Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom
Page 347
[25] This, it seems to me, is why men entrust all their important matters to Fortune, making their public offices and generalships subject to allotment; brothers also divide their patrimony in that way. And so Polyneices too, if indeed he had been well advised, ought to have drawn lots with his brother for the throne; but as it was, not only was he himself slain, he destroyed his brother as well, all because he referred the matter to priority of birth and not to Fortune.
[26] κλήρῳ νῦν πεπάλαχθε διαμπερές, ὅς κε λάχῃσιν. οὗτος γάρ δὴ ὀνήσει ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς: καὶ ὤνησε λαχών: ὁ δὲ Ἕκτωρ ἡττήθη γνώμῃ πιστεύσας, οὐ τύχῃ. δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει. θησαυροὶ μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους οὗτοι παρὰ θεοῖς: ταμιεύει δὲ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἡ τύχη καὶ ῥήτορι καὶ στρατηγῷ καὶ
[26] Now shake the lot in turn and see who draws;
For the well-greaved Achaeans he will aid —
and, having drawn, aid he did; however, Hector was defeated because he trusted to judgement and not to Fortune.
For on his threshold Zeus has set two jars.
These are storage jars for mankind in the keeping of the gods; however, it is Fortune who administers them with regard to what is allotted — to orator or to general, to rich or poor, to old or young.
[27] πένητι καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πρεσβύτῃ καὶ νέῳ. Κροίσῳ δίδωσι χρυσόν, Κανδαύλῃ γυναῖκα, Πηλεῖ ξίφος, Νέστορι ἀσπίδα, Πτερέλᾳ κόμην χρυσῆν, Νίσῳ πλόκαμον πορφυροῦν, Ἀλκιβιάδῃ κάλλος, Σωκράτει δὲ φρόνησιν, Ἀριστείδῃ δικαιοσύνην, Λακεδαιμονίοις γῆν, Ἀθηναίοις θάλατταν. εἶτα ἐν μέρει τούτων μὲν ἀφείλετο, ἄλλοις δὲ ἔδωκεν. καὶ οὐδέν μοι δοκεῖ ὁ βίος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πομπῆς διαφέρειν ἐν ταῖς ἡμερησίαις μεταβολαῖς. [p. 156]
[27] To Croesus she gives gold, to Candaules a wife, to Peleus a sword, to Nestor a shield, to Pterelas golden locks, to Nisus a purple tress, to Alcibiades beauty, to Socrates wisdom, to Aristeides uprightness, to Spartans land, to Athenians a sea. Then in turn she takes from these and gives to others. And it seems to me that the life of man in its daily vicissitudes is in no wise different from a procession.
THE SIXTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON FORTUNE (III)
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΥΧΗΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΣ.
THE SIXTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON FORTUNE (III)
This essay deals with the injustice of human behaviour with respect to Fortune. Unlike the two essays on Fortune which precede it, there seems to be no good reason to doubt its authenticity; yet there are signs which suggest that its present form is not that in which it was composed. The author seems to repeat himself to an extent not to be expected in so brief a composition. Besides, one misses from time to time those particles and formulas commonly employed by Dio and other Greek writers to indicate transition and to knit together the argument, e.g., at the beginning of the new paragraph in § 7 and at the beginning of §§ , , and . On the other hand, the γὰρ which is found in the beginning of the new paragraph in § 4 seems so unwarranted in that setting that Wilamowitz proposed to strike it out. In view of these phenomena it is not unlikely that we have before us, not one unified composition, but rather a collection of passages drawn from various contexts and here put together because of their common theme. It is possible that Dio’s editor desired thus to preserve passages in writings now lost to us which he deemed noteworthy; though Dio himself may for his own convenience have grouped together paragraphs on related topics. It is worth noticing that the passages that have been cited as marked by asyndeton have the earmarks of prooemia. For a fuller discussion of the general problem see von Arnim, Dio von Prusa 268-271.
[1] Οἱ σφόδρα τῇ τύχῃ πεπιστευκότες καὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ταύτης ἐπαιρόμενοι δοκοῦσί μοι κάλλιστα συνηγορεῖν αὐτῇ καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἐπειδὰν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεὶς αὐτῇ μέμφηται. τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἅπαντες τῇ βαρύτητι τῶν εὐτυχούντων δυσχεραίνοντες καὶ τὴν ὕβριν αὐτῶν μεμισηκότες ὅταν καταλίπῃ τινὰ αὐτῶν, ἐπαινοῦσι καί φασι δικαίαν αὐτοῖς γεγονέναι τὴν μεταβολήν. δεῖ δὲ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας οὕτως χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτομάτοις ἀγαθοῖς ὥστε ὑπαρχόντων μὲν αὐτῶν μηδένα ἐγκαλεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ παύσηταί ποτε,
The Sixty-fifth Discourse: On Fortune (III)
Those who have relied greatly on Fortune and are elated by her presence are, it seems to me, her most effective advocates and insure that, whenever she does shift, no one shall blame her for it. For, on the contrary, all men, being disgusted at the offensiveness of those who enjoy good fortune and having come to hate their insolence, as soon as Fortune abandons any of these, applaud and declare that the change of fortune they have experienced is deserved. Nay, men of intelligence should so employ the blessings which so come to them unearned that, while they last, no one may censure them and, if some day they come to an end, no one may rejoice thereat.
[2] μηδένα ἐφήδεσθαι. τῷ παντὶ γὰρ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ἐνδεῶς πράττοντα ἀγαπᾶσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν πᾶσι παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀπαλλάττειν ἢ τοὐναντίον εὐτυχοῦντα μισεῖσθαι καὶ προσέτι καὶ τῇ τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι βλασφημίας αἴτιον, ὡς τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀντὶ τῶν χρηστῶν εὐεργετεῖν προαιρουμένῃ. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς βαρέως χρωμένους τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης ὑπάρχουσι πονηροὺς μὲν εἷναί φασι καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναξίους, οὐ μὴν ἀτυχεῖς γε εἰώθασι λέγειν: ἐμοὶ δὲ τοὐναντίον οὗτοι δοκοῦσι πάντων ἀτυχέστατοι καθεστηκέναι.
[2] For it is altogether better that one should be in straitened circumstances but well liked, and that he should be thought by all to be getting less than his deserts, than, on the contrary, that he should be prosperous but hated, and, besides, become the occasion for blasphemous railing at Fortune as preferring to benefit the wicked rather than the good. Now though most men say that those who are obnoxious in their use of the gifts of Fortune are wicked and unworthy of their blessings, they assuredly do not as a rule call them unfortunate; yet to me, on the contrary, such persons seem to have become the most unfortunate of all.
[3] τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νομιζομένων ἀγαθῶν μηδενὸς χρηστοῦ, βλασφημίας δὲ καὶ μίσους ἀπολαύειν πρὸς τῷ τὴν αὑτοῦ κακίαν γνωριμωτέραν πᾶσι ποιεῖν, πῶς οὐχὶ μεγάλη καὶ φανερὰ δυστυχία; διόπερ οἶμαι τοῖς ἀνοήτοις λυσιτελεῖ τῷ παντὶ μᾶλλον ἐνδεῶς πράττειν καὶ μήτε ἐξουσίας μήτε πλούτου μήτε τῶν τοιούτων μηδενὸς τυγχάνειν. ταπεινοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὄντες λανθάνειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔμελλον, ὁποῖοι κατὰ τρόπον ὑπάρχουσιν, ἀρθέντες δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς
[3] For when from what commonly are deemed blessings one reaps nothing that is good, but rather vilification and hatred, besides making his own wickedness more notorious for all the world, how can that be anything but a great
and conspicuous misfortune? And so, in my opinion, for those who lack intelligence it is in every way more profitable to be in needy circumstances and to acquire neither power nor riches nor any such thing at all. For as long as they were in lowly station most persons would fail to perceive their true character, whereas if they are exalted by Fortune their villainy is made conspicuous.
[4] τύχης ἐπίσημον τὴν πονηρίαν ἔσχον. ὥσπερ οὖν τοῖς τὸ σῶμα φαύλως διακειμένοις βέλτιον καθ̓ αὑτοὺς ἀποδύεσθαι καὶ μηδέποτε εἰς τὸ κοινόν, ὅπως μηδένα ἔχωσι τῆς περὶ τοῦτο αἰσχύνης μάρτυρα: τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμαι τρόπον, οἷς συμβέβηκε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγεννῆ [p. 157] καὶ μοχθηρὰν ὑπάρχειν, λυσιτελὲς ἂν εἴη δήπου ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ βίου καὶ σκότει τῆς τύχης διατελεῖν. — ἀδίκως γάρ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῆς τύχης κατηγορεῖν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐχούσης βέβαιον οὐδὲ πιστόν, ἀλλὰ ταχὺ δὴ μάλα, οἷς ἂν παρῇ, τούτους καταλειπούσης
[4] Accordingly, just as with those whose bodies are in bad condition it is better that they undress in private and never in public, in order that they may have no witness of their shame in that respect, in the same way, I fancy, those whose misfortune it has been to possess a soul which is ignoble and corrupt would surely find it to their interest to remain inconspicuous as to their lives and obscure as to their fortunes.
It seems to me unfair that most men arraign Fortune on the ground that she has no stability or trustworthiness but all too speedily deserts those whom she visits and shifts to others.
[5] καὶ μεθισταμένης πρὸς ἑτέρους. εἰ μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἦν ἰδεῖν χρωμένους ὡς τὸ πολὺ τοῖς παῤ αὐτῆς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς λαμβάνοντας καὶ μὴ τοὐναντίον εὐθὺς ὕβρεως καὶ μισανθρωπίας καὶ θρασύτητος ἐμπιμπλαμένους, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐποίει μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς παραμένουσα: νῦν δὲ οἶμαι προαιρεῖται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν ἕκαστον ὡς χρηστὸν καὶ τῶν παῤ αὐτῆς δωρεῶν ἄξιον, ἐπειδὰν δὲ φαῦλον αἴσθηται καὶ ταπεινόν, καταισχύνοντα τὴν εὔνοιαν τὴν παῤ αὐτῆς, εἰκότως ἀφίσταται καὶ ζητεῖ πάλιν ἄλλον, ἐὰν ἄρα ἐπιεικέστερον
[5] For if we could observe that the recipients of her blessings were for the most part making an honourable use of them and not, on the contrary, becoming filled immediately with arrogance and malevolence and effrontery, Fortune would not be acting right if she did not remain with the same people; but as it is, I imagine, she chooses in each instance to benefit a person because she supposes him to be a good man and worthy of her gifts, but when she finds him to be mean and base, bringing shame upon her benevolence, with good reason she leaves him and seeks somebody else in turn, hoping to find some one who is more honourable.
[6] εὑρεῖν δύνηται. πονηρῶν δὲ τῶν πλείστων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως σπανίως τινὰ φερούσης ἐπιτήδειον εὖ πράττειν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεχεῖς ποιεῖται τὰς μεταβολάς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἢ τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν. ἔστι δὲ ἄτοπον, εἴ τις αὐτὸς μὲν ἕκαστος οὐ δύναται φέρειν ἐνίους τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ἀλλὰ μικρὸν χρόνον ὁμιλήσας ἀφίσταται, καὶ μᾶλλον αἱρεῖται τὴν αὑτοῦ πενίαν ὅπως ἂν ἐνδέχηται φέρειν ἢ φορτικῶν καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνέχεσθαι τρόπων: τὴν δὲ τύχην, θεὸν οὖσαν, ἀξιοῖ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις συζῆν ἄχρι παντὸς καὶ πολλάκις ὑβριζομένην ὕβρεις δεινὰς
[6] But since most men are evil and human nature rarely produces anybody fitted to enjoy prosperity, Fortune must needs shift continuously, and much rather because of our nature than because of her own. Yet it is strange that one who cannot himself endure some who enjoy the favours of Fortune, but who after a brief association leaves them and prefers to bear his own poverty as best he can rather than put up with cheap and senseless manners, nevertheless expects Fortune, goddess though she be, to live with these same persons for ever and, though frequently subjected to outrageous insults, to remain with an utterly worthless slave!
[7] παραμένειν ἀνδραπόδῳ μηδενὸς ἀξίῳ. παρὰ γὰρ τῶν πλουσίων εἰς μὲν τοὺς συμβιοῦντας ἀνθρώπους ἡ ὕβρις ἐστὶ λοιδορία, προπηλακισμός, κατάγελως, τὸ πληγῆναι πολλάκις, εἰς δὲ τὴν τύχην αὐτὴν ὑπερηφανία, βαρύτης, μικρολογία. — ἀδικώτατά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἐγκαλεῖν οἱ πολλοὶ τῇ τύχῃ. νῦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν αἰτιῶνται, φάσκοντες ἄπιστον εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν βέβαιον. εἰ δ̓ [p. 158] ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς παρέμενεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐχὶ τῷ παντὶ μείζονος καὶ δικαιοτέρας ἐτύγχανε κατηγορίας. ὅπου γὰρ νῦν ὁρᾶτε τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας οὕτως ὄντας πονηροὺς καὶ βαρεῖς, καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ μέλλοντος ὑπάρχοντος ἀδήλου, πόσης ἂν οἴεσθε αὐτοὺς ὑπερηφανίας καὶ σκαιότητος εἶναι μεστούς, εἰ καθόλου μὴ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς μεταβολῆς ὑφεωρῶντο;
[7] For the fact is that the insolence shown by the rich toward the human beings with whom they live consists of abusive language, contumely, ridicule, and often a blow, but toward Fortune herself it is arrogance, harshness, captiousness.
Most unfair, it seems to me, are the charges most men bring against Fortune. For as it is they find fault with her as being untrustworthy and having no constancy at all. Yet if she always stayed with the same persons she would inevitably incur an altogether more serious and justifiable accusation. For when you now see that the prosperous are so base and disagreeable, even though what is in store for them is uncertain, with what arrogance and boorishness do you suppose they would be filled if they were not at all apprehensive of a change?
[8] φασὶ πολλοὶ τὴν τύχην ἄκριτον εἶναι καὶ πονηροῖς ἀνθρώποις προσμένειν, τῶν χρηστῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖν, ὅταν ὁρῶσι τοὺς ἠξιωμένους τῶν παῤ ἐκείνης ἀγαθῶν βαρεῖς ὄντας καὶ δυσχρήστους καὶ ἀγεννεῖς. δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἡ τύχη πρὸς αὐτοὺς δίκαια ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι φύσει φιλάνθρωπος οὖσα ἀεί τισι πάρεστιν ἡμῶν, οὐχ αἱρουμένη τοὺς ἀξίους οὐδὲ τοὺς πονηρούς, ἀεὶ δὲ οἵοις ἂν αὐτοῖς παραγένηται, τοιούτους αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἐξελέγχεσθαι. δεῖν οὖν τὴν αὑτῶν αἰτιᾶσθαι φύσιν, μὴ τὴν ἐκείνης, ὅτι τοιοῦτοι καθεστήκασιν,
[8] Many charge that Fortune lacks discrimination and stays with bad persons but neglects the good, when they observe that those who have been deemed worthy of her favours are disagreeable and hard to deal with and ignoble. But it seems to me that Fortune might justly say to them that, being naturally benevolent, she is always helping some among us,
without selecting the deserving or the base either, but that invariably the character they have when she comes to them is that which they show when the moral test is applied; and that therefore they should blame their own nature, not hers,
[9] ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἐνδεῶς ἔτι πράττων εὐθὺς ἄξιος εἶναι δοκεῖ βέλτιον ἀπαλλάττειν, ὅτῳ δ̓ ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τὰ παῤ αὐτῆς ἀγαθά, εὐθὺς μοχθηρὸς πέφηνεν. ἔστι γὰρ ὅμοιον ὥσπερ εἴ τις, ἀγγείων πολλῶν ὄντων, μηδενὸς δὲ ὑγιοῦς, τὸν εἰς αὐτὰ ἐγχέοντα ψέγοι βλέπων ῥέον ἀεὶ τὸ πληρούμενον. εἴποι γὰρ ἄν, Ἀλλ̓ ἔστι πάντα τοιαῦτα: ἕως δ̓ ἂν ᾖ κενά, λανθάνει.
[9] as being so constituted that he who is faring somewhat badly immediately seems worthy of better fortune, while he who receives her favours turns out to be a knave. Aye, it is very much as if, given a number of vessels and not one of them sound, one were to find fault with the person pouring liquid into them, on seeing that whatever vessel was being filled leaked. For the man might say, “Why, they all are like that: however, so long as they are empty it is unnoticed.”
[10] θαυμάζω πῶς ποτε οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν τύχην φασὶν ἐπικίνδυνον εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν τῶν παῤ αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν βέβαιον. ἐκείνη γὰρ ἐπειδάν τινι δῷ τὰ παῤ αὑτῆς ἀγαθά ῾ταῦτα δ̓ ἐστὶ χρήματα, ἰσχύς, δόξα, τιμαἴ τούτοις οὐδένα κωλύει χρῆσθαι κατὰ τρόπον καὶ νὴ Δία γε εἰς τἀσφαλὲς αὑτοῖς κατατίθεσθαι, λέγω δὲ οὐκ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἔνδον οὐδ̓ εἰς τὸ ταμιεῖον οὐδὲ κλεῖς ἐφιστάντας καὶ [p. 159] μοχλούς ῾οὐ φυλάττεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων οὐδὲν τῶν παῤ αὐτῆς᾿ ἀλλ̓ εἰς εὔνοιαν ἀνθρώπων, πατρίδος εὐεργεσίαν, φίλων βοήθειαν.