Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  [21] But the case is not so simple; for it is not the brother as such or the kinsman or the stranger who is by nature prone to do wrong, but rather the wicked man; but wickedness is found in almost all; aye, if you have good judgement, beware of all. A stranger? Beware. A fair and moderate man, he says? Beware still more. Let this principle be inviolate. “Yes,” you counter, “but he shows the kindly disposition of a man of courtesy.” Very well, accept him, with gratitude to the gods — or, so please you, to him as well — yet for the future you must watch him. For what some one has said about Fortune might much rather be said about human beings, namely, that no one knows about any one whether he will remain as he is until the morrow.

  [22] διαμενεῖ τοιοῦτος. τὰς γοῦν πρὸς αὑτοὺς παραβαίνουσι συνθήκας καὶ συμβουλεύουσιν αὑτοῖς ἕτερα, καὶ ἄλλα συμφέρειν νομίζοντες ἄλλα πράττουσιν. ὅθεν ὅταν τις ἐκ τοῦ πιστεύειν περιπέσῃ τινὶ τῶν δυσκόλων, γελοῖός ἐστιν αἰτιώμενος ἐκεῖνον, ἑαυτὸν δέον, καὶ θεοὺς ἐνίοτε ἐπιβοώμενος, ὑπ̓ ἀνδρὸς ἀπατηθεὶς φίλου καὶ συνήθους. [p. 200] οἱ δὲ θεοὶ καταγελῶσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἑαυτὸν ἐξηπάτησεν ἐπ̓ ἄλλῳ ποιησάμενος. οἱ προσπταίοντες ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἢ νὴ Δία ἐμπεσόντες εἰς πηλὸν ἢ βόθρον οὐκ ὀργίζονται τοῖς λίθοις ἢ τῷ πηλῷ: τελέως γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν ἀπόπληκτοι, δέον αὑτοὺς αἰτιᾶσθαι

  [22] At any rate, men do violate the compacts made with each other and give each other different advice and, believing one course to be expedient, actually pursue another. Thus it comes to pass that when a man, through trusting another, gets involved with one of those troublesome fellows, he makes himself ridiculous if he lays the blame on him when he should blame himself, and if he now and then cries out against the gods, when it is a man by whom he has been duped, a friend and close acquaintance. But the gods laugh at him, knowing as they do that he had duped himself by putting himself in another’s power. Those who stumble on the street or, by Zeus, fall into a mud-puddle or a pit are not angry at the stones or at the mud; for they would be absolutely crazy if they did, seeing that they ought to blame themselves and their heedlessness.

  [23] καὶ τὸ μὴ προσέχειν. τί οὖν; φήσει τις, δεῖ θηρίου βίον προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ζῆν ἔρημον; οὐ θηρίου, ἀλλ̓ ἀνδρὸς φρονίμου καὶ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς ἐπισταμένου. πολὺ γὰρ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ κρείττων ἡ ἐρημία τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους κοινωνίας, ἐὰν ἀδεῶς γίγνηται καὶ χωρὶς κοινῶν προσοχῆς. ὥσπερ οἶμαι τοῖς πλέουσι τὸ πέλαγος συμφέρει μᾶλλον τῆς γῆς, εἰ μή τις ἐν εὐδίᾳ πλέοι καὶ σαφῶς εἰδὼς τοὺς τόπους: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ πελάγει σπάνιον εἴ που διεφθάρη ναῦς, πρὸς δὲ ταῖς ἀκταῖς καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄκρας

  [23] “What!” some one will say, “must we choose the existence of a wild beast and live a solitary life?” No, not that of a wild beast, but rather that of a prudent man and of one who knows how to live in safety. For far safer and better is solitude than association with mankind, if only solitude be found apart from fear and devoid of solicitude for things of common interest. Just as, in my opinion, for persons making a voyage the open sea is more to their advantage than the coast, unless one be sailing in fair weather and be well acquainted with the region; for in the open sea rarely, if ever, is a ship wrecked, but it is close to the shores and near the capes that the wreckage may be seen.

  [24] ἰδεῖν ἔστι τὰ ναυάγια. τοιγαροῦν, ὅταν χειμὼν καταλάβῃ, τῶν μὲν ἀπείρων ἕκαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῆς γῆς, ὁ δὲ κυβερνήτης ὡς πορρωτάτω φεύγει. καίτοι λιμένας μὲν εὕροι τις ἂν ἀκλύστους, οἷς ἔνεστι πιστεύσαντας ἀσφαλῶς ὁρμεῖν, ἡλίκον ἄν ποτε ἀρθῇ τὸ πνεῦμα: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ μετριώτατοι τοῖς θερινοῖς ὅρμοις ἐοίκασιν, οἵτινες πρὸς τὸ παρὸν σκέπουσι: κἀκείνων γὰρ ἕκαστος πρὸς ἕν τι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιεικής, οὐ μέντοι καὶ πρὸς τἄλλα ὑπάρχει. χρημάτων μὲν γὰρ ἕνεκεν οὐδέν σε ἀδικήσειεν ἄν: ἔστω γὰρ εἶναί τινα τοιοῦτον: ἀλλὰ τάχ̓ ἂν ὀργῆς ἢ φιλοτιμίας καταλαβούσης οὐκ ἂν ἐπιγνοίης αὐτὸν ἀσάλευτον καὶ πιστόν: ἄλλος ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πάθους κινούμενον, ἐφ̓ ᾧ τις ἂν πιστεῦσαι βεβαίως

  [24] Therefore, when storm overtakes a ship, though every landlubber longs for the land, the skipper flees from it as far as possible. Yet havens free from billows can be found, trusting which men may safely ride at anchor, however high the gale may rise. But with human beings, the most temperate are like our summer anchorages, which afford shelter for the moment only; for with men of that type also the individual is a reasonable person with regard to some one of life’s problems, but with regard to the rest he is not. In money matters, for instance, he might never wrong you — granted, of course, that a man of that sort exists — but let a fit of rage or jealous rivalry seize him and you would perhaps not find him unshaken and trustworthy.

  [25] δύναιτο. οὐκοῦν τοῖς γε τοιούτοις ὅσον ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης καὶ τελέως ὀλίγον δεῖ χρῆσθαι, τὸ πλέον αὐτὸν ἐγρηγορότα καὶ φυλάττοντα, ὡς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὸν Ἕκτορά φησιν ὁ ποιητής: ὁ δὲ ἰδρείῃ πολέμοιο ἀσπίδι ταυρείῃ κεκαλυμμένος εὐρέας ὤμους σκέπτετ̓ ὀϊστῶν τε ῥοῖζον καὶ δοῦπον ἀκόντων [p. 201] ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ βίῳ δεῖ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην προβεβλημένους καὶ καλυφθέντας αὐτῇ φεύγειν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κακίαν καὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλάς, αἷς

  [25] Accordingly, one should have dealings with such persons only in so far as one is compelled to do so and extremely little at that, what is more, keeping wide awake one’s self and on guard, as the poet says of the Achaeans and Hector,

  But he, experienced in war, with shield

  Of ox-hide covered his shoulders broad and watched

  The whir of arrows and the thud of darts.

  Similarly in our life we must employ prudence and understanding as a shield and, covered by it, flee and guard against men’s villainy and the tricks and plots which they are wont to use.

  [26] εἰώθασι χρῆσθαι. καθόλου δὲ θαυμαστόν, εἰ τὸ μὲν φαγεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τραπέζης ἐμποδὼν ἔσται τῇ πονηρίᾳ καὶ νὴ Δία τὸ πιεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κρατῆρος καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν λύχνον ὁρᾶν: τὸ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον βλέπειν τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τρέφεσθαι γῆς οὐδεὶς ὑπολογίζεται τῶν πονηρῶν: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πανδοκεῖον ἢ νὴ Δία οἶκος ἕτερος ἐκ λίθων καὶ ξύλων ᾠκοδομημένος συγκίρνησιν ἀνθρώπους καὶ δύναται συνάγειν εἰς φιλίαν, ὥσπερ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀξιοῖ: αἰδε
ῖσθαι δὲ μέλαθρον: ὑπωρόφιοι δέ τοί εἰμεν. οὕτως ἡγεῖται τὴν σκηνὴν ἀξιωτέραν αἰδοῦς, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ ξύλων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ γεγονυῖαν, ἤπερ αὐτούς. ὁ δὲ σύμπας οὐρανός, ὑφ̓ ᾧ πάντες ἐσμὲν ἀρχῆθεν, οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν οὐδὲ ἡ τῶν ὅλων κοινωνία θείων οὖσα καὶ μεγάλων, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον

  [26] But, speaking generally, it would be surprising if eating from the same table were to prove a bar to villainy, and, forsooth, drinking from the same mixing-bowl and seeing the same lamp, when, on the other hand, seeing the same sun and being nourished by the same earth does not enter into the reckoning of any rogue; why, the tavern or, by Zeus, any other house made of stones and timbers mixes human beings together and can bring them together in friendship, just as Odysseus thinks is proper:

  Respect the house; we’re underneath thy roof.

  Thus he thinks that the hut — a hut, too, built of wood grown on hostile soil — is worthier of respect than the men themselves. Yet the whole sky, beneath which we all have been from the beginning, is of no avail toward producing concord, neither is our partnership in the universe, a partnership in things divine and majestic, but only, on the contrary, our partnership in things which are petty and worthless.

  [27] ἡ τῶν μικρῶν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ἑκάστῳ πατήρ, πολλάκις οὐδενὸς ἄξιος πρεσβύτης, μέγα δίκαιον, ὥστε μὴ ἐπιβουλεύειν ἀλλήλοις τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους: ὁ δὲ κοινὸς ἁπάντων ,ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τἐ, ἐξ οὗ πάντες γεγόναμεν, οὐ κατὰ Λάχητα ὢν οὐδὲ κατὰ Σίμωνα, οὐ δύναται κατασχεῖν οὐδὲ κωλῦσαι τὴν ἀδικίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἂν πιστεύοι τις τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς φιλίας, τοῦτο γὰρ λοιπόν ἐστι, φανερὸν

  [27] Again, every man’s own father — often an ineffectual old man — is a great force for righteousness to prevent those of the same family from plotting against each other; while the common father of all, of “both men and gods,” he from whom we all have our being, not a creature such as Laches or Simon, cannot check or prevent the unrighteousness of men! Indeed, that one could not trust mere words about friendship — for this is the only point remaining — is no doubt clear.

  [28] δήπου. γελοῖον γὰρ ἀργύριον μὲν δανείζοντα τοῖς πέλας μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τινα πιστεῦσαι λόγῳ μόνῳ, ἀλλὰ μαρτύρων δεῖσθαι καὶ γραμμάτων καὶ πολλοὺς καὶ ταῦτα παραβαίνειν. τί οὖν; φησίν, οὐκ ἤδη τινὲς ἐγένοντο φίλοι τῶν πρότερον; οἷον πᾶς ἂν λέγοι τοὺς ἡμιθέους θρυλουμένους τούτους, Ὀρέστην καὶ Πυλάδην καὶ Θησέα καὶ Πειρίθουν καὶ Ἀχιλλέα καὶ Πάτροκλον; εἰ δ̓ οὖν τις συγχωρήσειεν ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι ταύτην, δῆλον ὡς τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν φιλίαι γεγονυῖαι ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ, ἐν ὅσῳ πλεονάκις ἂν εἴποι τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλελοιπέναι. [p. 202]

  [28] For it is absurd that, when lending money to one’s neighbours, no one would lightly put faith in word alone, but instead requires witnesses and writings — and many do violence to even these — [and, on the other hand, that the mere profession of friendship should suffice].

  “What!” somebody objects, “did not the men of former times have any friends? For instance, what would you say of these demigods that are on the lips of all: Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Peirithoüs, Achilles and Patroclus?” Well, if one were to admit that the popular belief about these is true, there would be three friendships that had occurred in a period of time so extensive that in it one could say that the sun had gone into an eclipse quite a number of times.

  THE SEVENTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON LAW

  ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΜΟΥ.

  THE SEVENTY-FIFTH DISCOURSE: ON LAW

  On stylistic grounds this Discourse has been assigned to the sophistic period of Dio’s career. It is an encomium such as is familiar in sophistic literature, and it exhibits both the merits and the defects of that form of composition. Careful attention is paid to matters of detail connected with rhetorical effect, but one misses the note of sincere conviction to be found in many other writings of our author.

  The topic chosen for eulogy is νόμος. As is well known, that word covers a wide range, meaning at one time usage sanctified by long tradition, at another divine ordinance, and at another statutory law. Dio treats all three varieties impartially, passing lightly from one to another and back again. The opening phrase, ἔστι δέ, suggests that our Discourse was preceded by an introductory composition no longer extant.

  [1] Ἔστι δὲ ὁ νόμος τοῦ βίου μὲν ἡγεμών, τῶν πόλεων δὲ ἐπιστάτης κοινός, τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων κανὼν δίκαιος, πρὸς ὃν ἕκαστον ἀπευθύνειν δεῖ τὸν αὑτοῦ τρόπον: εἰ δὲ μή, σκολιὸς ἔσται καὶ πονηρός. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον φυλάττοντες ἔχονται τῆς σωτηρίας: οἱ δὲ παραβαίνοντες πρῶτον μὲν αὑτοὺς ἀπολλύουσιν, ἔπειτα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, παράδειγμα καὶ ζῆλον αὐτοῖς ἀνομίας καὶ βίας παρέχοντες. ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν πλεόντων οἱ τοῦ πυρσοῦ μὴ διαμαρτάνοντες, οὗτοι μάλιστα σῴζονται καὶ τοὺς λιμένας εὑρίσκουσιν, οὕτως οἱ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ζῶντες ἀσφαλέστατα πορεύονται διὰ τοῦ βίου καὶ

  The Seventy-fifth Discourse: On Law

  The law is for life a guide, for cities an impartial overseer, and for the conduct of affairs a true and just straight-edge by which each must keep straight his own conduct; otherwise he will be crooked and corrupt. Accordingly, those who strictly observe the law have firm hold on safety; while those who transgress it destroy first of all themselves and then their fellows too, providing them with an example and pattern of lawlessness and violence. Yes, just as at sea those who do not miss the beacon are most likely to come through with their lives and to find their havens, so those who live according to the law journey through life with maximum security and reach the right destination.

  [2] τῆς καταγωγῆς τῆς δεούσης τυγχάνουσιν. ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν οὖν ἤδη τις συμβούλῳ χρησάμενος μετενόησεν, οὐ μέντοι νόμῳ. τοσούτῳ δὲ τῶν τειχῶν ταῖς πόλεσι χρησιμώτερός ἐστιν, ὥστε ἀτείχιστοι μὲν πολλαὶ τῶν πόλεων διαμένουσι, νόμου δὲ χωρὶς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμίαν οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δὲ συμφέρει τοῖς θνητοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς. ὁ γοῦν κόσμος ἀεὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον ἀκίνητον φυλάττει καὶ τῶν αἰωνίων οὐδὲν ἂν παραβαίη τοῦτον. ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ βασιλεὺς εἰκότως ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν κέκληται, τὴν μὲν βίαν καταλύων, τὴν δὲ ὕβριν καθαιρῶν, τὴν δὲ ἄνοιαν σωφρονίζων, τὴν δὲ κακίαν κολάζων, ἰδίᾳ δὲ καὶ κοινῇ πάντας τοὺς δεομένους ὠφελῶν, τοῖς μὲν ἀδικουμένοις βοηθῶν, τοῖς δὲ ἀπορουμένοι�
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  [2] There have been, it is true, instances in which one who has used a human being as counsellor has done so to his sorrow, but not so with the law. So much more serviceable is it for our cities than their walls that many of them still remain unwalled, but without law no city can be administered.

  But the law is of advantage not only to mortals, but to the gods as well. At any rate the universe always preserves the same law inviolate, and nothing which is eternal may transgress it. It is for that reason, methinks, that the law has appropriately been called “king of men and gods”; for law does away with violence, puts down insolence, reproves folly, chastises wickedness, and in private and public relations helps all who are in need, succouring the victims of injustice, and to those who are perplexed about a course of action making known what is their duty.

  [3] τινος μηνύων τὸ δέον. ὅταν γάρ τις συμβάντος τινὸς αὐτῷ δυσκόλου πράγματος ζητῇ τὸ συμφέρον, οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖ φίλους παρακαλεῖν καλεῖν οὐδὲ συγγενεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐλθόντα παρὰ τοὺς νόμους πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ οἰκεῖον σκοπῶν χεῖρον ἐκείνῳ παραινέσειεν οὐδὲ ἀγνοήσας τὸ βέλτιον οὐδὲ δἰ ἀσχολίαν τινὰ ἢ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν τοὺς σκεπτομένους παραιτήσαιτ̓ ἄν. τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἁπάντων ὁμοίως κήδεται καὶ σχολὴν ἄγει πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα καὶ