Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  Furthermore, I do entreat you, address to all the praise you are offering me. For just as at a banquet it is very disgraceful for only one of the guests to be drinking, and for this reason we take umbrage, not merely at the cupbearer, but also at the man who is drinking, this same principle obtains in regard to the official resolutions of commendation. [4] Besides, if you do this, you will be bringing honour upon yourselves, since the greatest honour a city has is the praise its citizens receive. On what else do you base your pride? Do not other cities excel you in point of size, and also, God knows, in wealth and plenty and their public edifices? However, this is the one particular in which we rival practically all the world, namely, our having men competent both to act and to speak, and, what is the most important of all, men who love their country. But if any one takes this from you, to what city, even the humblest, will you be deemed superior? For now, in case you have a quarrel with any city — which may none of the gods bring to pass! — and the people of that city consequently revile our citizens, saying they are rapacious, untrustworthy, in what temper will you take it? Will you not be angry? Will you not straightway shout, be abusive, possibly come to blows, as has often happened in the past? [5] Then what you do not tolerate from the lips of others will you yourselves say against yourselves? If ever a quarrel arises and your adversaries taunt you with having wicked citizens, with dissension, are you not put to shame? As for myself, I swear to you by all the gods, I was indeed violently angry when a certain person said to me, “Bring reconciliation to the city,” and I was vexed with him. For may I never see the day when you need reconciliation, but, as the saying goes, may such things be diverted to the heads of our enemies, that is, to the accursed Getae, but not to any others, members of our own race.

  [6] Why, what would be the good of my presence here, if I should fail to lead you to such a policy by persuasion, having constantly engaged with you in discussions conducive to concord and amity, so far as I am able, and trying in every way to eradicate unreasonable and foolish enmity and strife and contention? For truly it is a fine thing and profitable for one and all alike to have a city show itself of one mind, on terms of friendship with itself and one in feeling, united in conferring both censure and praise, bearing for both classes, the good and the bad, a testimony in which each can have confidence. [7] Yes, it is a fine thing, just as it is with a well-trained chorus, for men to sing together one and the same tune, and not, like a bad musical instrument, to be discordant, emitting two kinds of notes and sounds as a result of twofold and varied natures, for in such discord, I venture to say, there is found not only contempt and misfortune but also utter impotence both among themselves and in their dealings with the proconsuls. For no one can readily hear what is being said either when choruses are discordant or when cities are at variance. Again, just as it is not possible, I fancy, for persons sailing in one ship each to obtain safety separately, but rather all together, so it is also with men who are members of one state. [8] And it becomes you, since you excel in cultivation and in natural gifts and are in fact pure Hellenes, to display your nobility in this very thing.

  I might go on to say a great deal on these topics, I believe, and things commensurate with the importance of the subject before us, were it not that I am in quite poor health, and also, as I was saying, if I did not observe that your condition is not permanent. For no incident has yet happened, nor does this malady thrive among you, but it is possibly a slight attack of distrust, which, like sore eyes, we have caught from our neighbours. But this is a thing which often befalls the sea too — when the depths have been violently disturbed and there has been a storm at sea, often there are faint signs of the disturbance in the harbours also.

  [9] Do you imagine there is any advantage in market or theatre or gymnasia or colonnade or wealth for men who are at variance? These are not the things which make a city beautiful, but rather self-control, friendship, mutual trust. But when you find fault with the Council, with the leaders of the government, with the duly elected officials, are you not finding fault with yourselves? For if the better men among you are base, what should one assume regarding the others? “Shall we, then, lose what belongs to us?” some one retorts. No one is suggesting that; on the contrary, you may rest assured that in all our cities there are public funds, and a few persons have these funds in their possession, some through ignorance and some otherwise; and it is necessary to take precautions and try to recover these funds, yet not with hatred or wrangling.

  [10] These men are generous; they have often made contributions to you out of their own resources. Use persuasion on them, appeal to them; if they are stubborn, urge the justice of your claims before them privately, with no outsider present. Is it not you who often praise us all day long, calling some of us nobles, some Olympians, some saviours, some foster-parents? Then, by all that’s holy, are you going to be convicted of false witness in your own household, and is it anger which now prompts your words, or was it flattery then; and is it that you are the victims of deception now, or were you guilty of deception then? Will you not cease your turbulence and recognize that you have fellow citizens of refinement and a city that can be prosperous? I can accomplish many things, if Heaven wills, with these men as my helpers; however, I cite the proverb, one man is no man.

  [11] But possibly you were displeased that the work has not been completed. It is going forward, and it will be completed very speedily, especially with the enthusiastic and earnest interest of these men, provided they give willingly; for you know they were not unwilling when they gave their promise. But why do you demand payment from these men and not from me? Because I am supposed to have made payment to you already? Then do you regard it as my doing, if I have made my own fatherland more highly esteemed by providing some working capital, as it were, from the Council fees, and, and by Zeus, from increase in income brought about through the revision of our finances? Why, these matters are as if I had prayed in your behalf, while the gods did the work.

  [12] Aye, and if I am able to do it again I will do it again. And I shall be able to do so with confidence, provided I have the friendship of the people of Prusa, and I shall not charge you anything for such efforts. For neither do parents charge to the account of their children the prayers offered in their behalf. Do you imagine I should be speaking of a colonnade or anything else, if I saw you wrangling? Why, that would be just as if, when a man is ill and suffering from brain fever, though the proper treatment, no doubt, would be to put him to bed and apply a poultice, one were to rub him with perfume and administer a garland! These things are a luxury for the well, for those who have no affliction. Do not you suppose that at the time when the Athenians were in the grip of civil war and had brought upon themselves the enemy and were betraying one another — poor devils! — they had both the Propylaea and the Parthenon and the colonnades and Peiraeus? Aye, but the Propylaea and the dockyards and the Peiraeus itself only echoed the more loudly to their cries.

  [13] And yet a great and populous city suffering from civil war and folly can for a time endure its misfortune; still you can see how terrible even such things are. Do not the Athenians accuse one another, do they not drive men into exile, do they not put one party into the Council and drive out the other? Is not everything subject to upheaval as in an earthquake, everything unsettled, nothing stable? They have reached the point of not being satisfied with their own leaders, but, just as in the case of incurable diseases, require physicians from abroad. Then comes what happens with intractable horses — when the bit fails to hold them in check, a curb is put upon them from without.

  [14] My concern is partly indeed for you, but partly also for myself. For if, when a philosopher has taken a government in hand, he proves unable to produce a united city, this is indeed a shocking state of affairs, one admitting no escape, just as if a shipwright while sailing in a ship should fail to render the ship seaworthy, or as if a man who claimed to be a pilot should swerve toward the wave itself, or as if a builder should obtain a house a
nd, seeing that it was falling to decay, should disregard this fact but, giving it a coat of stucco and a wash of colour, should imagine that he is achieving something.

  If my purpose on this occasion were to speak in behalf of concord, I should have had a good deal to say about not only human experiences but celestial also, to the effect that these divine and grand creations, as it happens, require concord and friendship; otherwise there is danger of ruin and destruction for this beautiful work of the creator, the universe. [15] But perhaps I am talking too long, when I should instead go and call the proconsul to our meeting. Accordingly I shall say only this much more — is it not disgraceful that bees are of one mind and no one has ever seen a swarm that is factious and fights against itself, but, on the contrary, they both work and live together, providing food for one another and using it as well? “What!” some one objects, “do we not find there too bees that are called drones, annoying creatures which devour the honey?” Yes, by Heaven, we do indeed; but still the farmers often tolerate even them, not wishing to disturb the hive, and believe it better to waste some of the honey rather than to throw all the bees into confusion. [16] But at Prusa, it may be, there are no lazy drones, buzzing in impotence, sipping the honey. Again, it is a great delight to observe the ants, how they go forth from the nest, how they aid one another with their loads, and how they yield the trails to one another. Is it not disgraceful, then, as I was saying, that human beings should be more unintelligent than wild creatures which are so tiny and unintelligent?

  Now this which I have been saying is in a way just idle talk. And civil strife does not deserve even to be named among us, and let no man mention it. [17] However, I propose that after purifying the city — not with squill nor yet with water, but with what is far more pure, namely, reason — we negotiate in public meeting what yet remains, not only concerning ourselves with our clerks of the market and so forth, but also calling the attention of the Council to these matters, so that it may make provision for the city, as is its practice; for these things will be quite easy for you to do. Besides, this deserves your serious attention also on account of the archon whom you have created, in order that, having taken a man of inexperience, you may not later abandon him in wave and tempest.

  THE FORTY-NINTH DISCOURSE: A REFUSAL OF THE OFFICE OF ARCHON DELIVERED BEFORE THE COUNCIL

  The major portion of this Discourse is devoted to a consideration of the importance of the philosopher in the administration of affairs of state and of his duty to accept office for the good of the state. It appears that Dio, without his previous consent, had been set up as a candidate for election to the archonship, the highest office in the government. That election to this office was a function of the Council is clear, not only from the fact that Dio’s excuses are offered to that body, but especially from the natural interpretationº of §§ 14-15. Furthermore, we learn from § 15 that the Council had once before elected him to that office by acclamation. Arnim argues with much cleverness that the election just referred to took place the year preceding our Discourse, A.D. 102, that Dio declined to serve on that occasion, and that he used his influence to bring about the substitution of his son to fill his place (cf. Or. 48.17 and note). On the occasion referred to Dio, in support of his request to be excused, urged the imminence of his departure from Prusa. Not yet having made good that announcement, he now feels called upon to assert his good faith and to declare that this time he is really about to leave (§ 15).

  For what reason was he to take his departure? In the initial sentence of Or. (A.D. 101 or 102) he says he believes he has not much longer to stay in Prusa. One infers from his use of the verb οἴομαι that his departure is not wholly a matter of personal choice. In that same speech (§ 3) and in Or. he suggests that he might reasonably look to Trajan for some preferment. Arnim concludes that some such offer of preferment had been made prior to Or. 45 and that Dio’s earlier uncertainty as to the precise moment of his departure was due to the Emperor’s absence from Rome in connexion with his campaign in Dacia. That campaign is now over and Dio is due to begin his journey to Rome.

  The Forty-ninth Discourse: A Refusal of the Office of Archon Delivered before the Council

  To reasonable and cultivated men the holding of office is neither distasteful nor difficult. For they enjoy nothing more than doing good; and the ruler of a city, or of a tribe, or of still larger aggregations of mankind, not only has the fullest opportunity for doing good, but also is practically bound to do so; but if he fails in that respect, the ruler who does harm is not tolerated, I do not say by human beings, reputed to be the most petulant of all creatures, but not even by the stupidest of the beasts. [2] For example, neither do cattle willingly submit to neglect on the part of the hersdmen nor do flocks of goats and sheep submit to keepers who ruin them. For some run away and do not obey, and others even retaliate against their wicked guardians. In fact horses inflict much worse punishment on ignorant drivers by throwing them off than the drivers inflict by striking them with the whip. But of all these creatures man is the most clever and has the most intelligence; accordingly man is most hostile of all toward a bad ruler, though most kindly of all toward one who is good. Thus being a ruler is pleasant for those who know the art — though no pursuit could be difficult for the man who had practised it from the start and had equipped himself for it.

  [3] But he who is really a philosopher will be found to be devoting himself to no other task than that of learning how he will be able to rule well, whether it be ruling himself or a household or the greatest state or, in short, all mankind, provided they permit it, and, while himself needing no ruler other than reason and God, he will be competent to care for and give heed to the rest of mankind. Moreover, this fact has not escaped the notice even of kings themselves, or of any men in power who are not utterly bereft of judgement. For they entreat men of cultivation to become their counsellors in their most important problems, and, while giving orders to everybody else, they themselves accept orders from those counsellors as to what to do and what not to do.

  [4] Take Agamemnon for example — Homer says that Agamemnon also sought the opinion of Nestor especially, and that every time he did not follow Nestor’s advice he bewailed the fact and promptly repented. Again, Philip, who is reputed to have been the cleverest of kings, engaged Aristotle as teacher and ruler for his son Alexander, believing that he himself was not competent to give instruction in the science of kingship; nay, while he thought himself fit to rule the other Macedonians and Thracians and Illyrians and all the Greeks, he handed his son over to another to be ruled, and while he gave orders to so many myriads, he did not dare give orders to that one man. The reason is that he did not feel his own risk to be as great if he should err where it concerned any one else as it would be if he should commit some error in connexion with his son.

  [5] And yet previously Philip himself, while a hostage at Thebes, not only was associated with Pelopidas, a man of cultivation — in consequence of which it was even said that Pelopidas had been his lover — but he also witnessed the deeds of Epaminondas and listened to his words; and it was not mere accident that Epaminondas had acquired such power among the Greeks and had wrought so great a change in Greece as to overthrow the Spartans, despite their long-continued rule, but because he had conversed with Lysis, the disciple of Pythagoras. This, I fancy, explains why Philip was far superior to those who previously had become kings of Macedonia. Yet for all that, though he had the good fortune to obtain so good an education, he did not have the courage to instruct Alexander himself.

  [6] However, while one would find that philosophers have rarely become rulers among men — I mean holding positions termed “offices,” serving as generals or satraps or kings — on the other hand, those whom they ruled have derived from them most numerous and most important benefits — the Athenians from Solon, from Aristeides, and from Pericles, the disciple of Anaxagoras; the Thebans from Epaminondas; the Romans from Numa, who, as some say, had some acquaintance with the philosoph
y of Pythagoras; and the Italian Greeks in general from the Pythagoreans, for these Greeks prospered and conducted their municipal affairs with the greatest concord and peace just so long as those Pythagoreans managed their cities.

  [7] Furthermore, since they cannot always be ruled by kings who are philosophers, the most powerful nations have publicly appointed philosophers as superintendents and officers for their kings. Thus the Persians, methinks, appointed those whom they call Magi, because they were acquainted with Nature and understood how the gods should be worshipped; the Egyptians appointed the priests who had the same knowledge as the Magi, devoting themselves to the service of the gods and knowing the how and the wherefore of everything; the Indians appointed Brachmans, because they excel in self-control and righteousness and in their devotion to the divine, as a result of which they know the future better than all other men know their immediate present; [8] the Celts appointed those whom they call Druids, these also being devoted to the prophetic art and to wisdom in general. In all these cases the kings were not permitted to do or plan anything without the assistance of these wise men, so that in truth it was they who ruled, while the kings became are servants and the ministers of their will, though they sat on golden thrones, dwelt in great houses, and feasted sumptuously.

  And indeed it is reasonable to expect that man to administer any office most capably who, occupying continuously the most difficult office of all, can show himself free from error. [9] For example, the philosopher is always master of himself; and this is altogether more difficult than to be king over all the Greeks or all the barbarians. For what race of men is as savage as are anger and envy and contentiousness, things over which the philosopher must maintain control? What race is as knavish and intrigue number and traitorous as are pleasures and lusts, by which he must never be overcome? What race is as violent and terrifying and debasing to men’s souls as are fear and pain, to which he must never be seen to yield? [10] Again, what armour, what defences does he possess for protection against these efforts such as both kings and generals have against a foe? What allies or bodyguards can he employ against them, unless it be words of wisdom and prudence? Whom else can he bid do sentry duty or trust to stand guard, or what servants can he employ? Is he not, on the contrary, obliged to hold this watch himself both night and day, with anxious thought and vigilance, lest, ere he is aware of it, he may be excited by pleasures or terrified by fears or tricked by lust or brought low by pain and so be made to abandon those acts which are best and most righteous, turning traitor to himself? [11] However, the man who administers this office with firmness and self-control does not find it difficult from then on to show himself superior even to the whole world.