Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [4] Again, if I have said that the commons were subjects for pity, let no one assume that I mean they have been treated unfairly and illegally, for we also pity persons who are subjected by physicians to surgery or cautery, although such treatment is for their recovery, and since their mothers and fathers alike weep over them, although they know that they are being benefited.

  However, as I was saying, though I admired you even ere this, before ever I had had sufficient experience of your disposition, now certainly, I swear to you by all the gods, I for my part not only judge the Council worthy of respect and affection, but am even amazed at your power and truthfulness and independence.

  [5] τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. καὶ τοῦτον ἔσχηκα τὸν τρόπον, ὥστε τῷ δήμῳ μὲν ἐκτετικέναι δοκεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δύναμιν, ὡς πολίτης, ὑμῖν δὲ ὀφείλειν καὶ μηδέποτε ἂν δυνηθῆναι τὴν ὑμετέραν εὔνοιαν ὑπερβαλέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν τινος ῥητόρων, ὑπερβολήν τινα ἔχειν δοκοῦν κολακείας, ὅτι ,τὸν δῆμον εἰκότως ἂν ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς περιφεροίμην̔ ἐγὼ δικαίως ἂν εἴποιμι πρὸς ὑμᾶς. καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦτον, εἰ νοῦν ἔχει καὶ σωφρονεῖ, νομίζω πάντα τὸν βίον ὑμῖν ἀναθήσειν καὶ θεραπεύσειν ὑμᾶς οὐχ

  [5] Moreover, I have conducted myself in such a way that, while I have, as I think, repaid the people in full to the best of my ability as a citizen, yet to you I am still indebted, and I could never outdo your benevolence toward me. And in fact that expression which was used by one of the orators of old which was considered to contain a certain excess of flattery, namely, “I might with good reason carry the commons around with me in my eyes,” I could justly use with reference to you. And what is more, this son of mine, if he is sensible and prudent, I believe will dedicate his whole life to your service and consult your welfare no less than I do.

  [6] ἧττον ἐμοῦ. τίνος γενομένου, φήσει τις, καὶ τίνα τῶν ἀνδρῶν πεῖραν εἰληφὼς οὕτως ὑπερδιατείνῃ; ἴσως ἐπίπνοιά τις μοι γέγονεν αὐτόματος καὶ φορὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τοιαύτη πρὸς ὑμᾶς: ἐκεῖνο δ̓ οὖν ἐπίστασθε σαφῶς ὅτι οὔτε δῆμον οὔτε βουλὴν οὔτε ἄνδρα σατράπην ἢ δυνάστην ἢ τύραννον στέργειν ἢ θεραπεύειν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγὼ δύναμαι, μὴ παῤ ἐμαυτῷ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐπαινέσας καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἀποδεξάμενος. ὑμᾶς δὲ ὁρῶ σχεδὸν ὁσάκις ὑμῶν γέγονε πεῖρα τῆς διανοίας μηδὲν πώποτε ἄδικον μηδὲ ἀμφίβολον μηδὲ ταπεινὸν μηδὲ εὐμετάβολον μηδὲ ἀναίσθητον ἢ

  [6] “What had happened,” some one will say, “and what experience of the gentlemen have you had, that you are so extravagant in your language?” Possibly it is an inspiration which has come to me spontaneously, a spiritual impulse of that sort in your direction; but one thing at any rate I would have you know clearly — that I cannot cherish or favour with my eloquence either commons or Council or man, be he satrap or prince or tyrant, without first praising them to myself and approving the character of their spirit. But in your case, practically every time there has been a test of your disposition, I see you have never displayed any injustice or double-dealing or baseness or fickleness or insensibility or yielding to clamour or annoyance.

  [7] θορύβων ἢ πραγμάτων ἐπιδεδειγμένους: ὥστε εἴποιμ̓ ἂν θαρρῶν, ἔχετε μὲν προστάτας χρηστούς, οὐδένα δὲ ἄξιον ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ̓ οὐδὲ τῶν πρότερον ἢ τὸν ἐμὸν πατέρα ἢ πάππον οὐδὲ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, [p. 100] πάντας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τιμῆς ἀξίους. καὶ μηδείς με νομίσῃ λέγειν ἐμαυτὸν εἰσποιοῦντα τῷ προΐστασθαι τῆς βουλῆς: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειμι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ῾καὶ πιστεύσατε ὡς νῦν γοῦν ἀληθῶς λέγὠ καὶ ἴσως οὐκ ἐμαυτοῦ χάριν ὠφελείας ἢ τρυφῆς τινος: ἣν

  [7] And so I might say with assurance, that, while you have had excellent leaders, you have had none as excellent as you deserve, no, not even my father or my grandfather of days gone by, nor the forebears of the rest of you, all good men and deserving of honour as they were.

  And let no one imagine that I am trying through oratory to force my way into the presidency of the Council; for I am leaving Prusa for a variety of reasons — and you must believe that this time at least I speak the truth and perhaps not for the sake of special profit or any self-indulgence; indeed I have not been able to hide my purpose.

  [8] δὲ εἶχον ἀποκρύψασθαι γνώμην οὐκ ἐδυνάμην. καὶ οὐκ ἔστι δέος μήποτε ἐγὼ δόξω κολακεύειν ὑμᾶς, οὐ κολακεύσας τὸν ἐχθρὸν τύραννον οὐδὲ ῥῆμα ἀγεννὲς οὐδὲ ἀνελεύθερον εἰπών, ὅτε πολλοῖς ἀγαπητὸν ἦν ζῆν ὁτιοῦν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ μέγα καὶ θεῖον εἶναι τὸ γιγνόμενον παῤ ὑμῖν. ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ ὁποῖοί ποτέ ἐστε, οὐ σφόδρα ἀκριβῶς ἐπίσταμαι: νομίζω δὲ βελτίους τῶν πολλῶν. κοινῇ δέ, ὅταν συνέλθητε δεῦρο ἢ πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, οὐδὲν πώποτε οὔτε ταπεινὸν οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οἶδα εἰπόντας ἢ φρονήσαντας ὑμᾶς, οὐ παράκλησιν ἰσχύουσαν παῤ ὑμῖν, οὐχ ὑπόσχεσιν, οὐκ ἀπειλήν, εἴ τις ἄρα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὥστ̓ ἰσχύειν ἀπειλῶν. διὰ τί δὲ μὴ φῶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐμαυτῷ, καθάπερ δέον τὸν φιλόσοφον τὰ πονηρὰ μόνον ἐξελέγχειν, τὰ δὲ βελτίω παρακαλύπτεσθαι, ἢ τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ἐπὶ μόνοις τοῖς κακοῖς οὖσαν ὠφέλιμον, ἀλλ̓ οὐ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐδὲν ἧττον, ὅτι εὔφημος;

  [8] Besides, there is no fear that I may ever be thought guilty of flattering you, since I did not flatter the hateful tyrant or utter a single ignoble or servile word, at a time when many were glad to save their lives by any deed or word at all. On the contrary, your way of doing things seems to me to be grand, yes, superhuman. For, while I do not know with absolute precision what you are like in private life — though I believe you to be superior to most people — I do know that as a corporate body, whenever you gather here, or, it may be, in the Assembly, you have never said or thought anything base or servile, and that entreaty has no weight with you, nor promises, nor threats — supposing of course there is any one so low as to try to prevail by threats. But why should I not speak my mind — as if the philosopher had to confine himself to exposing what is bad and concealing what is better, or as if the truth were beneficial only in connexion with evils, instead of no less so in connexion with good things because it is laudatory!

  [9] σὺ οὖν, φήσει τις, ἐγκώμιον ἀναστὰς ἠθέλησας εἰπεῖν τῆς βουλῆς; καὶ τί δεινόν, ἐὰν ἀληθὲς ᾖ; τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον τοῦτο, ἐὰν φαίνησθε ἀνόμοιοι τοῖς λεγομένοις, οὐχ ὑμέτερός ἐστιν ἔπαινος, τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος κατηγορ�
�α. ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐποιησάμην οὐδένα λόγον τοιοῦτον, εἰ μὴ σφόδρα ἤλγησα: ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε, ἀκούσας ὅτι καθυφίεμαι τὸ ὑμέτερον, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπελογησάμην, οὐχ ὑπερορῶν ἀπολογεῖσθαι: πόθεν; οὐδὲ κρίνων ἐμαυτοῦ ταπεινότερον. νυστάζοντι μὲν γάρ, ὥς φασι, δικαστῇ, καὶ νὴ Δία τυράννῳ κακοήθει καὶ πονηρῷ ταπεινὸν ἀπολογεῖσθαι: πολίταις δὲ καὶ συγγενέσι καὶ φίλοις, οὕς τις ἡγεῖται μετρίους, οὐ ταπεινόν, ἀλλ̓ εὔγνωμον καὶ δίκαιον. καὶ τότε οὖν ὀρθῶς ἐποίησα καὶ

  [9] “But did you, then,” some one will ask, “rise to your feet merely to deliver a eulogy of the Council?” And what is there shocking in that, provided the eulogy be true? However, this eulogy of mine, in case you are clearly unlike what is said of you, is not a eulogy of you, but rather an accusation of the speaker. Still, for all that, I should not have delivered any such speech at all if I had not been very much hurt, as I was once before, on hearing that I am compromising your position. And this explains why I have defended myself, not disdaining to make a defence — why should I? — nor judging it to be beneath me. For while it is humiliating to make a defence before a dozing judge, as the saying goes, and also, by Heaven, before a malicious and rascally tyrant, to do so before fellow citizens and kinsmen and friends whom one regards as fair-minded is not humiliating, but reasonable and just. So not only was my conduct correct on that former occasion, but it is much more so now that I know you better.

  [10] νῦν πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ὅτε ὑμᾶς σαφέστερον ἐπίσταμαι. πυνθάνομαι [p. 101] γὰρ ὥς τινες ἔδοξαν καὶ λόγος ἐρρύη τοιοῦτος ὡς ἐμὲ ἐμποδὼν γενόμενον τῷ συνάγεσθαι βουλήν: ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε ἤκουσα ὡς πάντα ἁπλῶς νομίζουσι τὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὐκ ἀφαιροῦμαι τὸν υἱόν, τὸ μηδὲν ἄκοντος ἂν ἐμοῦ ποιῆσαι τῶν ἐφ̓ ἑαυτῷ μηδὲ ἄλλως ἂν ἢ στοχαζόμενον καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης: ὀμνύω δὲ μὴ προστάξαι μηδεπώποτε μηδέν, λέγω δὲ τῶν κοινῶν, τὸ δὲ συμβουλεύειν πατέρα ὄντα τὰ κρείττονα δοκοῦντα προστάγματος ἔχει τάξιν. καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν ταύτην ἀπὸ χρόνου τινὸς οὐδὲ ταῖς βουλαῖς παρετύγχανον. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν αὐτὸν ἀξιώσαντα τῆς πόλεως, ὡς ἱκανὸν ὄντα βουλεύεσθαι ἤδη καὶ διοικεῖν τὰ κοινά, μεταξὺ δὲ ἔργῳ ποιεῖν ἰδιώτην καὶ τῆς ἐξουσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἄκυρον οὔτε ἄλλως ἐπιεικὲς οὔτε ἴσως αὖ τοῖς τηλικούτοις.

  [10] For I learn — and there has been a flood of talk of that kind — that some have believed the charge that I blocked the assembling of the Council; indeed I have heard also that they believe that absolutely every act of the government takes place to suit my wishes. But as for me, while I do not rob my son of one thing, I mean his unwillingness to do anything within his own control against my wishes or in any other way than guessing at my opinion too, nevertheless I swear I never gave him any orders at all — I mean orders on public matters — though for one who is a father to advise what seems to him to be preferable does have the status of an order. Moreover, because of this suspicion of which I have spoken, for some time past I have not attended the sessions of the Council. For to have deemed him worthy of municipal activities as being competent by now to be a Councillor and to administer the commonwealth, but meanwhile actually to try to make him a private citizen and to rob him of the authority which is legally his — this, I say, is from any point of view neither reasonable nor yet fair for men of my age.

  THE FIFTY-FIRST DISCOURSE: IN REPLY TO DIODORUS

  ΠΡΟΣ ΔΙΟΔΩΡΟΝ.

  THE FIFTY-FIRST DISCOURSE: IN REPLY TO DIODORUS

  Of the Diodorus mentioned in the title of the present Discourse we know absolutely nothing. Dio supplies no clues in the speech itself. In fact, he does not address him directly. Consequently we may infer that the name rests upon reliable tradition. It would appear that the man in question had just made a speech in Assembly lauding some citizen of Prusa. It is plain from § 8 that this citizen had effected certain reforms in connexion with the ephebes. Diodorus may have moved — or seconded — a resolution to give him wider jurisdiction of similar character (cf. § 6). Dio followed him with this brief speech, whose purpose is both to register his own approval of the proposal and at the same time to cast suspicion upon the sincerity of the previous speaker.

  If we are left in the dark as to Diodorus, we are in almost equal darkness as to the unnamed recipient of the city’s favour. Arnim states confidently that he is Dio’s son. This is possible, but the speech provides no proof of the assumption. On the contrary, the speaker exhibits remarkable self-restraint, if we are to think of him as the father of the person who is receiving signal honours. Most of his remarks are devoted to the merits of his city, and when he does refer to the man whom that city is honouring, it is by means of a colourless τούτου or τούδε. In fact, the rather satirical tone of the opening sentence in § 2, the grudging acknowledgement at the beginning of § 4, and the possible suggestion of hasty judgement contained in the clause εὐθὺς ἡγεισθε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀμείνους δύνασθαι ποιεῖν (§ 8), give the impression that Dio was not enthusiastic over the task before him.

  [1] Σφόδρα θαυμάζειν ἔπεισιν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἴ τις οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενός τινα οὐδὲ ἀγαπῶν ἔπειτα ἀναστὰς ἐπαινεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐνίοτε διῆλθεν ἐγκώμιον μακρὸν καὶ λίαν ἐπιμελῶς συγκείμενον. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ, τι τῶν αἰσχίστων οὐ σύνοιδεν αὑτῷ, φθόνον, μικροψυχίαν, τὸ πάντων ἔσχατον, δουλείαν. λέγεται γοῦν οὐκ ἀτόπως καὶ παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ῾δούλου τόδ̓ εἶπας.῾ φέρε δή, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη δοῦλος ὁ πρὸς τοσούτους ἅμα ἀνθρώπους ἕτερα ὧν φρονεῖ εἰπών, καὶ ταῦτα οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ φροντίδος καὶ παρασκευῆς, καὶ κολακεύων πολλάκις ἄνθρωπον

  The Fifty-first Discourse: In Reply to Diodorus

  My friends, it strikes me as exceedingly surprising when a man who does not approve of some one or does not like him nevertheless rises to praise him in a speech, and on occasion enters into a long eulogy, one very carefully composed. For such a person has on his conscience all that is most disgraceful — envy, meanness of spirit, and, worst of all, servility. Not inappropriately, at any rate, is that term used for it by the ancients in the verse

  A slave’s word this thou hast spoken.

  Aye, how could that man be other than a slave, who in the presence of so many people acts at variance with his own thoughts — and that too, not with frankness, but with premeditation and cold calculation — and indulges in frequent flattery and admiration of a person whom he does not like? Indeed that is to put it mildly!

  [2] καὶ θαυμάζων ὃν οὐ φιλεῖ;μέτριον γὰρ οὕτως εἰπεῖν. καὶ μὴν ὅτι πάντες πάντας ἐγκωμιάζουσι παῤ ἡμῖν ἐπίστασθε δήπου: [p. 102] ὥστ̓ ἐγὼ συνήδομαι κα�
�� κρίνω μακαρίους ὑμᾶς, εἰ οὕτως φιλοῦμεν πάντες ἅπαντας. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἀκόλουθον. ἐβουλόμην δ̓ ἄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς βουλαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις πολλῶν ἐγκωμίων ἀκοῦσαι ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συλλόγοις. νῦν δὲ παρὰ τὸν τόπον τοιαῦτα ἢ τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ γυμνάζοντες αὑτοὺς ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐγχειροῦμεν εἰς ἀμφότερα. οὐκοῦν, ἂν μὲν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν τις παραγένηται τῶν ξένων, ἡρώων τινῶν ἢ σοφῶν ἡγήσεται τὴν πόλιν: ἂν δ̓ εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλῃ, ὁποίων οὐδὲν δεῖ λέγειν: ἐπίστασθε γὰρ αὐτοί.

  [2] As a matter of fact, you know, no doubt, that with us everybody lauds everybody; and so I rejoice with you and count you fortunate if we all are so fond of everybody — for this is the natural inference! However, I wish that, just as it is possible to hear many eulogies in meetings of the Council and of the Assembly, so also it might be in the market-place and the other places where men come together. But as it is, the words which are spoken are thus or thus in keeping with the place, and, just like those who are training themselves in the schools, we too try our hands at both sides of the question. Therefore, if a stranger attends a meeting of the Assembly, he will imagine that ours is a city of heroes, as it were, or sages; whereas if he bursts into the market-place — there is no need to tell what kind of people he will think us, for you know that yourselves.