Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [5] Dio. Again, given two persons, one of whom says he intends to sail immediately and will gain much profit from trading, although he has not provided himself with either ship or sailors, has no cargo whatever, but, in fact, never goes near the harbour at all, or even the sea; whereas the other occupies himself constantly with these matters, examining thoroughly a boat and putting on board a pilot and a cargo — which of the two will you say is seriously interested in trading? The one who says he is, or the one who works at it and provides himself with all that the voyage and the business of trading demand?

  Int. I should say the latter.

  [6] καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐμπορίας; — Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτον. — Δ. Ἐπὶ παντὶ ἄρα τὸν μὲν λόγον, εἰ καθ̓ αὑτὸν λέγοιτο, μηδενὸς ἔργου προσόντος, ἄκυρον ἡγήσῃ καὶ οὐ πιστόν: τὸ δ̓ ἔργον αὐτὸ πιστόν τε καὶ ἀληθές, ἐὰν καὶ μὴ προάγῃ λόγος; — Οὕτως. — Δ. Πότερον οὖν γεωργίας ἐστί τινα ἔργα καὶ παρασκευὴ καὶ ναυτιλίας καὶ ἄλλα τῷ κυνηγέτῃ προσήκοντα καὶ τῷ ἀστρονόμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι, φιλοσοφίας δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν οἰκεῖον ἔργον οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ παρασκευή;

  [6] Dio. In every matter, then, will you consider that the word alone, unaccompanied by any act, is invalid and untrustworthy, but that the act alone is both trustworthy and true, even if no word precedes it?

  Int. Just so.

  Dio. Well then, if there are certain functions and articles of equipment peculiar to farming or to seafaring and different ones appropriate to the hunter, the astronomer, and all other professions as well, then has philosophy no function peculiar to itself, no activity, no equipment?

  Int. Most assuredly it has.

  [7] — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Δ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἄδηλα τὰ προσήκοντα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐμπόρων καὶ γεωργῶν καὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ἀστρονόμων καὶ ὧν νῦν δὴ εἶπον ἔκδηλα καὶ φανερά; — Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. — Δ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ λόγοι τινές εἰσιν, ὧν δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀκούειν, καὶ μαθήματα, ἃ δεῖ μανθάνειν, καὶ δίαιτα, ἣν δεῖ διαιτᾶσθαι, καὶ καθόλου βίος ἄλλος μὲν τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος, ἄλλος δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων: ὁ μὲν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ φρόνησιν τείνων καὶ θεῶν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ θεραπείαν [p. 180] τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς, μακρὰν ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἀπάτης καὶ τρυφῆς,

  [7] Dio. Well, are those things obscure which belong to the philosopher and to philosophy, while those which belong to the traders and farmers and musicians and astronomers and those whom I have just named are conspicuous and manifest?

  Int. No, I think not obscure.

  Dio. But surely there are certain words which one who goes in for philosophy must hear, and studies which he must pursue, and a regimen to which he must adhere, and, in a word, one kind of life belongs to the philosopher and another to the majority of mankind: the one tends toward truth and wisdom and toward care and cultivation of the gods, and, as regards one’s own soul, far from false pretence and deceit and luxury, toward frugality and sobriety.

  [8] εὐτέλειάν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην — καὶ γὰρ στολὴ ἑτέρα μὲν τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος, ἑτέρα δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ κατάκλισις καὶ γυμνάσια καὶ λουτρὰ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη δίαιτα, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ τὸν χρώμενον τούτοις δεῖ νομίζειν ὡς φιλοσοφίᾳ προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν: τὸν δὲ ἐν μηδενὶ τούτων διαφέροντα μηδὲ ὅλως ἕτερον ὄντα τῶν πολλῶν οὐχ ἕνα ἐκείνων θετέον, κἂν μυριάκις εἴπῃ τε καὶ ἐπαγγείληται φιλοσοφεῖν ἐναντίον τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων ἢ Μεγαρέων ἢ παρὰ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῦσιν: ἀλλ̓ ὠστέον τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰς τοὺς ἀλαζόνας καὶ ἀνοήτους καὶ τρυφερούς.

  [8] And, in fact, there is one kind of dress for the philosopher and another for the layman, and the same holds good as to table manners and gymnasia and baths and the mode of living generally, and he who is guided by and employs these distinctions must be thought to be devoted to philosophy; whereas he who does not differ in any of these matters and is not at all unlike the world in general must not be classified as a philosopher, not even if he says he is a thousand times and makes public profession of philosophy before the popular assembly of Athens or of Megara or in the presence of the kings of Sparta; instead, we must banish this man to the company of impostors and fools and voluptuaries.

  [9] καίτοι μουσικὸν μὲν οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἷναι μὴ πράττοντα τὰ τοῦ μουσικοῦ: ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ οὐκ ἀναγκάζει ἀεὶ προσέχειν αὑτῇ τὸν νοῦν καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖσθαι περὶ πλείονος: καὶ ἀστρονόμον ὄντα οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει τρέφειν ἀλεκτρυόνας ἢ κυβεύειν: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀστρονομία ἐμποδών ἐστι τὸ μὴ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν: καὶ νὴ Δία ἱππικὸν γενόμενον ἢ κυβερνήτην ἀγαθὸν ἢ γεωμέτρην ἢ γράμματα εἰδότα οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἢ παρὰ ταῖς ἑταίραις ἢ ταῖς αὐλητρίσιν ὁρᾶσθαι: τὸ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι οὐδὲν ποιεῖ βελτίω

  [9] And yet it is not impossible to be musical without engaging in musical activities; for the art of music does not compel one to devote his attention to it and to regard nothing else of greater moment. Again, if one is an astronomer, possibly nothing prevents his keeping game-cocks or throwing dice; for in no wise does astronomy prevent his doing what is not right! Furthermore, by Heaven, if one has become an expert horseman, or a good pilot, or a surveyor, or a literary critic, it is nothing surprising that he should be seen in the apartments of either the courtesans or the flute-girls. For the knowledge of those skills does not make the human soul one whit better or turn it aside from its errors;

  [10] τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν οὐδὲ ἀποτρέπει τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων: φιλοσοφίᾳ δὲ προσέχων τις καὶ μετασχὼν τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀποσταίη τῶν βελτίστων, οὐδὲ τούτων ἀμελήσας αἰσχρόν τι καὶ φαῦλον προέλοιτ̓ ἂν πράττειν οὐδὲ ἀργεῖν καὶ ὀψοφαγεῖν καὶ μεθύσκεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ταῦτα μὴ θαυμάζειν καὶ τὴν τούτων ἐπιθυμίαν ἐξαιρεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοὐναντίον εἰς μῖσος αὐτῶν καὶ κατάγνωσιν προάγει φιλοσοφία ἐστί. τὸ δέ γε φῆσαι φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι καὶ αὑτὸν ἐξαπατῆσαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει. [p. 181]

  [10] but if one is devoted to philosophy and partakes of this study, one could never desert the highest things, nor, neglecting these things, could he prefer to engage in anything which is shameful and low, or to be lazy and gluttonous and drunken. For to refuse to admire these things and to banish the desire for them from the soul and on the other hand, to lead the soul to hate and condemn them, is the essence o
f philosophy. However, possibly there is nothing to prevent one’s claiming to be a philosopher and at the same time playing the impostor and deceiving himself and everybody else.

  THE SEVENTY-FIRST DISCOURSE: ON THE PHILOSOPHER

  ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥ.

  THE SEVENTY-FIRST DISCOURSE: ON THE PHILOSOPHER

  In this Discourse Dio examines the statement that “the philosopher should be remarkable in everything.” As examples of versatility he considers Hippias of Elis, the well-known sophist, and Odysseus, each of whom exhibited a high degree of skill in both intellectual and manual pursuits. While admitting their claim to excellence, Dio maintains that the philosopher should be able to excel all men above all in “acting, or not acting, advantageously, and in knowing when to act and where and the right moment better than the craftsman, and also in knowing what is possible of achievement.” This dictum (§ 6) is illustrated by reference to Daedalus and other skilled artificers, who failed of real excellence because they were ignorant in just those respects. The Discourse concludes with a sarcastic allusion to Nero’s varied ambitions.

  [1] Εἰσὶν οἵ φασι δεῖν πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν εἷναι περιττὸν τὸν φιλόσοφον: καὶ ὁμιλῆσαι ἀνθρώποις φασὶ δεῖν εἶναι δεινότατον καὶ μηδέποτε σιγᾶν μηδὲ ἀπορεῖν λόγων τοιούτων πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας, οἳ δυνήσονται τέρπειν αὐτούς: εἰ δὲ μή, φασὶν ἰδιώτην εἶναι τὸν μὴ παρεσκευασμένον οὕτως καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξιον. ἐγὼ δέ φημι τὰ μὲν

  The Seventy-first Discourse: On the Philosopher

  There are those who say that the philosopher should be remarkable in everything in any surroundings; moreover, they say that he should be very able in conversation with men and never keep silent or be at a loss before those in his company for lack of such language as will be capable of pleasing them; otherwise, they say, he who is not thus equipped is an ignoramus and worth but little. But I say that, though some of their statements are just and truthful, some are not.

  [2] δίκαια καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν αὐτούς, τὰ δὲ οὔ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν πανταχοῦ τὸν φιλόσοφον τῶν ἄλλων δοκοῦσιν ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν: πλὴν εἰ μή γε καὶ τὰς τέχνας φασὶ δεῖν αὐτὸν ἁπάσας εἰδέναι καὶ βέλτιον κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἅπαντα ποιεῖν τῶν δημιουργῶν, οἰκίας τε οἰκοδομούμενον καὶ πλοῖα ναυπηγούμενον καὶ χαλκεύοντα καὶ ὑφαίνοντα καὶ γεωργοῦντα: ὥσπερ ὁ Ἠλεῖος Ἱππίας ἠξίου σοφώτατος εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐ μόνον ποιήματα παντοδαπὰ καὶ λόγους αὑτοῦ ποικίλους προφέρων Ὀλυμπίασί τε καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πανηγύρεσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἐπιδεικνὺς ἔργα, τόν τε δακτύλιον καὶ τὴν λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὴν ζώνην, ὡς ἅπαντα πεποιηκὼς αὐτός, οἷον ἀπαρχὰς τῆς σοφίας τοῖς Ἕλλησιν

  [2] For that the philosopher should in every situation be superior to all others, it seems to me they are right in demanding — unless they mean that he must not only know all the crafts but also, in accordance with the rules of the craft, produce everything better than the craftsmen, both building houses and making boats and working as a smith and weaving and farming. For example, Hippias of Elis claimed to be the wisest of the Greeks, for both at the Olympic Games and at the other national gatherings of the Greeks he produced poems of every style and speeches which he had composed of divers kinds, but he also displayed other products of his — his ring, his oil-flask and strigil, his mantle, and his girdle — boasting that he had made them all himself, displaying them to the Greeks as a kind of firstfruits of his wisdom.

  [3] ἐπιδεικνύων. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος Ὀδυσσέα πεποίηκεν οὐ μόνον γνώμῃ διαφέροντα καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι περὶ πραγμάτων βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λέγειν δεινότατον ἔν τε πλήθει καὶ πρὸς ὀλίγους καὶ πρὸς ἕνα, καὶ νὴ Δία γε ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ πότον καὶ εἰ τύχοι μετά τινος βαδίζων ὁδόν, καὶ πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ πρὸς ἰδιώτην, καὶ πρὸς ἐλεύθερον καὶ πρὸς δοῦλον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔνδοξον ὄντα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ αὖ πάλιν ἀγνοούμενον καὶ πτωχόν, καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα τε ὁμοίως καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ κόρην, ἔτι δὲ μάχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁπάντων ἔμπειρον, τεκτονικῆς καὶ οἰκοδομίας

  [3] And Homer too, I venture to remark, has represented Odysseus, not merely as pre-eminent and judgement and in his ability to plan concerning practical matters, not merely as a most able speaker, whether in a crowd or before a few or before only one person — yes, by Heaven, both in assembly and over the wine-cups and on occasions when walking with somebody on a journey — whether in the presence of king or of commoner, freeman or slave, no matter whether he was himself held in honour and recognized as king or, on the other hand, unknown and a beggar, and, moreover, alike when addressing either man or woman or maiden; but he also makes him pre-eminent for his knowledge of the art of combat, and he has even represented him as skilled in all such crafts as those of the joiner, the carpenter, and the shipwright.

  [4] καὶ ναυπηγικῆς. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ λέχος ἐποίησεν ἀποκόψας [p. 182] τόν γε τῆς ἐλαίας θαλλόν, εἰ μὴ τεκτονικῆς ἐπιστήμων ἦν; πῶς δ̓ ἂν περιέβαλε τὸν θάλαμον, εἰ μὴ καὶ οἰκοδομῆσαι ἠπίστατο; πῶς δ̓ ἂν εἰργάσατο τὴν σχεδίαν οὐκ ὢν ἔμπειρος ναυπηγίας; τὰ δὲ περὶ φυτείαν καὶ γεωργίαν εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἐσπουδακὼς φαίνεται παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς δένδρα αἰτῶν καὶ ἀμπέλους: ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς γεωργοῦ ὄντος πάνυ ἐπιμελοῦς τε καὶ ἐμπείρου εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὸν ταῦτα μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅπου γε καὶ προκαλεῖται τὸν Εὐρύμαχον καὶ ἀμῆσαι καὶ ἀρόσαι. ἀλλά φησι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔμπειρος εἶναι, μαγειρικῆς τε καὶ οἰνοχοΐας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἁπάσης

  [4] For instance, how could Odysseus have constructed his bed by cutting off the trunk of an olive tree if he were not acquainted with the joiner’s art? How could he have enclosed his bed-chamber if he had not been acquainted with the builder’s art? How could he have built his raft if he had not understood ship-building? As for the operations connected with planting and husbandry, he obviously had shown a serious interest in all that from his very boyhood, since he begged his father for trees and vines; and especially, since his father was a very careful and experienced farmer, it was to be expected that Odysseus would not be ignorant of these matters, yes, he even challenges Eurymachus to a contest in both reaping and ploughing. Why, Odysseus claims to be acquainted also with such matters as cookery and wine-serving and all other departments of domestic service, matters wherein he says that those of lower rank serve the nobles.

  [5] διακονίας, ἅ φησι τοὺς χείρονας τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διακονεῖσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἴσως Ἱππίας καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς δεινὼ ἤστην: ἐγὼ δέ
φημι τὸν φιλόσοφον τὰς μὲν τέχνας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι πάσας εἰδέναι ῾χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ μίαν ἀκριβῶς ἐργάσασθαἰ ποιῆσαι δ̓ ἂν ἅπαντα βέλτιον ὅ,τι ἄν τύχῃ ποιῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας, ἂν ἄρα ἀναγκασθῇ ποτε ἅψασθαι τοιούτου τινός, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην διαφέροντα — τοῦτο γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε, τοῦ τέκτονος τὸν ἰδιώτην ἄμεινον ποιῆσαί τι κατὰ τὴν τεκτονικὴν ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ τὸν οὐκ ὄντα γεωργίας ἔμπειρον ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τι τῶν γεωργικῶν

  [5] Very well, in these respects no doubt Hippias and Odysseus were a clever pair; but I say that the philosopher, while unable to know every one of the crafts — for it is difficult to be thoroughly proficient in the practice of even one — nevertheless could do everything, no matter what he might be doing, better than anybody else, even though from the point of view of the crafts, if he really is ever compelled to tackle anything of that nature, he is not superior when measured by the standard of craftsmanship. For this is an impossibility, that the layman should produce anything better than the joiner by the standard of the joiner’s craft, or that one who lacks experience in farming should be found more expert than the farmer in performing any of the tasks of the farmer.