Bitter Harvest

by Ian Smith

  Finance Minister Wrathall was able to give me an encouraging picture early in the New Year, 1969. Our national production was up, and development in industry and housing was outstripping the availability of materials. Because of sanctions, we were exporting at a discount and importing at a premium and obviously this was skimming some of the cream off the top, but because of the extra effort Rhodesians, both black and white, were contributing, our balance of payments was under control and, most important of all, the morale of the people was high.

  We looked on with interest at the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference taking place in London from 7 January 1969, and enjoyed the spicy reports which were emanating from it in profusion. Indira Gandhi stated that India was contemplating withdrawing from the Commonwealth, as it was no longer credible. Lee Kwan Yew (Prime Minister of Singapore) expressed his deepening disenchantment with the Commonwealth. Ayub Khan expressed desperation, and it was not long before Pakistan was out of the Commonwealth. Sub-Saharan Africa, as usual, was in chaos. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were one-party dictatorships and were busy expelling Asians in spite of the fact that they had been born locally. Kaunda had been in power in Zambia only for a short while, and although he had so far resisted the establishment of a de jure one-party state, he achieved the same result de facto. Nigeria was in the midst of a violent civil war and a number of other west African countries had eliminated all opposition.

  When the media representatives in London enquired whether all of these violations of human rights in Africa would come under scrutiny at the conference, there was a simple, clear cut reply: ‘The internal affairs of member countries have always been protected from discussion.’ Yet the internal affairs of Rhodesia were the principal item on the agenda.

  Wilson, with his usual sleight of hand, evaded all obstacles and seemed to have satisfied the Afro-Asian bloc by assuring them that NIBMAR (No Independence Before African Majority Rule) was still Britain’s policy — the fact that the Fearless proposals had thrown it out of the window seemed to have evaded everybody. Moreover, when speaking in the Commons soon after all the prime ministers had returned home, he reiterated that the Fearless proposals remained on the table

  It was difficult for anyone who followed the proceedings to treat the conference seriously, and I made the comment that ‘one could not have any respect for people who had jettisoned democracy and all the basic freedoms and standards of decency that the Commonwealth once stood for and fought for’. I was not alone in these views, as some of our black MPs spoke about the Commonwealth in equally scathing terms. The leader of the opposition in our Parliament, Percy Mkudu, a man highly respected by all shades of opinion, visited the OAU conference in Dar es Salaam to put the case for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, because it was the black people who were suffering and being killed by the terrorists. He was told that unless he committed himself to supporting the terrorist movement he would not be allowed to address the conference, so he returned to Salisbury immediately.

  I got on well with Mkudu and we had many constructive discussions. He saw clearly the need for evolutionary change and recognised the important part played by the Chiefs and the tribal structure. He also openly conceded the tremendous advances which the black people were making, with many of them enjoying a standard of life superior to that of a large number of whites. He also assured me that he and his colleagues were well aware of the rampant corruption and denial of human rights in most of the countries to our north, and supported our resolve to prevent the same thing happening in Rhodesia. In my turn I appreciated the need for him to steer a middle course, because if he were seen to be too close to our government, he would be branded a stooge of the white man. It was not only the OAU who supported the extremists and terrorists to the exclusion of everyone else, it was the same with the British government, who had scorned our attempts to bring in the Chiefs and the moderate, responsible black people. They were not thinking of a solution which would serve the best interests of Rhodesia, they were mainly concerned with appeasing their friends in the OAU.

  Our biggest problem was to get Britain and the rest of the free world to understand Africa. Let me repeat that, to my reasoning, the true Africa is sub-Saharan Africa. Our problem was to bring these Africans across, to try to bridge a 2,000-year gap in the shortest possible time. Clearly this was an evolutionary process, and from our experience on the spot we were satisfied that we were making good progress with it. The evidence emanating from the break-up of the Federation proved conclusively how much more we had done for the advancement of our black people than the British had done in the two colonies to our north. We had enough intelligence to understand that it was in the best interest of all Rhodesians, white as well as black, to ensure the progress of our people in the fields of education, health, housing and economic well-being. The results were there for anybody to witness, with the development of a middle class, and a growing number of black people joining the ranks of the wealthy, owning modern houses and employing their own servants, whereas a few decades previously they themselves had been the servants. But it took time, planning, professional services and finance to bring about the necessary improvements, and if people tried to run before they could walk, they invariably tripped. Africa to our north is a glaring example of this simple truth, bankrupt and in chaos as it is, because what should have been an evolutionary process was allowed to run riot and develop into a revolution. Contrary to professed communist philosophy, it has led to the establishment of Marxist-Leninist dictators who live like kings while their subjects degenerate into poverty, malnutrition and an end to their freedom.

  Fortunately the majority of our black people had been alarmed by these tragic developments, and were happy to work with us to prevent the same happening in our country, but our attempts were being undermined by Harold Wilson and the British Labour Party. What made it so contemptible to me was that I well knew from my contact and discussions with them that many of the Labour Party had the intelligence and awareness to comprehend our predicament, but they were taking the easy way out by appeasing the excessive demands of the OAU, instead of confronting them with their record of one-party dictatorships and blatant abuse of power.

  These were the people who were now holding us to ransom. What more, we wondered and asked, were we expected to do? Not only overseas visitors, but those who came on a mission seeking evidence, including a number of British MPs, conceded how much more we had done for our black people than had been done in all the surrounding countries. We had provided better schools, better hospitals, better houses, better recreation facilities, and a higher standard of living. We also had peace, which was exceptional and almost unique in the world, and a declining crime rate. Yet the UN, with the support of both Britain and the USA, had passed a resolution declaring that Rhodesia was a ‘threat to world peace’. As the historian Kenneth Young said in his book Rhodesia and Independence:

  After four years of struggle it appeared that Britain had come off worst in her war against her tiny adversary with its puny budget, its midget exports and its miniature army, civil service, police and air force. But the spirit and courage that made Britain great were not extinct; they had emigrated.

  13

  The Home–Smith

  Agreement, 1972

  So as we moved into 1969 it was clear that Wilson and the Labour Party had decided to shelve the Rhodesian question and concentrate on their home front, where their problems seemed to be getting out of control. The time was approaching when they would have to face up to a general election.

  I mentioned to Humphrey Gibbs that he should once again point out to Wilson that we had solved the main problem of agreeing on the new constitution, achieving what most people had believed to be the impossible, and that this was going to be thrown overboard because of Wilson’s insistence on a ridiculous procedure of returning to legality in an attempt to exact retribution. When so much was at stake, this was unbelievable pettiness, in conflict with the spirit of reconciliation that
we had all agreed would be necessary if we were to secure a just settlement. If Wilson was prepared to allow his blatant appeasement of the OAU to be the rock on which all our efforts would now founder, this would be a dreadful indictment of him personally, and the Labour Party in general. Gibbs accepted that it would be worth trying, but judging by their record he was ‘not sanguine’. It seemed that our best bet was to hope for a Conservative victory at the next British election.

  We now had more time to concentrate on our own affairs and the finalisation of our new constitution. This introduced the original concept of representation in Parliament proportional to contribution to the fisc. If the UN operated on such a principle, there would be a lot more wisdom and justice emanating from its headquarters! The flaw in our plan was that it was based on a racial division. This was introduced into Rhodesia for the first time in our 1961 constitution, and was the principal cause of my break with the government at that time. Prior to that, there had been no racial division in our franchise qualification, and it was my strong belief that we should perpetuate the principle and continue our philosophy of trying to establish a genuine meritocracy in keeping with Rhodes’s famous dictum: ‘Equal rights for all civilised men’. However, once racial division was introduced — and of course it had also been part of the Federal constitution in 1952 — it was accepted as an easy means of providing a short-term solution to black political aspirations.

  Thus my requests for a return to the old system of a non-racial qualified franchise were always rebuffed on the spurious ground that it would take too long for our black people to make any impact in Parliament. So we were caught up in a situation which — regrettably to my mind — had entrenched a political racial division into our constitution. Had we attempted to remove it now it would have been interpreted as prejudicial to our black people. When I queried the inclusion in the new constitution of a clause which could fairly be interpreted as moving it to the right, the answer was that it would give us room for manoeuvre when we next talked to the British. I was reminded of the occasion when we were negotiating with Harold Wilson and his team, and at the end of a long day of talks, Gerald Clarke said that the British chaps had commented to him that what they found disconcerting was that, once I stated my position, they were unable to get me to move. According to them there had to be give and take in negotiation. They were prepared to follow this rule, but there was no response from us. Of course, as I have pointed out before there was a logical reason for this: we were dealing with the future of our country, and decisions which would effect the lives of our citizens.

  One of the more controversial proposals of the constitutional committee was that Rhodesia should become a republic. This was no easy decision for many of us who from birth had been ingrained with the ideals of the British Empire. It had, however, become increasingly difficult for us to separate monarch and Empire from the deviousness of the politicians. Wilson went so far, later, as to drag the Queen into his machinations by getting her to include in a speech at the Jamaica Commonwealth conference in April 1975 some provocative remarks about Rhodesia which were a distortion of the truth. This caused a large number of our older generation of loyal citizens to become extremely angry, tearing up their pictures of the Royal Family, and pulling down their Union Jacks. Some remarked that if only her father or grandfather had been alive, Wilson would have been put in his place, but it was no easy task for the young Queen.

  The new constitution was duly brought in, followed by the proclamation of a republic, on 1 March 1970. Soon afterwards, on 10 April, a general election resulted in the Rhodesian Front winning all fifty ‘A’ roll seats for the second successive time since UDI.

  This phenomenon of a party winning every seat in an election aroused the curiosity of a number of political analysts, and we had visits from many overseas historians and scientists to investigate whether it was genuinely a free election, or whether it was the normal African affair of one man, one vote, one candidate. They were pleasantly surprised to find that there was no suggestion of malpractice from any quarter. Moreover, we had achieved our victories in spite of the fact that the only national daily newspaper in the country had consistently opposed our government, and used their monopoly to direct a constant stream of British-inspired criticism against us. I met a number of these visitors and explained the reasons for this incredible unity among Rhodesians, telling them how even our erstwhile opponents were appalled at the hypocrisy and double standards of the British and other free world governments, and that this applied to our black as well as our white people.

  Of great significance, however, was that, contrary to predictions, the Conservatives won the British general election a few months later, in June, and while the new Prime Minister Edward Heath was absorbed with Europe and the movement towards a Common Market, the Rhodesian question was left in the capable hands of the Foreign Secretary, Alec Home, who had both experience of and a feeling for our problem. Once again the good offices of Sir Max Aitken and Lord Goodman were invoked. We had lengthy discussions in Salisbury from early April 1971, and when the decks were sufficiently cleared to the satisfaction of Lord Goodman and the British officials who accompanied him, Alec Home flew out on 15 November, accompanied by Attorney General Peter Rawlinson and Dennis Greenhill, who was the top civil servant in the Foreign Office. The negotiations went on for some time and, after give and take on both sides, we signed an agreement on 21 November 1971.

  I realised that it would not receive the approval of the extreme right wing of the Rhodesian Front, but likewise the left-wingers — who had always opposed us — would be unhappy. But that certainly did not worry me, because our history had consistently shown that the great majority of Rhodesians fell within that middle group of reasonable, responsible people who opposed extremists whether they were left or right. The problem with an extremist is that he tends to provoke another extremist in the opposite direction, with the divergent factions constantly trying to outdo one another, thus driving themselves deeper into the trough of unreasonableness and bitterness.

  As far as our agreement was concerned, we could honestly claim to have produced one which complied with the principles which had been laid down by previous British governments and to which we had never taken exception. There was to be an immediate increase in black representation in Parliament, and the principle of majority rule was enshrined with safeguards ensuring that there could be no legislation which could impede this. On the other hand, there would be no mad rush into one man one vote with the resultant corruption, nepotism, chaos, and economic disaster which we had witnessed in all the countries around us. Fortunately, reports from all corners of the country indicated that there was general satisfaction and relief over the agreement. Not only were the white people happy, but of significance was a report that in Highfield, just outside Salisbury, which had always been the centre of black political activity, the people were openly celebrating. The obvious truth was that the Rhodesians had endured enough, and tragically our black people had suffered most from both sanctions and terrorism. After six years we could now shake off the shackles of sanctions and work together to build up the economy of our country and improve the standard of living of all our people. Once again, here was conclusive evidence that there was no truth in the claim that the Rhodesian Front government was attempting to impede the process to majority rule in order to maintain control in white hands — quite the reverse.

  There remained, however, the test of acceptability among the Rhodesian people as a whole, and on the evidence before us we were satisfied that it would receive approval, although, as we had always stated, it would be impossible to obtain an honest assessment from our black people, since the vast majority of them had never exercised a vote in their lives, could neither read nor write, did not understand the meaning of the word ‘constitution’, and were completely bemused by all the talking and manoeuvring going on around them. The danger was that the communist-motivated extremists would mount an anti-campaign, resorting to emoti
onal tactics and mob-psychology, and the very effective weapon of intimidation. But our experts in this field believed that intimidation would have only a limited effect, especially in the big cities, because the people still held strong memories of the dreadful atrocities, in particular the petrol bombings, perpetrated by the terrorists over recent years. It was important to avoid procrastination in order to minimise the time that the opponents to the agreement would have to mount their evil plans.

  Alec Home agreed with us on this point, and undertook to expedite the appointment of the commission to carry out the test of acceptability. I was happy that we now had something positive in prospect, and that everyone was working towards it. Probably above everything else was the hope that it would bring to an end the useless fighting and killing between Rhodesians. It would get them working together to build their wonderful country, and to create a better future for all their people. People would recognise that at last decisions affecting our future would be in our own hands, free from the outside interference of the scheming politicians who had used us mercilessly as a pawn in their efforts to gain favour and support on the chessboard of international politics. Neither side could claim complete victory, and this would have the advantage of bringing opposing sides together with a minimum of rancour and revenge seeking, but sharing hope for genuine reconciliation.