Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [6] καὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους. οὕτω δὲ καὶ Νουμᾶν μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι τυχὸν ἂν λέγοιεν αὑτῶν δαίμονα, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ Ἄννωνα καὶ Ἀννίβαν, Μακεδόνες δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον ἢ Φίλιππον, ὃς Μακεδόνας ταπεινοὺς ὄντας καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ παραχωρήσαντος Ὀλυνθίοις [p. 280] τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἰσχυροὺς ἐποίησε καὶ πολεμικοὺς καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν ἁπάσης Εὐρώπης ἐγκρατεῖς. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὕστερον μετ̓ ἐκεῖνον εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐξαγαγὼν ἅμα μὲν πλουσιωτάτους ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀπέδειξεν, ἅμα δὲ πενιχροτάτους, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἰσχυρούς, ἅμα δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, φυγάδας τε καὶ βασιλέας τοὺς αὐτούς, Αἴγυπτον μὲν καὶ Βαβυλῶνα καὶ Σοῦσα καὶ Ἐκβάτανα προσθείς, Αἰγὰς δὲ

  [6] And thus also by the Romans Numa might perhaps be named as their guiding spirit, and Hanno and Hannibal by the Carthaginians, and Alexander, by the Macedonians, or else Philip, who, when the Macedonians were inglorious and weak, and his father had ceded part of his kingdom to the Olynthians, made them strong and warlike and masters of nearly all Europe. Then afterwards Alexander, succeeding Philip, led them over into Asia and made them at once the wealthiest of all peoples and at the same time the poorest, at once strong and at the same time weak, the same men being both exiles and kings, because while he annexed Egypt, Babylon, Sousa, and Ecbatana, he deprived them of Aegae, Pella, and Dium.

  [7] καὶ Πέλλαν καὶ Δῖον ἀφελόμενος. Καρχηδονίους δὲ Ἄννων μὲν ἀντὶ Τυρίων ἐποίησε Λίβυας, καὶ Λιβύην κατοικεῖν ἀντὶ Φοινίκης, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ συχνὰ ἐμπόρια καὶ λιμένας καὶ τριήρεις, καὶ πολλῆς μὲν γῆς, πολλῆς δὲ θαλάττης ἄρχειν. Ἀννίβας δὲ πρὸς τῇ Λιβύῃ καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας αὐτῆς κρατῆσαι παρέσχεν ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη. αὖθις δὲ αἴτιος ἐγένετο ἀναστάτους γενέσθαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν μεταβαλεῖν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, πολλοὺς πρότερον τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀπολέσας, καὶ μικρὸν ἀποσχὼν αὐτὴν ἑλεῖν τὴν Ῥώμην, οὐ βουληθεὶς δέ, ὥς φασι, διὰ τοὺς οἴκοι ἀντιστασιώτας. καὶ τοῦτον ἴσως οὔτε Καρχηδονίοις οὔτε Ῥωμαίοις ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα

  [7] And the Carthaginians Hanno made Libyans instead of Tyrians, forced them to live in Libya instead of Phoenicia, caused them to possess great wealth, many trading-centres, harbours, and warships, and to rule over a vast land and a vast sea. Then in addition to Libya, Hannibal enabled them to control Italy itself for a period of seventeen years; but after that he was responsible for their being driven from their homes and for their capital itself being moved at the order of the Romans, after he had previously slain great numbers of these Romans and come within a little of taking Rome itself, although, men say, he had no desire to do this, on account of his political opponents at home.

  And yet Hannibal, perhaps, neither the Carthaginians nor the Romans could fittingly claim as their good guiding spirit.

  [8] προσήκει αὑτῶν καλέσαι. Νουμᾶς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην παραλαβὼν μικρὰν καὶ ἄδοξον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ χώρᾳ διῳκισμένην καὶ σύγκλυδας καὶ πονηροὺς ἔχουσαν τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, ἔτι δὲ τοῖς προσχώροις πᾶσιν ἐχθροὺς καὶ πένητας καὶ ἀγρίους καὶ ἐπικινδύνως ζῶντας διὰ τὴν Ῥωμύλου χαλεπότητα, τήν τε γῆν αὐτοὺς βεβαίως ἔχειν ἐποίησε καὶ φίλους εἶναι τοῖς περιοίκοις καὶ νόμους καὶ θεοὺς καὶ πολιτείαν κατεστήσατο, καὶ πάσης αἴτιος ὑπῆρξε

  [8] But Numa took over Rome when it was still small, unknown to fame, and situated in a land owned by others, when it had as its inhabitants an unprincipled rabble, who were, besides, at enmity with all their neighbours, were both poverty-stricken and savage, and lived a precarious existence because of the harshness of Romulus’ rule; caused them to hold their land in security and to be on terms of friendship with their neighbours, and gave them a code of laws, and gods to worship, and a political constitution, thus becoming the author of all their subsequent felicity of which all men speak.

  [9] τῆς λεγομένης ὕστερον εὐδαιμονίας. ἔχοιμι δ̓ ἂν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγειν πόλεων καὶ γενῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εὖ τε καὶ κακῶς πραξάντων διά τινας ἄρχοντας αὐτῶν γενομένους [p. 281] καὶ προστάτας: ἀλλὰ ἱκανῶς οἶμαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐνδεδεῖχθαι. εἰ δὴ τούτους καλεῖς δαίμονας ὡς τῶν ὑπ̓ αὐτοῖς καὶ δἰ οὓς ἕκαστοι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον ἔπραξαν, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι.

  [9] I could go on to speak in the same way about the other cities, and populations which have fared well or ill on account of certain men who were their rulers and leaders. However, my own opinion has, I think, been made sufficiently clear. So, if you do call those I have mentioned in very truth guiding spirits of those who were under their sway and who severally fared better or worse on account of them, I should be glad to hear what you have to say.

  THE TWENTY-SIXTH DISCOURSE: ON DELIBERATION

  ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ.

  THE TWENTY-SIXTH DISCOURSE: ON DELIBERATION

  This is another of the twelve dialogues reported directly and probably all written by Dio while in exile. In this one Dio considers with his interlocutor the meaning of ‘deliberation’ (τὸ βουλεύεσθαι). It does not mean making a blind guess as to the truth of something. There must be some knowledge, however imperfect, upon which to base the conjecture. If, on the other hand, there is complete knowledge of the thing, no room is left for conjecture, that is, deliberation. Then Dio attempts to show that one cannot deliberate about the future because it is non-existent. One must have something real about which to deliberate. This position rather surprises us, because deliberation is most naturally about some course of action in the future. After this Dio, unconsciously perhaps, shifts his position and maintains that to deliberate is to form correct conclusions about a matter from a full knowledge of all factors involved. However, one must admit that it was Dio’s companion, rather than Dio himself, who was so certain that deliberation comes into play only in those cases where there is some knowledge, but not enough to enable one to decide with certainty. Dio concludes by exhorting men earnestly to strive to gain full knowledge about the most important things in life in order that their deliberations in these matters may lead to the right conclusions.

  Sonny (Ad Dionem Chrysostomum Analecta, f.) expresses the view that this Discourse and the pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus, which apparently was written about 350 B.C., were drawn from a common source, while Dümmler (Academica, ) would go further and name Antisthenes’ paradox ὅ τι οὐκ ἔστι ζητεῖν (seeking that which is not) as this common source. On the other hand, Hirzel (Der Dialog II, ), von Arnim, as one may infer from his note on §§ 4-5, and Wegehaupt (De Dione Chrysostomo Xenophontis Sectatore, ff.) maintain that Dio used the Sisyphus directly. Wegehaupt points to so many parallels between this Discourse and the Sisyphus as to make his theory a
ppear very reasonable. If this theory is not correct, then Dio and the author of the Sisyphus followed their common source very closely.

  [1] Πάλαι καθήμενος καὶ ὑμῶν ἀκούων, ὅτε πολλὰς ὥρας διετρίβετε παρά τινι τῶν πολιτικῶν βουλευόμενοι περί τινων πραγμάτων σκοπῶ παῤ ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἀναζητῶ τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ φατε βουλεύεσθαι ἢ αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι; ἆρα γὰρ περὶ τούτου τις βουλεύεται τοῦ πράγματος ὃ οἶδέ τε καὶ ἐπίσταται; — Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι περὶ ὧν τις οἶδε, περὶ τούτων βουλεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἤδη εἰδέναι. — Τί δαί; ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲ ἃ ἐπίσταται, περὶ τούτων ὥσπερ διαμαντευόμενος καὶ ἀναζητῶν γνῶναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; — Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι οὐδὲ οὗτος δύνασθαι βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν οὐδεμίαν

  The Twenty-sixth Discourse: On Deliberation

  Dio. For a long time, as I sat and listened to you men when you spent many hours at the home of one of our public men in deliberating about certain affairs of state, I have been considering by myself and examining the meaning of that which you call deliberation, or what deliberation in the abstract is. Does a person really deliberate about a matter which he knows and understands?

  Interlocutor. I do not think that when a person knows certain things, he deliberates about them, but that he already knows them.

  Dio. Well then, when there are things he does not know or understand, is it about these that he deliberates, casting about as it were like a diviner, and thus seeking to find out what he does not know?

  Int. It does not seem to me that this man, either, can deliberate about things when he has no knowledge about them.

  [2] ἐπιστήμην ἔχει. — Ὅρα οὖν μὴ τοιόνδε τι ᾖ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι ὥστε τινὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τινὰ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ᾖ περὶ οὗ βουλεύονται ἄνθρωποι; ἵνα δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ λόγῳ παρακολουθήσωμεν, δἰ εἰκόνος τινὸς ἐπιδείξομεν αὐτό. ὑποτιθέμεθα γὰρ εἰδέναι μὲν ἡμᾶς Χαρικλέα καὶ Χαρίξενον, ὅπου δὲ οἰκοῦσιν ἀγνοεῖν, στοχάζεσθαι

  [2] Dio. Then can deliberation be something like this — that when men know some things but do not know other things, this is the subject about which they deliberate? And in order that we may follow the argument better, we shall make it clear by an illustration. For instance, we assume that we know Charicles and Charixenus, but do not know where they live, and so are making conjectures about their place of residence;

  [3] δὲ περὶ τῆς οἰκίας αὐτοῖν, μὴ ἄρα τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι ὥστε ἐξ ὧν οἴδαμεν, ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδέπω ἴσμεν τεκμαίρεσθαι: καθάπερ οἱ ἀρτιάζοντες ἴσασι μὲν ὅτι ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχουσιν οἱ προκαλεσάμενοι αὐτοὺς χρῆμα, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ̓ ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπέτυχον εἰπεῖν, καὶ οὕτω δὴ κρατήσαντες ἀπηλλάγησαν. [p. 282] μὴ ἄρα καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι τοιοῦτον ᾖ, ὥστε εἰδέναι μέν τι — τὰ δὲ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἀγνοοῦμεν, στοχασάμενοι ἐνίοτε αὐτομάτως ἐπετύχομεν καὶ μετ̓ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης.

  [3] is not this deliberation — the drawing of inferences from what we do know about that which we do not yet know? Or, just as people playing at odd and even know that the challengers have something in their hands but now how much; yet sometimes they do hit upon the right answer and in that way come off victorious. May we conclude, then, that deliberation too is like this — that though there is something we do know, yet concerning all the other things which we do not know, we make a guess and sometimes accidentally hit it although without any knowledge?

  [4] Φέρε γὰρ ἴδωμεν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα. τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἐγένετο καὶ ὑφέστηκε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ἐγένετο οὔτε ὑφέστηκεν. οὐ δεῖ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἤδη ὄντων: ἔστι γὰρ καὶ οὐδὲν ὄφελος περὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ ὑφεστηκότων βουλεύεσθαι: τί γὰρ καὶ βουλευσόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν; ἵνα μὴ γένηται τὰ γεγονότα; οὐ δύναται μὴ γεγονέναι. ἀλλ̓ ἵνα μὴ ᾖ τὰ ὄντα; πῶς δυνάμεθα ποιῆσαι μὴ εἶναι; οὕτως ὡς ἐγένετο; ἀλλ̓ ἵνα μὴ ὑφεστήκῃ; πᾶν τὸ ὂν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων τί

  [4] Now come, let us see what the nature of the thing is: Things which are in being both are, and have come to be, and exist, while things that are not in being neither are, nor have come into be, nor do they exist. Now we do not need deliberation for things which are already in being; for there is no profit in deliberating about things which have come into being and exist. In fact, what imaginable reason will we have for deliberating about them? In order that things that have come into being may not come into being? It is impossible for them not to have come into being. Well, is it in order that things which are in being may not be? Absurd! Can we prevent their being just as they have come to be? Well, is it in order that they may not exist? Everything which is in being has existence. But about things that are in being why should a person deliberate anyway?

  [5] ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύοιτο; περὶ τίνων οὖν βουλευόμεθα; περὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑποδείκνυσι: τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε ὑφέστηκεν. περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων οὖν τίς δύναται βουλεύεσθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐχ ὑφεστώτων; τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ὂν οὐδέν ἐστι. περὶ δὲ τοῦ οὐκ ὄντος οὐδεὶς δύναται βουλεύεσθαι. οὐδεὶς ἄρα δύναται βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων. ἡ γὰρ βουλὴ ἐπί τινί ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὔ τί ἐστιν. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων δύναιτ̓ ἂν εἶναι.

  [5] About what things, then, do we deliberate? About the future, as the argument suggests. But the future neither is, nor has been, nor exists. Hence, about things that are not and do not exist, who is able to deliberate? For the thing not in being is nothing, and about that which is not no one can deliberate. Hence no one can deliberate about things which are yet to be; for deliberation deals with a thing that is, and that which is yet to be does not exist. Therefore deliberation cannot possibly be about the future either.

  [6] Τί οὖν; ὁ ἄμουσος καὶ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων ἁρμονίας καὶ μέλους καὶ ῥυθμοῦ καὶ τῆς τούτων τάξεως καὶ κινήσεως δύναιτ̓ ἂν καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν κατὰ μουσικήν; — Οὐδαμῶς. — Τί δέ; ὁ γεωμετρίας ἄπειρος περὶ σώματος καὶ μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους βουλευόμενος ἂν καλῶς βουλεύοιτο; — Οὐδὲ οὗτος. — Τί δέ; ὁ νεὼς ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ νεὼς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔργων κυβερνητικῶν ἱκανῶς ἂν βουλευόμενος

  [6] Take another case: Would the
unmusical person and the one who has no knowledge of harmony, melody, rhythm, and their arrangement and movement be able to deliberate successfully about music and the operations involved in music?

  Int. Certainly not.

  Dio. Another point: Would the man who has no knowledge of geometry, in deliberating about a solid body, its length, width, and height, deliberate successfully?

  Int. No, he also would not.

  Dio. Then further: Would the man who does not know how to command a ship, in deliberating about the command of a ship and the duties of the captain, deliberate competently?

  Int. No, he would not, either.

  [7] βουλεύοιτο; — Οὐδὲ οὗτος. — Ὅστις ἄρα οὐδὲν ἱκανῶς περὶ οὐδενὸς [p. 283] οὔτε πεπαίδευται οὔτε οἶδεν, οὗτος οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τούτων ἱκανός ἐστιν; χρὴ οὖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μάλιστα φρονήσεως καὶ παιδείας, ἵνα ἡμῖν ᾖ ῥᾴδιον περὶ ἁπάντων πραγμάτων βουλεύεσθαι καὶ εἰδέναι τὸ συνοῖσον ἑκάστῃ βουλῇ καὶ μὴ διαμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ οἱ μουσικοὶ καὶ οἱ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ κυβερνῆται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων οὐκ ἀτέχνως σκέπτονται καὶ ἅπαντες οἱ περί τι δεινοὶ καὶ συνεῖναι περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανοί εἰσιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς περὶ

  [7] Dio. Then a person who has had no competent education and no knowledge whatever about a thing is not competent to deliberate about it, either. Therefore it is necessary to give the greatest attention to prudence and education, in order that it may be easy for us to deliberate about all things whatsoever and to know what is going to suit each deliberation and not to make serious mistakes; but just as musicians, geometricians, and ship-captains consider with professional skill their own particular work, and as all persons who possess skill in any matter are also competent to understand their work, in like manner let us also be competent to deliberate and speak about our own business.