[21] “And is it not better,” said he, “to let the sun go down if one is listening to useful words than to go on an idle journey?”
“And likewise in almost all cases where practical experience in ‘using’ is lacking, it is difficult to be zealous, and the damage is likely to be greater where the things concerned are greater. Do you, then, think that the ‘use’ of an ass is like the ‘use’ of a horse?” “Of course not.” “Well, then, is the ‘use’ of a man like the ‘use’ of a god?” “But that question does not deserve an answer, Diogenes,” said he. “Is there anyone, then, who can make use of himself who does not know himself?” “How could he?” replied the other. “Because the one who does not understand man is unable to ‘use’ man?” “Yes, because he cannot.”
[22] ἤδη οὖν ἀκήκοας τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα τὸ ‘γνῶθι σαυτόν’; ἔγωγε. οὔκουν δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θεὸς κελεύει πᾶσιν ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν αὑτούς; ἔοικεν. εἷς ἄρα τῶν πάντων καὶ σὺ εἴης ἄν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ σὺ γιγνώσκεις αὑτόν; οὔ μοι δοκῶ. σεαυτὸν δὲ ἀγνοῶν ἄνθρωπον ἀγνοεῖς, ἄνθρωπον δὲ οὐκ εἰδὼς χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ δυνατὸς εἷ, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ χρῆσθαι ἀδύνατος ὢν θεῷ ἐπιχειρεῖς, ὃ τῷ παντὶ μεῖζον καὶ χαλεπώτερον ἐκείνου ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι.
[22] “So he who does not understand himself would not be able to make use of himself, would he?” “I believe not.” “Have you ever heard of the inscription at Delphi: ‘Know thyself’?” “I have.” “Is it not plain that the god gives this command to all, in the belief that they do not know themselves?’ “It would seem so.” “You, therefore, would be included in the ‘all’?” “Certainly.” “So then you also do not know yourself?” “I believe not.” “And not knowing yourself, you do not know man; and not knowing man, you are unable to ‘use’ man; and yet, although you are unable to ‘use’ a man, you are attempting to ‘use’ a god, an attempt which we agree is altogether the greater and more difficult of the two.
[23] τί δέ; νομίζεις τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα ἀττικίζειν ἢ δωρίζειν; ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι διάλεκτον ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν; ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει ὥστε τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν ἐν Τροίᾳ Σκάμανδρον παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις Ξάνθον καλεῖσθαι, καὶ τὴν κύμινδιν τὸ ὄρνεον χαλκίδα, καὶ τόπον τινὰ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃν οἱ Τρῶες ἐκάλουν Βατίειαν, τοὺς θεοὺς σῆμα Μυρίνης ὀνομάζειν. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἀσαφῆ τὰ τῶν χρησμῶν ἐστιν καὶ πολλοὺς ἤδη ἐξηπάτηκεν.
[23] “Tell me, do you think Apollo speaks Attic or Doric? Or that men and gods have the same language? Yet the difference is so great that the Scamander river in Troy is called Xanthus by the gods, and that the bird kymindis is called chalkis, and that a certain spot outside the city which the Trojans called Batieia was called the Sema Myrines by the gods. From this it naturally follows that the oracles are obscure and have already deceived many men.
[24] Ὁμήρῳ μὲν οὖν ἀσφαλὲς ἦν ἴσως πορεύεσθαι παρὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω εἰς Δελφούς, ἅτε διγλώττῳ ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς φωνάς, — εἴπερ ἁπάσας ἠπίστατο, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὀλίγ᾽ ἄττα: ὥσπερ οἱ δύο ἢ τρία Περσικὰ εἰδότες ῥήματα ἢ Μηδικὰ ἢ Ἀσσύρια τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας ἐξαπατῶσι — σὺ δὲ οὐ δέδοικας μὴ ἄλλα τοῦ θεοῦ λέγοντος ἄλλα διανοηθῇς; ὥσπερ οὖν φασι Λάϊον ἐκεῖνον, τὸν γενόμενον Χρυσίππου ἐραστήν, ὃς ἀφικόμενος εἰς Δελφοὺσ῾̣̣̓ἐπηρώτα [p. 114] τὸν θεὸν ὅπως αὐτῷ ἔσοιντο παῖδες. ἔχρησεν οὖν μὴ γεννᾶν, ἢ ἐκτιθέναι γεννήσαντα.
[24] Now for Homer perhaps it was safe to go to Apollo at Delphi, as being bilingual and understanding the dialects — if he really did understand them all and not just a few things, like persons who know two or three Persian, Median, or Assyrian words and thus fool the ignorant.
“But how about you? Have you no fear, lest, when the god says one thing you may understand another? As, for instance, the story of the famous Laïus, the man who became the lover of Chrysippus; when he had gone to Delphi, he asked the god how he might have issue. The god bade him ‘not to beget, or, having begotten, to expose.’
[25] οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητος ἦν ὁ Λάϊος ὥστε ἀμφότερα παρακοῦσαι τοῦ θεοῦ: καὶ γὰρ ἐγέννησε καὶ ἔθρεψεν. ἔπειτα καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπώλετο καὶ πᾶς ὁ οἶκος αὐτοῦ, διότι ἀδύνατος ὢν ἐπεχείρησε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι χρῆσθαι. μὴ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τὸν Οἰδίποδαοὐκ ἂν ἐξέθηκεν. ὁ δὲ οἴκοι τραφεὶς οὐκ ἂν ἀπέκτεινε τὸν Λάϊον, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι αὐτοῦ παῖς εἴη.
[25] And Laïus was so foolish as to misunderstand both commands of the god, for he begot a son and did not rear him. Afterwards both he and all his house were destroyed, all because he had undertaken to ‘make use of’ Apollo when he lacked the ability. For if he had not received that oracle, he would not have exposed Oedipus, and the latter, having been reared at home, would not have slain Laïus, for he would have known that he was his son.
[26] καὶ τοίνυν τὰ περὶ Κροῖσον ἀκήκοας τὸν Λυδόν, ὃς ἡγούμενος πείθεσθαι τῷ θεῷ παντὸς μᾶλλον καὶ διαβὰς τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Ἅλυν, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπέβαλε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν πέδαις ἐδέθη καὶ ὀλίγου κατεκαύθη ζῶν. ἢ σὺ οἴει φρονιμώτερος εἶναι Κροίσου, ἀνδρὸς οὕτω πλουσίου καὶ τοσούτων ἀνθρώπων ἄρχοντος καὶ Σόλωνι συγγενομένου καὶ ἄλλοις παμπόλλοις σοφισταῖς;
[26] Then you have heard the story about Croesus, the Lydian, who, imagining that he was most faithfully carrying out the behests of the god, crossed the river Halys, lost his empire, was bound in chains himself, and barely escaped being burned alive. Or do you, pray, think that you are wiser than Croesus, a man of such wealth, who ruled over so many people and had met Solon and a great many other wise men?
[27] τὸν δὲ Ὀρέστην καὶ αὐτὸν δήπου ὁρᾷς ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐγκαλοῦντα τῷ θεῷ καὶ μεμφόμενον, ὁπότε μαίνοιτο, ὡς συμβουλεύσαντος ἐκείνου τὴν μητέρα ἀποκτεῖναι. καί τοι μὴ νόμιζετὸν Ἀπόλλωνα χαλεπόν τι ἢ αἰσχρὸν προστάξαι τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν αὐτόν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ εἶπον, χρῆσθαι τῷ θεῷ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες, ἔπειτα ἐπιχειροῦντες, οὐχ αὑτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνον αἰτιῶνται. σὺ οὖν, ἐάν μοι πεισθῇς, φυλάξῃ, καὶ πρότερον προθυμήσῃ γνῶναι σεαυτόν,
[27] As for Orestes, I presume you see him also in tragic performances inveighing against the god in his fits of madness, and accusing him as though he had counselled him to slay his mother. But do not imagine that Apollo ever ordered those that consult him to commit any dreadful or disgraceful act. It is as I said: although men are incapable of ‘using’ the god, they go ahead, try, and then blame him and not themselves.
“You, then, if you follow my advi
ce, will take heed and aim first to know yourself; afterwards, having found wisdom, you will then, if it be your pleasure, consult the oracle.
[28] ἔπειτα φρονήσας, ἐὰν δοκῇ σοι, τότε ἤδη μαντεύσῃ. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰροἶμαί σε μηδὲν δεήσεσθαι μαντείας νοῦν ἔχοντα. καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὅρα, ἐάν σε κελεύσῃ γράφειν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὀρθῶς μὴ γραμματικὸν ὄντα, οὐ δυνήσῃ. γράμματα δὲ εἰδώς, καὶ μὴ τοῦ θεοῦ κελεύοντος κατὰ τρόπον γράψεις καὶ ἀναγνώσῃ. ὁμοίως δὲ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πράττειν, ἐὰν συμβουλεύσῃ σοι μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ, οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει. καὶζῆν ὀρθῶς οὐ δυνήσῃ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐδ᾽ ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐνοχλῇς καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ σχολάζῃ. νοῦν δὲ ἔχωνς γνώσῃ ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ ὅ, τι σοι πρακτέον ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπως.
[28] For I am persuaded that you will have no need of consulting oracles if you have intelligence. Why just consider! If the god bids you to read and write correctly when you have no knowledge of letters, you will not be able to do so; but if you know your letters, you will read and write well enough, even without any command from the god. In the same way, if he advises you to do anything else when you do not know how, you will not be in a condition to obey. You will not be able to live properly, either, if you do not know how, even though you importune Apollo day after day and he gives you all his time. But if possessed of intelligence, you will know of yourself what you ought to do and how to go about it.
[29] ὃ δὲ ἔλαθέ με περὶ τοῦ Οἰδίποδος εἰπεῖν, ὅτι εἰς Δελφοὺς μὲν οὐκ ἦλθε μαντευσόμενος, τῷ δὲ Τειρεσίᾳ συμβαλὼν μεγάλα κακὰ ἀπέλαυσετῆς ἐκείνου μαντικῆς διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἄγνοιαν. ἔγνω γὰρ ὅτι [p. 115] τῇ μητρὶ συνεγένετο καὶ παῖδές εἰσιν αὐτῷ ἐξ ἐκείνης: καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, δέον ἴσως κρύπτειν τοῦτο ἢ ποιῆσαι νόμιμον τοῖς Θηβαίοις, πρῶτον μὲν πᾶσιν ἐποίησε φανερόν, ἔπειτα ἠγανάκτει καὶ ἐβόα μεγάλα, ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν πατήρ ἐστι καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς γυναικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ υἱός.
[29] “There is one thing, however, that I forgot to say about Oedipus: He did not go to Delphi to consult the oracle but fell in with Teiresias and suffered great calamities from that seer’s divination on account of his own ignorance. For he knew that he had consorted with his own mother and that he had children by her; and subsequently, when perhaps he should have concealed this or made it legal in Thebes, in the first place he let everybody know the fact and then became greatly wrought up, lifted up his voice and complained that he was father and brother at once of the same children, and husband and son of the same woman.
[30] οἱ δὲ ἀλεκτρυόνες οὐκ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐδὲ οἱ κύνες οὐδὲ τῶν ὄνων οὐδείς, οὐδὲ οἱ Πέρσαι: καίτοι δοκοῦσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἄριστοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐτύφλωσεν αὑτόν: ἔπειτα ἠλᾶτο τετυφλωμένος, ὥσπερ οὐ δυνάμενος βλέπων πλανᾶσθαι. καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἔφη, Σὺ μέν, ὦ Διόγενες, ἀναισθητότατον ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀποφαίνεις τὸν Οἰδίπουν: οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες οἴονται οὐκ εὐτυχῆ μὲν γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον,
[30] But domestic fowls do not object to such relationships, nor dogs, nor any ass, nor do the Persians, although they pass for the aristocracy of Asia. And in addition to all this, Oedipus blinded himself and then wandered about blind, as though he could not wander while still keeping his sight.”
The other on hearing this replied, “You, Diogenes, make Oedipus out to be the greatest dullard in the world; but the Greeks believe that, though he was not a fortunate man, he was the most sagacious of all men. At any rate they say that he alone solved the Sphinx’s riddle.”
[31] συνετὸν δὲ πάντων μάλιστα: μόνον γοῦν αὐτὸν λῦσαι τὸ αἴνιγμα τῆς Σφιγγός. καὶ ὁ Διογένης γελάσας, Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνος ἔλυσε τὸ αἴνιγμα; οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ἐκέλευσε γνῶναι ἡ Σφίγξ; ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπον μὲν ὅ ἐστιν οὔτε εἶπεν οὔτε ἔγνω: τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγων ᾤετο λέγειν τὸ ἐρωτώμενον: ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὁ δὲ μηδὲν εἴποι πλέον τοῦ ὀνόματος, ὅτι Σωκράτης. ἐγὼ δὲ ἤκουσά του λέγοντος ὅτι ἡ Σφίγξ ἡ ἀμαθία ἐστίν.
[31] At this Diogenes broke into a laugh and said, “He solve the Sphinx’s riddle! Have you not heard that the Sphinx prompted him to give the answer ‘man’? As to the meaning of ‘man,’ however, he neither expressed himself nor knew, but when he said the word ‘man’ he thought he was answering the question. It was just as if one were asked, ‘What is Socrates?’ and should give no other answer than the word ‘Socrates.’ Iº have heard someone say that the Sphinx stands for stupidity;
[32] ταύτην οὖν καὶ πρότερον διαφθεῖραι τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ νῦν, οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐῶσαν εἰδέναι, ἅτε ἀνθρώπων ἀμαθεστάτους. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους μᾶλλόν τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τῆς αὑτῶν ἀνοίας, τὸν δὲ Οἰδίποδα, σοφώτατον ἡγησάμενον αὑτὸν εἶναι καὶ διαπεφευγέναι τἠν Σφίγγα καὶ πείσαντα τοὺς ἄλλους Θηβαίους τοῦτο, κάκιστα ἀπολέσθαι. ὅσοι γὰρ ἂν ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες πεισθῶσι σοφοὶ εἶναι, οὗτοι πολύ εἰσιν ἀθλιώτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων: καὶ ἔστι τοιοῦτον τὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος.
[32] that this, accordingly, proved the ruin of the Boeotians in the past just as it does now, their stupidity preventing their knowing anything, such utter dullards they are; and that while the others had an inkling of their ignorance, Oedipus, who thought that he was very wise and had escaped the Sphinx, and who had made the other Thebans believe all this, perished most miserably. For any man who in spite of his ignorance deludes himself with the belief that he is wise is in a much sorrier plight than anyone else. And such is the tribe of sophists.”
THE ELEVENTH DISCOURSE MAINTAINING THAT TROY WAS NOT CAPTURED
ΤΡΩΙΚΟΣ ΥΠΕΡ τοῦ ΙΛΙΟΝ ΜΗ ΑΛΩΝΑΙ.
THE ELEVENTH DISCOURSE MAINTAINING THAT TROY WAS NOT CAPTURED
The eleventh Discourse is interesting to us because it contains a great deal of the criticism of Homer from Plato’s time down; and because it seems to be so evidently just a “stunt” to show what could be done to disprove what everyone believed to be a fact, some would assign it to the period before Dio’s exile when he was a sophist. If this view is accepted, then the hostility Dio shows to the sophists is simply a pretence to make his auditors forget that he is a sophist himself, though he is at that very time performing one of the sophists’ most characteristic acts. Others feel that in view of the self-assurance of the speaker and the skill with which he presents his arguments, the speech belongs to Dio’s riper years and that he had some serious purpose in delivering it.
[1] οἶδα μὲν ἔγωγε σχε
δὸν ὅτι διδάσκειν μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας χαλεπόν ἐστιν, ἐξαπατᾶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον. καὶ μανθάνουσι μὲν μόγις, ἐάν τι καὶ μάθωσι, παρ᾽ ὀλίγων τῶν εἰδότων, ἐξαπατῶνται δὲ [p. 116] τάχιστα ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν οὐκ εἰδότων, καὶ οὐ μόνον γε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς πικρόν ἐστι καὶ ἀηδὲς τοῖς ἀνοήτοις, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος γλυκὺ καὶ προσηνές.
The Eleventh Discourse Maintaining that Troy was not Captured
I am almost certain that while all men are hard to teach, they are easy to deceive. They learn with difficulty — if they do learn anything — from the few that know, but they are deceived only too readily by the many who do not know, and not only by others but by themselves as well. For the truth is bitter and unpleasant to the unthinking, while falsehood is sweet and pleasant.
[2] ὥσπερ οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς νοσοῦσι τὰ ὄμματα τὸ μὲν φῶς ἀνιαρὸν ὁρᾶν, τὸ δὲ σκότος ἄλυπον καὶ φίλον, οὐκ ἐῶν βλέπειν. ἢ πῶς ἂν ἴσχυε τὰ ψεύδη πολλάκις πλέον τῶν ἀληθῶν, εἰ μὴ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν ἐνίκα; χαλεποῦ δέ, ὡς ἔφην, ὄντος τοῦ διδάσκειν, τῷ παντὶ χαλεπώτερον τὸ μεταδιδάσκειν, ἄλλως τε ὅταν πολύν τινες χρόνον ὦσι τὰ ψευδῆ ἀκηκοότες καὶ μὴ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἐξηπατημένοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ πάπποι καὶ σχεδὸν πάντες οἱ πρότερον.
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 211