The Complete Essays

by Michel de Montaigne

  To my taste, those men who steal away from common obligations and from that infinity of thorny, many-sided conventions which a punctiliously decent man treats as binding when living in society spare themselves a great deal, no matter what singular penance they inflict upon themselves. That is to die a little so as to flee the pain of a life well lived. They may win some other prize, but never, it seems to me, the prize for difficulty; for where hardship is concerned there is nothing worse than standing upright amid the floods of this pressing world, loyally answering and fulfilling all the duties of one’s charge.

  It is perhaps easier to do without women altogether than duly and scrupulously to restrict yourself to the company of your wife: a man has more means of living an unworried life in poverty than in duly controlled abundance; behaviour duly governed by reason is more thorny than abstinence. Moderation is a virtue which makes more demands on you than suffering does. The Younger Scipio’s way of living aright has a thousand forms: Diogenes’ has but one. Diogenes’ life is as superior in its innocence to ordinary lives, as choice lives which have achieved much are superior to his in usefulness and fortitude.

  34. Observations on Julius Caesar’s methods of waging war

  [An interesting example of how Montaigne read his Classics. He often wrote his opinion of the books he had just read on their flyleaves. Several extracts from what he wrote on his Caesar are transcribed in this chapter. As always the Roman wars, especially the Civil Wars, evoke comparisons with the Wars of Religion in France.]

  [A] We read that many leaders in war held particular books in special esteem: Alexander the Great esteemed Homer; [C] Scipio Africanus, Xenophon; [A] Marcus Brutus, Polybius; Charles V, Philippe de Commines. And it is said that in these our days there are others who still think highly of Machiavelli, though the late Marshal Strozzi who took Caesar for his book had without any doubt made the much better choice; truly Caesar ought to be the breviary of every fighting-man: he was the true and sovereign model for the art of war. And in addition God knows with what grace and beauty Caesar painted up such rich material in a written style so pure, so refined and so perfect that there are, to my taste, no writings in all the world which can compare in style with his.

  Here I intend to list certain special and particular details about Caesar on the subject of war which have remained in my memory.1

  His army was in some dismay because of the rumour then current about the great forces which King Juba was leading against him. Instead of playing down the opinions which his soldiers had formed or minimizing the resources of his enemy, he had the troops assemble to reassure them and to put heart into them; but he adopted a course quite opposite to what we are used to: he told them not to bother any more about attempts to find out what forces his enemy was leading, as he had received a definite report. He then told them that the enemy’s numbers were far greater than they really were and than what they were rumoured to be among his troops, doing so more readily since (according to the judgement of Cyrus and Xenophon), such deception is less reprehensible when we eventually find the enemy to be weaker than we had expected than when we find that in reality he is stronger.

  Caesar trained all his soldiers simply to obey orders, without being concerned to criticize or discuss his plans as their Captain; he never informed them of his plans before the moment came to carry them out; and if any leaks did occur he delighted in changing his decision on the spot in order to keep his men guessing; for this purpose, after having determined to camp at a certain place, he would march right past it and, especially in bad rainy weather, lengthen that day’s march.

  At the beginning of his wars in Gaul the Swiss sent envoys to him asking for leave to cross through Roman territory; he had already decided to stop them by force from doing so, but he put on an affable expression and delayed a few days in giving his reply so as to give him time to concentrate his troops. Those simple folk had no idea how good he was at using time: he himself repeated on several occasions that the most sovereign qualities in a commander are knowing how to seize opportunities at the right moment, which in the case of his campaigns was truly unparalleled, and acting with speed, which in his case was truly incredible.

  He did not show much of a conscience in seizing the advantage over his enemies under pretext of a treaty of concord; but then neither did he do so in never requiring any virtue from his soldiers but valour, punishing hardly any vice except mutiny and the failure to obey orders. After a victory he would often allow them unbridled licence; he would even free them for a while from the rules of military discipline, adding that he had soldiers who were so well formed that even when smelling of musk and scent they would still go and fight like mad. He genuinely preferred them to have splendid weapons, getting them to wear armour which was engraved in gold and silver, so that they would fight more bitterly out of a concern not to lose them. When he addressed them he called them his companions – a term we still use; but his successor, Augustus, changed all that, reckoning that Caesar had merely done so because his affairs required him to flatter the minds of his followers, who were all volunteers:

  [B] Rheni mihi Cæsar in undis

  Dux erat, hic socius: facinus quos inquinat, æquat.

  [When Caesar crossed the waters of the Rhine he was my Leader; here in Rome he is my companion, since aiders and abettors are equal in crime.]2

  [A] As such a usage was too lowly for the dignity of an Emperor, of a Commander of armies, he restored the practice of simply calling them soldiers.

  Caesar however intermingled such courtesies with a great severity in keeping men down. When his Ninth Legion revolted near Placentia he smashed it into ignominy; even though Pompey was still on his feet he restored it to favour only after many an entreaty. He appeased his men more by an audacious use of authority than by being conciliatory.

  When he talks of his crossing of the Rhine into Germany he states that he considered that it was unworthy of the dignity of the Roman people to do so in boats, so he caused a bridge to be made to enable his men to march across it dry-shod. It was then that he built that astonishing bridge, over the construction of which he goes into such detail; for he never more willingly lingers over his achievements than in describing for us the skill of his inventions in similar sorts of engineering.

  I have also noted how he attached great importance to his exhortations to his soldiers before battle, so that whenever he wants to indicate that he was taken by surprise or obliged to hurry he always mentions that he did not even have time to address his men. He says that, before the great battle against the Turones, ‘Caesar, having seen to everything else, ran at once wherever Fortune led him and encouraged his men; when he came across the Tenth Legion he merely had time to tell them to remember their usual valour, not to be thrown into confusion and boldly to withstand the enemy’s charge. Then, as the enemy were already within bow-shot, he gave the signal to engage; he at once crossed the field to encourage the others, but found that they had already joined battle.’

  That is what he says at this point.

  It is undeniable that his tongue served him notably well on several occasions; even at the time his eloquence on the field was so highly esteemed that many in his armies took down his speeches; by which means there were compiled several volumes which long outlived him. His style of speaking had a grace of its own – so much so that, whenever readings were made from that compilation, those who knew him well, including Augustus, recognized even words and phrases which were not his own.

  The first time that he left Rome with an official command he reached the banks of the Rhone in just over a week; in front of him in his coach he kept a secretary or two ceaselessly taking down what he said: behind him was the man who had charge of his sword. And certainly, even if you had nothing to do but make the journey, you could hardly equal the speed with which, ever victorious, he left Gaul, followed Pompey to Brundisium, subjugated Italy in eighteen days, and then went on from Brundisium to Rome; from Rome he went off to the remotest par
ts of Spain where he surmounted the greatest of difficulties in the war against Affranius and Petreius, and then on to besiege Massilia. From there he proceeded to Macedonia, defeated the Roman army at Pharsalia; crossed over to Egypt in pursuit of Pompey; subjugated it; went on from there to Syria and to the country round Pontus where he fought Pharnaces; then he went on to Africa where he defeated Scipio and Juba; and finally he returned through Italy into Spain where he defeated the sons of Pompey:

  [B] Ocior et cæli flammis et tigride foeta.

  [Swifter than lightning and a tigress defending her young.]

  Ac veluti montis saxum de vertice preceps

  Cum ruit avulsum vento, seu turbidus imber

  Proluit, aut annis solvit sublapsa vetustas,

  Ferhrr in abruptem magno mons improbus actu,

  Exultatque solo, Silvas, armenta virosque

  Involvens secum.

  [It was like a landslide rushing down the mountain slopes when land is uprooted by the wind or loosened by the lashing rain or undermined by the force of passing years: as the huge mass crashes down into the void, it makes the earth tremble and bears away forests with their herds and herdsmen.]3

  [A] Talking of the siege of Avaricum he tells how it was his practice to remain night and day with the men whom he kept toiling at the siege-works. In all his important campaigns he did his own reconnoitring and never sent his army anywhere without first seeing the place for himself. And, on Suetonius’ authority, when he had led his campaign across the Channel into Britain he was the first to leap down to test the depth of the water. He would say that he preferred his victories to be won by thought than by might; when Fortune presented him with a clear chance of gaining the advantage during the war against Petreius and Affranius he rejected it, hoping, he says, to finish off his enemies by taking more time but less risk.

  [B] And it was a marvellous stroke when he ordered his entire army to swim across the river when nothing compelled him to do so:

  rapuitque ruens in prælia miles,

  Quod fugiens timuisset, iter; mox uda receptis

  Membra fovent armis, gelidosque a gurgite, cursu

  Restituunt artus.

  [the soldier, hastening to the fray, takes a route which he would have dreaded to take in flight: his drenched limbs glow as he puts his armour back on and he runs to warm up his blood, frozen by the swirling current.]4

  [A] In his campaigns I find more restraint and reflection than in those of Alexander, who seems to go looking for dangers and charging at them like a rushing torrent which indiscriminately batters and unselectively attacks anything it meets.

  [B] Sic tauri-formis volvitur Aufidus,

  Qui Regna Dauni perfluit Appuli,

  Dum sævit, horrendamque cultis

  Diluviem meditatur agris.

  [Thus does the river Aufidus charge like a bull as it flows through the realm of Daunus of Apulia: it rages along, threatening the ploughed fields with a dreadful flood.]

  [A] Alexander was active in the flower and first ardour of manhood, whereas Caesar began when already ripe and fully mature. Moreover Alexander was of a more sanguine complexion, choleric and ardent, and he further stimulated that humour with wine, whereas Caesar was very abstemious. But whenever the present occasion necessitated it, when the action itself required it, never was there a man more who put less value on his own person.

  It seems to me that in many of his exploits Caesar showed a definite resolve to get killed so as to flee from the disgrace of being beaten. At that great battle which he fought against the Turones, when he saw the advanced thrust of his army giving way he rushed out just as he was, offering himself to the oncoming enemy without his shield. That happened several times. After he had learned that some of his men were surrounded, he passed in disguise through the enemy ranks so as to fortify them by his presence. Once, after he had crossed over to Dyrracchium with a very few troops and had realized that the rest of his army which he had entrusted to Antony to lead was slow in following after, he personally undertook to sail back during a very great storm; he had to steal away to resume command of the rest of his forces because the harbours and the entire seaway were in the hands of Pompey.

  As for exploits carried out with a handful of troops, there are several in which the dangers he took exceed any reasoned military argument: for with what puny resources did he undertake to subjugate the Kingdom of Egypt and thereafter to go and attack the forces of Scipio and Juba, which were ten times greater.

  Those two men had some inexplicable, more-than-human confidence in their fortunes. [B] And Caesar said that great campaigns are not to be deliberated upon but waged.5

  [A] After the battle of Pharsalia, when he had sent his army ahead into Asia, he was crossing the straits of Hellespont with a single ship when he met Lucius Cassius sailing with ten heavy warships; he had the courage not simply to wait for them but to head straight for them and to summon him to surrender.

  He was already engaged in that frenzied siege of Alexia, where the defenders numbered eighty thousand, when the whole of Gaul rose to attack him and raise the siege, gathering an army of a hundred and nine horses and two hundred and forty thousand infantry. What boldness, what insane confidence, he showed by deciding not to give up the siege he had undertaken and by determining to take on two such problems at the same time! And he did withstand them: after he had won that great battle against the forces outside he soon reduced to submission those he held under siege. (The same happened to Lucullus at the siege of Tigranocerta against King Tigranes, but under different circumstances, given the weakness of the enemy with whom Lucullus had to deal.)6

  I would like to emphasize here two rare and extraordinary events concerning that siege of Alexia: one was that the Gauls, who had assembled to confront Caesar, first counted all their troops and then decided in council to cut out a goodly part of that huge crowd, fearing that they might produce chaos.

  This fear that your forces are too numerous provided a new example: yet if you look at it the right way it is indeed likely that a body of soldiers should be only moderately big and limited to some definite size, both for the difficulty in feeding them and also for the difficulty of leading them or keeping them in formation. At least it is easy to prove that those monstrously large armies have rarely achieved anything worthwhile, [C] which agrees with the saying of Cyrus in Xenophon, that the advantage lies not in numbers of men but in numbers of good men, the rest being less a help than a hindrance.7 And Bajazet based his decision to dispute the field with Tamberlane against the advice of his Captains mainly on the fact that the uncountable numbers of the enemy gave him certain hope of their falling into confusion. Scanderbeg, a good and very experienced judge, often said that ten or twelve thousand faithful combat troops should suffice a competent war-leader to guarantee his reputation in every sort of military need.

  [A] The other point which seems to be contrary to both the reason and usages of war is that Vercingetorix (who had been named General commanding all the areas of Gaul which were under revolt) should have taken the decision to go and shut himself up in Alexia. For a man in command of an entire country must never, except in a case of extreme necessity, so hem himself in that the fight becomes his last stand, his only hope lying in defence; in other cases he must ensure his liberty, so as to have the means of providing for things in general over all the regions he controls.

  To get back to Caesar. As time passed he became a little more slow and deliberate, as Oppius who was intimate with him shows; Caesar later judged that he should not really hazard the honour acquired from so many victories, which one single disaster could lose for him. That concords with what is said by the Italians when they wish to reprove that rash bravery found in younger men by calling them bisognosi d’honore, ‘needy of honour’: they say that since they are still hungry for reputation, which is hard to come by, they are right to go and look for it at any price – something which ought not to be done by those who have already acquired a store of it. In this ap
petite as in any other there can indeed be found a just moderation between desire for glory and satiety.

  Caesar was far removed from the scruples of the Ancient Romans who wished to exploit only their simple, straightforward valour, yet he brought more conscience to bear than we would nowadays; he would not have approved of acquiring the victory by any sort of means. In the war against Ariovistus he was parleying with him when a disturbance broke out between the two armies, started by the horsemen of the enemy; during the confusion Caesar found himself in a position of real advantage over Ariovistus: but he had no wish to exploit it, fearing that he could have been accused of having acted throughout in bad faith.

  He customarily wore in battle his most splendid equipment, brilliantly coloured so as to make himself stand out. When approaching the enemy he kept his soldiers on a shorter, tighter rein.

  When the Ancient Greeks wished to accuse anyone of extreme inadequacy they used the common proverb: ‘He can neither read nor swim.’8 He shared their opinion that to know how to swim was most useful in war, and he derived many advantages from it: when he needed to hurry he normally swam across any rivers he encountered for, like Alexander the Great, he preferred to travel on foot. When he was in Egypt he was forced to escape in a small boat; so many jumped in with him that it was in danger of going under; he therefore preferred to jump into the sea and swim out to his fleet which was about two hundred yards away, holding his writing-tablets above the water in his left hand and dragging his armour along with his teeth to prevent the enemy getting hold of it. He was then well on in years.