Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [28] Besides, even if one should become silver, gold is more precious; and if gold, it will have to be refined. Indeed, each rich man resembles money, as far as any excellence is concerned. For while no one praises money, each one who gets it uses it then it is worn out by those who use it and at last is found among the coins which do not pass current. So the rich man too comes to be reckoned among the poor and those who do not pass current and no one any longer receives a man like that of all who once were filled with admiration for him; instead, they do not even turn him over before casting him aside.

  [29] ταῖς τῶν τραγῳδῶν Ἐρινύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ δόξα: τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαινόμενον αὐτῆς λαμπρὸν ὅμοιον τῇ λαμπάδι, τὴν δὲ μάστιγα τοῖς κρότοις τις ἂν οἶμαι καὶ τῇ βοῇ τῶν πολλῶν προσεικάσειε, τοῖς δὲ ὄφεσι τοὺς ἐνίοτε συρίττοντας. πολλάκις οὖν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ τινὰ ὄντα καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα κακὸν ἁρπάσασα καὶ τῇ μάστιγι ψοφήσασα ἐξέβαλεν εἰς πανήγυρίν τινα ἤ θέατρον.

  [29] Again, reputation is like the Furies of the tragic poets — its seeming splendour is like their torch, while one might, I fancy, liken their whip to the clapping and the shouting of the crowd, and those who sometimes hiss might be likened to the Furies’ snakes. Therefore, often when one is enjoying peace and quiet and is confronted by no evil, reputation lays violent hands on him, and, cracking her whip, drives him forth to some festal gathering or to the theatre.

  THE SIXTY-SEVENTH DISCOURSE: ON POPULAR OPINION

  ΠΕΡΙ ΔΟΞΗΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΣ.

  THE SIXTY-SEVENTH DISCOURSE: ON POPULAR OPINION

  Although its Greek title is the same as that of the preceding Discourse, Or. 67 gives to the word a different meaning, that of opinion. It is argued that opinion is a poor guide and that, it discover the truth about external things, one must first obey the famous motto inscribed on Apollo’s temple at Delphi — Know Thyself — the motto which formed the basic principle of the philosophy of Socrates. Proceeding from this fundamental concept, the author demonstrates the futility of being swayed by the opinions of others.

  Here again we have what professes to be the report of a conversation between Dio and one of his followers. The abruptness with which it begins and ends has led Arnim to conclude that Dio did not intend it to be published, at least not in its present form. He regards it as what might be termed a stenographic record, which in some way or other found its way into the hands of Dio’s editor.

  [1] Δ. Τίνι: γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι διαφέρειν μάλιστα ὁ σώφρων ἀνὴρ καὶ φιλόσοφος ἡμῶν τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ εἰκῇ φερομένων; — Ἐμοὶ μέν, εἰ δεῖ οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι φαύλως τε καὶ ἀκόμψως, ἀληθείᾳ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν καὶ τῷ ἐπίστασθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν πάνυ ὀλίγων τε καὶ μακαρίων νενομισμένων τὸν. — Δ. Φιλόσοφον τῷ ὄντι, οὐ μέντοι φαῦλον καὶ ἄκομψον τὸ ῥῆμα. καί μοι τόδε εἰπὲ πρὸς θεῶν, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀληθείᾳ φὴς διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων τὸν φιλόσοφον καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ δόξαν

  The Sixty-seventh Discourse: On Popular Opinion

  Interlocutor. Well, in what particular does it seem to you that the man of self-control, the philosopher, most especially is superior to us who constitute the majority of mankind and are moved by random impulse?

  Dio. It seems to me, if one should express an opinion in such plain and unadorned terms, that he is superior in respect to truth and knowledge, not merely to the majority of mankind, but also to the very few, those who are regarded as favoured by fortune — the philosopher is, I mean.

  Int. Indeed your statement is truly plain and unadorned.

  Dio. Well, by Heaven, tell me this. You mean, do you not, that the philosopher is superior to all others in truth and in his examining each thing in the light of truth and not in accordance with opinion?

  [2] σκοπεῖν; — Φαύλῳ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἄριστε, κανόνι καὶ παντάπασι σκολιῷ μὰ Δἴ οὐ μίαν τινὰ καμπὴν ἔχοντι, μυρίας δὲ καὶ πάσας ὑπεναντίας, τὰ πράγματα σταθμῷτο τῇ δόξῃ πειρώμενος ἀπευθύνειν αὐτά. — Δ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα πρὸς ἀλήθειαν σκοπεῖ, τὴν δόξαν οὐδαμῇ προσφέρων ὡς ψευδῆ τινα τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἀστάθμητον στάθμην καὶ κανόνα τοιοῦτον, ὁποῖον ἄρτι εἴρηκας: αὐτὸς δὲ αὑτὸν τούτῳ τῷ κανόνι καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ στάθμῃ σταθμώμενος ἄξιος ἂν εἴη; — Οὐ μὰ Δἴ οὐδαμῶς. — Δ. Δῆλον [p. 170] γὰρ ὅτι οὐδέποτε γνοίη ἂν ἑαυτὸν οὕτω σκοπῶν. — Οὐ γὰρ ἂν

  [2] Int. Why, my good sir, he would be using a poor straight-edge with which to gauge his problems, one altogether crooked, a straight-edge, by Zeus, with not just one bend but thousands, and all running counter to one another, if he tried to set things straight by means of opinion.

  Dio. Well then, suppose that he views all else in the light of truth, never applying opinion as a gauge, because he believes this to be, in fact, a false and untrustworthy measuring-line, a straight-edge such as you have just described it, yet if he should measure himself with that kind of straight-edge and that kind of measuring-line, would he be acclaimed as worthy?

  Int. No, by Heaven, not by any means.

  Dio. Yes, it is plain that he could never come to know himself if he examined himself in that fashion.

  Int. Why, of course he could not.

  [3] γνοίη. — Δ. Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πείθοιτο τῷ Δελφικῷ προσρήματι κελεύσαντι παντὸς μᾶλλον γιγνώσκειν αὑτόν; — Πῶς γὰρ ἄν πείθοιτο; — Δ. Οὔκουν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἴσεται πραγμάτων αὑτὸν ἀγνοῶν οὐδὲ δυνήσεται πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἐξετάζειν αὑτοῦ πρώτου ἐσφαλμένος; — Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. — Δ. Χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσει τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας καὶ ψόγον τε καὶ ἔπαινον τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἠλιθίων ἀνθρώπων, ἐάν τε πολλοὶ τύχωσιν ὄντες ἐάν τε ὀλίγοι μέν, ἰσχυροὶ δὲ καὶ πλούσιοι. τὴν δέ γε καλουμένην δόξαν ἡγήσεται μηδὲν διαφέρειν σκιᾶς, ὁρῶν ὅτι γίγνεται τῶν μεγάλων μικρὰ καὶ τῶν μικρῶν μεγάλη: πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πλείων,

  [3] Dio. Consequently he would no longer be obeying the Delphic injunction, which has prescribed that, above all, a man must know himself.

  Int. Why, of course he would not be obeying it.

  Dio. Then he will not know any of the other things either, since he does not know himself, nor will he be able to examine things in the light of truth, since he has failed with himself to begin with?

  Int. Why, certainly.

  Dio. Then he will bid farewell to honours and dishonours and to words of censure and of praise uttered by foolish persons, whether they chance to be many or whether they be few but powerful and wealthy. Instead, what is called popular opinion he will regard as no better than a shadow, seeing that sometimes the popular view makes much of small matters and little of great ones, and often concerning the same matters it is at one time greater and at another smaller.

  Int. You seem t
o me to have made a very excellent comparison.

  [4] ὁτὲ δὲ ἐλάττων. — Εὖ πάνυ δοκεῖς μοι προσεικάσαι. — Δ. Εἰ οὖν τις εἴη τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος οἷος ζῆν πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ σκιάν, ὥστε αὐξομένης μὲν αὐτῆς ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ μεγαλαυχεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς θύειν αὐτός τε καὶ τοὺς φίλους κελεύειν, βραχυτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης λυπεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι ταπεινότερος, καὶ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἐλάττων γίγνηται, καθάπερ αὐτὸς φθίνων, θαυμαστὴν ἂν οἶμαι παρέχοι διατριβήν. — Πολύ γε ἂν εἴη τοῦ Μαργίτου μωρότερος,

  [4] Dio. Suppose, then, there should be a person so constituted as to live with an eye to his own shadow, with the result that as it grew he would become elated and boastful and not only offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods himself but also bid his friends to do so, while as his shadow diminished he would be grieved and show himself more humble, and the more so the smaller his shadow became, just as if he himself were wasting away, methinks he would afford wondrous amusement.

  Int. Yes, he would be a much bigger booby than Margites, who did not know how to treat his wife once he had married her.

  [5] ἀγνοοῦντος ὅ,τι χρὴ γήμαντα χρῆσθαι τῇ γυναικί. — Δ. Τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ὁτὲ μὲν λυποῖτ̓ ἄν, ὁτὲ δὲ χαίροι. πρωῒ μὲν ἐπειδὰν ἴδῃ τὴν σκιὰν ἑωθινὴν πάνυ μακράν, τῶν τε κυπαρίττων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τείχεσι πύργων σχεδὸν μείζω, δῆλον ὅτι χαίροι ἂν ὡς αὐτὸς ἐξαπίνης γεγονὼς τοῖς Ἀλῳάδαις ἴσος καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν βαδίζοι ἂν καὶ εἰς τὰ θέατρα καὶ πανταχόσε τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως ἂν ὑπὸ πάντων βλέποιτο. περὶ δὲ πλήθουσαν ἀγορὰν ἄρχοιτ̓ ἂν σκυθρωπότερος αὑτοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀναχωροίη. τῆς δὲ μεσημβρίας αἰσχύνοιτ̓ ἂν ὀφθῆναι ἀνθρώπων τινὶ καὶ ἔνδον μένοι ἂν ἐγκλεισάμενος, [p. 171] ἐπειδὰν ἐν τοῖς ποσὶ βλέπῃ τὴν σκιὰν: πάλιν δὲ περὶ δείλην ἀναλαμβάνοι ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ γαυρότερος φαίνοιτ̓ ἂν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἑσπέραν.

  [5] Dio. Yes, for on the same day sometimes he would be sad and sometimes happy. For instance, early in the day, when he saw his shadow at dawn very long, almost larger than the cypresses or the towers on the city walls, manifestly he would be happy, supposing himself to have suddenly grown to the size of the sons of Aloeus, and he would go striding into the market-place and the theatres and everywhere in the city to be observed by one and all. However, about the middle of the morning he would begin to grow more sad of countenance than he had been and would go back home. Then at noon he would be ashamed to be seen by anybody and would stay indoors, locking himself up, when he saw his shadow at his feet; yet again, toward afternoon, he would begin to recover and would show himself ever more and more exultant toward evening.

  [6] — Πάνυ μοι δοκεῖς ἄτοπον διάθεσιν καὶ ἄνδρα διαπλάττειν ἠλίθιον. — Δ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τῇ δόξῃ προσέχων οὐδέν τι βελτίων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἀθλιώτερος. πολλάκις γὰρ ἂν πλείους μεταβολὰς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ μεταβάλλοιτο, καίτοι οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐν τεταγμέναις ὥραις τισίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δείλης καὶ ἕωθεν οὐδὲν αὐτὸν κωλύσει μὴ δυστυχέστατον ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, νῦν μὲν φερόμενον καὶ πετόμενον ὑψηλότερον τῶν νεφῶν, ἂν τύχωσι μαρτυρήσαντες αὐτόν τινες καὶ ἐπαινέσαντες, νῦν δὲ συστελλόμενον καὶ ταπεινούμενον, πολὺ πλείους αὐξήσεις τε καὶ φθίσεις τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ λαμβανούσης, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν,

  [6] Int. You certainly seem to me to be fashioning a strange disposition and a foolish kind of man.

  Dio. Well then, he who pays heed to popular opinion is not a bit better, but rather far more pathetic. For often he would undergo several changes on one and the same day, yet not, like the man I have imagined, at certain definite times, but, alike in the afternoon or in the early morning, nothing will keep him from being the most unfortunate of mortals, now being swept along and flying higher than the clouds, if it so happen that any have sent him forth under full sail and have praised him, now taking in his sails and abasing himself, his spirit experiencing, methinks, far more waxings and wanings than the moon.

  [7] τῶν τῆς σελήνης. ἆῤ οὖν οὐκ ἀθλιώτερον πότμον καὶ μοῖραν εἴληχε πολὺ δυστυχεστέραν ἤ φασι Μελέαγρον τὸν Ἀλθαίας τε καὶ Οἰνέως τυχεῖν, ᾧ δαλόν τινα λέγουσι ταμιεύειν τὸν τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον: καὶ δὴ λάμποντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῷ διαμένοντος ζῆν τε καὶ ἀκμάζειν ἐκεῖνον, μαραινομένου δὲ τοῦ δαλοῦ καὶ τὸν Μελέαγρον φθίνειν ὑπὸ λύπης τε καὶ δυσθυμίας: σβεσθέντος δὲ οἴχεσθαι ἀποθανόντα.

  [7] Has he not, then, drawn a more wretched fate and a far more luckless lot than they say fell to Meleager, son of Althaea and Oeneus, whose span of life, men say, was in the keeping of a mere firebrand? So long as the brand blazed and the fire remained in it, just so long Meleager lived and throve, but as the brand lost its strength, he too wasted from grief and despondency, and when the fire went out he died and was gone.

  THE SIXTY-EIGHTH DISCOURSE: ON OPINION

  ΠΕΡΙ ΔΟΞΗΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΣ.

  THE SIXTY-EIGHTH DISCOURSE: ON OPINION

  In this Discourse Dio once more approaches the subject of opinion as contrasted with knowledge. Here, however, he is stressing the practical utility of knowledge in one’s daily life and business pursuits, in other words, the impossibility of achieving success in any walk of life when led by mere opinion rather than by a clear understanding of the things to be avoided or attempted and of the reasons on which one’s choice should be based. Although some attention is paid to the unwisdom of following the opinion of one’s neighbours, the principal emphasis is laid upon the necessity in each instance of substituting knowledge for one’s own untutored opinions.

  [1] Οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ὁπόσα ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ζηλοῦσιν, οὐδὲν αὐτῶν εἰδότες ὁποῖόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἥντινα ἔχει ὠφέλειαν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, ἀλλ̓ ὑπὸ δόξης ἢ ἡδονῆς ἢ συνηθείας ἀγόμενοι πρὸς αὐτά. [p. 172] οὐδ̓ αὖ ὅσων ἀπέχονται καὶ εὐλαβοῦνται μὴ πράττειν, εἰδότες ἃ βλάπτει ἀπέχονται οὐδὲ ὁποίαν τινὰ φέρει τὴν βλάβην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ὅσα ὁρῶσι τοὺς ἄλλους εὐλαβουμένους ἢ περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰς ἔθος καταστῶσιν ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι, ἢ ἃ νομίζουσιν ἀηδῆ ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ πόνον τινὰ δοκεῖ ἔχειν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ταῦτα ὑποπτεύουσιν.

  The Sixty-eighth Discourse: On Opinion

  Most men in all their pursuits and interests follow them in utter ignorance of what the nature of each is or even what practical value each has; instead, th
ey are drawn to them by opinion or pleasure or habit. Nor, on the other hand, in the case of those pursuits and interests from which they abstain and which they avoid engaging in, do they abstain because they know which are harmful or what is the nature of the harm which they entail; instead, in these matters too, whatever they observe that their neighbours avoid or things which it has become their custom to avoid or which they suppose will be unpleasant for themselves and are reputed to be accompanied by some pain, these things they generally view with misgiving.

  [2] καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ πόνου πᾶσι κοινόν: ἀλλ̓ οἱ μὲν ἧττον, οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπ̓ αὐτῶν δουλοῦνται: τὸ δὲ τῆς δόξης ἀνόμοιον καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸ πᾶσιν. ὅθεν οἱ μὲν ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ψέγουσι, πολλάκις τἀναντία. οἷον ἀλγεῖ μὲν ὅ τε Ἰνδὸς καὶ ὁ Λάκων τιτρωσκόμενος ἢ καόμενος καὶ ὅ τε Φρὺξ καὶ ὁ Λυδός: ἀλλ̓ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐχ ὑπείκουσι διὰ τὸ ἠσκηκέναι, οὗτοι δὲ, διὰ τὸ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀνάσκητοι εἶναι. πάλιν ἥδεσθαι μὲν ἀφροδισίοις καὶ σιτίοις καὶ ποτοῖς ἡδέσιν ἀνάγκη τόν τε Ἴωνα καὶ τὸν Θετταλὸν καὶ τὸν Ἰταλιώτην καὶ τὸν Γέτην καὶ τὸν Ἰνδὸν καὶ τὸν Σπαρτιάτην: ἀλλ̓ οἱ μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι φροντίζουσι τῶν ἡδέων, ἀρχὴν δὲ οὐδὲ πειρῶνται ἁπάντων: οἱ δὲ ἀποθανεῖν ἕλοιντ̓ ἂν