Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [9] Again, both Socrates and Homer alike scorned the acquisition of wealth. Besides, they both were devoted to the same ends and spoke about the same things, the one through the medium of his verse, the other in prose — human virtue and vice, actions wrong and actions right, truth and deceit, and how the masses have only opinions, while the wise have true knowledge.

  Furthermore, they were most effective at making similes and comparisons.

  Int. This is indeed surprising if with Homer’s comparisons of fire and winds and sea and eagles and bulls and lions and so forth, figures with which he adorned his poetry, you shall see fit to compare the potters and cobblers of Socrates.

  [10] Dio. I shall, my dear fellow, since indeed we compare the fox of Archilochus with the lions and leopards of Homer and declare it to be not at all, or not much, inferior. However, perhaps you disapprove also of such Homeric similes as those in which he refers to starlings or daws or locusts or a firebrand or ashes or beans and chickpeas, or the one in which he has depicted men winnowing — [11] perhaps these seem to they to be the most inferior portions of Homer’s work, while you admire only his lions and eagles and Scyllas and Cyclopes, with which he was wont to beguile stupid people, just as nurses beguile children with tales of the Lamia. Indeed, just as Homer through myths and history undertook to instruct human beings, who are very troublesome to instruct, so also Socrates often used this sort of device, sometimes admitting that he was in earnest and sometimes pretending to be joking, with the aim of benefiting mankind — though in so doing he perhaps came into conflict with mythologists and historians.

  [12] Again, it was not without conscious purpose that he represented Gorgias or Polus or Thrasymachus or Prodicus or Meno or Euthyphro or Anytus or Alcibiades or Laches as speaking, when he might have omitted their names; on the contrary, he knew that by this device most of all he would benefit his hearers, if perchance they grasped the point; for to comprehend human beings from their words, or their words from human beings, is not an easy task for any but philosophers and educated persons. On the other hand, most men suppose that such items are purposeless, and they regard them as mere vexation and nonsense. [13] But Socrates held that, every time he introduces a boastful man, he is speaking of boastfulness; every time he introduces a shameless, loathsome man, he is speaking of shamelessness and loathsomeness; every time he introduces an unreasonable, irascible man, he is turning his hearers against unreason and anger. Moreover, in all other cases similarly he revealed the true nature of the passions and maladies of men in the persons of the very ones who were afflicted by the passions or the maladies more distinctly than if he were using the words by themselves.

  [14] But it appears to me that he took this too from Homer. For example, when Homer tells about Dolon, how he conceived a longing for the horses of Achilles, and how, when he might have fled from the enemy, he halted with his lance planted close beside him and obtained no benefit from his fleetness, and how his teeth chattered and struck together from terror, and how he talked to the enemy, not only when they asked him a question, but even on topics about which no one was inquiring — for instance, he gave information about the Thracian horses and about Rhesus, of whose arrival no one knew — by telling all this so very plainly does Homer not seem to you to be discoursing on cowardice and love of notoriety?

  [15] And again, when he tells about Pandarus, how he violated the truce in the hope of rewards from Alexander son of Priam, and how he not only failed to slay Menelaüs by his shot, although reputed but an able bowman, but also by violating the truce made the Trojans more discouraged as to the war through their constant recollection of their broken oaths — as witness these lines:

  But now we fight as traitors to our oaths;

  On that account ’tis not so well for us —

  [16] and how not much later his tongue was cut off and he died before ever Alexander could even put into words his gratitude to him — in recounting these things with such scrupulous attention to detail, does Homer appear to you to be talking of anything else than of bribe-taking and impiety and in general of folly? Why, Pandarus even cursed his arrows and threatened to smash and burn them, as if the arrows were in fear of him!

  [17] Take another example. When Homer says of Asius son of Hyrtacus that, after his commander had given orders to leave the horses outside the trench, he alone did not obey,

  But with them neared the speedy ships, the fool!

  Nor was he fated, dodging the spirits dire,

  To come again, exulting in team and car,

  Back from the ships to wind-swept Ilium,

  [18] driving into such difficult terrain amid trench and wall and ships, where even the men on foot found it not to their advantage when caught by the foe, but most of them were slaughtered when a small rescue party issued from within the gate; yet Asius, elated as he was by his horses and the beauty of his chariot, though thinking to drive past the wall, was prepared to plunge into the sea and to fight from his chariot — think you not that Homer then is speaking of disobedience and boastfulness?

  [19] On the other hand, when he contrasts with these Polydamas giving orders to be cautious and not to cross the trench, pointing now to the enterprise as a risky venture and now to the omen they had had — for he felt that, while no one would listen to his words in any other way, perhaps by the omen he might persuade Hector; or, to take another illustration, when, as Agamemnon and Achilles are reviling one another, Homer depicts Nestor as trying to make them cease their rage, and foretelling plainly what will befall them in consequence of their strife, and later upbraiding Agamemnon as being in the wrong and forcing him to entreat Achilles; or again, Odysseus setting right the blunder of Agamemnon through which, while wishing to test the army to see how it stood the war’s delay, he almost brought about its flight — is it not likely that by scenes like these Homer is trying to give advice regarding prudence and generalship and prophecy, and more than this, regarding tact and tactlessness?

  [20] As for the Odyssey, while I shall omit all else, I shall recall just one character, Antinoüs. For Homer has portrayed him as the most braggart of the suitors and the most dissolute. For example, in the first place he scorned Odysseus because he was in rags, while Antinoüs himself in costly raiment was drinking from golden goblets — and those not his own — and was dining sumptuously, not on his father’s viands, but rather playing the parasite in a house that lacked a master; moreover, while he professed to be enamoured of Penelopê, he was seducing the maidservants of Odysseus and behaving licentiously in general; [21] and he ended by attempting to draw the bow, though he was unacquainted with archery and his hands were so spoiled by dainty living as not to be able to grasp the bow-string unless some smeared it with tallow; and what is more, he did this in the sight of Odysseus and in the presence of the object of his wooing, in the midst of such a crowd of men, not even being able to bend the bow, nor understanding how Telemachus was going to set up the axes. But for all that, Homer caused this man also to meet his death by a telling blow through the throat, instead of in some chance spot, just as, you remember, he caused Pandarus to be smitten through the tongue. For indeed if such things do take place by some chance, still in many instances it is possible to say that this man ought to die from a blow through the belly and that man through the genitals and another man through the mouth.

  [22] Well, then, Homer does not seem to you to say anything without a purpose, does he? No more, then, did Socrates employ his words or illustrations at random; on the contrary, when conversing with Anytus he would refer to tanners and cobblers; but if he conversed with Lysicles, it would be lambs and fleeces; if with Lycon, law-suits and blackmail; if with Meno the Thessalian, lovers and boy friends.

  THE FIFTY-SIXTH DISCOURSE: AGAMEMNON OR ON KINGSHIP

  This document, like the one preceding, appears to be a transcript of a conversation between Dio and an unnamed pupil. In his opening sentence Dio proposes Agamemnon as a topic likely to improve the mind. Having secured the pupil�
��s acceptance of that theme, he proceeds, in true Platonic fashion, to elicit a definition of the word king; “he who exercises general supervision of human beings and gives them orders without being accountable to them.” That definition having been obtained, he demolishes it by calling attention, first to the restraint imposed upon the kings at Sparta by the ephors, and then to Agamemnon’s dependence upon Nestor and his council of elders. Having seemingly induced the pupil to concede the point, Dio suddenly suggests that they drop the question, as having been dealt with adequately the day before, and turn to something else. The pupil protests that he is just beginning to understand what Dio has in mind and is eager for a full discussion, but our document goes no farther. Either the reporter decided for some unknown reason to stop at that point or Dio’s literary executor felt that this much was sufficient to illustrate this particular theme. The various aspects of kingship are considered by Dio not only in the first four orations in our collection — assigned by Arnim to the opening years of Trajan’s reign — but, at least incidentally, in several others.

  The Fifty-sixth Discourse: Agamemnon or On Kingship

  [1] Dio. Do you wish to hear words of practical wisdom on the subject of Agamemnon, words by which the mind can be improved, or does it annoy you to have Agamemnon son of Atreus named in my discussions?

  Interlocutor. Not even if you should speak of Adrastus son of Talaüs or of Tantalus or of Pelops, should I be annoyed, provided I am likely to be improved.

  Dio. Very well, I have just called to mind certain words which I might speak, if you would consent to answer when I question you.

  Proceed, for I will answer.

  [2] Dio. Are there certain persons who are rulers of men, just as there are some who are rulers of goats, others of swine, others of horses, others of cattle, these one and all having in common the title herders; or have you not read this verse of Cratinus?

  My post is herder; goats and kine I tend.

  Int. I could not tell you whether it is better to call all who tend animals herders or not.

  Dio. Not merely those who tend brute beasts, my good fellow, but human beings too, if one should put any faith in Homer regarding these matters. But why did you not answer the original question?

  Int. What question?

  Dio. Whether there are indeed certain rulers of men.

  Int. Why, of course there are.

  [3] Dio. Who are these? What do you call them? I am not speaking of those who rule soldiers in war, for those who are leaders of the army as a whole we are wont to call generals; just as also, considered unit by unit, the ruler of a company is called captain; of a regiment, colonel; of the fleet, admiral; and of a single trireme, trierarch; moreover, there are several others similarly named who in warfare exercise rule over small units, because at that time men need fullest care and leadership. [4] Nor, as it happens, am I asking what the leaders of the choruses are called, who give orders to the singers and set the tune, nor am I asking about the leaders of symposia, nor about any others who for a single act or for a set time assume a certain oversight and control over a group of men; on the contrary, I mean rather those who at any time rule human beings in their activities as citizens, or in their farming, it may be, or simply in their living, as Cyrus, for example, ruled the Persians, Deïoces the Medes, Hellen those named for him, Aeolus the Aeolians, Dorus the Dorians, Numa the Romans, and Dardanus the Phrygians.

  [5] Int. Why, your question is not a hard one; for all these whom you now name were called kings, and kings they were; and this rule of which you speak, whereby a man exercises general control over human beings and gives them orders without being account able to them, is called kingship.

  Dio. Then you do not regard as kingship the rule of the Heracleidae, who were kings in Lacedaemon for so long a time? For they did not do everything according to their own pleasure, [6] but in many matters they were subject to the ephors, who, once this office had been established in Sparta in the reign of Theopompus, from their year of office had no less authority than the kings, insomuch that they wished to throw into prison even Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the victor at Plataea, and when he had fled for refuge to the shrine of Athena, they killed him there, and it profited him nothing that he was of the line of the Heracleidae, or that he was guardian of a boy, or that he had been leader of all Hellas and not of Sparta alone. [7] And later on, when Agesilaüs was at war with the Great King and had been victorious in battle in the neighbourhood of Sardis and had gained control over all lower Asia, the ephors sent a subordinate to summon him home; and Agesilaüs did not delay a single day, although he had gained authority over so many Greeks and so many barbarians. Was Agesilaüs, then, not king of Sparta, since he was subject to other rulers?

  Int. Why, how could these be kings in the strict sense of kingship?

  [8] Dio. Will you, then, hold that not even Agamemnon was king of both Argives and Achaeans at Ilium, since he had an older man as supervisor of his rule, Nestor of Pylus? Moreover, it was at that man’s bidding that the wall about the ships was built and the trench dug about it as protection for the naval station, and at his direction too Agamemnon divided the army into detachments, though previously, as it would seem, it had fought without organization, both infantry and cavalry, all being mixed together in confusion, both Pylians and Argives and Arcadians and Boeotians. However, Nestor later bade him divide the army by tribes,

  That phratry may aid phratry and tribe aid tribe.

  [9] “Moreover,” said he, “in this way wilt thou recognize both the valorous and the cowardly among thy leaders” — but if among the leaders, obviously among the common soldiers too — and at the same time he explained the magnitude of the advantage that would result.

  Int. And with what purpose did Nestor do this?

  Dio. In order that even after Nestor’s death Agamemnon might understand the art of generalship. But Agamemnon was so wholly obedient to Nestor that he not only did eagerly anything Nestor commanded in person, but even if in a dream he imagined that Nestor was saying something, he would not disregard that either. For instance, the dream about the battle deceived him in this way, because of its resemblance to Nestor.

  [10] However, he was not only obedient to Nestor, who was deemed the wisest of the Achaeans, but also he would not attempt anything without the elders. For instance, when he was about to lead forth his army in obedience to the dream, he did not do so until the council of the elders had held a session by the ship of Nestor. Moreover, with regard to the test which he wished to make of the army, to see if it was willing to remain longer and fight it out despite the wrath of Achilles, he did not make the test in any other way before first consulting the council. On the other hand, most demagogues do not hesitate to bring before the popular assembly measures which have not been passed upon by the council. Yet Agamemnon conferred with the elders, and only then reported to the soldiery on the state of the war.

  [11] Int. This is nothing strange, that, king though he was, he gave the others a chance to be heard and had an advisor who was trusted because of his years, though he himself had full authority in all matters. Else why did he act as he did in the matter of Briseïs instead of obeying the most noble Nestor?

  Dio. Why, it is just like the case of many men in private station who, not obeying their rulers or the laws, commit many unlawful acts, acts for which they even have to submit to an accounting; so when they are brought before the court they are subjected to whatever penalty they severally are thought to merit.

  Int. Certainly.

  [12] Dio. Well then, does it not seem to you that Agamemnon, because he disobeyed on that occasion, was later called to account by Nestor? I refer to the passage in which Nestor accuses him of that act in the presence of the wisest of the allies, the leaders themselves, adding what he was to suffer or to pay by way of penalty, a most grievous assignment — for he was an able speaker — wherein he says he has long been troubled by Agamemnon’s conduct:

  [13] E’er since that day, oh son o
f Zeus, when thou

  Didst go and snatch Briseïs from the tent,

  Despite Achilles’ rage, and not at all

  As I was minded. Many words I spake

  Against it; yet to thy proud heart thou didst

  Submit, dishonouring the bravest man,

  Whom e’en the gods had honoured; for his prize

  Thou hast by seizure; still let us plan e’en now.

  [14] And, by the gods, he not only called him to account by his words but even laid upon him the heaviest penalty of all for his misconduct. For he bids him entreat Achilles and go to all lengths to persuade him. And Agamemnon, like men convicted in the courts, first makes a counter proposal of a fine, such as he says he is able to pay, as compensation for his insult; then, among other things, he undertakes to offer sacrifice and to swear an oath regarding Briseïs, that he has not even touched her since the day he took her from Achilles; [15] and in payment for merely having removed her from one tent to another, he offers to give much gold, horses, tripods, cauldron, women, and cities; and finally, thinking this not enough, he offers Achilles whichever of his three daughters he may desire to have as wife. Such a penalty no man had ever been condemned to undergo — in payment for a maidservant, and her a captive woman, although she had suffered no harm, to be forced to give his own daughter in marriage, together with a huge dower, and without any presents from the groom! In truth we know of no suit involving a man in private station that has received a more bitter decision than this one.