Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [10] Now with what purpose have I rehearsed these matters? Surely not because I was making you the object of such admonition, or because I aimed to dissuade you from being true to a trust. For I should be far worse than Zethus was if I subjected you to such criticism, for he admonished his brother because he did not deem it fitting for him to devote himself to the pursuit of wisdom or to waste time on music to the neglect of his own affairs; and he said that his brother was introducing an absurd and unprofitable Muse. Just as if perchance some one were to say that you too had chosen that sort of occupation, not one of idleness or of drunkenness by any means, and yet one involving neglect of your own estate quite possibly; and, by Zeus, he might even recite this line:

  Wherefore an empty house shall be thy home.

  THE SEVENTY-FOURTH DISCOURSE: ON DISTRUST

  ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΙΣΤΙΑΣ.

  THE SEVENTY-FOURTH DISCOURSE: ON DISTRUST

  This Discourse, as its title suggests, approaches the question of human relationships from a different angle from that observed in Or. . There the speaker was stressing the annoyances and misfortunes resulting from being trusted; here he produces a wealth of examples to show that it is dangerous to trust any one. That note of cynicism is maintained with remarkable consistency to the very end, and there is a ring of conviction about it all which suggests strongly that Dio is speaking out of the bitterness of his own heart. Arnim places the Discourse among those delivered during the period of Dio’s exile. Because the element of dialogue is found only at the very opening of the document, he infers that Dio was addressing a group of listeners, one of whom bore to the speaker a closer relationship and therefore was helpful in launching the discussion. The abruptness with which the Discourse opens and closes is held to indicate, as in some other instances, that our text has been separated from its original setting, or possibly that the reporter chose only this much for preservation.

  [1] Δ. Ἐπίστασαί τινας ἤδη βλαβέντας ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν; — Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — Δ. Τί δέ; ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ συγγενῶν τινων, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔγγιστα, ἀδελφῶν ἢ υἱῶν ἢ πατέρων; — Ἔγωγε πολλούς. — Δ. Τίς οὖν ἡ αἰτία, δἰ ἣν οὐ μόνον οἱ ἐχθροὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀδικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ λεγόμενοι φίλοι ἀλλήλους καὶ νὴ Δία πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν οὕτως ἀναγκαίων; — Δῆλον ὡς ἡ κακία τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὑφ̓ ἧς ἕκαστος οἶμαι καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν αὑτῷ βλαβερός. — Δ. Πάντας ἄρα δεῖ τοὺς φίλους ἐπ̓ ἴσης φυλάττεσθαι καὶ μὴ πιστεύειν μηδὲν μᾶλλον, κἂν φίλος ἢ συνήθης ἢ πρὸς αἵματος εἶναι δοκῇ; — Πάντας, ὡς ὁ λόγος οὗτός φησιν. — Δ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ἔγραψεν ὁ τοῦτο γράψας τὸ ἔπος: νᾶφε καὶ μέμνας᾿ ἀπιστεῖν: ἄρθρα ταῦτα τᾶν φρενῶν; [p. 193]

  The Seventy-fourth Discourse: On Distrust

  Dio. Are you aware that in the past there have been persons who have been harmed by enemies?

  Interlocutor. Why, of course.

  Dio. Well then, have they been harmed by so-called friends and close acquaintances, or even by certain kinsmen, some even by the very closest, brothers or sons or fathers?

  Int. Yes indeed, many have been.

  Dio. What is the reason, then, that not only do enemies injure their enemies but also the so-called friends injure one another, and, by Heaven, that many even of those who are so closely related act so?

  Int. Clearly the reason is found in the depravity of mankind, because of which each, I imagine, is also himself harmful to himself.

  Dio. Toward all men, then, one should be equally on his guard, and not be one whit more trustful even if a person is held to be a friend or a close acquaintance or a blood-relative?

  Int. Toward all, as this statement of yours declares.

  Dio. Then was the author of this verse right when he wrote,

  Keep sober and remember to distrust;

  These are the joints essential to the mind?

  [2] — Ἴσως ὀρδῶς. — Δ. Καὶ μὴν δῆλος ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ταῦτα ὑποτιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς νομιζομένους φίλους. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑφ̓ ὧν τις μισούμενος ἐπίσταται, τούτοις ἂν ἐξουσίαν δοίη καθ̓ αὑτοῦ. πῶς ἂν οὖν διακελεύοιτο ἀπιστεῖν, οἷς μηδεὶς πιστεύει; φέρε τοίνυν κἀκεῖνο ἴδωμεν: ὑπὸ τίνων πλείους ἀπολώλασι, πότερον ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἐχθρῶν ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι φίλων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὁρῶ καὶ τῶν πόλεων τῶν ἁλουσῶν πλείονας ὑπὸ τῶν προδοτῶν ἀπολομένας ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων εἰλημμένας κατὰ κράτος καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείους τῷ παντὶ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς συνήθεσιν ἐγκαλοῦντας τῶν αἰτιωμένων

  [2] Int. Probably he was.

  Dio. Furthermore, manifestly the poet is giving this advice, not to his enemies, but rather to those whom he considers friends. For surely those by whom one knows himself to be hated would not entrust with power against himself. How, then, could the poet be urging those to be distrusted whom he does not himself trust?

  Well, then, let us consider the following question also. By whom have more persons been ruined — by those who are admittedly enemies, or, on the contrary, by those who profess to be friends? As for myself, I observe that of the cities which have been captured those which have been destroyed by traitors are more numerous than those which have been forcibly seized by the foe, and also that with human beings those who lodge complaints against their friends and close acquaintances are altogether more numerous than those who blame their enemies for their misfortunes;

  [3] τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς: ἔτι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους ἅπασι τείχη καὶ φρούρια κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τούτων ἐνίοτε πολλῶν ἐτῶν μηδεμίαν χρείαν γενομένην: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς συμπολιτευομένους καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κοινωνοῦντας: ἱερῶν καὶ θυσιῶν καὶ γάμων καὶ φυλέτας ὄντας ἀλλήλων καὶ δημότας καὶ συγγενεῖς τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα. καὶ ταῦτα οὐδέποτε ἠρεμεῖ. μεσταὶ γοῦν αἱ πόλεις αἰεὶ κατηγορούντων, ἀπολογουμένων, δικαζόντων, δικαζομένων, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς ἱερομηνίαις ἢ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἀλλήλων ἀπέχεσθαι δύνανται. τίθενται γοῦν ἑτέρους νόμους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ τούτους ἱεροὺς καλοῦσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄνομα ὠφελοῦν. ὁ γὰρ τῆς κακίας πόλεμος διηνεκὴς ἅπασι πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἄσπονδος ὢν καὶ ἀκήρυκτος: μάλιστα δὲ οὗτος συνέστηκε τοῖς ἐγγὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

  [3] and, furthermore, that whereas against the foe walls and fortresses have been provided for all — though sometimes no use has been made of these for many years — yet against their fellow citizens, against men who have a common share in the same sanctuaries and sacrifices and marriage rites, men who are fellow tribesmen with one another, fellow dem
esmen and kinsmen, the courts, the laws, and the magistracies have been provided. Furthermore, these institutions are never idle. At any rate the cities are always crowded with plaintiffs and defendants, with juries and litigants, and not even during their solemn festivals or in times of truce can men keep their hands off one another. At least they pass special laws regarding crimes committed during festivals, and they call these “holy laws,” as if the name did any good! Yes, the war against depravity is unremitting for all against all, a war without truce and without herald;

  [4] τὸν μὲν οὖν ἐν εἰρήνῃ βουλόμενον βιοῦν καὶ μετ̓ ἀσφαλείας τινὸς εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους κοινωνίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐπίστασθαι τῶν πολλῶν ἑτοίμην οὖσαν πρὸς τὸ μεταδοῦναι κακίας τινός, καὶ μηδὲ ἂν μυριάκις λέγῃ φίλος εἶναι πιστεύειν. οἰ γάρ ἐστι παῤ αὐτοῖς βέβαιον οὐθὲν οὐδὲ ἀληθές: ἀλλ̓ ὃν ἂν ἁπάντων προτιμῶσιν ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, ἐὰν οὕτω τύχῃ, μετὰ μικρὸν [p. 194] ἔχθιστον νομίζουσι καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπέχονται πολλάκις.

  [4] but above all this war is joined between those who are close to one another.

  Accordingly those who wish to live at peace and with some degree of security must beware of fellowship with human beings, must recognize that the average man is by nature prone to let others have a share in any evil, and that, no matter if one claims a thousand times to be a friend, he is not to be trusted. For with human beings there is no constancy or truthfulness at all; on the contrary, any man whom at the moment they prize above everything, even, it may be, above life itself, after a brief interval they deem their bitterest foe, and often they cannot refrain even from attacking his body.

  [5] ὁ γοῦν ἐραστὴς τὸν ἐρώμενον ἀποσφάττει διὰ τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν, ὡς οἴεται, παροξυνθεὶς ἐκ τῆς τυχούσης αἰτίας. ἕτεροι δ̓ ἑαυτοὺς ἀποκτιννύασιν, οἱ μὲν ἄκοντες δἰ ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δὲ ἑκόντες, μηδενὸς ὄντος αὐτοῖς ἀτόπου κατὰ τὸν βίον ἢ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς μοχθηρίας. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλας βλάβας τὰς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἑκάστου δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐπεξελθεῖν ἔστιν. ποία δὴ πίστις πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ἢ τίς ἀσφάλεια; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐμὲ ἀγαπήσειεν ὁ μηδ̓ αὑτὸν ἀγαπῶν; τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ῥηθέν, ὅτε ἐν ἐσχάτοις ὄντες ἠξίουν τι περὶ Σάμου, καλῶς ἂν οἶμαι λεχθείη πρὸς τοὺς φιλίαν ὑπερχομένους τῶν φαύλων: ὃς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὐ φιλεῖ, πῶς ἄλλον φιλεῖ, ἢ ξένον ἢ τέκνον ἢ ἀδελφόν;

  [5] For example, the lover slays his beloved because he loves him too much, as he imagines, but really because he has become enraged over some trivial matter. Others slay themselves, some involuntarily because of incontinence, and some voluntarily, since there is nothing in their life more extraordinary than their innate depravity. But enough of this, for the other injuries which each inflicts upon himself it obviously is impossible to examine in detail.

  Then what kind of trust can one have in dealing with men like these, or what assurance? Or how could a person love me who does not love even himself? For the reply which was made to the Athenians on the occasion when, being in dire straits, they made some request concerning Samos, might well, I think, be made to those low persons who try to worm their way into one’s friendship: “If one does not love himself, how can he love another, whether stranger or son or brother?”

  [6] τί οὖν, ὅταν τις φιλοφρονῆται καὶ καθ̓ ἱερῶν ὀμνύῃ καὶ μόνον οὐ κατατέμνειν αὑτὸν ᾖ πρόθυμος; ἀκούειν μὲν ἤδη τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νὴ Δία ἴσως κατανεύειν: εἰδέναι μέντοι σαφῶς ὅτι μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἰσχυρόν. Ἠλέκτρα τὸν Ὀρέστην δακρύοντα ὁρῶσα καὶ προσαγόμενον αὐτήν, τότε μὲν ᾤετο ἄνεσίν τινα αὐτῷ γεγονέναι, τοῦ μέντοι παντάπασι πιστεύειν πολὺ ἀπεῖχεν. ὁρῶσα γοῦν μετ̓ ὀλίγον παρακινοῦντά φησιν, οἴμοι, κασίγνητ̓, ὄμμα σὸν ταράσσεται, ταχὺς δὲ μετέθου.

  [6] What, then, must one do when some one makes a show of friendship, takes a solemn oath at the altar, and is almost eager to butcher himself there? He must listen, of course, immediately, and, by Zeus, possibly nod assent; yet at the same time be quite certain that not one of his protestations is valid. For example, when Electra beheld Orestes weeping and striving to draw her to him, at the moment she supposed that he had experienced some abatement of his madness, and yet she was far from trusting him entirely. At any rate shortly afterward, seeing him sore distraught, she exclaimed,

  Ah me, dear brother, how confused thy glance,

  How swiftly though hast changed!

  [7] τὴν θάλασσαν οὕτως ἠρεμοῦσαν πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἔστιν, ὥστ̓ οἶμαι καὶ τὸν δειλότατον καταφρονῆσαι. τί οὖν; διὰ τοῦτο πιστεύειν δεῖ καὶ μήτε ἀγκύρας ἔχοντα μήτε πηδάλιον μήτε τἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν ἀνάγεσθαί ποτε; ὄψει γάρ, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, μετ̓ ὀλίγον κατερείσαντος ἀνέμου κλύδωνα ἰσχυρὸν καὶ κύματα τροφόεντα, πελώρια ἶσα ὄρεσσι, κυρτὰ φαληριόωντα: [p. 195] καὶ τὸν νῦν σοι φαινόμενον πρᾷον καὶ πολλὴν ἐνδεικνύμενον εὔνοιαν καὶ σπουδὴν τῆς τυχούσης αἰτίας καταλαβούσης ἄγριον εὑρήσεις

  [7] Again, one may often behold the sea so calm that, methinks, even the most timid would scorn it. What then? On that account should one have faith in it, and with neither anchors nor rudder nor all the other aids to safety put to sea? Nay, if Fortune so decrees, presently a gale will swoop down upon you and you will behold a mighty surge and

  Enormous billows, huge as mountains are,

  Curling and topped with foam;

  and the man who but now seems to you gentle and who makes much display of kindliness and zeal, when some chance occasion overtakes him you will find is savage and harsh and ready to work any and every mischief.

  [8] καὶ χαλεπὸν καὶ πᾶν ὁτιοῦν κακὸν ἕτοιμον ἐργάσασθαι. πόσα δοκεῖς τὴν Μήδειαν εὔξασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν τέκνων ἢ ποσάκις ἀγωνιᾶσαι νοσούντων ἢ ποσάκις ἀντ̓ ἐκείνων αὐτὴν ἂν ἑλέσθαι τελευτᾶν; ἀλλ̓ ὅμως αὐτόχειρ αὐτῶν ἐγένετο. νὴ Δία, ἐρεῖ τις, ὀργιζομένη καὶ ζηλοτυποῦσα. τοὺς πολλοὺς δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἴει καὶ ζηλοτυπῆσαι; τί δέ; φθονῆσαι; τί δέ; ἐλπίσαι; σχεδὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν τούτοις εἰσίν. μὴ τοίνυν πίστευε τοῖς εὐνοεῖν φάσκουσι καὶ μηδέποτε ἂν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν τὴν πρὸς σὲ φιλίαν. ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ τὸν ἄνεμον σημαίνουσαι ταινίαι κατὰ τὴν στάσιν αἰεὶ τοῦ πνεύματος αἰωροῦνται, νυνὶ μὲν οὕτως, πάλιν δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἡ τῶν φαύλω�
� διάνοια πρὸς πᾶσαν

  [8] How many prayers do you suppose Medeia offered to the gods in behalf of her children, or how many times did she suffer agony when they were ill, or how often would she have chosen to give her own life in their stead? Yet she became their murderer. “Aye, by Zeus,” someone will say, “in a fit of anger and jealousy.” But do you not suppose that most of mankind could also become jealous, envious, apprehensive? Why, one might almost say that they are always and unceasingly in the grip of these emotions. Do not, therefore, trust those who say that they feel kindly toward you and that they never would abandon their affection for you. For just as the streamers which mark the breeze always flutter according to the quarter from which it blows, now in this direction and now in the opposite direction, in the same way the mood of the common herd shifts in response to each and every emotion.

  [9] φορὰν οὕτως ἔχει. τοῖς δούλοις οὐδεὶς πιστεύει συντιθεμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ κυρίους ἑαυτῶν εἶναι: πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐ χρὴ προσέχειν ταῖς τῶν τοιούτων ὁμολογίαις. τῷ παντὶ γὰρ πλεῖον ἀπέχουσι τῆς ἐλευθερίας διὰ τὴν κακίαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. τοῖς νεωτέροις τοσούτων ἐτῶν νόμος οὐκ ἐᾷ συμβάλλειν ὡς ἀπίστοις οὖσιν, οὐδὲ γυναικὶ παῤ Ἀθηναίοις συναλλάσσειν πλὴν ἄχρι μεδίμνου κριθῶν, διὰ τὸ τῆς γνώμης ἀσθενές. τῶν μέντοι πάνυ νέων οὐθὲν διαφέρουσιν οἱ φαῦλοι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν παιδαρίων, πλὴν τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ τῇ πανουργίᾳ: διὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς άπιστεῖν ἐκείνων

  [9] Nobody trusts slaves when they make an agreement, for the reason that they are not their own masters; far more should one pay no heed to the agreements of such persons as I am describing. For in every respect human beings, because of their depravity, are farther removed from a state of freedom. The law does not permit one to make a contract with persons younger than a specified age on the ground that they are untrustworthy, nor, at Athens, may one have business dealings with a woman except to the extent of a measure of barley because of the weakness of female judgement. In fact, ordinary persons are no better than the very young, or rather than even the little boys, except in their bodily strength and their rascality; consequently they deserve to be distrusted more than those others.