Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [5] Int. Well, for my part, I think that what this poet says is nonsense. But Homer’s statement disturbs me because, wise though he was, he expressed that view about mankind.

  Dio. And what absurdity is there in it? He does not say that all men without exception are wretched, but that there is no creature more wretched than man when he is wretched, just as we too undoubtedly should say; for, mark you, man is perhaps the only unfortunate creature of them all, just as he is the only fortunate one; for, you see, man alone is said to be ‘senseless,’ just as man alone is said to be ‘sensible.’ It is clear that a horse cannot be either unjust or dissolute, nor can a pig or a lion, just as it cannot be uncultured or illiterate.

  [6] Int. Well, I think you have made an excellent correction of Homer’s statement, and I reply that I believe man is fortunate.

  Dio. Then when a man’s fortune or guardian spirit is good, you maintain that the man is fortunate, but when it is bad, that he is unfortunate, do you?

  Int. I do.

  Dio. And do you speak of a guardian spirit as good in a different sense?

  Int. What do you mean?

  Dio. In the sense in which a man is good and, still more, a god; or if you do think that the gods are good, do you think that they are not just and sensible and self-controlled and in possession of all the other virtues, but unjust and senseless and intemperate?

  Int. I certainly do not.

  Dio. Then in the case of a guardian spirit also, if you really consider any to be good, is it not clear that you consider it just and useful and sensible?

  Int. Why, of course.

  Dio. Pray, when you think that any person is bad, do you believe that he is at the same time evil and unjust and senseless?

  Int. Most assuredly so.

  [7] Dio. Well, then, do you not think that each man lives under the direction of his own guiding spirit, of whatever character it may be, and is not directed by a different one?

  Int. Certainly not directed by that of a different one.

  Dio. Then do you believe that the man to whom Fortune has given a good guardian spirit lives justly and prudently and temperately? For this is the character that you agree his spirit has.

  Int. Certainly.

  Dio. And that the man to whom Fortune has given the bad guardian spirit lives wickedly and senselessly and foolishly and intemperately?

  Int. That appears to follow from what we have just said.

  Dio. Then when a man is in possession of intelligence and is just and temper, is this man fortunate because he is attended by a good spirit; but when a man is dissolute and foolish and wicked, must we maintain that he is unfortunate because he is yoked to a bad spirit and serves it?

  Int. True.

  [8] Dio. And do you describe as wise anyone except the man who is sensible and just and holy and brave, and as a fool him who is unjust and unholy and cowardly?

  Int. I do.

  Dio. Then you should no longer be surprised when people say that they hold the wise man alone and without exception to be fortunate or happy, whereas of fools there is none that is not unfortunate or unhappy; you should agree to this inasmuch as you also seem to hold that view.

  [9] Int. What you have said so far I think has been quite reasonable; but how are we to consider any spirit to be wicked and unjust and senseless, I am unable to say; and besides, it is not like you philosophers, if you really hold that the guiding spirit is divine, to assume any such thing.

  Dio. Well, just now I have not been expressing my own view for the most part except in this one matter — that I believe every wise man is fortunate and happy and he alone; but in everything else I have accepted the views of the majority of men, that I may not seem to be forcing my own views on them. [10] For just consider: If you really believe that the guiding spirit is divine and good and the author of no evil to anyone, how do you explain a man’s becoming unfortunate, that is, unhappy? Or does that happen when he does not heed or obey his guiding spirit, this being good? It is just as if we should think that all physicians are good in the matters of their profession and that none of them is a bad physician or harmful, but yet should see some of their patients doing poorly and suffering harm in their illnesses; evidently we should say that they refuse to obey orders and that such patients as do obey cannot but come through well; and nothing that should happen to them would surprise anyone.

  Int. That is right.

  [11] Dio. Do you think, therefore, that the really self-controlled and sober and sensible patients are those who would disobey their physicians when these are skilled and prescribe the treatment that is good for them, or, on the contrary, the senseless and uncontrolled?

  Int. Evidently the uncontrolled.

  Dio. Then again, do you hold that to obey the guardian spirit when it is good, and to live in conformity with its direction, is a mark of those who are temperate and sensible or of those who are wicked and senseless?

  Int. Of those who are temperate.

  [12] Dio. And that to refuse to obey and give heed and to act contrary to that which is divine and from the guardian spirit is a mark of the bad and foolish?

  Int. How could we say anything else?

  Dio. And that those who obey the guiding spirit, since it is of this character, are ‘fortunate and happy,’ and that those who disobey are ‘unfortunate and unhappy?’

  Int. Necessarily so.

  Dio. Therefore, here also it turns out that the wise and sensible man is ‘fortunate and happy’ in every case, but that the worthless man is ‘unfortunate and unhappy,’ not because his guardian spirit is bad, but because, although it is good, he does not heed it.

  THE TWENTY-FOURTH DISCOURSE: ON HAPPINESS

  This Discourse, like the fourteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth, begins by saying that the majority of men act wrongly in respect to something and then proceeds to set them right. This same admonishing attitude is found also in Discourse .-, where Dio tells of the beginning of his ‘preaching’ activity during his exile. For this reason von Arnim believes that all these Discourses, except the last of course, belong to the period of Dio’s exile.

  The great majority of men, says Dio, select their occupation in life without first considering the important question of what the life of man should be, and what is the highest good for him, the ideal toward which he should strive. Only the man who knows what this highest good is and subordinates everything else to it can gain true success and happiness.

  The Twenty-fourth Discourse: On Happiness

  The majority of men have not as a rule concerned themselves at all with the question of what kind of men they ought to be, nor of what is ideally man’s best good, to the attainment of which he should direct all his other activities; but, each in accordance with his taste, they have devoted themselves, some to horsemanship, some to military commands, some to athletic competitions, others to music, or farming, or expertness in oratory. But what practical utility each of these pursuits has for themselves, they do not know or even try to ascertain. [2] The consequence is that while some become good horsemen — in case they work hard at that and train diligently — and some become more efficient in wrestling than others, or in boxing, or running, or in other contests, or in avoiding crop failures, or in sailing the seas without wrecking their ships, and in knowledge of music some surpass others; yet the good and prudent man, one who can answer the all-important question, ‘What man is he who is virtuous and intelligent?’ cannot be found among them all.

  [3] Take oratory, for instance. There are many well-born men and, in public estimation, ambitious, who are whole-heartedly interested in it, some that they may plead in courts of law or address the people in the assembly in order to have greater influence than their rivals and have things their own way in politics, while the aim of others is the glory to be won thereby, that they may enjoy the reputation of eloquence; but there are men who say they desire the mere skill derived from experience, some of these being indeed speakers, but others only writers, of whom a certain
man of former times said they occupied the borderland between philosophy and politics. But what their activity profits them, or to what end the glory is of use to them, or in what respect this experience is worth their while, all this they fail to consider.

  [4] But as for me, I claim that without this knowledge of which I speak and the quest for it, all the other things are little worth; but that for the man who has reflected upon that important point and has come to understand it, then practicing eloquence, exercising military command, or any other activity that may occupy him, is to his advantage and is directed toward a good. For the truth is that, for and of itself, receiving the approbation of senseless persons, which is just what the majority are, or having influence with men of that kind, or leading a pleasant life, will not, so far as happiness is concerned, be one whit better than being censured by them, or having no influence, or leading a laborious life.

  THE TWENTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON THE GUIDING (OR GUARDIAN) SPIRIT

  This Discourse, like the twenty-first, twenty-third, and twenty-sixth, is one of the twelve Discourses which are in the form of a dialogue reported directly and are believed to belong to the period of Dio’s exile, although in this case after the first few exchanges Dio does all the speaking. He introduces and illustrates the apparently original view, a suggestion for which he may have got from Plato’s Republic 540B, that the ‘guiding spirit’ (δαίμων) is not something within the man himself, but is some other man who controls him and determines his destiny. One man may even control a great number of men, such as are found in a city, a race, or an empire, and be the cause of their faring well or ill. In this case he is their δαίμων.

  Even though Dio does not in this Discourse keep his promise given at the outset, to tell about the view of the philosophers that only the wise man is happy, yet the Discourse appears to be complete in the form in which we have it.

  The Twenty-fifth Discourse: On the Guiding (or Guardian) Spirit

  Interlocutor. People say the philosophers maintain that really only the wise man can be happy.

  Dio. Yes, that is what they maintain.

  Int. Well, do you think they speak the truth?

  Dio. I do.

  Int. Then why have you never stated their view to me?

  Dio. I will, if you tell me first what you think the guiding spirit is.

  Int. For my part, I believe that it is that which controls each individual and under whose direction each human being lives, alike whether he be a free man or a slave, whether he be rich or poor, a king or a plain citizen, and no matter what his business in life is.

  Dio. And do you think that this principle is within the man himself, this thing which controls the individual, which we call the guiding spirit, or that, while being a power outside of the man, it yet rules him and is master of him?

  Int. The latter is my belief.

  [2] Dio. Do you mean a different person? For I suppose it is a person who in one case controls one particular man, and in another case many men, one who leads them where and how he himself wishes, by using either persuasion, or force, or both. And I am saying nothing that is unknown, but refer to the popular leaders whom the cities obey in everything and do exactly as those men direct and advise, whether they advise them to go to war, or to remain at peace, or to build fortifications, or to construct triremes, or to offer sacrifices, or to banish some of their number, or to confiscate their property, or even to cut their throats; and I refer also to both kings and tyrants, and likewise to all masters of servants, who whether by paying down money for a person or by some other means have got anybody into their possession. [3] It is just as if you should call Lycurgus a guiding spirit of the Spartans — for at his command even now the Spartans are scourged and sleep in the open and go lightly clad and endure many other things that would seem hardships to other peoples — and Peisistratus the guiding spirit of the ancient Athenians. For you know, I presume, that when Peisistratus was leader and ruler, the people did not come down to the city, but stayed on the land and became farmers, and that Attica, which was formerly bare and treeless, they planted with olive trees by the order of Peisistratus, and in everything else they did exactly as he wished.

  [4] And, later on, one might perhaps say that not only others but Themistocles and Pericles also became guiding spirits; for I take it that you have heard about these two men, how the one compelled the Athenians, who had been foot soldiers before, to fight on the sea, to give up their country and their city to the barbarians, as well as the temples of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors, and stake all their fortunes on their fleet, and afterwards to fortify the Peiraeus with walls of more than ninety stades in length and enjoined upon them by his orders other measures of the same kind, some of which they continued to carryº out only as long as he was present, and others even when he was in banishment and after his death. Yes, and at a still later time certain other men, you may perhaps say, have become guiding spirits of the Athenians, for example, Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, and Nicias, Cleon, and Hyperbolus — some few of them honourable men perhaps, but the rest utterly wicked and cruel.

  [5] Then again you might say that Cyrus became for a time a guiding spirit of the Persians, a spirit kingly indeed and liberal in character, who, when the Persians were enslaved to the Medes, gave them liberty and made them masters of all the peoples of Asia; and you might go on to name Cambyses and Darius and their successors; Cambyses, who squandered their money, shot his subjects down, sent them on toilsome campaigns without intermission, and never allowed them to stay at home; and Darius, who amassed as much money as possible, caused the land to be cultivated, and like the other forced them to wage difficult and dangerous wars, for instance, as I recall, the one against the Scythians and the one against the Athenians.

  [6] And thus also by the Romans Numa might perhaps be named as their guiding spirit, and Hanno and Hannibal by the Carthaginians, and Alexander, by the Macedonians, or else Philip, who, when the Macedonians were inglorious and weak, and his father had ceded part of his kingdom to the Olynthians, made them strong and warlike and masters of nearly all Europe. Then afterwards Alexander, succeeding Philip, led them over into Asia and made them at once the wealthiest of all peoples and at the same time the poorest, at once strong and at the same time weak, the same men being both exiles and kings, because while he annexed Egypt, Babylon, Sousa, and Ecbatana, he deprived them of Aegae, Pella, and Dium. [7] And the Carthaginians Hanno made Libyans instead of Tyrians, forced them to live in Libya instead of Phoenicia, caused them to possess great wealth, many trading-centres, harbours, and warships, and to rule over a vast land and a vast sea. Then in addition to Libya, Hannibal enabled them to control Italy itself for a period of seventeen years; but after that he was responsible for their being driven from their homes and for their capital itself being moved at the order of the Romans, after he had previously slain great numbers of these Romans and come within a little of taking Rome itself, although, men say, he had no desire to do this, on account of his political opponents at home.

  And yet Hannibal, perhaps, neither the Carthaginians nor the Romans could fittingly claim as their good guiding spirit. [8] But Numa took over Rome when it was still small, unknown to fame, and situated in a land owned by others, when it had as its inhabitants an unprincipled rabble, who were, besides, at enmity with all their neighbours, were both poverty-stricken and savage, and lived a precarious existence because of the harshness of Romulus’ rule; caused them to hold their land in security and to be on terms of friendship with their neighbours, and gave them a code of laws, and gods to worship, and a political constitution, thus becoming the author of all their subsequent felicity of which all men speak.

  [9] I could go on to speak in the same way about the other cities, and populations which have fared well or ill on account of certain men who were their rulers and leaders. However, my own opinion has, I think, been made sufficiently clear. So, if you do call those I have mentioned in very truth guiding spirits of those who w
ere under their sway and who severally fared better or worse on account of them, I should be glad to hear what you have to say.

  THE TWENTY-SIXTH DISCOURSE: ON DELIBERATION

  This is another of the twelve dialogues reported directly and probably all written by Dio while in exile. In this one Dio considers with his interlocutor the meaning of ‘deliberation’ (τὸ βουλεύεσθαι). It does not mean making a blind guess as to the truth of something. There must be some knowledge, however imperfect, upon which to base the conjecture. If, on the other hand, there is complete knowledge of the thing, no room is left for conjecture, that is, deliberation. Then Dio attempts to show that one cannot deliberate about the future because it is non-existent. One must have something real about which to deliberate. This position rather surprises us, because deliberation is most naturally about some course of action in the future. After this Dio, unconsciously perhaps, shifts his position and maintains that to deliberate is to form correct conclusions about a matter from a full knowledge of all factors involved. However, one must admit that it was Dio’s companion, rather than Dio himself, who was so certain that deliberation comes into play only in those cases where there is some knowledge, but not enough to enable one to decide with certainty. Dio concludes by exhorting men earnestly to strive to gain full knowledge about the most important things in life in order that their deliberations in these matters may lead to the right conclusions.