered to be the leading strategist in Europe; I ordered the fire to cease at once.
This episode is beset by a series of different accounts. Major General G.O. de R. Channer, who was present, said that multiple guns opened fire. Braddon asserts, on the evidence of Captain H.S.D. MacNeal, that von der Goltz was not actually present and the target was Khalil. The significance of the incident is Townshend’s reaction to it. He compared his chivalrous gesture to ceasefire with that at Torres Vedras. There, a warning shot was fired to warn off Massena, who was reconnoitring the British position. The reality is that to spare the life of the man dedicated to the killing or capture of Townshend and all his soldiers is absurd, and in sharp contrast to a further incident that followed several days later.
Lance Corporal John Boggis recalled that he was with the GOC on his rooftop observation platform, and both were peering through slits in the steel plates that offered some protection from small-arms fire. They looked out over the Turkish lines, which by now ringed Kut with about 30 miles of trenches. In the distance, a solitary Turkish soldier was at the river drawing water.
‘Boggis,’ called Townshend.
‘Sir,’ replied his orderly.
‘Rifles! See that man over there?’ The General pointed out the distant figure.
‘We’ll have a go at him.’
Both men seized weapons and squinted over their sights. Townshend, with a borrowed and un-zeroed weapon, fired first. The man dropped, and his can, of no further use to him in this life, leaked its contents into the desert sand.
‘Mine,’ exclaimed Townshend exultantly, and Boggis was disinclined to argue in the face of the evidence. Boggis recorded that the General was a good shot and as he left the rooftop he was in high spirits and singing a music hall hit of the day: ‘When I was single my pockets would jingle. I long to be single again.’214
Townshend was to make it a continuing practice to snipe at Turks squatting by the river, with remarkable success, but not with the unanimous admiration of his officers. One commented to the other members of his mess that it was ‘very unsporting – shooting sitting Turks’.
The lives of everyone involved in this campaign were dominated by one thing, and that was the ubiquitous Tigris River. It was the means of movement to battle and the means of evacuation of the wounded; it provided water to drink and was life-giving. It provided water in which to shave and so was an aid to strong morale. For those incarcerated in Kut, its dark brown waters were a protection, but when they rose they were a menace. It was a possible escape route, but it was also a barrier to freedom. It was variously too shallow, too sinuous, too fast-flowing. It presented opportunities and threats. It was never neutral and always a factor in military planning. For the Arabs and Turks it provided a route into Kut for spies, and was their convenient sewer. Accordingly, it posed a health risk to all, and especially to those on the bank and in Townshend’s sights.
It was a nightly occurrence for Arabs to slip into the water, buoyed by an inflated goatskin, in an attempt to get to the Turkish lines. A few deserters tried the same tactic. On their arrival the welcome was not just warm; it was red hot. Most arrivals were shot out of hand; any surviving sepoys were issued with black uniforms that served to identify them. Few made old bones.
In Kut, lice had taken their place alongside the bloody flies as objects of unbridled hate. They were the product of dirty clothes on dirty flesh. They were the heralds of disease and death for many.
A tentative probe of the Hanna line showed that the Turks were as obdurate as ever and that the path to Kut would have to be forced. In the besieged town, Townshend ordered a re-evaluation of his food stocks and on 16 January he signalled Aylmer that he had food enough for twenty-one days for British troops and seventeen for his Indians; he added that in addition, he had fodder for five days, tinned meat for thr
ee, meat on the hoof for seventeen and tea for eight. On this basis he could survive beyond his earlier 7/8 February deadline. Townshend’s latest forecast should have reduced the debilitating urgency that so far had been at the centre of Aylmer’s endeavours. However, Nixon, by now right at the end of his period in command, was determined that the Tigris Corps should press on regardless, and signalled to that effect.
Aylmer’s Corps licked its wounds and regrouped. It found that burying the dead presented a challenge in the morass. Reconnaissance of this next daunting objective brought home to Aylmer the magnitude of his task and the impossibility of a successful operation on the left bank. On the night of 16/17 January, he telegraphed to Generals Nixon and Townshend as follows:
The position of affairs must be frankly faced. The enemy is blocking the entrance of the Wadi–Nukhailat Defile with very strong works and, judging of his dispositions within them, they have been designed to resist a heavy bombardment from across the river as well as attack in front. His bivouac shelters seem to indicate that he may have with him the whole 52nd Division and two regiments of the 35th and 38th divisions, but of course I cannot be certain of this. Emplacements for nineteen guns have been seen, eleven of which are designed to fire across the river. Behind, in defile, there is a single line of entrenchments … between marsh and river, probably 1½ miles long. Behind, again, is the Es Sinn position. It is impossible, in my opinion, to take the first position by a coup de main from this side alone without losing half the force. … I do not think that our progress as an entire force can be anything but very slow.215
55. The Battle of Hanna. (Prepared by the Historical Section of the Committee for Imperial Defence)
This is a very gloomy but probably reasonable judgment by Aylmer, given the experiences of the previous two weeks and the intelligence he had to hand. He held the view that the best way to proceed was for Townshend to break out, cross the river on to the right bank with the largest force he could muster and then march around the Turkish position at Es Sinn. Aylmer would then send one division across the river with an additional cavalry brigade to meet him.