Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [9] And here is an indication of the depravity of mankind. If men were to do away with the laws and licence were to be granted to strike one another, to commit murder, to steal the property of one’s neighbours, to commit adultery, to be a footpad, then who must we suppose would be the persons who will refrain from these deeds and not, without the slightest scruple or hesitation, be willing to commit all manner of crimes? For even under present conditions we none the less are living unwittingly with thieves and kidnappers and adulterers and joining with them in the activities of citizenship, and in this respect we are no better than the wild beasts; for they too, if they take fright at men or dogs set to guard against them, refrain from thieving.

  THE SEVENTIETH DISCOURSE: ON PHILOSOPHY

  This brief dialogue, like others in our collection, both begins and ends abruptly. It has the appearance of being an excerpt from a lengthier discussion, probably selected for publication because it contained a noteworthy tribute to the essential nature of philosophy. The rôle of the student in this document — if it was a student — is decidedly minor, consisting chiefly in assenting to the statements made by the principal speaker. Dio is emphasizing the crucial difference between pseudo-philosophers and those who are philosophers in deed as well as in word. In Truly Socratic fashion he leads up to his main thesis by citing examples of pretence in fields such as farming, trading, hunting, and the like, showing in each instance that no one is misled by profession of interest unaccompanied by fitting conduct.

  The Seventieth Discourse: On Philosophy

  Dio. Come now, suppose you should hear some one say that he wants to be a farmer, but should observe that he is doing nothing toward that end, neither buying or raising cattle nor preparing ploughs or the other equipment needed in farming, nor even living on a farm himself, either as owner or as tenant of another, but rather in town, spending his time principally about the market-place and the gymnasium and occupied with drinking parties and courtesans and that sort of frivolity — in such a case will you treat seriously what he says rather than what he does? And will you say the fellow is a farmer and a producer, or one of the lazy and frivolous set?

  Interlocutor. One of the lazy set, of course.

  [2] Dio. Very good. But suppose a man were to say that he is a huntsman, and that he surpasses Hippolytus himself or Meleager in both his valour and his diligence, but it should be obvious that he is engaged in no activity of that nature, since he has acquired neither dogs nor hunting-nets nor a horse and never goes out after game at all but, on the contrary, neither has been tanned by the sun nor is able to endure cold, but has been reared in the shade and is soft and very like the women, could you possibly believe that this man is telling the truth and that he has anything to do with hunting?

  Int. Not I.

  [3] Dio. Correct; for it is absurd that we should know and pass upon every man’s life on the strength of what he says rather than of what he does. Again, if some one should offer his services as an expert in music and as one who devotes his time to this, and yet no one should ever hear him either playing the cithara, nay, even see him holding a cithara or a lyre, or descanting on any subject related to music — that is, apart from his offering his services and saying that he has a better knowledge of music than Orpheus and Thamyras — but if one should see him training and rearing game-cocks or quails and spending his time for the most part in company with those of like interests, ought one to conclude that he is a musician, or, on the contrary, one of the set with which he associates and whose pursuits are the same as his?

  Int. Evidently one of that set.

  [4] Dio. Again, if one were to profess that he is an astronomer and that he knows most accurately how the orbits and courses and the intervening distances stand with relation to one another in the case of sun and moon and similar heavenly bodies, and also celestial phenomena, and yet the man has shown no predilection of this sort and has no serious interest in these matters, but rather prefers to associate with gamblers, lives his life in their company, and is seen with them day after day, will you call this man an astronomer or a gambler?

  Int. Nay, by heaven, I would not consider that he had anything at all to do with astronomy, but much rather with gambling.

  [5] Dio. Again, given two persons, one of whom says he intends to sail immediately and will gain much profit from trading, although he has not provided himself with either ship or sailors, has no cargo whatever, but, in fact, never goes near the harbour at all, or even the sea; whereas the other occupies himself constantly with these matters, examining thoroughly a boat and putting on board a pilot and a cargo — which of the two will you say is seriously interested in trading? The one who says he is, or the one who works at it and provides himself with all that the voyage and the business of trading demand?

  Int. I should say the latter.

  [6] Dio. In every matter, then, will you consider that the word alone, unaccompanied by any act, is invalid and untrustworthy, but that the act alone is both trustworthy and true, even if no word precedes it?

  Int. Just so.

  Dio. Well then, if there are certain functions and articles of equipment peculiar to farming or to seafaring and different ones appropriate to the hunter, the astronomer, and all other professions as well, then has philosophy no function peculiar to itself, no activity, no equipment?

  Int. Most assuredly it has.

  [7] Dio. Well, are those things obscure which belong to the philosopher and to philosophy, while those which belong to the traders and farmers and musicians and astronomers and those whom I have just named are conspicuous and manifest?

  Int. No, I think not obscure.

  Dio. But surely there are certain words which one who goes in for philosophy must hear, and studies which he must pursue, and a regimen to which he must adhere, and, in a word, one kind of life belongs to the philosopher and another to the majority of mankind: the one tends toward truth and wisdom and toward care and cultivation of the gods, and, as regards one’s own soul, far from false pretence and deceit and luxury, toward frugality and sobriety.

  [8] And, in fact, there is one kind of dress for the philosopher and another for the layman, and the same holds good as to table manners and gymnasia and baths and the mode of living generally, and he who is guided by and employs these distinctions must be thought to be devoted to philosophy; whereas he who does not differ in any of these matters and is not at all unlike the world in general must not be classified as a philosopher, not even if he says he is a thousand times and makes public profession of philosophy before the popular assembly of Athens or of Megara or in the presence of the kings of Sparta; instead, we must banish this man to the company of impostors and fools and voluptuaries.

  [9] And yet it is not impossible to be musical without engaging in musical activities; for the art of music does not compel one to devote his attention to it and to regard nothing else of greater moment. Again, if one is an astronomer, possibly nothing prevents his keeping game-cocks or throwing dice; for in no wise does astronomy prevent his doing what is not right! Furthermore, by Heaven, if one has become an expert horseman, or a good pilot, or a surveyor, or a literary critic, it is nothing surprising that he should be seen in the apartments of either the courtesans or the flute-girls. For the knowledge of those skills does not make the human soul one whit better or turn it aside from its errors; [10] but if one is devoted to philosophy and partakes of this study, one could never desert the highest things, nor, neglecting these things, could he prefer to engage in anything which is shameful and low, or to be lazy and gluttonous and drunken. For to refuse to admire these things and to banish the desire for them from the soul and on the other hand, to lead the soul to hate and condemn them, is the essence of philosophy. However, possibly there is nothing to prevent one’s claiming to be a philosopher and at the same time playing the impostor and deceiving himself and everybody else.

  THE SEVENTY-FIRST DISCOURSE: ON THE PHILOSOPHER

  In this Discourse Dio examines the st
atement that “the philosopher should be remarkable in everything.” As examples of versatility he considers Hippias of Elis, the well-known sophist, and Odysseus, each of whom exhibited a high degree of skill in both intellectual and manual pursuits. While admitting their claim to excellence, Dio maintains that the philosopher should be able to excel all men above all in “acting, or not acting, advantageously, and in knowing when to act and where and the right moment better than the craftsman, and also in knowing what is possible of achievement.” This dictum (§ 6) is illustrated by reference to Daedalus and other skilled artificers, who failed of real excellence because they were ignorant in just those respects. The Discourse concludes with a sarcastic allusion to Nero’s varied ambitions.

  The Seventy-first Discourse: On the Philosopher

  There are those who say that the philosopher should be remarkable in everything in any surroundings; moreover, they say that he should be very able in conversation with men and never keep silent or be at a loss before those in his company for lack of such language as will be capable of pleasing them; otherwise, they say, he who is not thus equipped is an ignoramus and worth but little. But I say that, though some of their statements are just and truthful, some are not. [2] For that the philosopher should in every situation be superior to all others, it seems to me they are right in demanding — unless they mean that he must not only know all the crafts but also, in accordance with the rules of the craft, produce everything better than the craftsmen, both building houses and making boats and working as a smith and weaving and farming. For example, Hippias of Elis claimed to be the wisest of the Greeks, for both at the Olympic Games and at the other national gatherings of the Greeks he produced poems of every style and speeches which he had composed of divers kinds, but he also displayed other products of his — his ring, his oil-flask and strigil, his mantle, and his girdle — boasting that he had made them all himself, displaying them to the Greeks as a kind of firstfruits of his wisdom.

  [3] And Homer too, I venture to remark, has represented Odysseus, not merely as pre-eminent and judgement and in his ability to plan concerning practical matters, not merely as a most able speaker, whether in a crowd or before a few or before only one person — yes, by Heaven, both in assembly and over the wine-cups and on occasions when walking with somebody on a journey — whether in the presence of king or of commoner, freeman or slave, no matter whether he was himself held in honour and recognized as king or, on the other hand, unknown and a beggar, and, moreover, alike when addressing either man or woman or maiden; but he also makes him pre-eminent for his knowledge of the art of combat, and he has even represented him as skilled in all such crafts as those of the joiner, the carpenter, and the shipwright. [4] For instance, how could Odysseus have constructed his bed by cutting off the trunk of an olive tree if he were not acquainted with the joiner’s art? How could he have enclosed his bed-chamber if he had not been acquainted with the builder’s art? How could he have built his raft if he had not understood ship-building? As for the operations connected with planting and husbandry, he obviously had shown a serious interest in all that from his very boyhood, since he begged his father for trees and vines; and especially, since his father was a very careful and experienced farmer, it was to be expected that Odysseus would not be ignorant of these matters, yes, he even challenges Eurymachus to a contest in both reaping and ploughing. Why, Odysseus claims to be acquainted also with such matters as cookery and wine-serving and all other departments of domestic service, matters wherein he says that those of lower rank serve the nobles.

  [5] Very well, in these respects no doubt Hippias and Odysseus were a clever pair; but I say that the philosopher, while unable to know every one of the crafts — for it is difficult to be thoroughly proficient in the practice of even one — nevertheless could do everything, no matter what he might be doing, better than anybody else, even though from the point of view of the crafts, if he really is ever compelled to tackle anything of that nature, he is not superior when measured by the standard of craftsmanship. For this is an impossibility, that the layman should produce anything better than the joiner by the standard of the joiner’s craft, or that one who lacks experience in farming should be found more expert than the farmer in performing any of the tasks of the farmer.

  [6] Wherein, then, would the philosopher be superior? It would be in his acting, or not acting, advantageously, and in his knowing when to act and where and the right moment better than the craftsman, and also in his knowing what is possible of achievement. For instance, I believe that Daedalus did not build his Labyrinth in Crete well — entering which his fellow citizens, both male and female, met their death — for he did not build it justly. And besides, in abetting the malady of Pasiphaë he wrought not rightly; for it was not advantageous nor was it just or honourable to lend such aid or to invent devices for ends which were shameful and impious. And even when he equipped Icarus with wings — if we are to believe the tale — I say he did not do well to invent this device; for he was attempting the impossible when he attached wings to a human being. Accordingly he wrought the death of his son.

  [7] But apparently Homer too says harsh things of a certain builder among the Trojans, as not having done well when he built for Alexander the ships with which he sailed to Hellas — though he has no fault to find with him on the score of craftsmanship. For this is what he says:

  Who built for Paris well-proportioned ships,

  Sources of ill,

  not lauding him for his construction of the ships, but rather censuring him much more severely than if, by saying that he had made the ships either slow or with some other defect, he had censured him for ship-building. And Homer in similar fashion censures also a certain huntsman and ridicules his skill, because he had acquired it to no good purpose, but, on the contrary, while the man knew how to shoot wild beasts, in warfare he could not hit any one but was useless because of his cowardice, and he adds that on the occasion in question Artemis did not aid him.

  [8] From these illustrations, therefore, it is evident that there is need of wisdom and virtue as applied both to what men know and also to what they do not know; and thus it is that the prudent man, such as the philosopher should be, would in everything be superior to all the world, whether in doing any of these things or in not doing, no matter how he performs according to the standards of the craft. But that he will paint better than the painter when not himself a painter; or that he will tend the sick better than the physician, as measured by the standards of art, when himself not a physician; or that he will sing more musically than the musicians when unacquainted with the art of music or only slightly acquainted; or that he will show himself better versed than the arithmeticians in the theory of numbers, or than the surveyors in surveying, or than the farmers in planting, or than the pilots in piloting; or that he will slaughter an animal more expeditiously than the butchers, or, should it be necessary to cut it up, do so more expeditiously than those who have made this very thing their profession — such things are not to be expected.

  [9] And yet a certain king of our times had the ambition to be wise in this sort of wisdom, believing that he had knowledge of very many things — not, however, of such things as do not receive applause among men, but rather those for which it is possible to win a crown — I mean acting as a herald, singing to the cithara, reciting tragedies, wrestling, and taking part in the pancration. Besides, they say that he could paint and fashion statues and play the pipe, both by means of his lips and by tucking a skin beneath his armpits with a view to avoiding the reproach of Athena! Was he not, then, a wise man?

  THE SEVENTY-SECOND DISCOURSE: ON PERSONAL APPEARANCE

  In this Discourse Dio is defending what he considers to be the typical appearance of philosophers — the himation, or cloak, unaccompanied by the tunic generally worn next to the body, and long hair and beard. We learn that those who presented such an appearance were commonly subjected to insult and mockery and even to physical violence. And yet, as he tells us,
philosophers — or pseudo-philosophers — were a more familiar spectacle with his hearers than shoemakers or fullers or jesters or the followers of any other calling. It is argued that the philosopher can find a precedent for his appearance in the statues of both gods and generals and kings, none of which excites amusement or resentment on the part of the beholder. Furthermore, the city in which he is speaking tolerates the sight of many outlandish costumes. This leads to the conjecture that the reason why the philosopher is singled out for insult is that men are inclined to view him with distrust, feeling that he is critical of them, and being actuated, as one might say, by an inferiority complex. Sometimes also the philosopher is subjected to annoyance by those who expect to hear from him words of wisdom. Reference to this type of annoyance leads naturally to the telling the fable of the owl and the birds, a fable more briefly sketched in Or. . but preserved nowhere else. The moral of the fable is that it is risky to trust to appearances, for, though the owl of the fable was truly wise, the owl of Dio’s day resembled her only in “feathers, eyes, and beak,” and actually served as decoy for other fowl.