Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [17] However, I propose that after purifying the city — not with squill nor yet with water, but with what is far more pure, namely, reason — we negotiate in public meeting what yet remains, not only concerning ourselves with our clerks of the market and so forth, but also calling the attention of the Council to these matters, so that it may make provision for the city, as is its practice; for these things will be quite easy for you to do. Besides, this deserves your serious attention also on account of the archon whom you have created, in order that, having taken a man of inexperience, you may not later abandon him in wave and tempest.

  THE FORTY-NINTH DISCOURSE: A REFUSAL OF THE OFFICE OF ARCHON DELIVERED BEFORE THE COUNCIL

  ΠΑΡΑΙΤΗΣΙΣ ΑΡΧΗΣ ΕΝ ΒΟΥΛΗΙ.

  THE FORTY-NINTH DISCOURSE: A REFUSAL OF THE OFFICE OF ARCHON DELIVERED BEFORE THE COUNCIL

  The major portion of this Discourse is devoted to a consideration of the importance of the philosopher in the administration of affairs of state and of his duty to accept office for the good of the state. It appears that Dio, without his previous consent, had been set up as a candidate for election to the archonship, the highest office in the government. That election to this office was a function of the Council is clear, not only from the fact that Dio’s excuses are offered to that body, but especially from the natural interpretationº of §§ 14-15. Furthermore, we learn from § 15 that the Council had once before elected him to that office by acclamation. Arnim argues with much cleverness that the election just referred to took place the year preceding our Discourse, A.D. 102, that Dio declined to serve on that occasion, and that he used his influence to bring about the substitution of his son to fill his place (cf. Or. 48.17 and note). On the occasion referred to Dio, in support of his request to be excused, urged the imminence of his departure from Prusa. Not yet having made good that announcement, he now feels called upon to assert his good faith and to declare that this time he is really about to leave (§ 15).

  For what reason was he to take his departure? In the initial sentence of Or. (A.D. 101 or 102) he says he believes he has not much longer to stay in Prusa. One infers from his use of the verb οἴομαι that his departure is not wholly a matter of personal choice. In that same speech (§ 3) and in Or. he suggests that he might reasonably look to Trajan for some preferment. Arnim concludes that some such offer of preferment had been made prior to Or. 45 and that Dio’s earlier uncertainty as to the precise moment of his departure was due to the Emperor’s absence from Rome in connexion with his campaign in Dacia. That campaign is now over and Dio is due to begin his journey to Rome.

  [1] Τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ πεπαιδευμένοις οὔτε ἀηδὲς τὸ ἄρχειν οὔτε χαλεπόν. ἥδονται μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ εὖ ποιεῖν: τῷ δὲ ἄρχοντι πόλεως ἢ ἔθνους ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων οὐ μόνον ἐξουσία πλείστη τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη σχεδόν: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἀνέχονται τὸν βλαβερὸν ἄρχοντα οὐχ ὅπως ἄνθρωποι, δ δὴ δοκεῖ πάντων δριμύτατον εἶναι, ἀλλ̓ οὐδὲ τῶν

  The Forty-ninth Discourse: A Refusal of the Office of Archon Delivered before the Council

  To reasonable and cultivated men the holding of office is neither distasteful nor difficult. For they enjoy nothing more than doing good; and the ruler of a city, or of a tribe, or of still larger aggregations of mankind, not only has the fullest opportunity for doing good, but also is practically bound to do so; but if he fails in that respect, the ruler who does harm is not tolerated, I do not say by human beings, reputed to be the most petulant of all creatures, but not even by the stupidest of the beasts.

  [2] θηρίων τὰ ἀφρονέστατα. οὔτε γὰρ βόες ῥᾳδίως ὑπομένουσι βουκόλων ἀμέλειαν οὔτε αἰπόλια καὶ ποῖμναι τοὺς φθείροντας νομέας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀποφεύγει καὶ οὐ πείθεται, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀμύνεται τοὺς πονηροὺς προστάτας. οἱ δ̓ ἵπποι τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς ἡνιόχους ἀποβάλλοντες πολὺ κάκιον κολάζουσιν ἢ ἐκεῖνοι τῇ μάστιγι παίοντες. [p. 94] τούτων δὲ ἁπάντων ἄνθρωπος δεινότατόν ἐστι καὶ πλείστην ἔχον σύνεσιν: ὥστε κακῷ μὲν ἡγεμόνι πάντων ἐχθρότατον, τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ πάντων εὐνούστατον. ἡδὺ μὲν οὕτως τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις τὸ ἄρχειν: χαλεπὸν δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρᾶγμα οὐδὲν τῷ μελετήσαντι

  [2] For example, neither do cattle willingly submit to neglect on the part of the hersdmen nor do flocks of goats and sheep submit to keepers who ruin them. For some run away and do not obey, and others even retaliate against their wicked guardians. In fact horses inflict much worse punishment on ignorant drivers by throwing them off than the drivers inflict by striking them with the whip. But of all these creatures man is the most clever and has the most intelligence; accordingly man is most hostile of all toward a bad ruler, though most kindly of all toward one who is good. Thus being a ruler is pleasant for those who know the art — though no pursuit could be difficult for the man who had practised it from the start and had equipped himself for it.

  [3] ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ παρεσκευασμένῳ πρὸς αὐτό. ὁ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φιλόσοφος οὐκ ἄλλο τι φανήσεται διαπονούμενος ἢ ὅπως ἄρχειν καλῶς δυνήσεται καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ συλλήβδην ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἂν ἐπιτρέπωσι, καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ προσδεήσεται οὐδενὸς ἄρχοντος ἀλλ̓ ἢ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ φροντίζειν ἱκανὸς ἔσται. καὶ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τοὺς βασιλέας αὐτοὺς λέληθεν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις ὅσοι μὴ τελέως ἄφρονες. τῶν γὰρ πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις δέονται συμβούλους σφίσι γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προστάττοντες αὐτοὶ παῤ ἐκείνων προστάγματα

  [3] But he who is really a philosopher will be found to be devoting himself to no other task than that of learning how he will be able to rule well, whether it be ruling himself or a household or the greatest state or, in short, all mankind, provided they permit it, and, while himself needing no ruler other than reason and God, he will be competent to care for and give heed to the rest of mankind. Moreover, this fact has not escaped the notice even of kings themselves, or of any men in power who are not utterly bereft of judgement. For they entreat men of cultivation to become their counsellors in their most important problems, and, while giving orders to everybody else, they themselves accept orders from those counsellors as to what to do and what not to do.

  [4] λαμβάνουσιν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι: ὥσπερ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα Ὅμηρός φησιν ἀεὶ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς γνώμης τοῦ Νέστορος καὶ ὁσάκις αὐτῷ συμβουλεύοντι μὴ ἐπείσθη, ὀδύρεσθαι καὶ παραχρῆμα μετανοεῖν. Φίλιππος δέ, ὃς δοκεῖ δεινότατος γενέσθαι τῶν βασιλέων, Ἀριστοτέλην ἐπηγάγετο τῷ υἱεῖ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ διδάσκαλον καὶ ἄρχοντα, ὡς αὐτὸς οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὢν παιδεῦσαι τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην: ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων Μακεδόνων καὶ Θ�
�ᾳκῶν καὶ Ἰλλυριῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἁπάντων ἠξίου ἄρχειν, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἑτέρῳ παρεδίδου ἀρχθησόμενον, καὶ τοσαύταις μυριάσι προστάττων ἑνὶ ἐκείνῳ προστάττειν οὐχ ὑπέμενεν. οὐ γὰρ ἴσον ἡγεῖτο κίνδυνον εἶναι αὑτῷ, εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξαμαρτάνοι ἢ

  [4] Take Agamemnon for example — Homer says that Agamemnon also sought the opinion of Nestor especially, and that every time he did not follow Nestor’s advice he bewailed the fact and promptly repented. Again, Philip, who is reputed to have been the cleverest of kings, engaged Aristotle as teacher and ruler for his son Alexander, believing that he himself was not competent to give instruction in the science of kingship; nay, while he thought himself fit to rule the other Macedonians and Thracians and Illyrians and all the Greeks, he handed his son over to another to be ruled, and while he gave orders to so many myriads, he did not dare give orders to that one man. The reason is that he did not feel his own risk to be as great if he should err where it concerned any one else as it would be if he should commit some error in connexion with his son.

  [5] εἴ τι περὶ τὸν υἱόν. καίτοι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἐν Θήβαις ὁμηρεύων Πελοπίδᾳ τε συνῆν, ἀνδρὶ πεπαιδευμένῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἐραστὴν ἔφασαν αὐτοῦ τὸν Πελοπίδαν γενέσθαι, καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδου τά τε ἔργα ἑώρα καὶ τῶν λόγων δὲ ἤκουεν, ὃς οὐκ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου τοσοῦτον ἴσχυσεν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τοσαύτην μεταβολὴν ἐποίησεν, ὥστε [p. 95] καταλῦσαι Λακεδαιμονίους τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ Λύσιδι ὁμιλήσας τῷ Πυθαγόρου μαθητῇ. ὅθεν οἶμαι πολὺ διήνεγκεν ὁ Φίλιππος τῶν πρότερον ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλευσάντων. ἀλλ̓ ὅμως τοιαύτης παιδείας ἐπιτυχὼν οὐκ ἐθάρρει τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον αὐτὸς

  [5] And yet previously Philip himself, while a hostage at Thebes, not only was associated with Pelopidas, a man of cultivation — in consequence of which it was even said that Pelopidas had been his lover — but he also witnessed the deeds of Epaminondas and listened to his words; and it was not mere accident that Epaminondas had acquired such power among the Greeks and had wrought so great a change in Greece as to overthrow the Spartans, despite their long-continued rule, but because he had conversed with Lysis, the disciple of Pythagoras. This, I fancy, explains why Philip was far superior to those who previously had become kings of Macedonia. Yet for all that, though he had the good fortune to obtain so good an education, he did not have the courage to instruct Alexander himself.

  [6] διδάσκειν. εὕροι δ̓ ἄν τις σπανίως μὲν φιλοσόφους ἄρξαντας ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγω δὲ τὰς ὠνομασμένας ἀρχάς, στρατηγοὺς ἢ σατράπας ἢ βασιλέας καθισταμένους: πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ μέγιστα ἀπολαύσαντας αὐτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοὺς ἀρχομένους: Σόλωνος μὲν Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἀριστείδου καὶ Περικλέους τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου μαθητοῦ, Θηβαίους δὲ Ἐπαμεινώνδου, Ῥωμαίους δὲ Νόμα, ὅν φασί τινες τῆς Πυθαγόρου σοφίας μετασχεῖν: Ἰταλιώτας δὲ σύμπαντας τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν, τοσοῦτον χρόνον εὐδαιμονήσαντας καὶ μετὰ πλείστης ὁμονοίας καὶ εἰρήνης πολιτευσαμένους, ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι χρόνον τὰς

  [6] However, while one would find that philosophers have rarely become rulers among men — I mean holding positions termed “offices,” serving as generals or satraps or kings — on the other hand, those whom they ruled have derived from them most numerous and most important benefits — the Athenians from Solon, from Aristeides, and from Pericles, the disciple of Anaxagoras; the Thebans from Epaminondas; the Romans from Numa, who, as some say, had some acquaintance with the philosophy of Pythagoras; and the Italian Greeks in general from the Pythagoreans, for these Greeks prospered and conducted their municipal affairs with the greatest concord and peace just so long as those Pythagoreans managed their cities.

  [7] πόλεις διεῖπον. καὶ κοινῇ δὲ τὰ ἰσχυρότατα τῶν ἐθνῶν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ δύνανται ἀεὶ βασιλεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἐπιστάτας τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἄρχοντας τούτους ἀπέδειξαν: Πέρσαι μὲν οἶμαι τοὺς καλουμένους παῤ αὐτοῖς μάγους, οἳ τῆς φύσεως ἦσαν ἔμπειροι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ᾔδεσαν ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν: Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ τοὺς ἱερέας, οἳ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶχον τοῖς μάγοις, τῶν θεῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι καὶ τὰ ξύμπαντα γιγνώσκοντες ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως ἔχοι: Ἰνδοὶ δὲ βραχμᾶνας, ἐγκρατείᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ διαφέροντας καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον φιλίᾳ, ὅθεν μᾶλλον ἴσασι τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι

  [7] Furthermore, since they cannot always be ruled by kings who are philosophers, the most powerful nations have publicly appointed philosophers as superintendents and officers for their kings. Thus the Persians, methinks, appointed those whom they call Magi, because they were acquainted with Nature and understood how the gods should be worshipped; the Egyptians appointed the priests who had the same knowledge as the Magi, devoting themselves to the service of the gods and knowing the how and the wherefore of everything; the Indians appointed Brachmans, because they excel in self-control and righteousness and in their devotion to the divine, as a result of which they know the future better than all other men know their immediate present;

  [8] ἄνθρωποι τὰ παρόντα αὐτοῖς: Κελτοὶ δὲ οὓς ὀνομάζουσι Δρυΐδας, καὶ τούτους περὶ μαντικὴν ὄντας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν: ὧν ἄνευ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐδὲν ἐξῆν πράττειν οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἐκείνους ἄρχειν, τοὺς δὲ βασιλέας αὐτῶν ὑπηρέτας καὶ διακόνους γίγνεσθαι τῆς γνώμης ἐν θρόνοις χρυσοῖς καθημένους καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλας οἰκοῦντας καὶ πολυτελῶς εὐωχουμένους. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον εἰκός ἐστι πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν ἱκανώτατα διοικῆσαι, ὃς τὴν χαλεπωτάτην ἀρχὴν διηνεκῶς ἄρχων δύναται παρέχειν ἀναμάρτητον

  [8] the Celts appointed those whom they call Druids, these also being devoted to the prophetic art and to wisdom in general. In all these cases the kings were not permitted to do or plan anything without the assistance of these wise men, so that in truth it was they who ruled, while the kings became are servants and the ministers of their will, though they sat on golden thrones, dwelt in great houses, and feasted sumptuously.

  And indeed it is reasonable to expect that man to administer any office most capably who, occupying continuously the most difficult office of all, can show himself free from error.

  [9] αὑτόν. ὁ τοίνυν φιλόσοφος ἀεὶ αὑτοῦ ἄρχει: ὃ τῷ παντὶ χαλεπώτερον ἢ συμπάντων μὲν Ἑλλήνων, συμπάντων δὲ βαρβάρων βασιλεύειν. ποῖον μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἄγριον ἀνθρώπων γένος ἐστὶν ὡ�
� ὀργαί τε καὶ φθόνοι καὶ φιλονικίαι, ὧν αὐτὸν ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι [p. 96] δεῖ; ποῖον δὲ οὕτω πανοῦργον καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ προδοτικὸν ὡς ἡδοναί τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, ὧν αὐτὸν οὐδέποτε ἡττᾶσθαι δεῖ; ποῖον δὲ οὕτω βίαιον καὶ καταπληττόμενον καὶ ταπεινοῦν τὰς ψυχὰς ὡς φόβοι τε καὶ λῦπαι, οἷς οὔποτε αὐτὸν πρέπει ὑπείκοντα ὀφθῆναι;

  [9] For example, the philosopher is always master of himself; and this is altogether more difficult than to be king over all the Greeks or all the barbarians. For what race of men is as savage as are anger and envy and contentiousness, things over which the philosopher must maintain control? What race is as knavish and intrigue number and traitorous as are pleasures and lusts, by which he must never be overcome? What race is as violent and terrifying and debasing to men’s souls as are fear and pain, to which he must never be seen to yield?

  [10] ποῖα δὲ ὅπλα, ποῖα δὲ ἐρύματα πρὸς ταῦτα προβέβληται, οἷα οἵ τε βασιλεῖς καὶ στρατηγοὶ πόλεως πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους; ποίοις δὲ συμμάχοις ἢ δορυφόροις ἐπὶ ταῦτα χρῆσθαι δυνατόν, εἰ μή γε τοῖς σοφοῖς καὶ φρονίμοις λόγοις; τίσι δὲ ἄλλοις ἐντείλασθαι φυλακὰς ἢ ἐπιτρέψαι φρουρεῖν, ἦ ποίοις χρήσασθαι διακόνοις; ἆῤ οὐκ αὐτὸν δεῖ καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ̓ ἡμέραν φροντίζοντα καὶ ἀγρυπνοῦντα τὴν φυλακὴν ταύτην ἔχειν, ὅπως μὴ λάθῃ αὑτὸν ἤτοι ἀνασεισθεὶς ὑπὸ ἡδονῶν ἢ καταπλαγεὶς ὑπὸ φόβων ἢ παρακρουσθεὶς ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ λύπης, ὥστε ἀποστῆναι τῶν